What this covers

Amity Shlaes, Bloomberg columnist and visiting senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, joins Russ Roberts to discuss her book The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression. Their central argument challenges the standard narrative: both Herbert Hoover and Franklin Delano Roosevelt were interventionist figures whose unpredictable government tinkering—rather than laissez-faire neglect—extended the Depression by creating regime uncertainty that froze private investment. Hoover is rehabilitated from his hands-off reputation through his aggressive use of moral suasion and the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, while Roosevelt emerges as a destabilizing force whose constant experimentation and anti-business policies drove capital into effective strike.

The conversation spans the microeconomics of New Deal programs and their perverse consequences: killing six million pigs to raise food prices while people starved, banning consumer choice in the National Recovery Administration, and the mechanics of how unexpected deflation devastated leveraged homeowners and farmers. Shlaes explores Roosevelt's use of tax evasion prosecutions as class warfare, his undistributed profits tax, and his reinterpretation of The Forgotten Man (A-B-C Framework)) to flip William Graham Sumner's original meaning. The discussion also covers why the Dow did not recover until the 1950s despite wartime mobilization, how the National Recovery Administration drew inspiration from Soviet planning, and the constitutional damage inflicted by New Deal figures like Rexford Tugwell who sought to rewrite foundational law. Throughout, the hosts contend that understanding the Depression requires seeing policy uncertainty as a cause, not merely a symptom of prolonged economic stagnation.

Sharpest takeaway

Shlaes argues that both Hoover and Roosevelt were interventionist 'control freaks' whose constant, unpredictable government tinkering—not laissez-faire neglect—prolonged the Great Depression by creating regime uncertainty that froze private investment.

  • Hoover was an activist control freak (anti-layoff suasion, Smoot-Hawley) wrongly remembered as hands-off
  • Roosevelt's randomness and anti-business class warfare (undistributed profits tax, tax prosecutions) caused capital to go on strike
  • The economy and the Dow did not truly recover until the 1950s, indicating policy uncertainty, not just monetary factors, drove the prolonged slump

The argument · threads5 threads · 27 claims
0.72

New Deal price controls, industry codes, and wealth taxes destroyed market signals and business incentives to invest.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • The NRA tried to combat the Depression by keeping prices up to stop deflation and enforcing efficiency through codes covering every area of the economy—from sewing to chicken slaughter—but its premise that propping up prices would aid recovery was a total fallacy, and the excessive rules drove people crazy.

    “if we can keep prices up, we will be better and stop deflation, which is a total fallacy.”

  • Roosevelt waged a declared war on the wealthy ('I welcome their hatred'), using the young income tax—which then applied almost entirely to the rich—as a new tool, raising top rates into the 70s, which prevented people from creating jobs and attacked the sector of the economy whose growth could have ended the Depression sooner.

    “He outright declared war against the sector of the economy that could have given the growth that would have ended the Depression sooner. And, he had a new tool to wage that war with, which was the tax code”

  • Banning straight killing and consumer chicken selection under the NRA destroyed the value of consumer choice, which is important both for the individual (avoiding diseased animals in a pre-antibiotic age) and for the broader economy because choice sends signals that punish firms producing low-quality goods.

    “It's not only good for the individual consumer to get the chicken that he wants... but also for the rest of the economy because it sends a signal”

  • Roosevelt's undistributed profits tax, justified as forcing money 'back into the economy,' was effectively a wealth tax that ate away at the essence of business by removing firms' ability and incentive to invest, including in long-term projects.

    “create an undistributed profits tax to eat away the essence of business, that's like a wealth tax.”

0.68

New Deal experimentation and unpredictability froze capital investment and prevented economic recovery.

3 pointscentrality 5/5
  • The salient question is not whether the war ended the Depression but why it lasted so long; following Bob Higgs, the atmosphere of uncertainty Roosevelt created through relentless reform and tinkering made it much harder for the economy to recover, and GDP did not return to prior levels until late in the 1930s while the market did not recover until the 1950s.

    “This atmosphere of uncertainty that Roosevelt created through this relentless reform and tinkering and trying this, and that really made it much harder for the economy to recover from the downturn.”

  • Roosevelt had no fixed course but engaged in 'bold, persistent experimentation' that was unpredictable; because the ruler's unpredictability about what he would do next made investors and employers freeze, capital effectively went on strike, and this cost the economy significantly—an aspect generally left out of standard Depression histories.

    “what that attitude neglects is an appreciation of the cost of uncertainty. When the ruler... doesn't let you know what he's going to do next and is unpredictable, you freeze.”

  • Roosevelt was a control freak whose constant illness and daily discomfort or pain gave him a shorter attention span, making him more restless and impulsive—constantly shifting gears and 'moving the tiller' to avoid pain—which informed the restlessness of his presidency.

    “a person in that much pain has a little bit of a shorter attention span. He's more restless, he's more impulsive. It's all about getting away from the pain or the discomfort.”

0.58

The NRA imported Soviet-style planning that weakened constitutional protections and the culture of contract.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The New Deal subscribed to an age-old, arguably anti-Semitic medieval fallacy that middlemen are parasites who get in the way, when in fact middlemen render the economy more efficient.

    “it's a fallacy to believe that middlemen don't help the economy because actually they render the economy more efficient. And, the New Deal fell into that old medieval fallacy by subscribing to it.”

