Bruce Bueno de Mesquita on the Spoils of War
What this covers
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, a political economist at NYU, joins Russ Roberts to examine how American presidents decide to wage war. Rather than treating these decisions as driven by national interest, Bueno de Mesquita argues that presidents prioritize their own political survival and economic gain—what keeps them in office and what enriches them personally. The conversation applies this lens to some of the nation's most celebrated presidencies, offering a thoroughgoing reinterpretation of the motives and competence behind figures like George Washington and Abraham Lincoln, whose historical reputations he claims have been inflated by a systematic bias in how historians evaluate presidential greatness.
The discussion ranges across several distinct claims about presidential behavior and its relationship to war. Bueno de Mesquita points to a striking correlation: presidential greatness rankings align far more closely with the number of war deaths a president presides over than with peace or prosperity. He traces Washington's role in the French and Indian War and frontier expansion to land speculation interests, and reframes Lincoln's path to war after the Dred Scott decision as calculated political maneuvering rather than moral conviction, arguing that the Civil War was prosecuted incompetently and lasted far longer than military analysis would predict. He also examines JFK's handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis as prioritizing electoral survival over nuclear safety, and contrasts Lyndon Baines Johnson's willingness to fund Vietnam through immediate taxation—forcing voters to confront its cost—with how later administrations financed wars through debt to obscure their expense. Throughout, Bueno de Mesquita engages counterfactual scenarios, statistical models, and close readings of historical documents to support arguments that are explicitly framed as contestable reinterpretations of established narratives.
Bueno de Mesquita argues that US presidents decide on war primarily to serve their own electoral and economic self-interest rather than the national interest, and that history over-rewards war-presiding presidents, inflating the reputations of figures like Washington and Lincoln.
- Presidential greatness rankings correlate strongly with American war deaths, not peace and prosperity
- Washington's Revolution and Lincoln's Civil War can be reframed as driven by personal gain and electoral calculation
- Wars get presidents reelected, so the dominant decision criterion is what keeps them in power
Presidents choose war for self-interested electoral gain, not national interest, even when they believe their interests align with the country's.
- Presidents make the decision of how and when to go to war primarily in self-interested ways—prioritizing what is good for them (economic or, more often, electoral gain) over what is best for the nation—even though they may sincerely believe their interests align with the country's.
“The top item on their list is what is good for them. I'm sure they think that what is good for them is good for the country. What is good for them tends to reduce to either economic gain or, more often, electoral gain--what will get them re-elected?”
- Presidents who go to war are vastly more likely to be re-elected than presidents who produce peace and prosperity, making war an effective tool for staying in power.
“Presidents who go to war are vastly more likely to be re-elected than presidents who produce peace and prosperity.”
- In the Cuban Missile Crisis JFK took a tough stance against the Soviets because he believed he would be impeached and lose the House Democrats otherwise—even though by his own estimate the risk of nuclear war was one-third—meaning he valued the certainty of impeachment as worse than a one-third chance of nuclear war and gambled the country to secure his presidency; experts at the time knew the missiles in Cuba did not actually change the strategic threat.
“In JFK's case, he believed he would be impeached and he would lose the Democrats in the House if he did not take a tough stance against the Soviets. Even though, by his own estimates, the risk of nuclear war was one-third... He gambled on the country to secure himself in the Presidency.”
- Between Andrew Jackson and Lincoln, no president was reelected, which Lincoln would have known—reinforcing that he viewed war as the reliable path to securing and staying in power.
“We forget, after Andrew Jackson until Lincoln, no President had been reelected... And none were reelected.”
- Jefferson Davis was self-interested rather than altruistic: despite believing the South would lose the war (he was horrified to be asked, given his West Point and Mexican War experience), he accepted the Confederate presidency because it let him be president of a country—an opportunity that would never otherwise arise—and because facing the incompetent Lincoln gave him a chance.
“he got to be the President of a Country--something that would never happen otherwise... what he could know was that the South ought to lose the War easily but that they were going up against the incompetent Mr. Lincoln: Maybe that will work out.”
- After the 1857 Dred Scott decision, Lincoln's actions—the 1858 'House Divided' speech, refusing the Crittenden Amendment, and dividing the Democratic Party on slavery—were designed to make him President and get reelected rather than to end slavery as a primary goal; he reportedly said of the House Divided speech, 'Yes, but it will make me President.'
