Leif Wenar on Blood Oil
What this covers
Leif Wenar, a philosophy professor at King's College London, joins Russ Roberts to argue that the United States treats oil and mineral imports from authoritarian regimes as if they were legitimately for sale, when in fact they are stolen from the people who own those countries. The core claim rests on a philosophical principle: resources belong to a nation's people, not to whoever controls its government by force. Wenar contends that buying such resources violates market norms rather than upholding them, and that the U.S. could unilaterally adopt a narrower purchasing rule—limiting imports to governments minimally accountable to their citizens—without waiting for international consensus or fearing economic collapse.
The conversation ranges across philosophy, law, and empirical consequence. Wenar invokes the principle that already sits in international human rights law: peoples have the right to freely dispose of their own natural wealth. He distinguishes between market mechanisms and market legitimacy, noting that a functioning market for human beings existed 300 years ago, yet slavery was never morally sellable. The Resource Curse anchors much of the analysis: oil and minerals flowing to unaccountable rulers fund repression, civil conflict, and extremism rather than public welfare, making such imports complicit in outcomes ranging from torture to jihadist networks. Roberts pushes back with concerns about trade's benefits to low-wage workers and notes how past sanctions on Cuba entrenched its regime. Wenar proposes a tariff-trust mechanism to protect property rights even in second-hand goods, and argues that China eventually has incentives to stop fueling regional instability. The two disagree on how much the moral case can override conventional trade economics, but both engage the underlying premise: the question of resource trade is fundamentally about who has the legitimate right to sell what a people owns.
Wenar argues that importing oil and minerals from authoritarian regimes and armed groups violates core market norms by treating 'Might Makes Right' as a property rule, effectively buying stolen goods from people who don't own them, and that the U.S. could and should unilaterally adopt a rule of buying resources only from governments minimally accountable to their people.
- Resources sold by unaccountable rulers are effectively stolen from the people who own the country
- The same 'Might Makes Right' rule once legalized the slave trade and is anti-market
- The U.S. is a sovereign state that can set its own rules about whom it buys oil from, and a tariff-trust mechanism can protect property rights even on second-hand oil
Trade with low-wage countries improves worker welfare over time as industrialization occurs.
- Trade with low-wage and even sweatshop-labor countries tends to make those workers better off over time, as countries that industrialized through such labor became much wealthier; therefore boycotting them is often counterproductive, and the right move can be to buy more of what they produce to raise demand for their services and wages.
“the evidence is that a lot of these people who make these low wages actually have been improved over time by trade. Not by not-trade.”
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“we've added a new feature at EconTalk.org, the Extras”
Sanctions and trade restrictions allow repressive regimes to blame external enemies rather than reform.
- The roughly 50-year US sanctions and trade ban on Cuba allowed the Castro regime to blame the United States for Cuba's economic situation rather than its own policies, creating a demonization narrative that misled people—suggesting that non-engagement can entrench rather than weaken repressive regimes.
“the sanctions and the failure to trade with Cuba has allowed Cuba to blame the United States for its economic situation, rather than its own policies”
Reducing resource wealth concentration would decrease violence and conflict while improving wellbeing measurement.
- In resource states where wealth is very unequally distributed, average or per capita income is a poor measure of the population's wellbeing because high averages can mask deep deprivation among most people.
“of course it's often high in these countries it's very unequally distributed, so the average or per capita is a very bad measure of the wellbeing of the people”
- Lowering the value of the prize represented by oil wells would reduce the willingness of people to kill and brutalize others to gain access to those resources, which would be a significant benefit.
“if you lower the value of the prize of those wells, the willingness of people to kill other people and brutalize them to get access to that will be reduced”
- Across modern history, identities have changed to make more of the world like safe Manhattan rather than the dangerous eastern Congo, indicating that the world is on a trend toward becoming more peaceful and safe—though wickedness funded by oil money persists.
“Across modern history, identities have changed to make more of the world like Manhattan.”
Trade-restriction campaigns often mix genuine moral concern with hidden self-interested profit motives.
- Many trade-restriction campaigns succeed through a Bootlegger-and-Baptist coalition: 'Baptists' take the moral high ground (it's terrible to trade with exploited workers) while 'Bootleggers' support the same restriction because they personally profit from reduced competition—but the blood-oil case appears to be mostly Baptist, lacking the self-interested beneficiaries.
“It's what we call a Bootlegger and Baptist issue here on EconTalk, from Bruce Yandle's work”