What this covers

Andrew Fox, a veteran soldier and military researcher, sits with Russ Roberts to examine the mechanics and strategy of Israel's war in Gaza through the lens of military operations. Fox grounds the conversation in firsthand observation and technical analysis, walking through the constraints the IDF faced in urban warfare, the claims made against Israeli conduct, and whether the military campaign achieved its stated objectives. Roberts and Fox treat the war as a discrete strategic problem: what were the goals, what did the fighting actually accomplish, and what can be learned about future conflicts.

The discussion spans several distinct terrains. Fox argues that Gaza's physical destruction—often presented as indiscriminate—was driven by IED density and approximately 1000 miles of tunnels that made conventional advance lethal; detonation-based tactics thus became the operative method. On allegations of weaponized starvation, he examines caloric flow data (3000 calories per person daily entered Gaza) and distinguishes supply failure from distribution failure within a war zone. On targeting of children, he contrasts anecdotal testimony from doctors—amplified by halo effect—against hospital injury records from Hamas itself, finding the evidence incongruent. More broadly, Fox contends that Israel's strategic goals—securing borders and degrading Hamas's strike capability—were substantially achieved even though Hamas was not destroyed, and that Strategic goals vs victory/defeat framing provides clearer analysis than binary outcome language. The conversation also addresses the information environment: how the anti-Israel side uses Burden of proof / allegation-without-evidence trap tactics, and how Hamas intimidates journalists. Fox raises complications as well, including Israel's decision to cut aid around May as strategically counterproductive, and the challenges of mobilizing reservists on short notice with insufficient training.

Sharpest takeaway

Fox argues that the IDF had few tactical alternatives to the massive physical destruction in Gaza given Hamas's dense embedded tunnel-and-IED infrastructure, that famine and deliberate child-targeting allegations collapse under available evidence, and that Israel achieved its core strategic goals even though Hamas was not fully destroyed.

  • Gaza's near-ubiquitous IEDs and 1000 miles of tunnels forced detonation-based advance that flattened buildings
  • 3000 calories/person/day entered Gaza, so any hunger was a distribution problem (war, rubble, Hamas hoarding), not a supply or weaponization issue
  • Israel's strategic goals—secure borders, degrade Hamas's strike capability—were largely met, with long-term security now outsourced to a US-led arrangement

The argument · threads6 threads · 26 claims
0.72

Hamas embedded terror infrastructure so densely throughout Gaza that methodical dismantling necessarily required extensive physical destruction.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Because Hamas's terror capabilities were embedded in every square inch of Gaza—as many as 1000 miles of tunnels, 57,000 tunnel entrances being dug even during fighting, plus IEDs, arms caches, and inter-house rat runs—dismantling them necessarily required taking Gaza to pieces.

    “when you have as many as 1000 miles of tunnels underneath the ground, when you have 57,000 tunnel entrances and they're digging more whilst you're fighting, when you have IEDs and arms cases[?caches?] and rat runs between houses in pretty much every house you come to--unfortunately, to destroy that, you're going to have to take Gaza to pieces.”

  • Gaza's physical devastation is explained by IED density: estimates run from tens of thousands up to 100,000 IEDs, concentrated in cities, equating to roughly one IED every half a football pitch (about 60 meters or denser); since these were remotely watched and detonated by Hamas and could not be safely disposed of in combined-arms maneuver warfare, the IDF had to detonate them, and each detonation destroyed a building.

    “The low figure was tens of thousands: As many as 100,000 IEDs was the estimate they gave me. And if you then look at the surface area of Gaza, that equates--I did the math when I got home--that works out to an IED every half a football pitch.”

  • The colonialism framework of international law—written in the post-WWII era as European powers handed colonies back to indigenous populations—does not fit Israel, because rather than Jewish colonizers displacing native Arabs from land where no Jews had lived, you have two peoples both claiming indigeneity and long historical ties; even pro-Israel counterarguments like uti possidetis juris are themselves colonial frameworks, so applying colonial international law cannot solve the intractable problem.

    “What you effectively have is two peoples who both claim indigeneity, who both claim long historical ties to the land... colonialism narrative doesn't work.”

  • The anti-Israel side uses a clever information tactic that inverts the normal burden of proof: making allegations without evidence and demanding refutation, so that any attempt to refute lends the allegation credibility while declining to refute lets it stand as the only narrative.

    “the way allegations usually work is if you make an allegation, you have to give evidence... At the moment, what we've got is allegations--people making allegations--and saying, 'Right, refute that.'... by trying to refute it, you kind of play their game because you give credibility to the allegation by taking it seriously.”

0.68

Limited prior Israeli responses to Gaza threats failed to improve security and likely enabled the October 7th attack.

3 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Israel's prior pattern of limited responses to Gaza threats—a few air strikes and some ground maneuver, then stopping, as in operations since 2005 like Guardian of the Walls—did not make Israel safer and arguably led to the October 7th attack, which is why dismantling Hamas's embedded terror infrastructure methodically was chosen instead.

