
Thomas Hazlett on Telecommunications 11/24/2008
What this covers
This is a conversation between Russ Roberts and Thomas Hazlett of George Mason University, recorded in late 2008. It moves through the FCC, antitrust, cable and satellite video, cellular pricing, and the net neutrality fight. Hazlett's starting point is that regulators sit inside equilibria of competing interests, so good economic ideas rarely win on merit. The more useful question, he says, is who has money and influence on each side.
On competition, he notes that the government's 1969 suit against IBM ran thirteen years and was dropped in 1982 without a final opinion. He also argues that each dominant firm, from IBM to Microsoft to Google, draws monopoly fears that fade once the industry's center of gravity moves somewhere unexpected. He defends bundled deals, including Google's tie-ups with Clearwire and Motorola, and operator-curated bundles of 150 to 200 cable channels. Both claims are contested. Roberts adds a counterpoint: flexible rules give regulators too much discretion, while rigid ones produce oddities like the collapse of the IBM-Apple merger.
The spectrum half of the conversation starts with Ronald Coase's 1959 proposal for tradable frequency ownership. Hazlett contrasts it with the FCC's 734 local cellular markets, which he links to prices above 50 cents a minute against roughly 6 cents later. He calls TV white spaces an anti-commons, points out that over 90 percent of TV viewing already runs through cable or satellite, and sets roughly fifty billion dollars in auction revenue against a consumer surplus he puts above one hundred fifty billion dollars a year.
Hazlett argues that net neutrality regulation rests on a misreading of how the Internet evolved, and that spectrum is best managed through property rights and auctions rather than administrative allocation, because ownership and vertical integration drive efficiency and competition.
- The Internet grew spontaneously under private property rights and market interconnection, not under regulatory architecture
- Vertical integration and bundled deals, including Google's own, have been pro-competitive
- Administrative spectrum allocation leaves usable bandwidth idle, while property rights and auctions reallocate it to higher-value uses
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Regulatory agencies are constrained by equilibria among competing interests and idiosyncratic institutional features, so good economic ideas do not win on their merits, and scholars must understand that policy outcomes reflect who has more money and influence on each side.
“it turns out that there are really equilibria that determine policies and there are people pushing you know generally on all sides of the issue”
Antitrust litigation is too slow to address fast-moving technology markets: the 1969 government antitrust suit against IBM ran thirteen years and was dropped in January 1982 without a final opinion, and even full prosecution would have yielded remedies 15 to 20 years after the original problem.
“there's a major antitrust suit filed against IBM on the last day of the Lyndon Johnson administration in 1969 and that suit goes for thirteen years never reaches a final opinion and is dropped in January of 1982”
Early 1990s PCS spectrum policy under a cellular duopoly with two licenses in each of 734 local markets was radically fragmented, a policy no other country matched, and it kept prices high: cellular cost over 50 cents per minute in the 1980s versus about 6 cents per minute later.
“there had been 734 local licenses that is to say the FCC issued two licenses in each of 734 local markets that was a radical D concentration or fragmentation policy”
In 1959 Ronald Coase argued that instead of administrative allocation, distributing frequency ownership rights would let owners negotiate interference rules with neighbors, since a spectrum owner can pay a neighbor to adopt better technology or clean up its own transmissions, making the optimal interference outcome emerge from bargaining.
“he thought that if you just distributed frequency ownership right in the market that people could make their own wireless deployments and then through negotiations with their wireless neighbors”
Competition is a rich concept, and each successive dominant firm (IBM in mainframes, then Microsoft in PCs, and now Google) triggers fears of monopoly that later prove misplaced because the dominant position shifts to a business no one anticipated.
“each iteration of success alarms people so we go back in our lifetimes years of mine anyway when IBM was the biggest competitive threat”
Unlicensed white space devices create an anti-commons: because no one is a residual claimant except the regulators, no one has the incentive to clear and reallocate the TV band, whereas a property-rights owner could pay broadcasters to migrate to satellite and realize the band's value.
“when you dump the unlicensed devices in there you're creating you know what economists lawyers call tragedy the anti-commons there's nobody who is a residual claimant anymore”
Regulation faces an unsolvable tradeoff: rules that are flexible give regulators too much discretion, while arbitrary rules occasionally produce bizarre results, such as the IBM-Apple merger collapse, so antitrust cannot avoid these failures.