“Lincoln had been advised not to give the House Divided speech because it would cost him the prospect of winning the Senate. And his response was, 'Yes, but it will make me President.' And it did.”
Financing wars through current taxation rather than debt forces voters to confront costs and hold leaders accountable for military adventures.
- An independent body of academics (not a government agency) using previously-published, peer-reviewed models—much like weather forecasting consensus models—should publicly estimate the costs of any proposed war in lives, dollars, and foregone opportunities, so that presidents who understate costs face electoral punishment when reality exceeds their claims and the opposition is incentivized to anchor to the higher estimates, making presidents more cost-conscious about military adventures.
“Suppose we had a council of foreign policy advisers whose job it was not to pontificate... but to use well-developed, peer-reviewed, careful studies, algorithms, statistical analyses, models of what affects the costs of war”
- Wars should be financed by current taxation rather than debt because the cost of war is a political factor more than an economic one: paying as you go (as LBJ did by raising taxes for Vietnam) forces voters to confront the cost and hold leaders accountable, while putting war on a 'credit card' (as George W. Bush did for Iraq, cutting taxes and deferring payment) hides the cost and removes the political check that would restrain wasteful wars.
“The costs of war should be thought of as a political factor more than an economic factor.”
- Going to war only when the American people are solidly behind it is a good rule of thumb that would likely lead to fewer wars, but with the crucial caveat that public opinion must be informed about the consequences of both going to war and not going to war—as it was not, for example, by FDR before Pearl Harbor.
“I absolutely agree with that. But with the caveat: when public opinion is informed about the consequences of going to war and the consequences of not going to war.”
- LBJ, though ruthless and not a nice man, did what he believed was right and what most now believe was right, including paying for the Vietnam War as it went by raising taxes and introducing the draft lottery to replace Selective Service—a fairer system that knowingly cost him Northeastern Democratic support whose sons drew high-risk lottery numbers.
“the introduction of the lottery to replace Selective Service, which cost him the support of Democrats in the Northeast, whose sons had high-risk lottery numbers... And he knew that would be the consequence. But it was... a fair system.”
- The Iraq War cost approximately a trillion dollars—statistical estimates would have put it around $400 billion, well below actual cost but eight times what Donald Rumsfeld claimed it would cost—illustrating how leaders systematically understate war costs.
“the Iraq War, cost approximately a trillion dollars. By the way, the statistical estimates would have put the costs at about $400 billion, way below what it actually cost, but 8 times what Donald Rumsfeld said it would cost.”
- Democracies are not less prone to wage war than autocracies; they are more selective, choosing wars they expect to win—democracies win 93% of the wars they initiate versus about 60% for autocrats—so they favor weak opponents (colonial and imperial expansion) and high-probability victories, and success makes leaders popular.
“Democracies are not less prone to wage war than autocracies. They are more selective about the wars they wage... 93% of the wars initiated by democratic countries are won by them; and only about 60% of the wars initiated by an autocrat.”
Lincoln's civil war was strategically unnecessary and politically motivated, extending four years instead of the six months military models predict.
- Lincoln made a mistake in not tolerating Secession; he should have let the South go and imposed an economic embargo, after which the individual states would have come 'slinking back' to rejoin the Union on his dictated terms—but he refused because tolerating secession was unpopular with key 1860 voters and because war is a path to reelection.
“He should have let the South go and then put an economic embargo on it; and the individual states would have come slinking back, pleading to re-enter the Union. And then he could have dictated the terms.”
- Lincoln prosecuted the war incompetently by choosing popular rather than competent generals—first the aged, out-of-touch Winfield Scott, then McClellan, a 'great parade general' but not a fighter—instead of bringing in fighters like Sherman and Grant to plan a fast assault on the nearby Confederate capital at Richmond.
“he turned to Winfield Scott... an old man, who was out of touch with the military skills of the day. But was popular. So, he picked somebody who was popular rather than competent. Then he turned to General McClelland, and McClelland was well-known as a great parade general. But not a fighter.”
