Second Treatise
The second part of Locke's Two Treatises of Government, which grounds legitimate political power in the natural freedom and equality of individuals and their consent, addressing the origins, extent, and ends of political power.
As defined in Peter Berkowitz on Locke, Liberty, and Liberalism
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- Even Locke's austere framework justifies state intervention: he argues parents must educate children to prepare them for adult freedom, and that if a child is orphaned the state must step in to provide that education, because the state has an interest in ensuring every citizen is minimally capable of fending for himself; thus state intervention—including a basic social safety net, which Hayek endorsed—exists within classical liberalism, but it must remain as limited as possible because of the ever-present danger of government over-reach.Peter Berkowitz on Locke, Liberty, and Liberalism
- The real objection to economics is not that it gives a partial view of the world—every framework does—but that too many economists for too long claimed it gave the complete picture; the analogous error with Locke is that readers ascribe to the Second Treatise a complete theory of human nature, when Locke deliberately confined it to the origins, extent, and ends of political power.Peter Berkowitz on Locke, Liberty, and Liberalism