    “We've seen that repeated in previous conflicts--so, Guardian of the Walls or any of the other ops that have taken place in Gaza since 2005--that's essentially what Israel did. A few air strikes, a little bit of ground maneuver, and then stop. That didn't make Israel any more safe and actually led to the 7th of October, you could make the case.”

  • According to the Israeli Defense Minister, in the Middle East a state must choose being strong over being liked; this strength-based psychology, which many Western commentators fail to understand, informed Israel's decision to punch back hard rather than rely on limited targeted strikes.

    “his point was, 'Look, it's the Middle East, you have to be strong. If you have a choice between being liked and being strong, you choose being strong.'”

  • War outcomes should be framed by whether strategic goals were achieved rather than the binary of victory and defeat; by this lens Israel secured its borders and removed the strategic threat (Hamas cannot repeat October 7th and has minimal rocket stocks), so even though Hamas was not destroyed, it is heavily degraded and presides over a miserable half-Gaza, representing strong achievement of strategic goals.

    “I don't think victory and defeat are useful. I think what we're looking at is strategic goals: Have they been achieved or not? And, Israel's strategy goals were pretty clear: Secure Israel's borders, return the hostages, and destroy Hamas.”

0.58

Allegations of mass starvation and targeted killing of children lack credible evidence and contradict firsthand observation and hospital data.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Starvation allegations fail because 3000 calories per person per day on average entered Gaza during the war—more than enough to feed every man, woman and child daily—so the problem was conclusively distribution inside Gaza (war, rubble, isolated pockets) rather than supply, with Hamas hoarding high-value items like baby food to sell at inflated prices by restricting supply.

    “If you make allegations of starvation, you have to get past the fact that 3000 calories per day, per person on average went into Gaza during the war... And so, we can conclusively say that the issue is with distribution inside Gaza, not with the supply of food.”

  • Fox saw hungry but not starving people in Rafah—no signs of famine-level malnutrition comparable to Ethiopia or Biafra—documented by his photographs and video, supporting the conclusion that there was no famine where he observed.

    “I saw hungry people but not starving people--I think is my takeaway. They weren't anything like... Nothing like that at all, nowhere close. People wanted food, but they didn't look malnourished. And I've got a raft of photographs and video images to prove it.”

  • Based on firsthand experience seeing an actual headshot wound to a six-year-old in Afghanistan, Fox is intensely skeptical of and does not believe the MRI/X-ray images allegedly showing bullet outlines in children's brains, because real headshot injuries do not look anything like those images.

    “I've seen a headshot to a six-year-old, so I actually know what it looks like to a child... And, I can assure you it doesn't look like anything like those X-rays. So, I'm intensely skeptical of those, and I don't believe it.”

  • Doctors' claims in the New York Times that they saw mainly headshots and gunshot wounds to children are belied by Hamas's own per-hospital injury data, which shows no hospital reported a majority of gunshot wounds—let alone to children—with air strike being by far the largest mechanism of injury, illustrating an evidence-free anecdotal allegation amplified by the doctors' halo effect.

    “Hamas published, by hospital, the number of injuries and the kind and the mechanism of injuries they had been treating. And, whilst those doctors are in the Gaza Strip, no hospital in the Strip reported a majority of gunshot wounds, nevermind the majority of gunshot wounds to children. By far and away, the biggest mechanism of injury was air strike.”

0.49

Israel faced extraordinary urban combat complexity requiring full combined-arms execution that most Western armies lack recent experience executing.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • The IDF suffered high levels of fratricide (blue-on-blue) early in the war because in an urban environment everything becomes rubble, nothing matches the map, and units lose track of adjacent friendly positions, making it easy to accidentally shoot one's own troops—a problem the IDF mitigated with good call-sign de-confliction measures that other armies can learn from.

    “the IDF had quite high levels of fratricide--of blue on blue at the start of the war. Because it turns out that when you operate in an urban environment, all of a sudden everything is rubble. Nothing looks like it does on your map.”

  • The IDF's reliance on a citizen reserve army produces a flatter command structure and well-executed mission command (Auftragstaktik) that empowers the lowest levels effectively, and yields exceptionally talented individuals (e.g. a machine gunner finishing a higher-mathematics master's), but also creates problems—variable quality between professional and reserve units, weaker discipline (e.g. phone videos in Gaza), and difficulty disciplining reservists who can simply go home.

    “I do like how well the Israelis do what we would call mission command, what the Germans would have called Auftragstaktik... The way they empower down to the lowest level.”

  • Gaza presents a '720-degree threat' for fighting forces because danger comes from above-ground, underground, and all 360 horizontal degrees plus vertical, making it an exceptionally difficult environment in which to keep embedded journalists safe.

    “He described it as a 720-degree threat in Gaza just because of the above-ground, underground, 360-degrees horizontal and vertical.”

  • The IDF in Gaza executed full combined-arms maneuver—orchestrating air support, artillery, mortars, drones, signals intelligence, infantry, armor and tanks together in a pure urban setting—something the British Army hasn't done since 2007 and even then only in a rural-with-buildings environment, meaning most British officers below company commander have never done it and have much to learn.