- Applying Scott Bennett and Allan Stam's statistical model of war duration to the Union and Confederacy predicts the Civil War should have lasted approximately six months rather than four years, because the South was hugely outmatched—21 million Northerners versus ~4.5 million effective Southerners (half of the 9 million Southerners were slaves, a pro-Union fifth column), and the South grew cash crops, not food, and produced no munitions.
“we take an academic study by Scott Bennett and Allan Stam that looks at a bunch of variables and how they affect the duration of war... we apply their model to how long the Civil War should have lasted. And the answer that comes out from the statistics is: Approximately 6 months.”
- Robert E. Lee deserves credit for the war's duration as a great general handed a very bad hand who understood his disadvantages, but the length of a war is not determined by one person alone, and even accounting for generalship (a variable in the model) the war should have lasted perhaps a year, not four.
“Lee was a great general, handed a very bad hand... yes, he certainly deserves credit. The length of the war is not determined by one person alone. But, the war statistically should have been a lot shorter.”
- Contrary to popular wisdom, it is more prudent for a decision-maker to surround themselves with yes-men than rivals: per Randall Calvert's result, when someone who always disagrees with you keeps disagreeing you learn nothing, but when someone who always agrees with you suddenly disagrees, that carries real information signaling you may be wrong; thus Lincoln's celebrated 'team of rivals' was actually a cabinet of like-minded allies (Seward and Chase differed only as political, not ideological, rivals).
“when somebody who always disagrees with you... continues to disagree with you, you don't learn anything from their disagreeing. But when somebody who has always agreed with you... says to you, 'You know, you are making a mistake'... Now there's information.”
Obama followed constituent opinion on Iraq and Syria rather than shaping it, signaling weakness that destabilized the region and emboldened adversaries.
- Obama withdrew from Iraq because that's what his constituents wanted, despite it being entirely foreseeable (predicted in Bueno de Mesquita's 2009 The Predictioneer's Game) that withdrawal would trigger a Sunni civil war and Iranian dominance; and his unfulfilled 'game changer' red line on Syrian chemical weapons, followed by backing down, signaled weakness that emboldened Putin to expand into Crimea, prioritizing constituents and reelection over long-term stability.
“It was completely foreseeable that withdrawal from Iraq would mean a Sunni Civil War. It would mean that Iran would step in... I predicted that. This, before I knew who was elected”
- A central question is whether a president's job is to be a politician who follows opinion or a leader who shapes opinion; Obama (and FDR before WWII) followed opinion rather than shaping it, which is a failure of leadership.
“the job of the President to be a politician who follows opinion, or to be a leader who shapes opinion? Obama didn't shape opinion. He followed it.”
- You should not make 'game-changer' or red-line statements unless you are committed to carrying out the threat, because conditional on making such a statement, failing to be resolved about it creates dangerous destabilization—as seen when Obama's unfulfilled Syria red line emboldened adversaries.
“It would have been the smarter thing in my opinion; you don't make game-changer statements unless you are committed to carrying out the threat. He was not.”
- Intervening in Libya in 2011 was foolish because there was no prospect of creating a civil society there, whereas Syria at that time offered the best prospect for a civil society to emerge and would not have taken much (no ISIS threat yet), but Obama declined to intervene because public opinion didn't want it.
“if the United States and its allies at that time, in 2011, were going to intervene anywhere where there was a prospect of a civil society coming out of it, it was Syria. At that time, it wouldn't have taken very much. There wasn't an ISIS threat”
Historians rank presidents by war deaths presided over, conflating military death toll with greatness and obscuring leaders' self-interested calculations.
- Historians' rankings of presidential greatness are highly correlated with the number of American war deaths presided over: Warren Harding, who oversaw zero war deaths and 8% average annual per-capita income growth, ranks last, while Abraham Lincoln, who presided over 750,000 deaths and under 2% growth, ranks at the top.
“very highly correlated with how many American deaths in war they presided over. So, typically historians rank Warren Harding last among presidents. Warren Harding presided over zero deaths in war, and an 8% average annual increase in per capita income. At the top, they rank, for example, Abraham Lincoln, who presided over 750,000 American deaths in war; and a growth rate of under 2%.”
- The public treats war as heroic because it takes lives, money, and effort, and treating it otherwise would be too depressing given how much war-fighting the country does; this self-protective framing allows war-presiding presidents to escape the verdict that they acted self-interestedly.