“one of the challenges of any kind of regulation is it you can't have it be flexible to flexible because then it becomes too discretionary”
Google is vertically integrated: it maintains its own globally constructed physical transport network on dedicated bandwidth it owns, plus its own computing farms, and this proprietary infrastructure gives it a business advantage and a lightning-fast search experience for consumers.
“the Google network is globally constructed on dedicated bandwidth that is in essence owned by Google”
Backbone providers interconnect and exchange traffic without any mandate or regulation, through a spontaneously evolved system that coordinates competing yet complementary networks, which Hazlett calls a marvel of spontaneous market structure.
“those networks interconnect not because of any mandate there is no regulation there is simply a spontaneous system that's been evolved”
Microsoft's dominance came from an operating system business that the computer industry did not foresee as the new cash cow, and Microsoft itself initially thought applications software would be the big thing, yet its ubiquitous platform was good enough and cheap enough to create large efficiencies of scale.
“Microsoft didn't even understand that they thought applications software applications would be the big thing”
More than 90 percent of TV viewing already takes place on cable and satellite, and people are willing to pay to opt out of free over-the-air television, so the over-the-air TV band is inefficiently used and the FCC is protecting the 1952 broadcast model.
“we know that more than 90% of TV viewing already takes place on cable and satellite people are willing to pay to opt-out of what they call free television”
Radio spectrum use requires coordinating rules to avoid a tragedy of the commons, because more bandwidth for one service imposes costs on others through interference, so spectrum is an input whose allocation must be coordinated.
“there is a need to to impose rules on radio spectrum to avert tragedy of the Commons”
Non-neutral deals that bundle transport and content, such as Google's partnership with Clearwire on WiMAX wireless broadband and its default search button on Motorola handsets, have been highly pro-competitive because they let new business models test consumer acceptance and efficiency and raise capital.
“these non-neutral deals where you get both transportation and content in other words the delivery network and the content mixed up together bundled or vertically integrated if you will these have been very Pro competitive”
Consumers benefit from operator-curated multi-channel bundles of 150 to 200 channels, which are highly efficient compared with buying programs one at a time, even though critics see the bundle as an arbitrary, anti-consumer structure.
“it may be just highly efficient to give consumers the choice of a hundred or 200 channels and and in fact it is highly efficient”
The auction revenue of about fifty billion dollars is small relative to the real economic value: the lower-bound annual consumer surplus from the US wireless phone market exceeds one hundred fifty billion dollars per year, roughly three times the total value of all licenses auctioned since 1994, so the real stakes are getting more spectrum into use.
“you're generating well over a hundred and fifty billion dollars a year that's the lower bound estimate in terms of social consumer surplus”
Companies' regulatory positions reliably track their shareholders' interests, so observing which positions firms take shows where efficiencies lie and what the economics of competition are, rather than revealing an arbitrary policy preference.
“that's exactly right and that's why you can learn reliably where the efficiencies are not just to look at AT&T here one company in particular”
Congressmen are being urged to pressure the FCC to approve white-space devices, turning spectrum into a political football because officials bear none of the costs when the plan fails.
“congressmen are now being urged to write the FCC and call the FCC to put pressure on them to approve certain devices”
Concerns that cable operators' vertical integration thwarts consumer choice are a bad argument; vertical integration in cable has been highly efficient, and the cable market's real market power problems sit at the local competition level, after regulators suppressed cable competition for four decades to protect broadcasters.
“the cable TV example is actually one that's near and dear to my heart because I've spent a lot of my career looking at competition in the cable TV market”
Since 1994-96, multichannel video competition has grown: DirecTV entered in 1994 with a national satellite footprint, EchoStar's Dish Network entered in 1996, and telephone companies such as AT&T and Verizon have entered, so at least three operators now serve over 90 percent of US markets.
“now we do have at least three operators in well over ninety percent of US markets and we're getting a fourth in terms of the phone companies”
Cellular phone prices fell sharply as competition expanded: in the 1980s, when the FCC issued two cellular licenses in each of 734 local markets, service exceeded 50 cents per minute, while by Hazlett's account the average is now about 6 cents a minute.
“it was over 50 cents per minute now we're paying about 6 cents a minute on average”
Property rights in the cellular bands have been extremely important: over 260 million Americans have voice service and over 35 million have wireless broadband from a carrier, and this is only the beginning because regulators have been parsimonious in releasing bandwidth.
“the property rights approach particularly in the cellular bands has proven extremely important for allowing us to to use those bands for for much more valuable services”
New video entrants have no market power to exploit and do not restrict output; they must reach sufficient scale to survive, which is why they sell large linear bundles of 24/7 networks rather than individual programs.
