Dennis Rasmussen on Hume and Smith and The Infidel and the Professor
What this covers
Dennis Rasmussen of Tufts University discusses the intellectual partnership between David Hume and Adam Smith, two eighteenth-century Scottish philosophers whose friendship shaped their most enduring work. Russ Roberts hosts the conversation, which traces how Hume's ideas in moral philosophy and political economy influenced Smith's major texts—The Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations—while examining why Smith's reputation has overshadowed Hume's, despite Hume's originality in both domains. The discussion opens with how the two men sustained an intense long-distance friendship through letters despite spending little time together in person, and how their contrasting public stances on religion produced starkly different professional outcomes and posthumous legacies.
Rasmussen moves through distinct intellectual territories: how Smith's account of sympathy and moral motivation modifies Hume's framework, giving room for judged rather than merely transmitted emotion; how both men grounded morality in sentiment rather than reason or divine command, using related concepts like General Point of View and Impartial Spectator; and how Smith inherited and vastly expanded Hume's argument that commerce itself dissolves feudal dependence and produces liberty—a thesis Hume championed more enthusiastically than Smith himself, despite Smith's reputation as capitalism's founder. The conversation also addresses Smith's pessimism about wealth's capacity to generate happiness, the differential morality of reputation in different social ranks, and how Religion as Buttress functions in Smith's system without being its foundation. A recurring point concerns how Smith's careful public silence on religious doubts—contrasted with Hume's relative candor about skepticism—shaped their academic prospects and subsequent fame. Rasmussen argues both for reassessing Hume's contributions and for understanding that the so-called "Adam Smith Problem" stems partly from comparing two books on different subjects rather than from genuine philosophical contradiction.
Rasmussen argues that David Hume and Adam Smith's friendship was intellectually generative and mutually shaping, and that Hume's contributions—especially in political economy and the commerce-leads-to-liberty thesis—have been unjustly overshadowed by Smith, while Smith's advances in moral philosophy have been unjustly dismissed as mere footnotes to Hume.
- Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments builds on and substantially modifies Hume's account of sympathy and morality
- Smith credited Hume as the first to notice that commerce introduced liberty and security by undermining feudal dependence
- The two men's contrasting public postures on religion produced contrasting reputations—the infidel vs. the respected professor
Commerce and manufactures cause liberty and virtue by dissolving feudal dependence, though Smith stressed dangers to happiness while Hume embraced its benefits more fully.
- Smith, the so-called father of capitalism, viewed the pursuit of wealth as corrosive of happiness: because he understood happiness mostly as tranquility, the desire for wealth leads us to submit to endless toil and anxiety in pursuit of frivolous material goods that yield at best fleeting satisfaction—illustrated by the parable of the ambitious poor man's son who wastes his life chasing riches he later realizes wouldn't have made him happy.
“the desire for wealth can lead us to, you know, submit ourselves to endless toil and endless anxiety in the pursuit of what are, after all, frivolous material goods, that will provide at best fleeting satisfaction”
- Smith took the commerce-leads-to-liberty story largely directly from Hume—telling it at far greater length and centrality than Hume did—and explicitly states 'Mr. Hume is the only writer who I know who has taken notice of this before,' a claim best understood as crediting Hume specifically for the mechanism of how commerce caused the downfall of the feudal lords rather than the broader commerce-and-liberty association noted by Locke and Montesquieu.
“He even goes on to say, 'Mr. Hume is the only writer who I know who has taken notice of this before.'”
- Smith holds that commerce, while perhaps not making us the most noble or benevolent people, prevents much depravity: in commercial society success rests on reputation among relative equals, so for the 'middling ranks' honesty really is the best policy—you gain a good reputation by behaving admirably—making commerce on balance a positive force for morality even if not for happiness.
“your success rests on your reputation, among relative equals. And how do you gain a good reputation? By behaving admirably, on the whole.”
- Smith's most important claim in the Wealth of Nations (Book III) is that commerce and manufactures gradually introduced order, good government, liberty, and security among people who had previously lived in continual war and servile dependency—reversing the usual causal story: rather than liberty enabling a good economy, the rise of commerce and trade in luxuries led feudal lords to squander their authority over serfs (trading away their retainers for frivolous goods like diamond buckles), which dissolved feudal dependence and produced personal independence through market interdependence.
“commerce and manufacturers gradually introduced order and good government. And with them, the liberty and security of individuals... This, though it has been the least observed, is by far the most important of all their effects.”
- Hume argued for free trade decades before the Wealth of Nations, contending that a nation's true wealth is not gold, silver, or a positive balance of trade but a productive citizenry; that politicians' attempts to control economic choices are futile or counterproductive; and that free trade benefits all parties and you cannot get rich by beggaring neighbors—though Smith claimed his own free-trade ideas predated Hume's published essays, and Smith's monumental anti-mercantilist argument in one package proved far more influential than Hume's scattered essays.
