What this covers

Richard McKenzie and Russ Roberts explore a series of everyday pricing puzzles—water shortages, post-Christmas sales, movie popcorn, airline tickets, dry cleaning—and argue that common explanations often miss the mark. McKenzie contends that what appears to be greed, inefficiency, or monopoly power typically reflects deeper economic logic: price controls that suppress incentives to conserve, bundling arrangements that couple low ticket prices with high concession margins, or price discrimination strategies that exploit different customer elasticities. Roberts largely agrees on the diagnosis but adds that simple non-price competition and unrecognized cost differences often account for the same phenomena. The two test these frameworks against concrete cases: whether Southern California's water crises stem from rainfall shortages or binding price caps, whether movie popcorn represents monopoly extraction or rational bundling, whether post-Christmas markdowns indicate buyer error or deliberate price discrimination targeting two distinct market segments.

The conversation reaches into several consequential economic mechanisms. McKenzie emphasizes Gordon Tullock's transitional gains trap—how government subsidies and relief get capitalized into property values, trapping future owners who paid inflated prices and receive no net benefit from the original benefit. He argues that full price, including time costs and wait-times, often exceeds the nominal price, and that competition in economic profit opportunities drives variety and risky investment even absent pure price competition. Roberts pushes back on some claims, noting that pricing is so complex even insiders discover correct prices through trial and error, and that overhead costs—not monopoly—explain why a uniform dry-cleaning price across garment types would bankrupt a competitor. The discussion is laced with contested positions and genuine disagreement about which explanations hold most weight.

Sharpest takeaway

McKenzie argues that seemingly puzzling prices (water shortages, post-Christmas sales, expensive movie popcorn) are best explained not by greed or monopoly but by suppressed prices, price discrimination, bundling, and capitalized expectations, while Roberts presses that competition and unrecognized cost differences often explain the same phenomena.

  • Shortages like Southern California water crises stem from price controls removing the incentive to conserve, not physical scarcity.
  • Government relief and subsidies get capitalized into asset prices via the 'transitional gains trap,' negating intended benefits.
  • Movie popcorn pricing reflects bundling, price discrimination, and competition for films rather than simple monopoly exploitation.

The argument · threads6 threads · 31 claims
0.85

Movie theater pricing reflects bundled economics where studios capture most ticket revenue, forcing theaters to compete through low ticket prices and high-margin concessions.

6 pointscentrality 5/5
  • A major reason for multi-screen theater complexes is efficient use of concession counters: a single counter sits idle most of a two-hour movie, but 18 screens create a constant flow of customers through the lobby, lowering costs.

    “when you have one theater and one concession counter, that concession counter is idle for an hour and a half out of every... two hour movie. If you have 18 screens, then you can have a constant flow of people through the lobby and the costs are lower.”

  • The movie industry sells a bundled experience of film, popcorn, and soda, so there is a necessary interplay between popcorn prices, ticket prices, and the percentage of gate receipts the studios take, meaning popcorn pricing cannot be understood in isolation.

    “the movie industry is selling a bundled experience that can be composed of a movie and popcorn and a soda, and there's an interplay necessary interplay between the price of popcorn and the price of theater tickets, and then the percentage take that the studios get”

  • Because theaters give up about 70% of gate receipts to studios on major films but earn a high margin on concessions, they have a strong incentive to keep ticket prices low to get people through the turnstile and shift profit onto high-margin popcorn, increasing their overall take.

    “the typical movie contract gives about for major movies, about 70% of the gate receipts to the theaters. Well, if you're giving up 70 cents on the dollar at the gate,”

  • The efficiency gains of multi-screen complexes may not show up as lower popcorn prices but instead as larger film budgets, because more profitable theaters can bid more for movies, enabling expensive special-effects films like Indiana Jones.

    “the efficiency gains in those multi-screen complexes can be revealed and an increase in the film budgets. That is because their efficiencies of popcorn, more profitable theaters can bid more for the movies.”

  • The movie business is among the riskiest because films are unique, non-repeatable products whose success depends on opening buzz and which other movies open that weekend, exhibiting what Art DeVany calls extreme kurtosis, meaning no one can reliably predict which films will succeed.

    “There is what Art Devaney calls extreme kurtosis in this movie. That's a statistical concept, but it means that basically no one knows anything or can count on much of anything.”

  • Studios and theaters keep ticket prices uniform across movies because raising the price on a film could reduce attendance, dampen the all-important opening buzz, and lower future attendance, so there is a strong tendency not to buck the trend and to keep prices down to build word-of-mouth.

