What this covers

Robin Feldman, a law professor at UC Hastings College of the Law, sits down with Russ Roberts to examine why prescription drug prices remain stubbornly high despite a system ostensibly designed to reward innovation and enable competition. Feldman traces the problem to a structural misalignment: the Value vs Difference Standard means neither the Patent Office nor the FDA asks whether a drug actually delivers value—only whether it is different and safe—leaving no institutional actor checking whether the system produces genuine innovation or merely profitable tweaks. The conversation maps how drug companies exploit this gap, PBMs, insurers, and government rules conspire to block cheaper competitors, leaving patients and taxpayers to cover the cost.

The discussion moves through several distinct mechanisms of exclusion. Drug makers concentrate on secondary patents—minor dosage adjustments, delivery tweaks, or combinations of existing drugs—because the R&D costs are negligible while the rewards are lavish; over three-quarters of newly patented drugs are existing ones recycled this way. Meanwhile, secret rebate deals between drug companies and PBMs create Volume-Based Exclusion: an incumbent can offer per-bottle payments that newer or generic competitors cannot match, locking them out of formulary lists and therefore out of patient reach entirely. The conversation surfaces real-world cases—Allergan's Restasis, Johnson & Johnson's Remicade—where litigation has exposed these bundled exclusions. Feldman also identifies perverse incentives baked into law itself, particularly the Percentage-Cap Perverse Incentive in the Affordable Care Act, which rewards insurers when drug costs rise. The episode concludes with Feldman's proposed remedy: One and Done, a single-protection-period model that would restore predictability and the possibility of timed competition.

Sharpest takeaway

Feldman argues that the patent and regulatory system lets drug companies extend monopolies through trivial 'secondary' tweaks and secret rebate deals with pharmacy benefit managers, blocking cheaper competitors and keeping drug prices high at the expense of patients and taxpayers.

  • Drug companies use secret volume rebates to PBMs to exclude lower-priced rivals from formularies
  • Over three-quarters of new drug patents cover existing drugs with minor tweaks rather than genuine innovation
  • Government rules (patents, FDA approval standards, ACA provisions) distort incentives so cheaper competition never gets a foothold

The argument · threads2 threads · 34 claims
0.85

Pharmaceutical market dysfunction stems from government and third-party distortions, not from free-market failure.

1 pointcentrality 5/5
  • The dysfunction in the pharmaceutical market is not evidence that free markets fail in health care, because the health care market is not a free market—it is distorted by third-party payers and government attempts to control the market through legislation, and the badly designed incentives, not an evil conspiracy, drive the players' behavior.

    “People all the time tell me, 'Well, we know free markets aren't good in health care,' because look how bad, say, pharmaceutical market is. Well, it's not a free market. It's distorted in all kinds of ways.”

0.71

Industry arguments minimizing drug spending ignore the genuine financial pain patients experience from rising costs.

1 pointcentrality 4/5
  • The industry argues drug spending is barely more than 10% of the health care bill and is not where the problem lies, so the system should be left alone—a defense Feldman opposes by pointing to the real pain patients feel from rising co-pays, co-insurance, and shrinking coverage.

    “Drugs--yes, they are expensive, but they are only a, you know, they are barely more than 10% of the Health Care Bill.”