Joshua Rauh on Public Pensions
What this covers
Joshua Rauh, a finance professor at Stanford, speaks with Russ Roberts of EconTalk about the accounting crisis embedded in state and local pension systems. Rauh's central claim is straightforward: governments are using an 8% expected return to discount pension promises, which hides the true cost of these guaranteed obligations. When revalued at risk-free rates—the only defensible approach for guaranteed liabilities—the unfunded gap balloons from the officially reported $1 trillion to roughly $4.4 trillion, or about $38,000 per household. The conversation unfolds as a methodical case for why this accounting error matters, how it arose, and why the legal and political structure of public pensions makes the problem nearly impossible to solve through ordinary budget discipline.
The substance divides into distinct lines of attack. First, Rauh establishes the accounting error itself: a guaranteed liability must be discounted at risk-free rates, not stock market returns, because the guarantee holds regardless of market performance—a principle FASB applies to corporate pensions and one that international systems like the Netherlands observe. Second, he shows how balanced-budget requirements fail as a fiscal check because they constrain current spending but permit unlimited future promises, allowing states to circumvent them through pension accounting. Third, the conversation examines the structural traps: pension promises are treated as nearly immutable contracts, unlike Social Security which Congress can adjust; five to six million workers depend entirely on these systems; and the risk structure is perverse—when markets crash, precisely when taxpayers have least capacity to pay, they must supply additional funds. Rauh forecasts mounting municipal bankruptcies and crises within two decades unless states raise taxes substantially, cut services, or restructure pensions, a forecast endorsed by 92% of academic economists surveyed by the Initiative on Global Markets.
Rauh argues that state and local public pensions discount their guaranteed liabilities using an unrealistic 8% expected return, hiding the true cost; properly valued at near-risk-free rates the unfunded liability is roughly $4.4 trillion rather than the reported ~$1 trillion, and the legal inability to restructure these promises makes a slow-motion fiscal crisis likely.
- A guaranteed deferred pension must be discounted at risk-free rates, not the expected return on risky assets, because the guarantee holds regardless of market performance
- Balanced-budget rules constrain current spending but not future promises, letting states circumvent them through pension accounting
- Pension promises are treated as contractual and nearly impossible to restructure, unlike Social Security which Congress can adjust
Current pension structure shifts risk from employees to taxpayers, creating perverse incentives.
- Under the current structure the riskiness of the pension promise is borne by taxpayers rather than employees, so employees receive a generous guarantee whose risk is paid for by someone else—a bad set of incentives.
“they are getting a generous promise where the riskiness of that promise is paid for by someone else. And that's a recipe for--that's a bad set of incentives.”
Strikes enable negotiated settlements on future benefits, but past retiree promises remain the truly intractable problem.
- Strikes would be a relatively good outcome since they lead to negotiated settlements with current employees over future benefits; the truly difficult and nasty problem is trying to renegotiate past promises already made to current retirees.
“that's a settlement you'd usually negotiate with current employees over future benefits. We're talking about trying to renegotiate past promises to current retirees... It's going to get nasty.”