    “studios and theaters are very concerned about jacking up the price and causing fewer people to go. And, when you have fewer people to go, you can have less of a buzz and you can have less attendance down the road.”

0.85

Price discrimination is economically necessary and efficient when products cannot be resold and firms face real cost structures or competitive pressures.

6 pointscentrality 5/5
  • If many competing popcorn vendors lined the theater lobby, competition would drive the price down to marginal cost (kernels and oil), leaving no margin to cover overhead and the theater itself, so without significant economic profits in concessions there would be far fewer theaters and far fewer movies made.

    “if you did have such an environment, the price, the competitive price would descend toward the marginal cost... And, there'd be no margin enough to cover the cost of the overhead... So, if there weren't some significant economic profits in the movie business, you'd have a lot fewer theaters”

  • Movie popcorn is priced with steep quantity discrimination: a small bag costs about $1.37 per ounce, additional ounces in the medium cost about 12.5 cents per ounce, and with free tub refills the marginal cost can fall to about 8 cents per ounce, indicating something about the theater's low marginal cost structure rather than uniform gouging.

    “a small bag of popcorn costs $5 and 50 cents. You get about four ounces of popcorn there, and that means you're paying about a dollar and 37 and a half cents an ounce.”

  • Price discrimination requires two conditions: the firm must have some pricing (monopoly) power, and the good cannot be easily resold, because if buyers in the low-price market can resell to the high-price market, the discrimination breaks down.

    “the firm has to have some pricing power. Some people would call that monopoly power. And then, the other condition it can't be can't be easily resold.”

  • Storewide post-Christmas sales are not the result of inept buyers overstocking everything but are planned price discrimination exploiting two distinct markets: an inelastic pre-Christmas demand with urgency to buy gifts, and an elastic post-Christmas demand with no urgency, yielding different profit-maximizing prices.

    “many of these after Christmas sales are planned, and they have to be planned because the buyers have to place their orders back in, well, as early as well, at least by July.”

  • People who think movie popcorn is overpriced compare it only to the 55-75 cent ingredient cost of home popping, ignoring the value of their time; at $20 an hour, a half hour of popping, cleanup, and smuggling makes home popcorn cost $10-11, more than theater popcorn.

    “If somebody values his or her time at $20 an hour and takes about a half an hour to get out the popper, do the popping cleanup and put it into a bag... that means that tub of popcorn is going to cost 10 to $11, which is more expensive than the price of the theater popcorn.”

  • Price competition is not the only meaningful form of competition; the pursuit of economic profits from pricing power and price discrimination is itself a powerful Schumpeterian competitive force that drives variety, energy, and willingness to make sizable risky investments, so a market can be extremely competitive even where pure price competition appears absent.

    “in economics, we are sort of fixed on this idea of price competition being the only source of meaningful competition. And, I would argue that the retail industry is in fact extremely competitive because of things like the ability to price discriminate. It's a kind of Joseph Schumpeter point”

0.80

Government price controls and subsidies create perverse incentives by capitalizing benefits into asset values, inducing wasteful behavior and making policy reversal politically difficult.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Unconstrained government relief gets capitalized into property values so that a future buyer paying the inflated price (e.g. $110,000 instead of $90,000) gains nothing from the damage benefits because they paid the expected value of those benefits upfront, meaning indiscriminate aid ends up helping nobody.

    “those expected benefits can get captured or capitalized into the value of the property and the flood plain. So, somebody down the road... buys a property for $110,000. Well, that person is no better off with the damage benefits than without them because again, the person's paying for the 20,000 upfront.”

  • Taxing hillside residents to relieve floodplain damages raises floodplain property values, induces more people to build there with bigger houses and more valuable contents, reduces their incentive to evacuate when floods are coming, and therefore produces more newsworthy and costly floods.

    “if you start relieving people of their damages in the floodplain, then more people are going to want to live there and the price of the property can go up... they're going to build bigger houses, they're going to stock them with more valuable furniture”

  • Southern California's recurring water crises are not caused by low rainfall but by government-controlled prices that aren't allowed to rise; without price increases there is no incentive to conserve, producing shortages, just as fixing Mercedes or candy bar prices would create shortages of those goods.

    “It doesn't rain much water in Southern California, but it also doesn't rain any Mercedes-Benz in Southern California or Snickers candy bars. Why do we have crises in water, but not in Snickers candy bars or Mercedes-Benz?”

