Robert Skidelsky on Money, the Good Life, and How Much is Enough
What this covers
Robert Skidelsky sits with Russ Roberts to discuss whether rich societies should keep chasing economic growth or redirect toward a good life with more leisure. Skidelsky, biographer of John Maynard Keynes and co-author of How Much is Enough, argues that beyond a certain wealth threshold, the pursuit of ever-greater consumption becomes irrational and morally corrosive. He traces how Keynes predicted in 1930 that wealthy societies would eventually work only 15–20 hours weekly, freeing people for leisure and human flourishing. Instead, work hours barely fell—dropping from roughly 50 to 40 hours—and the rich now work hardest of all. Skidelsky locates the failure in human insatiability and relative wants: new goods keep arriving, people constantly compare themselves to others, and acquisitiveness persists regardless of material plenty.
The conversation ranges across why happiness itself makes a poor policy target (happiness is a byproduct of achievement, not a standalone goal), how Adam Smith unleashed consumption from moral restraint without explaining how to limit it, and why environmental arguments alone will not halt growth. Skidelsky proposes instead a Basic Goods Framework—health, security, respect, personality, harmony with nature, friendship, and leisure—drawn from overlapping traditions and cultures. He argues the state can legitimately nudge policy toward these goods and against overwork, since it already intervenes pervasively; respecting autonomy sets strict limits on such action, but working less should be made possible through labor-market restructuring in wealthy nations. The discussion becomes contentious on utilitarianism, the Adding-Up Problem, and whether economics itself has become a barrier to asking what a good life requires.
Skidelsky argues that beyond a certain level of wealth, the obsession with economic growth is irrational and morally impoverishing, and that public policy should actively make it easier for people to work less and pursue the basic goods of a good life rather than endless acquisition.
- Keynes predicted leisure would replace work as societies got rich, but human insatiability and relative wants kept people on the treadmill
- Happiness and environmental critiques of growth are inadequate, so one must return to the moral question of what constitutes a good life
- There is broad cross-cultural agreement on basic goods (health, security, respect, personality, harmony with nature, friendship, leisure), so policy can legitimately nudge toward them
Keynes correctly predicted satiation would reduce work but underestimated how constant quality improvements and relative wants perpetually tempt acquisition.
- Keynes predicted in 1930 that as societies became rich enough (with living standards 4-5 times higher and machines replacing human labor), people would ease off work and only need to work about 15-20 hours a week, with leisure replacing work as the central activity of the human race.
“he actually thought that by now, most of us would only be working about 15-20 hours a week. And that would be enough, as he put it, to satisfy the old [?]--leisure would replace work as the central activity of the human race.”
- Keynes underestimated the continued improvement in the quality of goods: although diminishing marginal utility applies to additional units of the same good, the constant arrival of better next-generation goods (like a new iPad) continually tempts people to acquire more, so quality improvement undermines the satiation Keynes expected.
“what that underestimated was the continued improvement in the quality of goods. An improvement that constantly tempts us to acquire the next generation of appliances of all kinds. I'm a bit of a sucker for that. I still think that my iPad 4 is going to be better than my iPad 3.”
- Keynes underestimated human insatiability: beyond a certain level, wants become relative rather than absolute, as people constantly compare their fortunes with others (and with their own past), so they always want more regardless of how much they have or how much goods improve.
“he underestimated human insatiability. We always seem to want more, something different than we have got, no matter how much there is; and that's irrespective of improvement.”
- Although Western societies have become much richer since 1930, work hours have not declined nearly as much as Keynes predicted—falling only from about 50 hours to about 40 hours and recently rising again in some countries—and paradoxically the rich are now among the hardest workers, replacing the idle rich with the workaholic rich.
“the average hours of work, which were 50 hours of so in the 1930s, still are about 40 hours. And recently they've even been going up a bit, in some countries like the United States. And the paradox is that the rich are among the hardest workers. The idea of the idle rich has been replaced by the idea of the workaholic rich.”
- Today economists occupy a dominant cultural position as the high priests of civilization, contrary to Keynes's hope that they would become merely useful technicians akin to dentists.
“economists are the high priests of our civilization.”
Growth beyond poverty elimination becomes collective insanity; modern work patterns perversely concentrate leisure at life's end when enjoyment is least possible.
- While growth is necessary and good where poverty still exists and the elimination of poverty must be the primary goal there, perpetual growth forever cannot be a realizable or sane objective; after a certain amount of growth, societies should pause and enjoy more moments not spent calculating life, rather than always seeking more and more.
“go 100, 200, 300 years into the future. Do you still want all this, all of us just to be growing and growing and having more and more things?... growth forever and ever can't be, can't be a realizable objective. Or a sane objective, I would say.”