“Hume is arguing for free trade decades before the Wealth of Nations appears, saying, 'What's the true source of a nation's wealth? It's not gold, it's not silver; it's not a positive balance of trade. It's a productive citizenry.'”
- Hume's view of commerce's moral, social, and political effects is overwhelmingly positive—even more so than Smith's, despite Smith's reputation as capitalism's founding father; in 'Of Refinement in the Arts' Hume argues commerce brings an 'indissoluble chain' of industry, knowledge, and humanity, making people more virtuous and more free, whereas Smith was more willing than Hume to acknowledge commerce's dangers and drawbacks.
“his view is more overwhelmingly positive than Smith's is, given Smith's reputation as the founding father of capitalism”
- Smith argues that for the 'superior stations'—the rich and nobility—honesty is not the best policy, because they are largely above the law and are admired purely on account of their wealth; people are dazzled by their riches, so they need not act admirably to be admired, which Smith regards as an illiberal feature of human psychology since the rich tend not to be admirable.
“they are just put in a position where they are admired on account of their wealth. People are dazzled, enchanted, by their riches. And so they don't have to act admirably to get people to admire them.”
Smith's concealment of his religious skepticism contrasted sharply with Hume's forthrightness, producing opposite career consequences and public standing.
- Smith's letter to Strahan describing Hume's cheerful, equanimous death and concluding that Hume approached 'as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit' provoked outrage among the devout—shocking 'every sober Christian'—because virtue was thought impossible for an unbeliever; Smith himself said it brought him ten times more abuse than his violent attack on the whole commercial system of Great Britain, and criticism persisted for decades into the 19th century.
“Upon the whole, I have always considered him... as approaching as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit.”
- Smith's true religious views, long debated, are best characterized as those of a 'skeptical deist'—more of a deist than Hume but more of a skeptic than commonly thought—likely believing in some distant, perhaps benevolent higher power while almost certainly not being a believing Christian and being suspicious of most forms of religious belief and devotion.
“I end up calling him a skeptical deist. So, that is to say, more of a deist than Hume, but more of a skeptic than most people think.”
- There is evidence Smith was less ardent a believer than often thought: many Providential-order passages in The Theory of Moral Sentiments are worded evasively, ambiguously, or hedged ('we suppose God thinks this'), focusing on our beliefs about God rather than God; the book grew less religious over time, with the first softening of religious undertones in the 3rd edition of 1767—the first published after Smith left Glasgow and its religious duties—and the final 6th edition of 1790 less religious still.
“the first kind of softening or tempering of the religious undertones comes in the 3rd edition of 1767, which is the first one that's published after he leaves Glasgow”
- The contrary public postures of Hume and Smith on religion produced contrary reputations and consequences: Hume, relatively forthright about his skepticism, was deemed unfit to teach the young and was twice rejected for professorships (at Edinburgh and Glasgow) due to his irreligion, while Smith, who carefully concealed his religious views, became a widely respected professor of moral philosophy.
“He twice applies for professorships, one at Edinburgh and one at Glasgow. But in both cases, he is turned down because of his irreligion.”
- There is no certain answer for why Smith was so much more reticent than Hume on religion, but several non-mutually-exclusive explanations are plausible and likely partly true: temperamental circumspection, concern for reputation and career, viewing religion as less important or dangerous than Hume did, believing its dangers were better fought by quiet neglect than confrontation, a desire to avoid offending his pious Presbyterian mother with whom he lived most of his life, and learning a cautionary lesson from Hume's outspokenness.
“I think it's quite likely that he wanted to avoid offending his mother: his mother was a quite pious Presbyterian; he was very close to her, lived with her almost his whole life.”
Smith grounded morality in an impartial spectator mechanism adapted from Hume's sympathy but imagining into another's situation rather than emotional contagion.
- Hume argues morality does not come from reason or the will of God but from human sentiments of approval; to avoid the trap that 'whatever feels right to me is right,' he says we must correct for personal bias and misinformation by adopting a 'general point of view'—an outside-observer perspective—which is precisely the parallel role Smith's 'impartial spectator' plays; both ground morality on disinterested, impartial sentiments.
“Hume says we need to correct for our personal biases, for misinformation, and so forth, by adopting what he calls, you know, the general point of view or the common point of view.”
- The opening of The Theory of Moral Sentiments is in large part a response to and extension of Hume's moral philosophy—Smith engages Hume throughout the book, often using the same examples and even referring to him obliquely as 'this ingenious and agreeable author'—yet Smith never names Hume, partly because the Treatise was anonymous (an 18th-century faux pas to name) and partly to spare Hume regarding a work he had disavowed, not merely out of caution about Hume's religious skepticism.
