Peter Berkowitz on Locke, Liberty, and Liberalism
What this covers
Peter Berkowitz of Stanford's Hoover Institution joins Russ Roberts to defend John Locke and the classical liberal tradition against what he argues are systematic misreadings by critics Patrick Deneen and Yoram Hazony. Berkowitz contends that these critics conflate an extreme modern variant of liberalism—associated with left-progressive and post-modern thought—with the historical classical liberal project itself. The conversation moves across the philosophical foundations of liberalism, the political implications of natural freedom and equality, and what constitutes a proper response to the Enlightenment's genuine excesses.
The discussion unpacks several distinct misconceptions. Critics, Berkowitz argues, wrongly attribute to Locke the view that freedom means emancipation from all desire and constraint, when Lockean freedom) is narrower: the absence of subjection to another's will. A related misreading treats Locke's Second Treatise as a complete theory of human nature, when it deliberately addresses only the origins and extent of political power. Roberts raises the challenge that free-market thought has little to say about the human longing to belong to traditions and communities. Berkowitz counters that classical liberalism provides the best contemporary framework for protecting tradition, faith, and the larger questions about the soul—not by overthrowing Enlightenment premises but by replenishing them with classical Greek and biblical wisdom. The pair also examine the self-correcting power of liberal democracy, the knowledge problem that afflicts government allocation of goods, and why both progressive and conservative appeals to freedom remain within a shared modern vocabulary, even as they disagree sharply on the state's proper role.
Berkowitz argues that John Locke and the classical liberal tradition are systematically mischaracterized by critics like Deneen and Hazony, who conflate an extreme post-modern variant of liberalism with classical liberalism itself; the proper response to the Enlightenment's genuine excesses is to correct and replenish it using classical and biblical wisdom, not to overthrow it.
- Locke's claim that humans are 'by nature free and equal' refers to a narrow, profound political freedom (not being subject to another's will), not the emancipation of all desire from constraint.
- Locke's Second Treatise was a limited account of the origins and ends of political power, not a complete theory of human nature, so faulting liberalism for ignoring the soul misreads its scope.
- Liberal democracy's distinctive virtue is self-correction: it provides a framework in which better and dissenting views can be heard and adopted, including critiques of liberalism itself.
Critics misread Locke by conflating classical liberalism with far-left progressivism and wrongly attributing to him a theory of complete human nature rather than limited political philosophy.
- Deneen's and Hazony's misreadings stem from identifying an extreme variant of modern liberalism—Far Left Progressivism or Post-Modernism—with classical liberalism itself; while there is a genuine root within Locke's thought that can lead to contempt for tradition, the proper response is not to vilify Locke but to recover the fullness of his thinking.
“both Hazony and Deneen have identified an extreme variant of modern Liberalism with Classical Liberalism itself. One could call this Far Left Progressivism. One could even call it Post-Modernism.”
- The real objection to economics is not that it gives a partial view of the world—every framework does—but that too many economists for too long claimed it gave the complete picture; the analogous error with Locke is that readers ascribe to the Second Treatise a complete theory of human nature, when Locke deliberately confined it to the origins, extent, and ends of political power.
“It seems to me the objection--the objection to economics is not that economics gives us a partial view of the world. The problem is too many economists for too long claimed that it gave us the complete inadequate picture of the world.”
- Deneen and Hazony portray Lockean liberalism as devoted to emancipating human desire and liberating human beings from all constraint—especially tradition, custom, and religious faith—making Locke the father of solipsism, narcissism, hedonism, and rampant individualism; but this is a straw man, because Locke's premise that humans are by nature free and equal itself imposes definite limits on what we may do and which desires we may rightly satisfy.
“Both believe that John Locke's liberalism is devoted to 'emancipating human desire and liberating human beings from all constraint'. That's a near-paraphrase of some of Patrick Deneen's writings.”
- Lockean freedom is a narrow but profound concept: not being legitimately subject to the will of another person—meaning no one is born with a title to rule and no one is born with a duty to serve—and it is distinct from absolute or complete freedom (e.g., freedom from physical constraints or from social norms); critics of liberalism wrongly attribute the absolute sense to Locke.
“The kind of freedom that we have by nature is not being legitimately subject to the will of another person, or other groups of human beings... no human being is born with a title to rule over another, and no human being is born to serve another.”
- Both Patrick Deneen and Yoram Hazony treat John Locke as the great demon or villain of the modern world—the first philosopher of liberalism—and regard the entire liberal tradition as a disastrous wrong turn that humanity must understand and overcome in order to recover what happiness is possible in political life.
“both books, however, treat John Locke as the kind of great demon or great villain of the modern world.”
Locke defends the nation-state and grounds freedom in natural human equality, creating a normative standard for gradual reform while recognizing humans as inherently social and familial beings.
