Michael Munger on Slavery and Racism
What this covers
Michael Munger of Duke University and host Russ Roberts trace how slavery's moral justification transformed in the American South between roughly 1815 and 1835. Munger argues this was not a conspiracy but an emergent order—a self-reinforcing convention that emerged from economic incentives and the human capacity to rationalize self-interest as principle. As cotton industrialization caused slave prices to spike, Southern institutions were quietly reorganized: courts began outlawing self-purchase agreements that had allowed enslaved people to buy their freedom, because enforcing those contracts destroyed the logical foundation the South had constructed for slavery itself. Through this process, the region's intellectual and economic elites persuaded themselves and each other that slavery was not merely a necessary evil inherited from Rome, but a positive good—that enslaved people were morally and mentally inferior, like children or animals, and that ownership carried obligations of care rather than exploitation.
The conversation draws on philosophy, economics, and moral psychology to explain how this happened. Munger invokes David Hume's insight that Reason as Slave of the Passions, showing how clever people harness reasoning to convince themselves that what serves their interest is actually right. He uses Adam Smith's impartial spectator alongside the veil of ignorance—Rawlsian thought experiments meant to check self-serving moral conclusions—to explore why the South's moral institutions proved resistant to them. The discussion also turns to how in-group/out-group thinking exploits visible markers like skin color as low-cost substitutes for trust, and how enslaved people's apparent laziness reflected confusing cause and effect: rational response to incentives misread as inherent inferiority. Roberts presses back on whether economic necessity exonerates the South, and the two weigh how fragile modern egalitarianism may be against the same cognitive architecture that produced that ideology.
Munger argues that Southern slavery's justification shifted from a Roman/economic 'necessary evil' to an Aristotelian 'positive good' racist ideology between roughly 1815 and 1835, and that this transformation was an emergent, self-persuasive process driven by economic incentives and the human capacity to harness reason in service of self-interest.
- Southerners abandoned the Roman captive-in-war justification because it could not justify hereditary, identifiable slavery, and adopted the Aristotelian view that slaves are morally/mentally inferior like children or horses.
- As slave prices spiked (post-1815 cotton industrialization), the South reorganized its institutions—outlawing self-purchase contracts—to preserve the ideological logic that blacks couldn't care for themselves.
- The shift was an emergent order: no conspiracy, but a self-reinforcing convention that became unanimous and unquestionable after 1835.
Southern elites constructed elaborate moral justifications for slavery through emergent self-deception, transforming it from necessary evil to positive good between 1815 and 1835.
- Following Hume's view that reason is the slave of the passions which reduce to self-interest, clever people harness their reason to persuade themselves that what serves their interest is actually right—explaining how Southerners constructed sophisticated, internally coherent justifications for slavery comparable in moral execrability to Nazi justifications for the treatment of Jews.
“David Hume thought that reasons are the slaves of passion. And passions come down to self-interest... We can harness our reason in service of those passions and persuade ourselves that what we are doing is actually right.”
- Between roughly 1815 and 1835, Southerners managed to persuade themselves—not via conspiracy but through emergent self-deception—that slavery was first a necessary evil and then a positive good, coming to genuinely believe slaves were better off enslaved than free in Africa.
“They persuaded themselves. They actually came to believe that slavery was, first, a necessary evil; and then, later, a positive good: that not only could they not do without it, but that slaves themselves were better off as slaves than they would have been in Africa.”
- The transformation of Southern thinking was not a rational institutional matching of property rights to economics but a deeply emotional process: slave owners used a family metaphor, convincing themselves slaves were part of their family, and case law (e.g., Catterall's volumes) shows two threads—slaves as children incapable of good choices and slaves as horses lacking moral sensibility.
“There was something deeply emotional where people convinced themselves that slaves were part of their family. So, what slave owners did was they used a family metaphor.”
- The American Anti-Slavery Society's 1835 mailing of tens of thousands of abolition postcards into the South—following the 1831 Nat Turner Rebellion and the Virginia legislature debates—provoked bonfires and riots and ended the legitimacy of any discussion of ending slavery, with the positive-good consensus becoming unanimous after 1835.
“the postcard incident, where the American Abolition Society... sent tens of thousands of postcards to the South advocating abolition... After 1835 the door slammed shut. No more can you question slavery”
- The Roman justification for slavery was an economic, mutually-beneficial exchange after losing a battle (spare your life in return for servitude), which could not justify enslaving children born to slaves; so the South adopted the Aristotelian justification that slaves are morally inferior or lack judgment—like children or horses—which converts ownership into a 'positive good' carrying obligations of care.
“the Southerners needed a different way, so they were looking for the Aristotelian notion of slavery, which is that slaves are people who are either morally inferior or lack the judgment to make independent choices. They are like children or like horses.”
