What this covers

Tina Rosenberg and Russ Roberts examine Iran's legal paid-kidney system—the world's only regulated market where citizens can sell kidneys to one another. The core claim is stark: Iran has eliminated the donor waiting list that constrains transplantation everywhere else, and the standard moral objections to paying donors do not withstand scrutiny. Rosenberg argues that a wealthy country adopting an improved version of Iran's model could save tens of thousands currently dying while waiting for living donor or deceased donor kidneys. The conversation moves between the mechanics of how Iran's system works, its actual track record, and whether its lessons transfer to countries with different institutional capacity and economic circumstances.

The discussion crosses several territories. Mechanically, Iran requires donors and recipients to share nationality and routes transactions through nonprofit civil society organizations rather than for-profit middleman, preempting the transplant tourism and exploitation that flourish in unregulated black market regimes. Medically, the conversation weighs the dramatic differences in outcomes between dialysis, deceased donor transplant, and living donor transplant, alongside the perverse economics of Medicare funding anti-rejection medicine for only three years. Morally and philosophically, both speakers challenge the commodification objection—noting that plasma, sperm, and egg donation are already paid—and weigh the repugnance of accepting payment against the repugnance of letting people die. The conversation also identifies genuine problems in Iran's system: donors tend to come from the poorest populations, the stigma around payment causes avoidance of follow-up care, and the government's shrinking subsidy has shifted costs onto patients, leaving poor recipients dependent on charities that run out of money. Throughout, the speakers debate whether these are flaws inherent to paying donors or artifacts of implementing the system in a resource-constrained setting.

Sharpest takeaway

Rosenberg argues that Iran's legal, regulated, government-and-charity-mediated market for living kidney donors has eliminated the donor waiting list and that the standard moral and exploitation objections to paying donors do not survive scrutiny, so rich countries could adopt an improved version to save the tens of thousands who die waiting.

  • Iran's regulated paid-donor system removed the donor wait that is the binding constraint everywhere else, and its problems are poverty-driven, not inherent to paying donors
  • Exploitation and 'commodification' objections weaken once you note we already pay for plasma, sperm, and eggs and that letting people die is more morally repugnant
  • The US already accepts a discriminatory altruism-only system and is moving toward removing financial disincentives to donation

The argument · threads6 threads · 40 claims
0.74

Iran's regulated paid-donor system eliminated waiting lists by matching patients to paid donors almost instantly, proving donation payment works at scale.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • By paying donors, Iran essentially eliminated the kidney recipient waiting list so patients could be matched almost instantly; instead it was donors who waited for the right patient to come up.

    “they eliminated essentially their kidney waiting list. People could get matched instantly. In fact, it was the donors who were on a waiting list.”

  • Iran's paid kidney donation is a legal, regulated official system rather than a black market, and precisely because legal purchase exists, it pre-empts the under-the-table transactions that lead to abuses.

    “if you can buy a kidney legally then you don't have to do one under the table, which leads to all sorts of abuses.”

  • A kidney transplant is done once whereas dialysis must be done forever, so supporting patients on dialysis is much more expensive than providing transplants; this cost reality drove Iran's post-revolution decision to pay donors.

    “people on dialysis is actually much more expensive than providing a kidney transplant, because a kidney transplant you could do once, and dialysis you do forever.”

  • Paying donors does not mean instant transplants in Iran—patients still wait due to medical testing, price negotiations, and donors withdrawing—and many people on dialysis simply choose not to get a transplant, but crucially the wait is not for finding a donor, which is the significant wait in essentially every other country.

    “they eliminated essentially their kidney waiting list. People could get matched instantly. In fact, it was the donors who were on a waiting list.”

  • Iran uses regional nonprofit dialysis and kidney associations (often run by patients and families) as middlemen rather than for-profit brokers, because a profit-motivated middleman would have incentives to create medically inappropriate transplants and take a large cut.

    “It's really important to not have a middleman who makes a profit, because otherwise they would have incentives to make matches and create transplants where they would be medically inappropriate.”

0.70

The US faces a desperate kidney shortage with years-long waits and preventable deaths, while current live-donation access is discriminatory against poor patients.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • In the US far more people need kidney transplants than there are kidneys available; the waiting list can be up to 10 years in some regions, and many patients die on dialysis before receiving a transplant.

    “in some places it can be as long as 10 years. And in the meantime, they are on dialysis. And a lot of people don't survive that long.”

  • The US live-donation system is effectively discriminatory because giving a kidney imposes large financial burdens (a month off work, travel, testing) that poor people cannot bear, so wealthier patients have far better access to living related donors than poor patients do.

    “Our system is discriminatory because poor people do not have the same access to live, related donors that wealthier people do.”

  • Rising obesity rates cause diabetes, and diabetes causes kidney failure, so the number of people needing kidney transplants has been rising and will continue to rise.

    “obesity is a big problem; that is causing diabetes, and diabetes causes kidney failure. So, with rising obesity and diabetes rates, people needing kidney transplants, that number has been rising and rising.”

  • Medicare pays for only 3 years of anti-rejection medication (about $14,000/year) after a kidney transplant, which is an absurd false economy because patients then likely lose the kidney and need another transplant or dialysis—both far more expensive.

    “Medicare will only pay for 3 years of anti-rejection medicine for people who have a new kidney. Which is absurd. Because that means they are likely to lose their kidney”

0.57

Iran's system has poor-country implementation problems like funding shortfalls and donor stigma, but these are not inherent to payment and rich countries could execute it far better.

8 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Originally the Iranian government paid donors the equivalent of about $3,500 framed as a 'gift' for altruism, but over time the government share eroded to about $350 of a ~$5,000 regulated price, shifting the burden onto patients and creating problems for poor patients who depend on charities that run out of money.

