What this covers

Russ Roberts delivers a monologue diagnosing the deterioration of political discourse not as the inevitable result of particular issues—immigration, or economic anxiety—but as a structural consequence of how the information market has evolved. The rise of cable and then the internet, especially personal smartphones, destroyed the old constraint that households had to compromise on shared programming. Now each person can customize their news to fit their preferences perfectly. Roberts argues this is not incidental to what we see: the market for information optimizes for [fit, comfort, and style](jargon:fit, comfort, and style) rather than truth, because there is no feedback mechanism. Unlike shoes, political beliefs do not hurt our feet if they are wrong. Skin in the game is minimal—most citizens implement almost none of their worldview and face almost none of the costs of holding false views—so the incentive to verify beliefs is tiny. Meanwhile, news outlets compete fiercely for attention, but their real competitors are not ideological opponents; CNN battles MSNBC for the same tribe. To win, each outlet must be louder, less nuanced, more entertaining, and readier to vilify the other side. Tribalism, ancient and likely hardwired, gets fed and indulged at a scale never before possible.

Roberts traces this as a market failure—individuals choosing what makes them feel good create negative externalities that harm others. Neither government regulation nor platform self-policing can solve it, because regulators and platforms face the same corrupted incentives and tribalism. He illustrates the problem with examples: the Deflategate survey showing Patriots fans in New England dismissing cheating claims that majorities elsewhere accepted; the story of Ignaz Semmelweis and hand-washing, ignored for decades because the truth was too painful; the observation that even empirical findings on minimum wage or immigration become mere window dressing for pre-existing beliefs. Roberts offers modest personal remedies—humility, following people you disagree with, resisting the pleasure of outrage—and suggests the only realistic hope lies in emergent cultural norms that reward thoughtfulness over tribal certainty, though he acknowledges no one knows how to deliberately create such norms. He does note that much of the transformation has been glorious for curious people, with unprecedented access to education and discovery.

Sharpest takeaway

Roberts argues that the deterioration of political discourse stems not from immigration or specific issues but from the transformation of the information market by cable and the internet, which lets people customize news to indulge their innate tribalism—optimizing for feeling good rather than discovering truth—and that neither government nor competition can fix this market failure, leaving cultural norms and individual behavior as the main remedies.

  • The competitive information market rewards outlets that are louder and more tribal because that attracts scarce attention, not because it improves truth-seeking
  • Citizens have almost no skin in the game, so their incentive to check whether their political views are true is tiny
  • Government and platform regulation cannot fix this because they face the same corrupted incentives, leaving humility and cultural norms as the realistic path

The argument · threads7 threads · 29 claims
0.85

Citizens face no real consequences for holding false political beliefs, eliminating feedback loops that normally correct error in markets.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • A Yelp-like solution to rate the truthfulness of news stories (as Elon Musk proposed) would fail because, unlike restaurants where we eat the food, we don't experience the consequences of our political views, so people would just indulge their tribalism—producing results like the Deflategate poll and the partisan ranting seen in comment sections.

    “That works okay with restaurants, where we eat the food. But we don't eat the political views that we hold. We don't know if our political food is really good or if it's actually poisoning us.”

  • The market for information uses the same fit-comfort-style logic as buying shoes, but unlike shoes that hurt your feet if they don't fit, there is no feedback loop for political views: because citizens have almost no skin in the game and barely any of their worldview is implemented, they bear none of the cost of holding false or harmful views and can always rationalize away bad outcomes in a complicated world.

    “But what's my incentive to get rid of the views or return the views or drop the views I hold that aren't true?”

  • If you consume only news that confirms your tribal identity and humiliates the other side, you not only stick to your views but hold them with much more enthusiasm and undeserved certainty—reading only the New York Times makes you confident Trump is a threat, watching only Fox News makes you confident he's a victim of conspiracy—and when tribalism trumps the search for truth, democracy struggles and political outcomes may oscillate more widely as the system's stabilizing inertia erodes.

    “if we only consume news that confirms our tribal identity, and that shows up, humiliates the tribes on the other side of the political fence, we will not only stick to our views, but we will stick to them with a lot more enthusiasm and undeserved certainty.”

  • The information ecosystem is a classic market failure with a negative externality: because individuals care about fit, comfort, and style rather than truth, their private news choices lead them to vote and hold views that hurt others, and the competition that normally self-regulates by serving customers is here part of the problem because firms profit by providing information customers want to hear even when it isn't true.

    “these are a classic case of what economists call a market failure. A situation where my private incentives lead to unattractive outcomes for others. You can call that a negative externality”

  • A survey found 75% of Americans thought Tom Brady was a cheater in Deflategate, but in exactly four states—Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island (Patriots country)—22% or fewer thought so, with Connecticut split at 55%, demonstrating that views on the matter were predicted by tribal sports allegiance rather than by evidence.

    “75% of the American people thought Tom Brady was a cheater. Seventy five percent. So, 3 out of 4.”

0.79

People naturally resist truth when it conflicts with self-image and tribal identity, preferring information that makes them feel good.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • As Adam Smith observed, man naturally desires not only to be loved but to be lovely—to be genuinely worthy of respect and admiration—which is why people like to believe they are truth-seekers even when they are not, because we resist thinking bad things about ourselves.