  • The New Deal weakened America's culture of contract—the contract between two people or between government and an individual—for the sake of more general laws, and key New Dealers like Rex Tugwell and Roosevelt himself regarded the Constitution as too old and in need of rewriting or expansive reinterpretation, eroding constitutional protections that were never fully recovered.

    “Our culture of contract was weakened by the New Deal. The contract between two people or a government and an individual was weakened for sake of more general laws.”

  • The National Recovery Administration, the centerpiece of the New Deal, was inspired by the Soviet Union—imagining labor, companies, and government meeting to set growth rates—and its administrators, while mostly not communists, were New Republic intellectuals who found Soviet planning exciting and worth trying in America.

    “It was very much inspired by the Soviet Union.”

  • The New Dealers' aggressive rewriting of politics precluded later generations' ability to reform; today's political candidates, even on the right like Mitt Romney, don't dare call for the kind of reform needed to keep the U.S. economy competitive over the coming generation, and that constraint stems from the New Deal.

    “their fund precluded ours. If you look at the range of political candidates now, even over on the right, Mitt Romney is not calling for the kind of reform that would actually assure that the U.S. economy stays strong”

0.57

Pre-Depression policy errors by Hoover and structural monetary constraints also contributed to the prolonged slump.

7 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Hoover signed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act despite economists from across the country warning him it would hurt the economy, and this protectionist measure helped turn the 1929 crash into a full-blown depression.

    “he signed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, and that helped make the crash into a depression.”

  • Hoover's use of moral suasion to pressure businesses not to lay off workers—telling them 'a good man will not lay off people'—was economically harmful because firms in a recession need to cut costs, and barred from doing so via layoffs, many instead shut down entirely.

    “rather than lay off people, the other choice is to shut down. And, indeed, that did happen because of Hoover's action there.”

  • The Dow is an important meter of the Depression alongside political polls and 20% unemployment, and it did not come back until the 1950s, indicating that Washington policy—not merely monetary issues—was responsible for the prolonged slump.

    “I argue that the Dow is an important meter too, and it didn't come back, as you know, Russ, until the 1950s.”

  • Although Hoover had free-market elements to his philosophy and came from the private sector, his temperament as a 'control freak' and 'fixer' overrode that philosophy, leading him to intervene aggressively when the crash happened rather than stand aside.

    “he was a private sector man who understood the power of the private sector, but his temperament trumped his philosophy and his temperament was he was a control freak.”

  • The Schechter Supreme Court victory marked the high-water mark of the New Deal: the NRA became illegal, and the Dow began to rally around the time the Schechters won, suggesting the recovery tracked the rollback of New Deal control.

    “the stock market, the Dow began to rally around the time that the Schechters won. The high water mark of the New Deal was over, the Schechters won, the NRA became illegal, and the Dow recovery tracks that”

  • Deflation punished risk-takers and the leveraged while rewarding the parsimonious and lenders, who could hire cheaply amid mass unemployment, which shaped the saving, risk-averse personalities of the Depression generation—explaining why they saved rubber bands and bought low-interest savings bonds.

    “Deflation punished risk-takers, people who were leveraged. If you were leveraged, you looked like a complete fool and you lost everything. If you were parsimonious in a deflation and maybe even a lender, you were rewarded”

  • There genuinely was not enough money in the economy, but because of affection for a mismanaged gold standard and the lack of a modern Fed law (passed only in the 1930s), policymakers didn't want to and didn't know how to conduct open market operations to expand the money supply, so even had they wanted to, easing would have been harder.

    “because of their affection for the gold standard, and they had a mismanaged gold standard... they didn't want to make more money and they didn't really know how to, and they didn't have the right fed law yet”

0.54

Roosevelt weaponized tax policy and prosecuted legal tax avoidance as criminal while eroding respect for the taxpayer.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Roosevelt's 'forgotten man' was the poor man at the bottom who receives the benefit, but William Graham Sumner's original forgotten man—C in the A-B-C formulation—is the unnoticed taxpayer who subsidizes the progressive project and always pays, and increasingly it is Sumner's forgotten man, the taxpayer, who matters most.

    “His forgotten man was the man who subsidizes the dubious progressive project, the one who pays.”

  • Roosevelt prosecuted people in an egregious way by conflating tax avoidance, which is sometimes legal, with tax evasion, which is illegal—treating anyone who tried to pay less in taxes as a criminal—exemplified by the hypocritical, persistent prosecution of Andrew Mellon for taking legal deductions even as Roosevelt himself failed to compute his own taxes.

    “by taking avoidance, which is sometimes legal, and evasion, which is illegal, and conflating them and treating them as if they were the same. Anyone who tried to pay less taxes was a criminal as far as he was concerned”

  • The vicious, decency-lacking list-making and smearing of innocent people associated with 1950s McCarthyism was foreshadowed by Roosevelt, who made lists of taxpayers to target and smeared completely innocent people for the purpose of class warfare—meaning Republicans learned their nastiness from the New Dealers.

    “where the Republicans learned how to be nasty. And, they learned it from the New Dealers because Roosevelt made up lists of taxpayers he wanted to target. The lists of McCarthy were foreshadowed by the lists of Roosevelt”