- Beyond a certain plateau of wealth, wanting ever more—such as a thousand pairs of shoes, or a whole society wanting more and more without limit—should be regarded as a form of collective insanity, and this insanity is the starting point that justifies putting the question of enough at the center of public policy.
“After a certain plateau of wealth has been achieved, you have to regard it as insane to want to have a thousand pair of shoes. And if you think of the whole society as wanting more and more and more and more, it is a form of collective insanity.”
- Veblen described conspicuous consumption as a mark of leisure—proof you did not have to work—but in modern times this has reversed: conspicuous consumption has become the product of ever-harder work, so people now work harder and harder to acquire the gadgets they consume, contrary to Veblen's expectation that at some point one would have enough and stop working.
“With Veblen, consumption, conspicuous consumption, was the mark that you didn't have to work. It was a mark of leisure. Whereas what's happened in recent times is that it's become the product of work. You work harder and harder in order to have more conspicuous consumption.”
- It is irrational to pack most leisure into the last 15-20 years of life when people are physically less able and less able to develop interests that take time to mature; leisure should instead be spread more evenly throughout life rather than working hard for 30-40 years and doing almost nothing afterward.
“Is it really rational to sort of pack in leisure period of people's lives into their last 15 or 20 years, when they are less able... Why not spread that leisure more evenly, throughout a life?”
Utilitarian consumption-maximization and happiness as a goal both misconceive human flourishing; basic goods like health, friendship, and leisure constitute the actual good life.
- Utilitarian utility-maximization is flawed on two counts: it is too individualistic, falsely assuming that everyone maximizing their own utility will add up to maximum utility for society (an adding-up problem too great to hold), and although maximizing utility need not mean maximizing goods, economists in practice interpret it as maximizing consumption of market-produced goods because it links to growth.
“it's very individualistic--it's your own utility you are trying to maximize. There's an assumption that if people maximize their own utilities that this will add up to the maximum utility for the whole society. And that assumption I don't think works at all. The adding up problem is too great.”
- An exclusive emphasis on maximizing the quantity of consumption goods causes society to underproduce the goods that make for a good life—friendship, community, helping others—and to overproduce goods that make for a bad life, while destroying nature along the way, so a one-track obsession with economic growth destroys components of what most people regard as a good life.
“Our society under-produces the goods that make for a good life. And over-produces the goods that make for a bad life... if you are obsessed simply with maximizing the quantity of consumption goods... you under-produce something else that you want. Which is friendship and a sense of community”
- Making happiness the goal of life is vacuous because happiness is merely a subjective state of feeling; if maximizing that feeling were the aim, a 'psychic aspirin' or drug that made one perpetually happy would suffice, yet no one would call a drugged person's life good—happiness is properly a byproduct of achievement, doing something well, and flourishing, not a goal in itself.
“if what you want to do is maximize this subjective state of feeling--being happy--then I think all you have to do is invent a psychic aspirin that makes you happy the whole time... you wouldn't want to say about someone made perpetually happy by being drugged or taking pills that that person is leading a good life.”
- There are seven basic goods that must exist to some degree in everyone's life for it to be a good life: health, security, respect, personality, harmony with nature, friendship, and leisure; these are not exhaustive or dogmatic and interrelate in complex ways, but without them life cannot be good.
“we suggest seven: health, security, respect, personality, harmony with nature, friendship, and leisure are our goods... without the existence of these goods to some degree in everyone's life, that life cannot be a good life.”
Adam Smith unleashed acquisitiveness from moral restraint but never addressed how to reestablish limits once poverty was overcome through wealth creation.
- Adam Smith did not regard acquisitiveness as the be-all and end-all of life but as the method for getting from poverty to wealth; in doing so he unleashed acquisitiveness from its traditional moral restraints, creating a Frankenstein's monster, and never answered the resulting question of how to rein in acquisitiveness once that wealth has been achieved.
“in a way his ideas unleashed acquisitiveness from their traditional moral restraints. And the question, which he never answers, in my view, is how do you then rein in the Frankenstein's monster that you've created?”
- Keynes was conflicted about saving: he recognized intellectually that a high savings rate was necessary for capital accumulation, but he disliked saving and the postponement of satisfaction as a moral and psychological quality, hoping enjoyment of the present would replace future-oriented thrift as soon as possible, an attitude he associated with Puritanism and the Judaeo-Christian tradition.
“I think he recognized intellectually, in order for capital accumulation to go on, you have to have a high savings rate. But then, he didn't like saving. He didn't like postponement and always looking to the future as a moral and psychological quality.”
- Modern Anglo-American civilization is a commercial civilization in which business psychology has spread pervasively, biasing and shaping human nature in one direction (toward deals, borrowing, profit) and thereby denying expression to many other elements of human nature, even though the goal is not to remake human nature but to accept and give fuller expression to it.
