What this covers

Morris Fiorina examines the puzzle of American political instability since 2000 in conversation with Russ Roberts. Fiorina, a Stanford political scientist, argues that the Republican and Democratic parties have genuinely moved toward ideological extremes, yet the American electorate itself has remained fundamentally moderate and unchanged since the 1970s. The apparent mismatch—volatile election outcomes, swings between parties controlling the presidency and Congress, and widespread voter dissatisfaction—stems not from voters shifting their views but from the choices offered them. Fiorina traces this disconnect through party identification, party sorting, primary mechanics, and the data on what citizens actually prioritize versus what politicians pursue.

The conversation spans several distinct territories. Fiorina argues that party sorting—the clarification of parties into ideologically coherent units as conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans disappeared—created the appearance of a transformed electorate even though the underlying distribution of liberal, moderate, and conservative voters stayed stable. He examines how small activist groups exploit low primary turnout to push candidates away from the center, how geographic redistribution has created homogeneous party bases nationwide rather than regional variation, and how Independents swing wildly yet cannot shape nominations. The discussion turns to specific disconnects: a 2013 Pew survey showing immigration, gun laws, and climate change ranked near the bottom of public priorities while the Washington establishment treats them as central; the collapse of support for government programs once costs are attached; and a broader erosion of public information despite information abundance. Fiorina also addresses the role of motivated reasoning among the most informed partisans and explores biological research into the inheritance of political attitudes—once a taboo subject in political science.

Sharpest takeaway

Fiorina argues that American political instability since 2000 reflects polarized, sorted parties offering choices that don't satisfy a fundamentally unchanged, moderate electorate—not a change in voters themselves.

  • Partisan and ideological self-identification has been essentially stable since the 1970s
  • Party sorting, not electorate change, drove the parties to ideological extremes
  • Small, ideologically extreme activist groups dominate primaries and pull candidates away from the center

The argument · threads8 threads · 31 claims
0.64

Voter ideology and partisanship have remained remarkably stable since the 1970s despite apparent electoral upheaval.

3 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Self-identified party identification has been stable since the mid-1970s—Democrats at 35-40%, Republicans never cracking ~30% since Eisenhower, with Independents close to the Democrats—and ideology is even more stable, with liberals at 20-25%, conservatives ~35%, and moderates the plurality at 35-40%.

    “the Democrats 35-40%; Republicans have never cracked about 30% since the Eisenhower era. They are definitely the minority. The Democrats have a plurality. The Independents are close to that as well.”

  • The American electorate's partisan inclinations, ideological self-positioning, and issue positions have changed very little since the 1970s; the instability arises not because voters change their minds but because the choices offered by the parties are unstable and neither party has convinced voters it has the answers.

    “the electorate itself hasn't changed. That if you go back and you look at people's partisan inclinations, look at their ideological position-taking, look at their positions on the issues, you would have a hard time differentiating the 1970s from the present era. If I didn't label the tables you'd have a hard time saying which era that comes from”

  • The major change mistaken for a changing electorate is 'party sorting': the relationships among partisanship and ideology have clarified, with conservative Democrats (especially Southerners) and liberal Republicans (the Rockefeller wing) dying out or leaving, so that the Democratic Party is now clearly liberal and the Republican Party clearly conservative—people are now in the 'right' parties—which fuels partisan warfare even though the actual percentages of liberals, moderates, and conservatives have not changed.

    “what's happened is conservatives have essentially been driven out of the Democratic Party or have left or died out. And the Republican Party, liberals or left have died out. And the moderates basically don't have a home in either party.”

0.64

Recent electoral instability arises from parties offering unstable choices rather than voters changing their fundamental preferences.

3 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Long periods of electoral instability arise when large-scale social and economic changes—mass immigration, economic transition (agricultural-to-industrial then, industrial-to-informational now), globalization, and internal population movements—throw up new issues that split old coalitions, so neither party can build a stable majority vision until one decisively wins and governs satisfactorily.

    “in the late 19th century we had a series of sweeping social and economic developments that are repeated today”

  • The period of roughly 2004-2010 produced four distinct patterns of majority control across the Presidency and both houses of Congress, an instability so unusual that one must go back to the 1886-1894 period to find a comparable era where both parties continually compete for control of all three institutions.