“they don't have market power to exploit they're not trying to restrict output they're trying to get sufficient scale and desperately so”
Spectrum appears fully allocated, as if regulators have nothing left to give out, but in reality it is badly underutilized: government spectrum maps show crowding even though licenses issued in 1990 declared the last available spectrum had been given away, and many licenses since have released hundreds of megahertz.
“the core T of the FCC or the government you know spectrum maps everything looks allocated but of course what's happening is that the spectrum is way underutilized”
Regulators should favor national or auctioned licenses that can be assembled into larger footprints, because the FCC's issuance of 734 local cellular licenses per market was a radical fragmentation policy that almost no other country copied, and companies' own statements about the efficiencies they need are reliable guides to where efficiency lies.
“no other country in the world comes close to issuing that many licenses”
The US TV band is allocated for over-the-air broadcasting with about 49 channels in every TV market, even though there are fewer than 1,800 TV stations nationwide, roughly eight stations per market, so the band is far underused even after the February 2009 digital transition.
“we will still have 49 TV channels allocated in every single TV market in America all 210 of them”
The Internet was not invented according to architectural blueprints but evolved spontaneously; the design factor that matters is private property rights, because network operators build infrastructure and transport facilities precisely because they own them and can charge market prices.
“the internet was not invented according to architectural blueprints it evolved spontaneously the to the extent that there's a design factor in there it's private property rights”
The Internet has developed modularly, with transport networks specializing in carriage and content providers specializing in content, because each side lacks a comparative advantage in the other's activity; this specialization produced a virtuous dynamic that was not built in by regulation, and regulation of the Internet has been minimal.
“transport networks tend not to get heavily involved with content they don't specialize in it they don't have a comparative advantage in it”
Many so-called net neutrality violations, such as network operators filtering malware and spam before it reaches customers, are very valuable interventions, and filtering out certain applications is not controversial because it offers economies of scale and efficiencies for customers.
“there are many many quote unquote violations of net neutrality that is to say network providers often do stick their fingers into the services that their customers receive and much of that is very very valuable intervention”
The government's theory in the Microsoft case was that Microsoft attacked the Netscape browser to protect its Windows operating system, because Netscape's Java could let thousands of applications run on any platform and turn Microsoft's operating system into a commodity.
“Microsoft was really protecting its underlying operating system because in like a Trojan horse in the Netscape navigating system was software code called Java”
Apple's comeback with the iPod and iPhone, two closed devices it fully controls, is ironic given its earlier failure to embrace open systems, and reflects a business model that proved more valuable than Apple's early openness strategy.
“they come back with two totally closed devices that they totally control and have created tremendous success with”
Congress authorized spectrum auctions in 1993, and since 1994 the government has raised about fifty billion dollars from them, after decades of economists urging property rights while regulators and congressional committees preferred the discretion of administrative allocation.
“finally in 1993 when we had the Congress and the president the presidency in the same party's hands we had Congress vote to authorize auctions”
Closed or relatively closed systems such as Apple's Mac machines are more resistant to malware, spam, and other Internet connectivity problems than open Windows-Intel machines, which normal users must constantly protect.
“the Apple machines because they're not as open as the Microsoft or so-called Wintel machines they are much more resistant to to malware and spam”
The FCC's rulemaking since 2002 to allow unlicensed low-power devices in the TV white spaces is central planning: regulators decide which devices may use the band, and this is the wrong question, which should instead be how to clear the over-the-air broadcast spectrum so it can be made available to whoever will pay most.
“the question is how can we get the over the air digital TV broadcast to efficiently make the entire space available for others who are willing to pay more”
The 1998 Justice Department antitrust case against Microsoft ended with essentially nil remedies, did not create competition in operating systems, and Microsoft's market value stagnated despite its scale and alleged market power over the decade that followed.
“Microsoft has seen its market value go nowhere despite this enormous scale and alleged market power and they lost the antitrust case and by you know by all accounts the remedies were were essentially nil”
Whether a business model is efficient depends on the era: the closed Mac model may have been inefficient in 1985 and efficient in 2008, so business models must be analyzed by watching how competing models rival one another rather than by fitting markets into a rigid framework.
“the closed or relatively closed model of you know the Mac world may have been inefficient in 1985 and it may be efficient and you know 2008”
A reliable way to understand the economics of a regulatory program is to see who is proposing which rules and why, because this reveals the interests at stake that are otherwise invisible from outside the agency.
