secondary patents
Additional patents obtained for minor modifications (dosage, delivery, combination) of an existing drug to extend monopoly protection.
As defined in Robin Feldman on Drugs, Money, and Secret Handshakes
Where it comes up · 1
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- The intended drug system—innovation, reward, then competition driving prices down—has been distorted into innovation, reward, more reward, and less-valuable innovation, because the large development costs (often cited as a billion dollars) apply only to genuinely new drugs (under 20% of the market) while the other 80% are recycled existing drugs that don't carry those costs and aren't the innovation society wants.Robin Feldman on Drugs, Money, and Secret Handshakes
- Drug companies are incentivized to make secondary changes (like adjusting a drug's dosage) rather than inventing new drugs because the R&D investment for a tweak is far less than for initial development while the reward is lavish, and with marginal profit margins around 76% once a drug is in place, a therapeutically meaningless change still produces a large payoff.Robin Feldman on Drugs, Money, and Secret Handshakes
- More than three-quarters (78%) of drugs associated with new patents are not new drugs coming to market but existing ones, because companies begin with patent or non-patent exclusivity monopolies and repeatedly extend protection by piling on secondary patents, channeling innovation into recycling and repurposing rather than inventing genuinely new drugs.Robin Feldman on Drugs, Money, and Secret Handshakes
- Many secondary patents are minor dosage/delivery changes or combinations of existing medications: for example Treximet, a migraine drug combining an old migraine medicine with Naproxen that could be bought separately for about $10-15, cost over $800 for 9 pills—illustrating how trivially recombined drugs command extraordinary price premiums.Robin Feldman on Drugs, Money, and Secret Handshakes
- A drug tweak with genuine value should be rewarded by the market—if patients prefer a twice-daily over a thrice-daily pill, that preference will compensate the company—rather than by the government putting its thumb on the scale with extended monopoly protection, because the company should have already recouped its reward from the initial patent and the tweak required far less R&D.Robin Feldman on Drugs, Money, and Secret Handshakes
- The quickest, most direct fix is for Congress to amend the Patent Act so that minor tweaks and modifications are deemed 'obvious' in patent terms and therefore not patentable, since that is not what is meant by innovation, which would go a long way toward ending the market distortions.Robin Feldman on Drugs, Money, and Secret Handshakes