    “as Adam Smith said, 'Man naturally desires not only to be loved, but to be lovely.' And that is to be respected and admired, and to earn that respect and admiration and praise honestly.”

  • Most people have a tendency to read what makes them feel good about themselves, finding it hard to read things that challenge their preconceptions or are charitable to the other side; they spend little time verifying whether their policy views are backed by evidence, and reporters who run speculative stories that turn out wildly inaccurate pay no price because they are making their readers happy.

    “if you are like most people, you have a tendency to read what makes you feel good about yourself. It's hard to read things that challenge your preconceptions, that are charitable to the other side.”

  • The story of Ignaz Semmelweis—who around 1846 showed that doctors washing their hands dramatically cut childbirth mortality from puerperal fever, yet was ignored for decades until germ theory emerged—demonstrates that people resist even life-saving truths when those truths are unpleasant, because accepting that doctors themselves were killing women was too painful, so they found reasons to dismiss the work as mere correlation.

    “even though of course they wanted to know the truth, the idea of that truth was really unpleasant. It was a very unpleasant truth. It was a truth that said that it was the doctors themselves that were killing these women.”

  • The standard 'media literacy' answer—teaching people to be skeptical because not everything they read is true—is naive as a national policy because it presumes people care about truth, when in fact most people hold beliefs that make them feel good (just as they wear comfortable shoes), and the return to discovering truth is too low since citizens are not in charge and a single vote rarely breaks a tie.

    “What if most people don't care about what's true? Just hold the beliefs that make them feel good--just like they wear the shoes that make their feet comfortable.”

0.79

News markets exploit evolutionary psychology by sensationalizing threats and demonizing opponents, with outlets competing via tribal loyalty not ideology.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • The news business exploits a likely evolutionary attraction to worry and paranoia—similar to why people pay to watch horror movies—by showing the risks of the other side gaining power, demonizing opponents as zombies or vampires, which turns political debate into a horror movie where Trump becomes a threat moving toward Nazi Germany or Hillary Clinton becomes someone who would destroy America forever.

    “The news business taps into this big time by showing us the risks of the other side gets in power and whatever policy issue is up for grabs. And, this demonization--it's really turning the political debate into a horror movie”

  • In an intensely competitive landscape, a news outlet's biggest competitor is not the ideological opposite but rivals serving the same tribe (CNN competes with MSNBC, Huffington Post, Daily Kos; Fox competes with Breitbart and Rush Limbaugh), so to win scarce attention each outlet must be louder in favor of the home team, less nuanced, more entertaining, and must vilify the other tribe—because outrage sells when competition is intense.

    “Their competition is really MSNBC and the Huffington Post and the Daily Kos and Twitter, on the Left, who give people what they want on the Left.”

  • Much of today's news seems designed to get people outraged, and people genuinely enjoy being outraged—they like working themselves into a state—which is why news, Twitter feeds, and Facebook all serve as vehicles for that pleasurable but unhealthy emotion.

    “people enjoy being outraged. They like working themselves into a state. And, the news is one way to do that.”

  • The proliferation of internet content has made it much harder to run a profitable news organization because of vastly increased competition for scarce attention, leading to a shakeout in which many newspapers and news sites went out of business, while traffic, eyeballs, and attention became the crucial scarce resources that pay the bills.

    “it suddenly becomes very difficult to run a news organization. It's a lot harder to make money because there's a lot more competition out there.”

0.71

Only cultural norms rewarding humility and open-mindedness, plus individual choices to engage charitably across difference, can gradually improve discourse.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Quoting Arnold Kling, the best way to fix problems with Facebook is not to regulate it but to come up with something better—if someone devises a much better way to run a social network, an entrepreneur will be able to make a success of it—so people should use alternatives with different incentives (like DuckDuckGo for search) when they emerge.

    “to me, the best way to fix it would be to come up with something better. I figure that if we really do come up with a much better way of running a social network, then some entrepreneur will be able to make a success out of our idea.”

  • The most general hope is that a cultural norm will emerge making it embarrassing to be tribal and outraged and rewarding thoughtfulness, open-mindedness, and humility; cultural norms are powerful and run the world beneath the surface, but the problem is that we don't know how to deliberately create or control them—they emerge from the cumulative actions of many individuals.

    “I think we have to hope that a cultural norm is going to emerge that it's a bad idea to indulge a tribalism all the time. And, cultural norms are really powerful.”

  • Think tanks and foundations can help by finding common ground across ideological lines—as Hoover, Brookings, and AEI do on regulation—though this is limited because such centrist institutions are far apart from the more attention-grabbing extremes, and it is much harder for the far Right and far Left to collaborate than for the centrist Right and centrist Left.

    “trying to find common ground from people who are generally on the Right and generally on the Left to work together. So I think that's a great idea.”

  • Your individual choices—how you respond to people on Twitter, in email, or over the dinner table—matter not by themselves but cumulatively alongside millions of others: every time you dismiss someone as evil or an idiot you push toward a bad direction, and every time you are open-minded, kind, skeptical, and humble you push the other way, so each person can help create a better cultural norm.

