accounting control fraud
Fraud led by the person who controls a seemingly legitimate firm, who uses the firm as a weapon to inflate reported income and enrich himself while looting the company.
As defined in William Black on Financial Fraud
Where it comes up · 1
- William Black on Financial Fraud11 claims
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- Relying on econometrics during the expansion phase of an accounting-control-fraud epidemic produces not just the wrong policy answer but the worst feasible answer, as when the Garn-St. Germain Act used Texas S&Ls as its deregulation model precisely because their fraudulent operations were reporting the best returns.William Black on Financial Fraud
- Liar's loans constitute a natural experiment proving the fraud thesis because no government entity encouraged them, even Bush-era regulators disparaged them, and no one required Fannie and Freddie to buy them—yet from 2003 to 2006 the number of liar's loans increased by over 500%, showing the behavior was driven by accounting control fraud rather than housing policy.William Black on Financial Fraud
- Liar's loans involve false statements about income, but the fraud is overwhelmingly driven by lenders—not borrowers—because lenders set the incentive structures through brokers that reward high volume of bad loans, for the same accounting-control-fraud reasons as the S&L crisis.William Black on Financial Fraud
- The accounting control fraud recipe for a lender has four ingredients: grow like crazy, by making really crappy loans at a premium yield, with extreme leverage, and virtually no allowances for future losses—guaranteeing record profits and executive wealth in the near term while maximizing real economic losses.William Black on Financial Fraud
- Accounting control fraud is a 'sure thing' because, as Akerlof and Romer argued, looting a firm for profit reliably produces record reported income and personal wealth in the near term, regardless of the underlying economic losses that will eventually surface.William Black on Financial Fraud
- In the S&L crisis the Office of Thrift Supervision made well over 10,000 criminal referrals and over 1,000 elite convictions, but in the current crisis the same agency made zero criminal referrals and the OCC made zero or three, demonstrating the collapse of the prosecution mechanism that previously deterred fraud.William Black on Financial Fraud
- Executive compensation systems like GE's 'rank and yank' can transmit the fraud message that the firm doesn't care whether reported income is real—if you create fictional reported income you'll be made rich—achieving pervasive fraud without an explicit memo that would expose participants to jail.William Black on Financial Fraud
- There is a tribal taboo in economics against serious consideration of fraud, evidenced by Akerlof and Romer being cited in perhaps only 1 of 100 articles on the crisis and fraud almost never being discussed as even a potential major contributor.William Black on Financial Fraud
- Private market discipline by creditors and subordinated debt holders fails entirely against accounting control fraud because firms reporting record profits attract eager lenders rather than scrutiny—creditors provide cash rather than discipline—so the very entities meant to police risk instead fund the fraud.William Black on Financial Fraud
- Accounting control fraud in the S&L crisis was concentrated among new entrants—overwhelmingly real estate developers with intense conflicts of interest—rather than established CEOs who had risen through the ranks and identified with their institutions, explaining why only about 10% of S&Ls engaged in it.William Black on Financial Fraud