- Contrary to Hazony's framing of liberalism as hostile to nationalism, Locke is a defender of the nation-state: he believes the best vehicle for defending rights is a state to which people have consented, and since one cannot imagine viable consent to a universal state, Locke is in effect a friend of nationalism.
“Locke is a defender, though, of nation-state. He believes that the best vehicle for defending rights would be a state to which people have consented; since you can't really imagine viable consent to a universal state, he's a kind of friend of Nationalism, too.”
- Locke's claim that human beings are free and equal was deliberately qualified as 'by nature'; he recognized that in 17th-century reality people were not treated as free and equal (slavery, bondage, divine-right monarchy), and the formulation served as a normative standard against which a recalcitrant political reality could be measured and gradually reformed.
“I've been emphasizing as this Locke formulation by nature free and equal. In reality, human beings were not treated as free and equal: slavery, other forms of bondage, inequalities, even savage inequalities in society.”
- Deneen and Hazony read Locke's state-of-nature teaching as a vision of radically atomized individuals who are happiest outside political society and are not truly social and political animals, making Locke the antithesis of the Aristotelian and biblical view that humans are fundamentally social; but Berkowitz argues this misreads Locke, who, like the Bible, recognizes humans as both individuals with inherent dignity and creatures formed by and inseparable from their families and communities.
“John Locke is putting forward a vision of human beings that is radically atomized or individualistic: That human beings come into the world as individuals; they are most happy outside of political society, but need compels them to form political societies; but we are not really social and political animals.”
- Locke marks a seminal moment because, while not the first to discuss limited government or consent, he gave classical expression to a new way of thinking about politics: that the most important fact about human beings is that they are by nature free and equal, and that a legitimate political society must respect this freedom and equality—a basis distinct from the Bible's grounding of equality in being created in God's image, and from Greek thought's focus on virtue and human excellence.
“he gives seminal expression to a new way of thinking about politics, a way of thinking about politics that says: most important fact about human beings... is that we are by nature free and equal; and a legitimate political society must respect this freedom and this equality.”
Liberal democracy's self-correcting power—enabling dissenting voices and competing arguments on freedom and equality grounds—gives it inherent advantages over rival regimes.
- Those who advocate more regulation and redistribution invariably justify it in terms of freedom and equality—almost no one argues for intervention to achieve aristocracy or to empower their own clique—which shows that the appeal to genuine freedom and meaningful equality is the shared currency of the entire modern tradition of freedom.
“Very few people say, 'I want more regulation in order to achieve greater aristocracy.' Or, 'I want it to increase the power of my small clique or corner of the elite.' Almost always the arguments are in favor, are justified by an appeal by what's necessary to do to achieve true and genuine freedom, or meaningful equality.”
- What distinguishes liberal democracy and classical liberalism from rival regimes is that it provides a framework in which a variety of views and voices—including dissenting and better opinions—can be heard, and not merely tolerated but capable of persuading people toward the truer view; this gives liberal democracy self-correcting powers greater than any competitor, evidenced by the fact that the sweeping critiques of liberalism by Gray, Deneen, and Hazony could only be written, circulated, and judged within liberal democracies, which even allow critics to build sheltered communities living by their own beliefs.
“it provides a framework within which a variety of views and voices can be heard. Not just dissenting opinions, but better opinions than the ones that rein. And second, not just tolerates the expression of opinion, but can create a framework in which one can be persuaded by the better view... That gives Liberal Democracy, I believe, more than any of its competitors, self-correcting powers.”
- On every major social issue (safety net, tax rates, abortion, affirmative action, same-sex marriage, transgender rights), arguments in the name of freedom and equality can be made on both sides; Progressives focus on using government—the most powerful agency in society—to improve more Americans' enjoyment of rights and to better reflect shared equality, while Conservatives warn that giving government such power threatens freedom and equality more than the unreformed situation, and this enduring structure of debate, present since Burke criticized the French Revolutionaries, is exactly as it should be.
“this is the enduring structure of the debate; and I'll only add this for now: That's as it should be. That is the debate that, since Edmund Burke criticized the French Revolutionaries, has constituted the modern tradition of freedom.”
- The 'liberalism' worth defending is not the contemporary left-wing/progressive program of using government to regulate the economy and redistribute wealth, but the broader modern tradition of freedom that crystallized in late-17th-century England with Locke's Two Treatises, whose fundamental moral premise is that all human beings are by nature free and equal, and whose aims are to secure equal individual rights, rest government on consent, limit government, and rely on free markets and civil society.
“Its fundamental moral premise is that all human beings are by nature free and equal. It says that the task of government is to secure individual rights shared equally by all, rest government on the consent of the governed.”
Skepticism about government wisdom and moral integrity justifies limiting state power over religion, speech, wealth allocation, and other domains, though basic safety nets remain justified within classical liberalism.