    “I think we have to hope that a cultural norm is going to emerge that it's a bad idea to indulge a tribalism all the time. And, cultural norms are really powerful.”

  • Roberts offers modest personal remedies: practice humility and learn to say 'I don't know' (while recognizing humility's risk of passivity when something is genuinely dangerous), follow people you disagree with, hold your anger for a day and answer hostile messages calmly, spend less time on the internet and more with humans, and notice and resist the unhealthy sweetness of feeling outraged.

    “first thing, not surprisingly, for long-time listeners, I would suggest humility. We don't know everything we think we do.”

0.65

Technology transformed how people consume information by enabling customization to tribal preference rather than common denominators.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The advent of cable, and then the internet with everyone having a personal smartphone, allowed people to watch only what they love rather than the lowest common denominator, making it possible for the first time to cater to individuals' specific tastes rather than the household compromise.

    “Everybody has the equivalent of their own television in their own pocket, which is their smartphone, so, 'I'm going to watch what I want to watch.'”

  • When households had only one television, programming had to satisfy everyone present, so—via the power of the minority (one person's strong dislike vetoes a show)—networks produced bland, lowest-common-denominator content; the rise of multiple TVs per household and then personal devices enabled customization to individual tastes rather than common denominators.

    “Everybody has the equivalent of their own television in their own pocket, which is their smartphone, so, 'I'm going to watch what I want to watch.'”

  • Most of the transformation of the information landscape has been glorious: for a curious person it is the greatest time to be alive, with podcasts, online education, Wikipedia, and YouTube videos on everything, allowing extraordinary discovery and customization of content.

    “For a curious person--I often say this here--this is the greatest time to be alive, if you want to discover things about the world and how it works”

  • Tribalism—the desire to join with others and be part of something larger than ourselves—is ancient and likely embedded in our DNA, so it has not changed; what has changed is our newfound ability to feed and indulge our tribalism in news and politics, a capacity created by the transformation of the information landscape beginning with cable and taken to a new level by the internet.

    “What has changed is our ability to feed and indulge our tribalism, particularly in the area of news and politics. And this newfound ability to indulge and let our tribalism run wild is, I believe, the result of the transformation of the news and information landscape.”

0.65

Certainty that opponents are wrong dehumanizes them, destroys civil conversation, and enables atrocity while tribalism escalates political volatility.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Political conversation in America has deteriorated significantly in recent years, marked by yelling, arrogance, and overconfidence, with the center failing to hold as people move toward the extremes—accurately captured by Yeats's line that 'the best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity.'

    “it feels like political conversation in America has deteriorated a lot in the last few years. There's a lot of yelling, a lot of arrogance, a lot of overconfidence.”

  • When you cannot imagine that political opponents might possibly be right and are certain you are right and they are wrong, it dehumanizes them and justifies the worst atrocities human beings are capable of—ending civilized conversation and often any conversation at all.

    “When you can't imagine that your political opponents might possibly be right--when you are certain that you are right and they are wrong--it dehumanizes them and it justifies the worst atrocities that human beings are capable of.”

  • The common explanation that turmoil stems from immigration and threats to national identity is only part of the story; immigration has been used to inflame feelings of tribalism that already exist under the surface rather than being the root cause of the deterioration in American politics.

    “I think that immigration has been used to enflame the feelings of tribalism that are already there under the surface.”

  • Politics has been a blood sport forever, as shown by the vicious things said about Thomas Jefferson when he ran for President, so one should be careful not to romanticize the past or overstate how different the present is.

    “Politics is a blood sport. It's been a blood sport forever. You should see the things they said about Thomas Jefferson when he ran for President.”

0.59

Government regulation and media literacy cannot fix information market failure because politicians and citizens operate from corrupted incentives.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Government intervention cannot fix the information market failure because politicians and bureaucrats face their own private incentives that conflict with good outcomes, and the very process of choosing politicians is corrupted by the same information landscape; letting government decide what news is true is not only unconstitutional but dangerous, and there is no reason to think people chosen by a corrupted process would provide truth.

    “Putting the problem into the government's inbox doesn't do anything to avoid it. The whole problem is that the way we choose our politicians and policies are being corrupted by the information landscape.”

  • Even if civil economists from opposing sides jointly examined data on minimum wage or immigration, it likely wouldn't revolutionize debate, because empirical findings are not decisive—economists like to think their work determines policy, but the findings function more as window dressing that politicians use to justify pre-existing beliefs and positions.

    “I think they are just tools that politicians use to justify their beliefs, and justify their positions. I don't think they are really--I'm not convinced they are decisive. I think they are more window dressing for politicians.”

  • Large internet firms with monopoly power (Google, Facebook, Apple, Twitter) self-regulating to prevent election interference is itself concerning, because they have their own axes to grind and their own tribalism, and to the extent they have monopoly power they can indulge it to enhance the chances that their preferred politicians and policies prevail.

    “To the extent they have monopoly power, they can indulge that power and indulge their own flavors of tribalism to enhance the chances that their kinds of politicians, their kinds of policies get passed.”