    “we went from unified Republican government in 2004 to a Republican head of divided government in 2006 to a unified Democratic government in 2008, to a Democratic head of divided government with split control of Congress in 2010. And there were four distinct patterns here of majority control”

  • After a big win, parties tend to overreach—building coalitions from their wing (Democrats from the left, Republicans from the right) and governing in ways that alienate the center they needed to win—so they lose the center in the next midterm, as happened to Bush after 2004 and Obama after 2008.

    “Democrats tend to build their coalitions from the left; Republicans tend to do theirs from the right; and you've got to get enough of the center to win. But then if you govern in a way that alienates the center once you get into office, then you lose that in the mid-term.”

0.53

Democrats lost control by pursuing ideological priorities misaligned with public economic concerns during crisis.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Beyond the substance of health care, what hurt Democrats was the mismatch of priorities: amid an economic crisis (foreclosures, unemployment), the public consistently signaled the economy was the priority, yet Democrats pursued cap-and-trade and health care—ideological 'hobby horses'—producing a 2010 backlash demanding focus on what voters considered important.

    “What are these people worrying about cap-and-trade and health care and stuff like that when we are dying? Houses are being foreclosed on, we're out of work, we have no money.”

  • A January 2013 Pew Poll asking the public to rank 21 priorities placed Obama's stated agenda items near the bottom—immigration 17th, gun laws 18th, and global warming 21st of 21—while economy, jobs, deficits, Social Security, education, and Medicare topped the list, revealing a total disconnect between what the Washington establishment treats as important and what the public considers important.

    “immigration came in number 17 in priority; gun laws came in 18th in priority; and global warming came in number 21 out of 21. So I mean there's a total disconnect between what the Washington establishment thinks of as the important issues facing the country and what the population as a whole does.”

  • Statistical modeling shows the health care vote was the difference between winning and losing for House Democrats in 2010 except in the strongest Obama districts: the 'McCain Democrats' (House Democrats from districts that voted McCain) were wiped out about three-quarters of the time, and only those who voted against both cap-and-trade and health care survived—about half of them—while those who voted for the bills lost, contributing to a 63-seat loss when only 38 were needed to flip the chamber.

    “the people who got wiped out in 2010 were what we call the McCain Democrats... And that group, basically 3/4 of them got wiped out. And it was always the case that if they voted for either cap-and-trade or health care, they lost.”

  • Among the minority who considered health care a big issue, about one-third saw it as about access and two-thirds about costs; but the access-focused group was nearly all the Democratic base, which is why the resulting legislation was structured as an access bill rather than a cost bill—not where the public felt the problem lay.

    “about 1/3 thought it was about access and 2/3 thought it was about costs. Now, the fact though, was that people who were concerned about access were nearly all of the Democratic base. So that's why you saw this being basically an access bill, and not a cost bill.”

0.50

Ideological activists and primary voters drive candidates to extremes, preventing moderation and general-election appeal.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Although the median voter model predicts candidates should converge on the center, the modern participatory nomination system lets small numbers of ideologically committed activists drive the process—turnout in early 2012 caucuses was as low as 1-7 voters per 100 eligible—so candidates are hauled to the extremes by true believers rather than nominated by professionals seeking a winner.

    “in Minnesota 1 out of every 100 eligible voters turned out in the Minnesota caucus that Santorum won. In Colorado 2 out of every 100 voters turned out... In the Missouri beauty-contest primary, 7 out of every 100 eligible Missouri votes turned out”

  • Unlike 1970, when Democratic and Republican electorates differed sharply by region (e.g., Mississippi vs. Massachusetts Democrats), the parties are now homogeneous across the country, so a Democrat's primary constituency everywhere is public-employee unions, pro-choice, anti-gun, and liberal cause groups, and a Republican's is taxpayer and pro-life conservative cause groups, pulling candidates left or right regardless of where they come from.