“The business psychology has spread throughout certainly the Anglo-American type of society... So, that's an example of denying part of human nature. And simply shaping it in one direction.”
State may reduce advertising's distorting power and impose work-hour limits on non-creative jobs to enable leisure; environmental limits alone cannot be trusted to halt growth.
- Relying on environmental limits to end acquisitiveness is a bet that the science will bring growth to a halt, but science may instead deliver technical fixes (even setting up on Mars) that allow growth to continue indefinitely, so the environmental check on growth comes too late and may not come at all.
“We are taking a bet that the science will bring acquisitiveness to an end. But suppose the science doesn't. Suppose we invent some technical fixes that will enable us to go on growing and growing and growing... that check on growth comes in too late and it may not come in at all.”
- There is a very old view, dating back to the 18th century and earlier, that if people did not have to work they would become idle, dissipated, and go to pieces, so work is the only thing keeping people on the straight and narrow—yet the historic leisure classes (nobles and gentry) were never expected to work, and not working was a mark of civilization.
“If we didn't have to work, we'd be idle and dissipated and go to pieces. Work is the only thing that keeps us on the straight and narrow. It's a very old view. But what about the so-called leisure classes of the past?”
- The objection that nudging violates liberty ignores that the state already interferes pervasively—surveillance, curbs on advertising, prohibitions like pornography—on the grounds that some things are harmful, so the state already nudges people away from harm; the book merely proposes extending this to also nudge people toward the good, provided there is enough agreement that it should be done.
“they ignore the fact that the state already interferes in all kinds of ways... It already in certain areas does try to nudge people away from harm. We are suggesting that the nudging also include nudging them towards the good.”
- Advertisers spend heavily because advertising powerfully shapes what people buy and like—often not by informing them about products but by suggestion (you'll feel better, be sexier)—so people's market choices are much less free than they believe, justifying measures to lessen the bombardment of advertising.
“their choices--what to buy, what to like--are being powerfully shaped by what they see on their television screens or internet... a lot of ads don't tell you that at all. They just say: You'll feel a lot better if you buy our product... Why do they bother with the suggestion if they think a lot of people aren't going to be influenced by it?”
- Economics is fundamentally about getting the most out of the least—it always involves calculation and trade-offs (e.g., trading off work against leisure)—which differs sharply from Keynes's hope for a future good life in which we would no longer count the cost of things, a break that points toward a world without economics where economists would be reduced to useful technicians like dentists.
“You are always doing a calculation. You are trading off... that's part of their view of human beings. And that is not the same as the idea Keynes looked for: we shouldn't be counting the costs.”
- The organization of the labor market is a powerful determinant of how much leisure people have: many jobs are offered only as full-time, take-it-or-leave-it positions, so someone wanting to work 20 hours a week cannot, and the state could legitimately impose limits on work hours for non-creative jobs (as many European countries do) to help people who are worked hard and would prefer to work less.
“A lot of jobs come as full-time jobs. Take it or leave it... The organization of the labor market in fact is a very powerful determinant of how much free time or leisure you've got. I would be perfectly happy, as they do in many European countries, to impose limitations on work hours”
Traditional religious and philosophical wisdom on the good life remains valid; cultural and ethical shifts must precede policy, within limits set by autonomy and respect.
- Although people are said to have wholly different ideas of the good life, the variety is much less than supposed: the major religious and philosophical traditions (Christian, Confucian, Buddhist, Islamic) overlap heavily on what counts as good, so rather than reinventing them we should rediscover these traditions and use them to decide the purpose of life.
“although variety undoubtedly exists, it's much less extensive than is often supposed... There's a very large degree of consensus about what is good. And we have to look at those traditions--they are Christian traditions, Confucian, Buddhist, Islamic... there's a very large overlap in their opinions of what is good, what is a good life.”
- Cultural attitudes toward money and meaning come from inside individuals, so change must begin with an ethical shift arising from dissatisfaction with present life; only when enough people believe this should the democratic process reorient policy—the good life should not be imposed by law, but law can be shifted to reflect a prior cultural and ethical shift.
“You have to start from the individual... there has to be this cultural shift. Which I would say would be an ethical shift. And then, if there are enough people who believe this to be the case, then I think you start relying on the democratic process to reorient policy”
- Because autonomy and respect are themselves among the basic goods, they intrinsically limit how much the state may do: respecting others' choices and refusing to coerce people sets a strict boundary on state action, so the good-life framework does not license unlimited government intervention even while justifying some.
“that's why we have as one of our basic goods--it limits anything the state can do. And that is autonomy... Respect includes autonomy. We respect the choices of others. We do not try and coerce people. And that limits completely the amount the state is entitled to do in our system.”