“a very reliable way figuring out the economics of different programs instantly it comes under your radar screen when you're at an agency and that is you know who is proposing what set of rules”
In May 2002, before its IPO and with little cash, Google paid cash and warrants to AOL to become the default search engine for AOL's roughly 134 million subscribers' startup page, a non-neutral deal that co-founders Sergey Brin and Larry Page argued was worth the cost over CEO Eric Schmidt's objections.
“Google actually paid both cash and warrants to AOL which at that time of course was the dominant internet service provider in the United States”
The 1995-96 Apple-IBM merger failed because Apple insisted on no collaboration on Mac OS until antitrust approval, which IBM expected to take a year or more, so IBM's shareholders would have lost a solid year of development with Apple and IBM refused the deal.
“Apple insisted that there be no no collaboration on the Mac OS until the merger were approved”
AT&T lobbied for a national PCS license as a potential entrant, but after buying the largest cellular network, CellularOne, in fall 1993 it withdrew that position and urged small local licenses, showing that firms' policy positions shift as they move from entrant to incumbent.
“in nineteen the fall of 1993 AT&T essentially bought the largest cellular network in the country it was called cellular one and they actually withdrew their previous filings”
Satellite distribution of broadcast TV could reach everyone without a satellite dish or cable connection for about three billion dollars, freeing the TV band, which could be worth about one hundred billion dollars if sold for other wireless uses.
“you could literally get everybody who doesn't have a satellite dish or a cable connection for about three billion dollars to be hooked up”
Apple's closed business model, which Microsoft's open licensing approach contrasted with, has proven very valuable, and Microsoft's licensing of its operating system is what Bill Gates urged Apple to adopt in 1985, when Apple refused to license Mac OS.
“Bill Gates in 1985 famously urged Apple to do because he wanted his applications to run on that beautiful graphical user interface”
Video programming will migrate over the next five to ten years from cable and satellite to broadband distribution, and this migration, rather than the net neutrality debate, is the generational shift policy should focus on.
“video programming is going to migrate not just from over-the-air broadcasting but it's going to migrate from cable and satellite to to broadband distribution”
The FCC and broadcasters are protecting a 1952-era over-the-air broadcast model, and proposed extremely low-power white-space devices are unlikely to substitute for Wi-Fi routers because the broadcasters have lobbied the FCC toward very low power limits, which keeps use localized and bandwidth limited.
“the broadcaster's are powerful at the sec and they've gotten the sec to talk about extremely low power limits”
The net neutrality argument holds that the Internet was built on an architectural design separating the edge (applications delivered to end users) from the core (an interconnected layer of networks), letting independent innovators reach the market without building their own delivery networks, and that large network providers could threaten this by closing off edge access to favor their own services.
“the argument has been that this design of the Internet does work spectacularly well in allowing lots of independent innovators to offer their content or applications to the marketplace without reinventing the wheel”
Regulators are not imaginative enough about spectrum, and a property-rights owner such as Google holding a slice of the TV band could move broadcasts to alternative channels and unleash innovations that the current regulatory path forecloses.
“if you allowed for example Google itself to own some slice of the TV band and then make deals to move the TV broadcasts”
Google is the leading corporate champion of net neutrality even though it engages in the non-neutral vertical deals it argues against, a pattern Hazlett suggests reflects strategic positioning, with Microsoft and other Silicon Valley firms also lobbying in the same direction.
“they argue most famously for net neutrality they're certainly the leading corporate champion”
The competition that actually displaced Microsoft came from unforeseen directions: Apple, which had nearly died, rebounded with the iPod and iPhone, and its market capitalization is now about half of Microsoft's.
“they now are a powerhouse that's it's worth about half and market cap what Microsoft is worth because it basically to hardware devices one one being the iPod and the other being the iPhone”
Regulators who oppose property-rights spectrum policy may be responding to political forces rather than economics, and Hazlett suspects that politics explains the disagreement more than economic analysis does.
“perhaps they're not kool-aid drinkers but responding to different forces than the new and I are perhaps I suspect political issues there”
Russ Roberts frames net neutrality fears as the risk that a dominant network provider could exploit consumers and cut off access because easy entry would not discipline it.
“people worry that we won't get the kind of robust competition and that the future will end up putting us in the hands of a very small group”
Economic analysis of Econ Talk style broadcast media shows that radio and TV are being pushed out by alternative technologies, so the innovation that does not happen elsewhere is the real issue to watch.
“the TV and radio which is where the spectrum started right for it was where the action was for so long are slowly being pushed out by alternative technologies”