    “the parties now are pretty much homogeneous across the country, so if you are a Democrat, it doesn't matter where you are--your primary constituency is going to be the public employees' unions, it's going to be the pro-choice groups, the anti-gun groups”

  • Many base activists would rather lose with an ideologically pure candidate than win with a moderate, treating partisanship like sports fandom; party officials face primary constituencies who say they would rather lose with a pro-life candidate than win with one who waffles, making it impossible to reason them toward electability.

    “there are people out there who would rather lose with their candidate than win with a moderate”

0.47

Independents swing sharply between elections and hold the electoral balance but cannot moderate primary nominations.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Independents have swung dramatically in recent elections—about 17 points against Republicans in 2006 and 18 points against Democrats in 2010, a net 35-point swing in four years—and had abandoned Obama by September 2009, forecasting the 2010 backlash; they are the wildcard, but because they don't vote in party primaries and turn out less than partisans, they cannot pull nominations toward the center.

    “I think it was 17 points against the Republicans in 2006 and 18 points against the Democrats in 2010. So a net 35 point swing in a 4-year period.”

  • The distribution of opinion within red and blue states is far more similar than people believe; rather than the stereotype of solid-red and solid-blue states, shading states by the proportion of strong partisans and Independents shows a country that is mostly pink and purple, and non-standard candidates like Christie could scramble the electoral map by competing where ordinary partisans cannot.

    “the distribution of opinion in red states and blue states are more similar than I think anyone believes”

0.44

Informed discourse suffers from public disengagement, mal-information among partisans, and academy overemphasis on methodology.

10 pointscentrality 2/5
  • A frontier of political science research, once politically incorrect, now studies the biological and genetic bases of political attitudes—including a twin-studies claim that about half of one's ideology is inherited from parents—funded increasingly by NIH rather than NSF, which no longer funds political science unrelated to national security or economic growth.

    “there's one claim, for example, based on twin studies that about half of your ideologies are inherited from your parents. That it's in your genes.”

  • Despite a vast increase in information sources, the American public as a whole is, if anything, less well-informed than a generation ago—fewer people can name their member of Congress today than 30 years ago—because the proliferation of ways to avoid political content (cable, entertainment alternatives) has outpaced the increased availability of information.

    “the American public as a whole is if anything less well-informed than it was a generation ago. For example, fewer people can name their member of Congress today than they could 30 years ago”

  • Contemporary American political science (and economics) has swung too far toward methodology and small empirical questions answerable with granular data, neglecting big arguments; the abundance of data and fancier statistical tools may not actually be producing more intellectually interesting work, and the pendulum will likely swing back as it did in political economy.

    “I find a lot of work in younger scholars being less concerned with bigger questions and more with how to answer smaller questions, or even just how to answer any question. I think basically the pendulum has swung a little too far in that direction.”

  • The classic 'problem of intensity' in democratic politics explains gun control: although 80-90% majorities favor measures like background checks, an apathetic majority that doesn't care can be effectively outweighed by an intense minority that will vote against any member of Congress who supports gun control, so the majority is not really being thwarted because if it truly cared it would not be thwarted.

    “is it fair the apathetic majority should rule... threatening the health of the system... and gun control is this way”

  • Long-range presidential forecasting is unreliable; the 1976 example—where a Gallup canvass of Democratic officials produced a list of 34 potential candidates that did not include eventual winner Jimmy Carter—shows an unexpected candidate may emerge, so naming Clinton, Cruz, Rubio, Bush, or Christie for 2016 is premature.

    “they came up with a list of 34 names of potential Democratic candidates for potential 1976. And one name that was not on the list of 34 was Jimmy Carter.”

  • In 1888 the Democrats won the popular vote but Grover Cleveland was counted out in the Electoral College, an additional technical parallel to the recent era of electoral instability.

    “the Democrats actually won the popular vote but Grover Cleveland was counted out in the Electoral College”

  • Public support for government action collapses when costs are attached: on spending items the only programs people want to cut are foreign aid, welfare, and the space program while wanting to increase everything else, and a health care study found support for universal access fell apart at around $50 per family per year, showing people endorse good things only as long as they are cheap and won't pay for others' access.