“it's pretty clear that Smith is engaging with Hume throughout The Theory of Moral Sentiments”
- Hume and Smith both ground morality in 'sympathy' but conceive it differently: Hume treats sympathy as an emotional contagion mechanism that transmits feelings directly from one person to another, whereas Smith (rejecting this in the first chapter of The Theory of Moral Sentiments) argues we feel little until we imaginatively project ourselves into another's situation—you don't catch an angry person's anger, and identical signs of anguish (a paper cut vs. a dead spouse) elicit different sympathy—so Smith's account leaves room for judging whether an emotion is warranted, which Hume's contagion view does not.
“The way Hume describes sympathy, it's basically just a mechanism that transports emotions from one person to another.”
Smith is world-famous while Hume remains obscure despite both being great original thinkers, because Wealth of Nations changed the world while History of England did not.
- Though best known today for epistemology, Hume was for many generations known as a historian first and philosopher second; his 6-volume History of England became a best-seller and the standard history of England for nearly a century, and was more famous in the 18th century than any of his philosophical works or either of Smith's books.
“He was known for many generations as an historian first and a philosopher second. He wrote a massive, 6-volume history of England that became a best-seller; it was seen as kind of the standard history of England for, I think almost a century.”
- Among the general public Smith is world-famous while Hume is relatively obscure, even though both are great original thinkers engaging predecessors; Smith's eclipse owes partly to being a slightly more accessible writer and packaging his ideas in two acclaimed books, but mainly to the fact that the Wealth of Nations changed the world in a way that Hume's far more contemporaneously-famous History of England did not.
“the way the Wealth of Nations changed the world in a way that, say, Hume's History of England didn't, for all of its fame and all of its readership.”
Religion functions as external support rather than foundation for morality; virtue requires no belief, as Smith's Letter to Strahan demonstrated through Hume's exemplary skeptical life.
- In Smith's moral theory religion functions not as a foundation or pillar but as a buttress: it supports morality from the outside, since most people are more likely to act morally if they believe the rules of morality come from God, but religion is not a precondition for virtue—you need not be religious to be virtuous, a point the letter to Strahan drives home by making the skeptic Hume the paragon of wisdom and virtue.
“Smith sees religion not as a foundation or even a pillar but rather as a buttress: It supports morality from the outside.”
- Scotland transformed from a poor, backward, barbaric outpost synonymous with oppressive Presbyterianism in the early 18th century into one of the intellectual golden ages in the history of thought, driven by a convergence of factors: an innovative parish-school system making it the most literate society in Europe, reformed top-tier universities, thriving clubs and publishing, a Kirk taken over by tolerant moderate ministers, and the economic boom and personal freedoms enabled by the Union of 1707.
“one was the innovative system of parish schools that had made Scotland the most literate society in Europe, maybe in the world, by that time”
Hume and Smith sustained an intense friendship through letters despite spending little time together, with Hume repeatedly attempting unsuccessfully to have Smith settle nearby.
- Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, regarded by philosophers as his masterpiece, was published anonymously and was a work Hume came to all but disavow only a few years after publishing it.
“Ironically, it's a work that he came to all but disavow. Not only a few years after he had published it.”
- Despite their deep and lasting friendship, Hume and Smith likely spent relatively little time together—possibly only a year or two living in the same city across their lives—sustaining an intense friendship largely through letters (41 survive from Hume to Smith, only 15 from Smith to Hume), a kind of long-distance friendship anticipating modern phenomena, with Hume repeatedly scheming to get the more reclusive Smith to settle near him in Edinburgh or London, attempts that never succeeded.
“41 from Hume to Smith, 15 from Smith to Hume.”
- Hume is widely regarded as the greatest philosopher ever to write in English (perhaps second to Hobbes), standing as the third great British empiricist after Locke and Berkeley while also belonging to the skeptical tradition—simultaneously one of the greatest philosophical critics of religion and of reason itself.
“Hume is, I think, widely seen as quite simply the greatest philosopher ever to write in English. Maybe second to Thomas Hobbes, depending on who you ask.”
- However appealing it would be to converse with Hume and Smith, one would not enjoy their standard of living—as Smith himself would be quick to point out, modern people have it considerably better in many respects.
“I'm not sure I'd like the standard of living. As Smith would be quick to point out. We have it quite a bit better than they did in lots of respects.”
- The so-called 'Adam Smith Problem'—that the Wealth of Nations is built on self-interest while The Theory of Moral Sentiments is about regard for others—is overstated; the two are simply books on different topics (moral philosophy vs. political economy) so emphases differ, and the Wealth of Nations itself contains many worries about commercial society, while empathy plays little role in it precisely because trade largely involves strangers with whom our limited capacity to empathize is small.
“I've never seen the big, yawning gap between the two that many others seem to have seen.”