Glenn Reynolds on Politics, the Constitution, and Technology
What this covers
Glenn Reynolds, a University of Tennessee law professor, sits down with Russ Roberts to diagnose American political malaise and explore structural remedies. The conversation moves from the proximate causes of distrust—the sheer value of capturing an increasingly powerful state—to deeper institutional failures in how government operates and how we might redesign it. Reynolds argues that the real obstacle to reform is not fiscal constraint but the non-monetary economy of self-importance that keeps politicians and bureaucrats invested in expansion, and that genuine change requires shifting culture first, then politics, then law, rather than betting on electing better people.
The episode ranges widely across criminal justice (prosecutorial discretion that handles 95 percent of cases outside formal trial), electoral mechanics (how gerrymandering produces hatred of Congress while individuals remain popular), and media incentives (why journalists tend to cheerlead bigger government). Reynolds defends the Constitutional Convention as a credible threat—one the framers designed so states could bypass Congress entirely—while dismissing suggestions to ignore the Constitution as self-defeating: official authority has no legitimacy except through that document, so abandoning it amounts to admitting rule by naked force. On technology, he sketches how modern tools empower individuals and small groups in ways the industrial era reserved for large organizations, even constraining state behavior in authoritarian contexts. He also proposes the House of Repeal, a chamber with power only to eliminate laws, addressing the absence of institutional incentive to shrink government. Throughout, Roberts and Reynolds engage points of tension—whether reform can move toward liberty, what triggers crystallization of public discontent, whether echo chambers or the loss of mainstream media gatekeeping poses the real problem.
Reynolds argues that the growth of government is fundamentally unsustainable and driven less by money than by the non-monetary rewards of power, and that genuine reform requires changing the culture and institutional incentives—not just electing better people—while technology decentralizes power and the Constitution's legitimacy is the only thing that makes official authority defensible.
- Distrust of government is at historic highs because capturing a powerful government is more consequential than ever
- Politicians and bureaucrats are driven by a non-monetary economy of self-importance, so shrinking government threatens their psychic income, not just their salaries
- Public officials' only legitimate claim to obedience flows from the Constitution, so arguing to ignore it undermines their own authority
Government growth persists because sincere moral advocates and power-seeking officials form an alliance citizens cannot defeat.
- Government growth is protected by a bootlegger-and-Baptist coalition: those who sincerely believe bigger government helps the children, elderly, or economy (the moral high ground) ally with those who simply enjoy wielding the levers of power and being important, and the two together are very hard to defeat.
“it's a classic bootlegger and Baptist coalition--one group that has the moral high ground... And then you have the people who like living in that world”
Hidden tax structures prevent citizens from perceiving government's true cost, undermining democratic accountability.
- The artificial wall between payroll taxes and income taxes—where half of payroll tax is nominally paid by the employer and many families pay no income tax at all—means people don't perceive the cost of government, which is bad for democracy.
“a lot of people don't perceive their payroll taxes--half of them are paid by their employer, at least on paper, probably coming out of their own paycheck, but most of us don't see that directly so we don't notice it”
Majoritarian voting systems push both candidates toward the median, leaving non-median voters chronically dissatisfied.
- Once a system grants a body power to pass non-opt-outable laws, the median voter (Hotelling) model implies two-candidate competition pushes both toward the middle, leaving anyone outside the median pretty unhappy by the nature of the system.
“the median voter model, the Hotelling model... if you only have two candidates they are going to push toward the middle. And anyone else is going to be pretty unhappy when it's over.”