- George Fitzhugh's proto-Marxist argument held that wage labor creates a moral hazard—employers pay only subsistence and don't care if workers starve given a reserve army of unemployed—whereas slave owners, because they own the slave as an asset that remains valuable in five years, have a Coasean incentive to take better care of them, providing housing and care a renter never would.
“it's literally a Coasean argument--since I owned them I have a much better reason to take care of them because they are still going to be valuable to me 5 years from now. Whereas if I rent labor, I don't care”
- Slavery is a theft of property rights inconsistent with capitalism, yet it is disquieting for a defender of markets that market practices were so easily adapted to work well with the buying and selling of human beings, which is partly why Marxist scholars used slavery to argue capitalism was corrupt.
“it is disquieting for someone who, like me, is a defender of markets to see how easily market practices were adapted to work pretty well with the buying and selling of human beings.”
Slavery became profitable and entrenched where large-scale agriculture met labor scarcity, making Southern emancipation economically ruinous while Northern abolition cost little.
- From a public choice perspective, slavery persisted only where it was profitable—regions with large fields and a labor shortage like South Carolina and Virginia—whereas England and the Northern states ended it at far lower cost because it was not profitable there, making Southern emancipation without reparations effectively economic suicide.
“The only place that kept slavery was the one that had very large fields and a shortage of labor. England doesn't have that... it was costly for Massachusetts to end slavery; but not nearly as costly as it was or would have been for South Carolina and Virginia.”
- After Britain ended its slave trade (1807-1810) and the U.S. banned the trade in 1808, the industrialization of cotton thread and textile production (cotton gin, spinning mule, jenny) caused slave prices to double and double again between 1815 and 1830, because a slave's price is the present value of the implicit wages the owner expects to capture.
“The cotton gin, the spinning mule, the jenny--those things that allowed the industrialization of the production of cotton thread and textiles meant that slaves doubled in price, and then doubled again. And the slave's price is the present value of its--the implicit wages that that person is earning over time.”
- Jefferson's 'wolf by the ear' captured two problems that made the South feel unable to release slavery: economically their gang-labor system (tobacco then cotton) couldn't survive without it and uncompensated emancipation would bankrupt society, and socially they feared free blacks living among them—including justified revenge—so like a man holding a wolf's ear, letting go seemed fatal.
“the wolf by the ear had two parts. One is, economically, they didn't think that their economic system could survive without big gangs of labor... The other is social: We can't have them living here among us”
- All the original reparations proposals were not payments to slaves but to slave owners, framed as a Fifth Amendment taking—'pay us for our slaves or it will bankrupt our society'—reflecting the property-rights conception of slavery.
“all the original reparations proposals were not money for slaves, but money for slave owners. It was as if it was a Fifth Amendment taking.”
The veil of ignorance and impartial spectator test expose how self-interest corrupts moral reasoning, yet elites successfully evade these checks through psychological isolation.
- Game theory's folk theorem shows that in a long-term repeated process where people benefit from cooperating, almost any arrangement of mutually-expected behavior can stabilize and persist; Hume anticipated this in believing almost anything could happen, whereas Smith overlaid the constraint that we intrinsically want to be seen as rule-following, which gets us others' respect.
“the folk theorem says that if you have a long-term process where people get benefits from cooperating, almost anything can happen. There are all sorts of different arrangements where, if I do it, you do, we each expect the other one to do, they tend to persist.”
- Public reason, a Kantian/Rawlsian concept developed by Gerald Gaus, is the set of things we would all agree on if suitably removed from our own self-interest; unlike the folk theorem where almost any convention works, Gaus holds there are some things we wouldn't agree to—and Munger wrote the paper partly to test whether slavery's emergent justification disproves Gaus's claim, since if such an atrocity could emerge through public reason, almost anything horrible could.
“public reason is a set of things... that we would all agree on, if we were suitably removed from our own self-interest.”
- The veil of ignorance—asking whether you would endorse an arrangement if you didn't know your position in society—functions as a challenge to persuasion, and Montesquieu anticipated it in 1748 regarding slavery by asking whether advocates would still endorse slavery if, upon leaving a room, some of them would become slaves; it problematizes conventions we accept merely as tradition.
“the veil of ignorance is a challenge about persuasion... 'Well, would you believe that if you didn't know what your position in the society would be?'”
- We can usually rely on Smith's impartial spectator, but because Southern elites managed to persuade their impartial spectator that slavery was acceptable by avoiding the logic of the veil of ignorance, the veil—asking what if I occupied the position of people I have little contact with—serves as an occasional abstract check on our self-serving moral conclusions that we are all capable of evading.
“many Southern elites managed to persuade their impartial spectator that this was okay by avoiding the logic of the veil of ignorance. And I worry that we are all capable of doing that.”
- Persuasion—actually changing what one believes—is the great understudied problem of social science, distinct from merely receiving new information (which leaves preferences unchanged); people rarely change their minds until they suddenly do, as when segregationists like George Wallace later renounced their views, because moral institutions are hard like glass rather than steel: they don't bend, they shatter and are then completely gone.