    “The only thing people ever want to cut is foreign aid, welfare, and the space program. Everything else they want to increase.”

  • An 'edge' of meanness in some Republican rhetoric—treating people on social programs as objects of moral opprobrium rather than just arguing the programs are ineffective or counterproductive—repels voters, who are willing to hear arguments that programs don't work but not that beneficiaries deserve punishment.

    “It's not just that we think these programs are ineffective. It's we think the people on them somehow should be the objects of moral opprobrium. And people sense that.”

  • Studies show unified governments do not produce more legislation than divided governments; the late-19th-century instability era nonetheless passed major laws (Interstate Commerce Act, Sherman Antitrust Act), and divided government may simply reflect an absence of consensus that makes legislating inappropriate, so gridlock is not necessarily bad and is judged negatively mainly by those who favor an active large government.

    “There are a number of studies: Do unified governments produce more legislation than divided governments? And the answer is: No.”

  • On social issues like homosexuality and sexuality, traditional morality is gone among younger generations—who are not immoral but hold different views—and the shift is not merely a generational cohort effect but also an aging effect, with even older cohorts becoming more open-minded as they come to know gay relatives, which hurts Republicans tied to hardline social-conservative positions.

    “when it comes to issues like homosexuality, anything having to do with sex basically--the old traditional morality is gone”

0.36

Structural House advantages, demographic realignment myths, and Republican brand weakness shape electoral outcomes.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • The post-2012 storyline that Republicans are doomed by demographics (Hispanics, single women, gays) is the kind of immediately-popular interpretation that is almost invariably wrong; demography matters but parties recalculate and reposition over time, as the Democrats did after cracking up in 1968-1972 and being pulled back to the mainstream by Bill Clinton roughly 20 years later.

    “the story line was that the Republicans are doomed because of demographics... Demography is important but it is not destiny.”

  • Republicans have a structural advantage in the House because rural and suburban districts are less homogeneous than urban ones, so Democrats waste votes running up huge majorities in urban and minority districts, and with the South now Republican, Republicans win their seats more efficiently (by ~60% rather than 70%).

    “the Democrats waste a lot of votes running up big majorities in urban districts, essentially in minority districts, and now that the South has gone from Democrats to Republicans, Republicans just have more efficient districts--they win by 60% rather than 70%”

  • The more interesting feature of 2012 was not merely a higher Hispanic and lower white share of the electorate, but that overall turnout dropped despite 6 million more eligible voters and white turnout fell by several million—so whatever Republicans were selling didn't play well even among whites, indicating a problem with the whole Republican brand rather than just demographics.

    “There were 6 million more eligible voters this time around; but turnout actually dropped... the white turnout dropped by several million, maybe 4-5 million in voters. So whatever they were selling didn't even play that well among whites this time.”

0.36

Ordinary voters hold inconsistent issue positions and differ fundamentally from activists in how they understand political labels.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Ordinary people do not mean by labels like 'conservative' what movement activists, commentators, and journalists mean; a person can call themselves a conservative yet hold liberal positions on various issues, because ordinary voters are far less consistent in their issue positions than activists.

    “A person can call themselves a conservative and yet have liberal positions on various issues. They are not nearly as consistent in their views on specific issues as activists and commentators and journalists are.”

  • There are two kinds of Independents—true Independents (uninformed) and leaning Independents (more informed)—while the strongest partisans are most informed yet also 'mal-informed' due to motivated reasoning: strong Democrats believe inflation didn't decline under Reagan, and strong Republicans believe WMD were found under Bush, both of which are false.

    “the strong partisan is also mal-informed. They believe things that aren't true. The surveys show, for example, that strong Democrats believe that inflation didn't decline under Reagan... And the strongest Republicans believe that weapons of mass destruction were found under Bush.”

  • Survey data show the public is simultaneously uninformed and mal-informed about taxes: they say the rich should pay more, but they underestimate what the rich currently pay and, when asked the fair tax for various income brackets, name figures actually below what those brackets currently pay.

    “the population according to these surveys does think we should have more taxes on the rich. But then when you ask them, what are the rich actually paying, they underestimate... they think the rich should be paying less than they actually are”