    “The government has set a price, actually. It's just about--it's over $5000. And the government pays $350 of that. So, all the rest is on the patient.”

  • Iranians involved in the kidney system are generally proud of it, viewing it as a creative solution the world can learn from despite deep, mostly financial problems, and feel pressure from global transplantation societies to abandon paying donors.

    “the doctors and the economists that I talked to all felt this was a really creative solution that the world can learn from. And, yes, it's got a lot of problems. But there's nothing to be ashamed of.”

  • Donating a kidney is a relatively safe operation because survival with one kidney is essentially the same as with two—an infection that would threaten a kidney would affect both anyway—so donors often have little need for follow-up care.

    “your chances of survival with one kidney are essentially the same as with two, because if you are going to get an infection, you are going to get it in both kidneys anyway.”

  • When you pay donors, the donor pool skews toward very poor people who tend to present sicker with more underlying problems than middle-class donors, so the death rate among Iranian donors is probably slightly higher than in unpaid systems—though still very low and not due to worse medical care.

    “when you pay donors, the people who are going to be donating their kidney are very poor people. And very poor people tend to come in sicker than middle class people.”

  • The problems Iran's kidney system runs into are 'poor country problems' (like running out of money mid-year) that are not inherent in the idea of paying kidney donors; rich countries could adopt the system and do a much better job without these issues.

    “the problems it has run into are poor country problems. They are not problems that are inherent in the idea of paying kidney donors. Rich countries could adopt this system and do a much better job”

  • Life expectancy differs sharply across dialysis, deceased-donor transplant, and live-donor transplant; deceased-donor kidneys often don't start working immediately (requiring brief dialysis), while live-donor transplants are higher quality with survival up to 20 years, and both are far superior to dialysis which cleans blood only about 15% as well as healthy kidneys.

    “Most dialysis cleans about 15% as well as your kidneys do, and the toxins kill you.”

  • The Shiraz region developed a successful deceased-donor program in part because the infrastructure (skilled transplant doctors, hospitals, testing facilities) built by the paid-donor system already existed, and the paid system serves as a safety valve so patients need not wait long for deceased donors.

    “if you need a kidney in Shiraz and you wait for a deceased donor, if you don't get one in 6 months, then you can go elsewhere and get a paid donor.”

  • Because Iranian donors are paid, donation is stigmatized (people assume donors are drug addicts), which leads many donors to give fake phone numbers and avoid medical follow-up after surgery.

    “because donors are paid, it's a bit stigmatized. People assume, 'Oh, if you are donating your kidney, you are a drug addict and you want money for drugs.'”

0.53

Paying donors at fair market rates ($15,000) does not inherently enable exploitation because regulated systems like Iran's prevent the abusive black-market organ trade.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Gary Becker and Argentine economist Julio Elias estimated a fair kidney payment of about $15,000 accounting for pain, suffering, and risk; adjusted for cost of living (purchasing power), that figure is roughly what Iranian patients pay.

    “Gary Becker, from the U. of Chicago... And Julio Elias, an Argentine economist, did a study and came up with the $15,000 figure. Now, if you translate that into Iran and you divide it by cost of living, that's about what Iran is paying”

  • Iran's system requires the donor to be the same nationality as the recipient, so foreigners cannot buy kidneys from Iranians and Afghan refugees must use Afghan donors, which prevents wealthy transplant tourism.

    “The rule that you had to be the same nationality as your donor. Which meant that people could not come from overseas and get kidneys from Iranians.”

  • The exploitative organ-trade model—wealthy tourists meeting brokers in poor countries who mistreat desperate donors and pay them far less than the patient pays—exists in many poor countries but not in Iran, precisely because Iran's regulated official paid system removes the conditions for it.

    “if you can buy a kidney legally then you don't have to do one under the table, which leads to all sorts of abuses.”

0.53

Moral objections to body-part payment and donor exploitation fail because we already compensate plasma, sperm, and egg donors, and kidney donation is safer than many paid dangerous jobs.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Even granting that paying someone for a kidney is morally repugnant, it is certainly more morally repugnant to let thousands of people die because they don't have a kidney, so the sacredness-of-the-body objection must be weighed against those deaths.

    “It is certainly more morally repugnant to let someone die because they don't have one.”

  • The objection that paying donors exploits the poor by luring them into dangerous work fails because people take dangerous jobs for money all the time, and donating a kidney is far less dangerous than many such jobs; the proposal to let only middle-class people donate is paternalistic.

    “people do dangerous things for money all the time. There's a lot of jobs that are pretty dangerous... Donating a kidney is far less dangerous than many other jobs. So, what's wrong with that?”

  • The moral objection that you shouldn't sell parts of your body is undercut because we already pay people for plasma (enough that the US supplies the world), sperm, and eggs; egg donation in particular raises more fraught ethical issues than kidney donation since it can produce a human being.

    “People get paid for donating plasma in the United States... We get paid for donating sperm; we get paid for donating eggs. So, that train has left the station”

0.49

The US should run pilot programs testing different donor-compensation schemes incrementally rather than wholesale adoption, given near-consensus political will to remove donation disincentives.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Rather than wholesale adoption, the US should hold a serious discussion of the pros and cons and run small-scale pilot programs trying different schemes of compensating kidney donors to see what works, since removing disincentives alone won't come close to meeting the need.

    “I'd like to see some pilot programs try different schemes of compensating kidney donors, on a small scale, and see what happens.”

  • There is near-unanimous political will in the US to remove disincentives to donation—compensating lost work time and providing health insurance—and the line between removing disincentives and outright compensating donors is very fuzzy, suggesting incremental movement toward payment.

    “the line between compensating donors and removing disincentives is a very fuzzy one. But there is definitely almost unanimous political will for removing disincentives.”