- Just as nearly all of human history gives us reasonable skepticism that government can wisely determine true religious beliefs—since handing government that power tends to bring mischief and destruction—the same skepticism applies to government deciding what may be said or heard, and to government allocating goods and wealth, because there is no good reason to suppose the men and women who win or are appointed to office possess either the wisdom to make these complex decisions or the moral integrity to resist the corruptions of power.
“we have a reasonable skepticism about the ability of government to, let's say, allocate wisdom about religion. And that evidence comes from virtually all of human history.”
- Within the broad modern tradition of freedom, one can locate a person on the Right-Left spectrum by how much power they are willing to give the state to secure freedom and equality; conservatives favor a limited state and broad private sphere—not from confidence individuals always choose best, but from skepticism that government can choose better for them on balance and over the long haul.
“you can determine where a person falls within this broader tradition, modern tradition of freedom, by how much power they are willing to give the state for the purpose of securing freedom and equality.”
- A specific political class concentrated in elite universities—overwhelmingly secular and of the Left—mistakenly equates its own interests and perspective with the universal perspective and interests, despite being unrepresentative of an American population that is more religious and not predominantly leftist; this class's combination of confidence in its own abilities and strong desire to rule warrants suspicion about concentrating power in its hands.
“they warrant the kinds of suspicions that you entertain, and I do, as well, about what happens with great concentrations of power. Even if the original impulse is a noble impulse. But also, these people tend to equate both their interests and their perspective with the universal perspective, and universal interests. And that's just not so”
- Even Locke's austere framework justifies state intervention: he argues parents must educate children to prepare them for adult freedom, and that if a child is orphaned the state must step in to provide that education, because the state has an interest in ensuring every citizen is minimally capable of fending for himself; thus state intervention—including a basic social safety net, which Hayek endorsed—exists within classical liberalism, but it must remain as limited as possible because of the ever-present danger of government over-reach.
“we'd like that intervention to be as limited as possible, because we remain alert to the dangers of government, to the temptations of over-reach.”
The Enlightenment produced genuine progress mixed with real harms; the solution is correcting and elevating it with classical and biblical wisdom, not overthrowing it.
- The flowering of the Enlightenment in the 18th century was driven by multiple converging developments beyond Locke: the rise of modern science, British maritime exploration that exposed Europeans to humanity's diversity, and an increasingly intricate economy that created more opportunities for more human beings, all pushing toward recognition of natural human freedom and equality.
“the rise of modern science, the rise of British maritime cultures. Ships are sent to all over the world... discovering the variety and diversity of humanity; as the economy becomes more involved and more intricate, more opportunities are created for more human beings; more human beings become open to the idea of human equality.”
- Against both the extreme Pinker progressive view that things have only improved and the extreme Gray/Deneen view that humanity took a disastrous wrong turn, the truth is that some things have gotten better and some have worsened—there is no logical contradiction in this, and it is the very frequent condition of humanity; intellectual and political movements generally tend to excess, so it would be strange if the Enlightenment had none.
“I go out on the limb and say, 'Some things have gotten better, and some things have worsened.' And, there is not only no logical contradiction there... it seems to me that this is the very frequent condition of humanity.”
- Classical liberalism, far from being inconsistent with the larger questions about the soul, tradition, and God raised by Deneen and Hazony, provides within the contemporary world the best political framework to raise those questions—to honor tradition and to serve God as one deems best; the solution to the Enlightenment's genuine pressures on tradition and faith is not to overthrow the Enlightenment, which is inscribed in all modern souls, but to correct, replenish, and elevate it using classical Greek and biblical wisdom.
“both Hazony and Deneen have identified an extreme variant of modern Liberalism with Classical Liberalism itself. One could call this Far Left Progressivism. One could even call it Post-Modernism.”
State coercion through force differs fundamentally from social constraint, and prudent statesmen recognize that radical regime replacement risks worse catastrophe than accepting flawed existing orders.
- Plato and Aristotle both leveled devastating criticisms of democracy—understanding its premise as freedom and equality and judging it prone to immorality and fated to devolve into tyranny—yet neither repudiated it; both concluded one is unlikely to do much better than democracy (Aristotle favoring 'polity,' a mix of rule by the wealthy and rule by the people), because as prudent men they understood that revolutionary attempts to replace one regime with a radically different one tend to produce even worse catastrophe.
“Plato and Aristotle both put forward devastating criticisms of democracy... They thought that this form of political life was subject to all manner of immorality and viciousness. And that it was fated to devolve into tyranny.”
- Social norms, guilt, and public opinion genuinely constrain people's freedom—a point Locke and Tocqueville recognized—but this kind of unfreedom is distinct from, and not what, the state is designed to protect against; the state's role is to prevent coercion by the will of another through force or the threat of violence, not to liberate people from social pressure.
“We should not deny that social norms can rein us in, pin us down, shackle us... John Locke and Tocqueville a little bit earlier, are making this point about the power of public opinion, and social norms, to limit us.”