“persuasion is not 'I got new information.'... Persuasion means I actually changed something that I believe. And it doesn't happen very often.”
- Contrary to Hayek, who called social justice a 'mirage' or meaningless 'moral stone,' Munger argues social justice is a coherent concept: there are institutions we can judge behind the veil of ignorance—asking whether we would endorse the society's set of outcomes without knowing our position—and that test gives content to justice even if it remains unclear how to get there or whether redistribution itself is just.
“Is there such a thing as social justice? Hayek said No. I think, Yes... there are institutions that we can judge about their performance behind the veil of ignorance.”
Visible skin color as an in-group marker made enslaving and tracking a racially-defined group far cheaper than maintaining slavery based on indistinguishable appearance.
- A visible, obvious marker like skin color did not merely make racist slavery easier but made it possible, because it reduced the cost of identifying and maintaining the in-group/out-group distinction in a way that Roman slaves or indentured servants—indistinguishable by appearance—could not serve.
“Not just easier. It made it possible... The Roman slaves and indentured servants wouldn't have served the purpose.”
- Human minds evolved for clans of about 150 (Dunbar's Number) with high-cost trust detection, so a visible socially-constructed marker like skin color is a convenient low-cost way to draw in-group/out-group lines; markets matter because they reduce the transaction cost of trusting strangers, but distributed trust institutions are expensive, making race a cheap—if pernicious—substitute that lets us deny social standing to others without caring whether we appear lovely to them.
“Our minds are evolved to live in clans whose size is governed by Dunbar's Number. So, something like 150... Race is a very convenient one.”
- Racism is distinct from mere bigotry: while any person can be a bigot, racism requires that racial revulsion be combined with the institutionally privileged position to impose it on others, which is why under this definition it is not easy for a member of a non-dominant group to be racist.
“racism is a combination of bigotry and an institutionally privileged position. So, any person can be a bigot. Racism requires that the sense of racial revulsion that you feel is combined with an ability to impose that institutionally.”
Courts and legislatures actively destroyed institutional checks on slavery ideology by outlawing self-purchase contracts that demonstrated enslaved people's rationality and agency.
- Self-purchase agreements—where a slave hired out earns money to buy his and his family's freedom, benefiting both slave and master—were enforced as binding contracts in South Carolina around 1815-1818, but by 1821 courts realized enforcing them destroyed the logical underpinning of the system (that blacks couldn't plan or take initiative), so they were outlawed, and reciprocal cross-purchase arrangements were banned by 1826, sacrificing efficiency to preserve the ideology.
“1815, 1818 these self-purchase agreements were honored. They were enforced. By 1821, the courts had realized, 'You know, we can't enforce these, because it destroys the logical underpinning of the whole system.'”
- Being raised inside a system where slavery is taken for granted as convention with elaborate justifications would have led even a modern critic—Munger admits of himself—to defend it; which should make us wonder what current practices future generations will find indefensible.
“if I were born to a slave-owning wealthy family in the South in 1830, 1835, I would have defended slavery. And that's terrible.”
- Of the roughly 220 Negro slave revolts catalogued by Herbert Aptheker, almost all were really labor actions seeking better conditions (shorter hours, breaks) rather than true revolts, with the Nat Turner Rebellion being a genuine exception that sent shock waves through the South.
“Herbert Aptheker, who catalogs Negro slave revolts, 220 slave revolts--if you look through them, almost all of them were labor actions... These weren't really revolts. Nat Turner was a real revolt.”
Enslaved people rationally resisted exploitation through labor actions and some achieved freedom via self-purchase, yet were falsely perceived as inherently lazy rather than responding to incentives.
- Slaves appeared 'lazy, dissolute, and shiftless' to whites not because of any inherent trait but because enslavement gave them no ability to profit from their work—they were effectively conducting labor actions—so observers confused cause and effect, mistaking a rational response to incentives for inferiority, paralleling how a paternalistic system that takes away the need to invest makes people appear ignorant about investing.
“slaves were "lazy"--and I'm making air quotes--because they were enslaved, they had no ability to make any money from their work. Basically these were labor actions: it was as if they were striking.”
Individual moral agency persisted despite systemic ideology, as some slaveholders like Washington freed their slaves while Jefferson failed to act on his own professed principles.
- Individual slave owners could have freed their slaves and some did (George Washington) while others did not (Thomas Jefferson); regardless of debt circumstances, Jefferson is a moral failure precisely because he did not act on the principles he professed.
“I blame Jefferson for not acting on what he said were his principles.”
- The concocted racist ideology was so deeply ingrained in Southern elites that resistance persisted long after Brown v. Board of Education—Munger attended segregated schools a decade after 1954—and the legacy of this constructed ideology still torments American society today.
“The resistance of Southern elites, because of this concocted ideology about racism, was so deeply ingrained in the South that even today we still are tortured by its legacy.”