“And so we treat it as heroic because to treat it otherwise would be very depressing. Because we do a lot of war fighting.”
The American Revolution was initiated by wealthy colonists protecting land interests, not downtrodden masses, and was unpopular and avoidable through negotiation.
- The American Revolution was led by very wealthy men—Washington (estimated $20 billion in today's dollars, the 59th wealthiest American ever), Hancock (wealthier, made money smuggling), and Franklin (printing-press monopoly)—who stood to lose huge wealth under the King's policies, not by the downtrodden; and the Revolution itself was unpopular, with about 60% of colonists neutral or opposed.
“These were people who stood to lose huge amounts of wealth because of the King's policies. And so they fought a Revolution. Which was, by the way, not very popular. Sixty percent of the colonists either were neutral or opposed to the Revolution.”
- The Revolution could have been avoided through negotiated representation, since the colonists were about 25% of the British population and could have legitimately claimed roughly 25% of Parliament's seats to form coalitions and change policy; British policies were not horrible (they wanted to tax colonists who were expensive to defend), and per-capita income tracked closely between the colonies and Canada during George III's life, providing little evidence for the tyranny claim.
“the colonists represented about 25% of the total British population. So they had a legitimate claim to 25% of the seats in Parliament... they could have changed the policies.”
- Reading the Declaration of Independence carefully reveals the two big driving grievances were the King imposing conditions on the colonists' acquisition of land, and the King turning the frontier over to the 'Indian savages'—indicating the Revolution was driven by land and frontier conflicts rather than abstract liberty.
“the two things, two big grievances that were driving the Revolution, were that the King was imposing conditions on the colonists' acquisition of land; and, even more--and this is a quotation--he was turning our frontier over to the 'Indian savages.'”
Washington and other founding figures acted from personal financial motives: land speculation, war profits, and securing assets rather than civic virtue.
- Contrary to the myth, Washington did not establish a two-term limit norm: after Andrew Jackson and until the Constitution was amended, every president alive at the end of his second term—Grant, Cleveland, Theodore Roosevelt, even a dying Woodrow Wilson—sought a third-term nomination, until Franklin Roosevelt succeeded.
“He did not set a norm to limit terms to two terms. After Andrew Jackson, until the Constitution was amended, every president who was alive at the end of the 2nd term sought his party's nomination for a third term.”
- George Washington, at age 21, led troops into the wilderness, slaughtered a group of Frenchmen and took their leader prisoner—after which a confederate assassinated the captured French ambassador carrying peace papers—literally starting the French and Indian War, motivated by securing land for the Ohio Valley Company in which he and his brother had interests.
“He literally started the French and Indian War. I repeat: literally. He led a set of troops, when he was 21 years old, into the wilderness; came across some Frenchmen; slaughtered them; took the leader of the group prisoner. One of his confederates... then assassinated the leader of the French who was the French Ambassador carrying papers to make peace with the English.”
- Washington's actions were motivated by personal financial gain through land speculation: he illegally secured huge amounts of riverfront land (knowing rivers and forks were where commerce flowed), violated a 1712 Virginia statute limiting riverfront holdings, cheated his soldiers out of the better land from a shared grant, and leased rather than sold land to keep collecting income.
“he violated a statute, a Virginia Statute of 1712, by taking for himself much more river-front land than any one individual was allowed to have. Because he knew that was where all the commerce would go... Whereas other people bought and sold land, he bought and leased land. So he held the land in the family and collected income from its use.”
Lincoln's shift on slavery after Dred Scott was opportunistic political calculation, not moral conviction, inconsistent with his earlier fugitive slave law sponsorship.
- Lincoln's earlier actions undercut the view that Dred Scott morally galvanized him: he had sponsored a Fugitive Slave Law for D.C. that offended abolitionists, took almost no legal cases defending slaves despite Illinois being free (to avoid being seen as fighting Fugitive Slave laws), and in 1848 endorsed a 'most sacred right' to revolutionize against government where a majority could form—so his post-Dred-Scott shift looks like seized opportunity, not conviction.
“there he was: he was the sponsor; it was deeply offensive to abolitionists; and in this earlier period, he took almost no legal cases to defend slaves--although Illinois was a free state--because he didn't want to be seen as fighting the Fugitive Slave laws”