    “what the IDF has done in Gaza is what we call a combined arms maneuver, where they use the full orchestra of war... British Army hasn't done that since 2007. And even then, that was in a rural environment interspersed with buildings, rather than a pure urban environment.”

  • The IDF is held to an unrealistic standard of perfection in war reporting, where any deviation from perfection is treated as catastrophic, which is an unrealistic way of looking at war given that war is inherently chaotic and messy as Clausewitz described.

    “there's such a skew in the way the IDF is reported on, almost in the sense that perfection is expected and if they drop anywhere short of complete perfection then somehow that's the worst thing that ever happened. And, that's just an unrealistic way of looking at war.”

0.44

IDF's tactical medical innovation, reserve-army strengths, mobilization challenges, ceasefire terms, soldier unit cohesion, and strategic mistake in aid cutoff each warrant specific analysis.

7 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Under the Trump ceasefire deal, Gaza's long-term security is effectively outsourced to the United States, which—visibly running the Civil Military Cooperation Center at Kiryat Gat over 27 troop-contributing countries—liaises with Hamas indirectly through Egypt, keeps violence minimal, and owns the Board of Peace, leaving the future largely out of Israel's hands.

    “if you go down to the Civil Military Corporation Center in Kiryat Gat--where I was last week--it's very clear who kind of runs the show down there. And it isn't Israel... It's the Americans, quite clearly. They are liaising through Egypt directly with Hamas.”

  • In an unstaged encounter with the 252 Reserve Division in the Netzarim Corridor, every soldier understood and believed in the mission's importance for national defense despite not wanting to be there, and expressed unprompted compassion and regret for the civilian situation—a unity of purpose Fox contrasts with his own Afghanistan experience where the mission rationale shifted constantly.

    “what really impressed me was the unity of purpose. Every single soldier understood why they were there. None of them wanted to be there... they came across so compassionate when it came to talking about the civilians”

  • Roughly 600 IDF soldiers who would have died under current British or prior Israeli standards of care survived because the IDF, recognizing data-driven that battlefield blood loss is the primary cause of death, placed refrigerated blood packs and doctors with forward fighting units rather than relying on saline or waiting for hospital evacuation.

    “it's 600 soldiers that would be dead not only if they'd been given current British standards of care, but if they had been given previous Israeli standards of care.”

  • Israel's complete cessation of aid around May was an unnecessary and foolish strategic mistake based on fuzzy logic—the theory that cutting supply would force Hamas to feed people—which did not work and instead did enormous reputational damage, handing enemies maximum ammunition in an environment where the slightest error is seized upon.

    “the complete cessation of aid, at that point--was at last May?--it was unnecessary. It didn't work. It did so much strategic damage reputationally. It gave the enemies as much ammunition as they could have dreamed of. And, it was just a foolish thing to do.”

  • Mobilizing 360,000 reservists in a short period exposed major lessons: the IDF lacked stocks and supplies for that many soldiers, and reservists who hadn't worn a uniform for up to three years got only a month-and-a-half of training before deploying, leading to on-the-job 'learning in contact' that produced early-war mistakes.

    “360,000 soldiers were mobilized by the IDF. They did not have stocks and supplies for 360,000 soldiers... they only had a month-and-a-half of training before deploying to Gaza. So, there was actually quite a lot of on-the-job training done at the start of the war; they were learning in contact.”

  • The key skill of military analysis is recognizing that lessons from Gaza will not be identical in future conflicts, so rather than lifting Conflict A wholesale onto Conflict B, an analyst extracts transferable themes and data points—categorized as things you can, might want to, or probably don't need to learn from—since future fights (e.g. in Eastern Europe) will likely still involve underground elements as seen as far back as Stalingrad.

    “you don't lift Conflict A and say, 'Conflict B will be just like this.' That the skills of the analyst... is to say, 'Look, these lessons are not going to be the same as Gaza, but here are themes.'”

  • Israeli wine is good roughly 75% of the time and bad about 25%, which doesn't stop Fox from persisting in drinking it.

    “It's about a 75-25 hit rate.”

0.36

Pre-war Gaza population was already largely hostile to Israel, making further alienation from intense response operationally irrelevant.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • The claim that an intense Israeli response created more support for Hamas rests on a false assumption that pre-war Gaza was a neutral population, when polling on a two-state solution and coexistence shows the population was largely already hostile—in many cases indoctrinated by the school system and UNRWA to hate Israel and Jews—so further alienation is largely irrelevant.

    “I think that rests on a false assumption that before the war, Gaza was somehow a kind of neutral population in terms of their attitudes to Israel, and only Hamas in there were the ones who really hated them. I don't think that stands up to any polling that we've seen ever”

  • Hamas and Hezbollah systematically intimidate journalists to control reporting—evidenced by credible third-party reports from the 2014 war and by networks' Beirut correspondents being threatened if reporters attended a captured-tunnel media trip in Lebanon—while any harm to a journalist would be blamed on the IDF regardless of who was responsible.

    “the networks had had their correspondents in Beirut threatened if people went on this trip. So, 'If you go on this trip to the tunnel, we'll hurt your correspondent in Beirut.' So, it's a very common tactic: it's not just Hamas that do it.”