  • Gordon Tullock's transitional gains trap describes how once benefits like farm subsidies or taxi medallions are granted, their value is capitalized into asset prices (land, medallions), so removing them penalizes later buyers who paid inflated prices in reasonable reliance, creating inertia that makes the policy hard to undo even when conditions change.

    “It's what Gordon Tullock called the transitional gains trap that once you start providing benefits, so often these benefits get captured.”

  • Because floods are anticipated, floodplain property sells at a discount equal to expected flood losses while comparable hillside lots sell at a premium, so when a flood is less severe than expected the floodplain buyers may actually come out ahead overall, meaning we should not reflexively pity flood victims who chose cheaper at-risk property.

    “if both the lots in the floodplain and those on the hillside are valued at a hundred thousand and you expect damages of 20,000, then you should expect the price of the flood plain property to fall to 90,000. The price of the lots up on the hillside to go up to 110,000.”

0.61

Regulatory interventions like antitrust breakups and price controls often produce worse outcomes than the market conditions they were meant to fix.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • In Irvine homeowner association contracts, residents are not supposed to leave their garage door open for more than 20 minutes at a time, though enforcement is rare.

    “You're not supposed to have your garage door open for more than 20 minutes at a time. Now, very few times do you have people actually enforcing it.”

  • Price controls on gasoline reduce supply and add wait-time costs to the fixed money price, so the full price buyers pay can actually be higher than under uncontrolled prices, especially for people with a high value of time, and high earners responded in the 1970s by paying teenagers to stand in line.

    “when you add the price, the fixed price of gasoline to the wait time of standing in line, you can actually, buyers can actually be paying a higher price because the supply is restricted because the price is controlled”

  • Coupons are usually explained as price discrimination enabling firms to earn economic profits, but the fact that Procter and Gamble organized a cartel of coupon distributors to suppress coupon distribution—and was taken to court by consumers—casts doubt on the simple profit-from-discrimination explanation.

    “if in fact, coupons just enable firms to make economic profits, then why did Proctor and Gamble organize a cartel of coupon distributors to try to suppress the distribution of coupons?”

  • The 1948 Supreme Court antitrust decision forcing studios to divest their theaters, justified by claims that vertical integration enabled monopoly pricing, was followed by ticket and popcorn price increases far exceeding the CPI, suggesting the ruling introduced inefficiencies rather than curbing monopoly pricing.

    “We had a Supreme Court decision in 1948, antitrust decision that forced studios to divest themselves of their theaters... If that theory were in fact the case, you should have expected the price of theater tickets and popcorn to fall in the decade or so after 1948. But, they did exactly the opposite.”

0.51

Government safety regulations can have unintended consequences that increase overall mortality by redirecting people toward riskier alternatives.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • When the TSA raises the security alert status on a rumor, it lengthens airport lines and increases travelers' jitters, driving people onto deadlier highways, so the agency faces a balancing act where its own caution can cause American highway deaths and its mandate should be broadened to account for these effects.

    “they raised the alert status from what yellow to orange that can lengthen lines at airports... It can literally drive people to the highways. And, as a consequence, the transportation security administration can indeed cause the deaths of Americans on highways.”

  • The 9/11 attacks likely killed more Americans after the event than on the day itself, because increased risk and wait costs of flying drove people to drive instead, and since highways are deadlier than air travel, an estimated 1,250 extra highway deaths occurred in the first 12 months as found by three Cornell economists.

    “the 9/11 terrorists have probably killed more Americans since 9/11, then they killed on 9/11 and the terrorists have been dead ever since 9/11.”

0.38

Collective action problems and rational individual self-interest undermine the effectiveness of appeals for voluntary conservation or restraint.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Public appeals to cut back on water consumption only reduce usage about 3-5% because individual homeowners rationally reason their own usage is too small to affect the crisis, and may even increase usage on hearing of others cutting back or fearing future water police restrictions.

    “those appeals work to some extent, but they seem to affect only about, they seem to cut the consumption maybe 3%, 5%.”

  • High last-minute airline ticket prices partly reflect airlines providing a service by reserving seats for travelers who must fly (business or family deaths), knowing those reserved seats are likely to go unfilled and represent a cost that is lost forever once the plane departs.

    “the airlines are indeed trying to provide those last minute customers with the service. That is, they're reserving some seats for people who have to fly... they know that if they reserve them to the last minute, there's a good chance that those seats are going to go unfilled.”