Sarah Paine — The war for India (lecture & interview)
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Historian Sarah Paine traces how great-power maneuvering in South Asia unfolded through structural constraints rather than ideology or sentiment. The centerpiece is her Cutthroat Billiards framework: because the United States shared no primary adversary with either India or Pakistan, every strategic move to strengthen one necessarily weakened relations with the other. Arms sales meant for one country would be aimed at the other; aid during periods of high strategic need (U-2 bases, mail routes to China, arming Afghan insurgents) alternated with neglect, producing proliferation and blowback. The deeper argument rests on Primary Adversary Analysis—the thesis that alliances cohere around shared existential threats, not shared ideology or gratitude. Britain, the US, and the Soviet Union fought together against Hitler despite mutually incompatible end goals; by contrast, ideological allies without a common enemy fragment. Paine traces how Mao Zedong's decision to absorb Tibet and build roads through it eliminated the buffer zone between China and India, while the Sino-Soviet split gave the US its only leverage—positioning China and Russia as each other's primary adversaries and allowing the US to overextend Soviet resources across two militarized frontiers.
The lecture ranges across Cold War strategy, the architecture of frozen conflicts in Kashmir and Korea, the structural brittleness of dictatorships without succession mechanisms, and the long-term costs of limited vs unlimited objectives in warfare. Paine discusses Deng Xiao Ping's economic opening and its collision with Communist Party monopoly, critiques how the Ronald Reagan administration's $3.2 billion Afghan operation enriched Inter-Services Intelligence and seeded later instability, and argues that the postwar US decision to rebuild West Germany and Japan as allies—rather than punish them—outperformed the punitive peace after World War I. She also addresses methodology: the 30-Second Test for evaluating historical scholarship (checking whether sources are cited in the languages of the countries studied) and the practice of Read Broadly for Unknown Unknowns from original documents and archives.
Paine argues that great-power intervention in South Asia is best understood through a 'cutthroat billiards' framework: because the US shared no primary adversary with either India or Pakistan, every move to aid one alienated the other, while alliances and frozen conflicts are governed by shared primary enemies, not ideology or gratitude.
- Alliances cohere around a common primary adversary and existential threat, not shared ideology (WWII Allies vs Axis).
- Arming either India or Pakistan inevitably aimed those arms at the other, poisoning US relations with both.
- The 1969 Sino-Soviet conflict made China and Russia each other's primary adversary, giving the US the swing position to overextend the USSR.
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Bismarck illustrates the power of limited objectives: by fighting the Danish, Austro-Prussian, and Franco-Prussian wars each for limited gains short of regime change, he avoided alarming the other powers who could have intervened, and thereby unified Germany and overturned the European balance of power—taking Prussia from the weakest of five great powers to a central dominant position.
“no one is really paying attention that he's actually upending the balance of power in Europe. They're just looking at it. It's limited. He's not toppling the Austrian government, he's not toppling the Danish government.”
When the Soviets asked the US in 1969 whether it was acceptable to nuke China during the border conflict and the US said no, Mao deduced that whoever wants to nuke you is your primary adversary; this shifted the alignment so that the US was no longer the primary enemy of both, but Russia and China became each other's primary adversaries, giving the US the swing position to team up with China and overextend the USSR.
“And Mao figures it out. The one that wants to nuke you, that's the primary adversary. So prior to that moment, the United States is the primary adversary of both Russia and China. Now with this, they're primary adversaries of each other.”
Good strategy requires reassessing your assumptions early and often without fear of being wrong, since changing your mind in light of new information is a sign of strength rather than weakness, and part of good strategy is recognizing that some problems are not feasible to solve and focusing scarce resources on those you can.
“Reassessing is a sign of strength. It's like, I got more information, I've changed my mind. Good thing, don't double down on bad information.”
Dictatorships are absolutely brittle because there is no orderly succession mechanism, so a dictator's death guarantees a leadership free-for-all; elections solve this by providing a routine transfer of power, whereas in a dictatorship like Putin's Russia, his death would force a focus on Moscow and could compel calling off external wars like Ukraine, just as Stalin's death pushed the Soviets to end the Korean War amid domestic unrest.
“in that kind of system is there's going to be a leadership struggle. That's the problem with dictatorships. They're absolutely brittle. And that's what's wonderful about having elections.”
The main theater of a war is where most of the fighting forces are, and since the Russians fought between two-thirds and three-quarters of the Nazi army throughout, the Eastern Front was WWII's main theater; the Normandy invasion was a peripheral operation that only succeeded because the simultaneous Soviet Operation Bagration drew German forces away.
“Russians fought between 2/3 and 3/4 of the Nazi army, always. That makes the eastern front the main theater. So you all think... that the Normandy invasion was a big deal. No, that is a peripheral operation.”
To judge a history book's quality, apply the 30-second test of flipping through the bibliography to check whether it cites sources in the language of the country in question; a book on the US with no English sources would be regarded as garbage, and Americans routinely produce such one-sided work, so genuine expertise requires reading what the other side thinks in its own language.
“flip through the bibliography... and see is there anything in the language of the country in question in the bibliography... And if there is zip, I would toss it.”
Alliances are held together not by shared ideology but by a common primary enemy that poses an existential threat; the WWII Allies (Britain, US, USSR) had mutually exclusive end goals yet cooperated because eliminating Hitler was a common way station, whereas the Axis shared fascist ideology but had different primary enemies and theaters, so they fought parallel wars and were defeated in detail.
“So the common existential threat can be a superglue of the most unlikely partners.”
An outside power can fund a secessionist insurgency in a rival country to pin that rival down and consume its attention without bearing any cost, but the result is a frozen conflict in which all the costs—horrendous deaths, lost economic growth, intractable hatred—are borne by the local population, as seen in Kashmir, Korea, and Palestine where veto players can block peace simply by sending a few package bombs.
“the outside power. if they are playing their cards right, their amoral cards right, they're not bearing any of the costs. They're pinning someone they don't particularly like. All the costs are borne by the local population who are suffering horrendous deaths, lack of economic growth.”
A war ends not when the winner decides it has won but when the loser decides it has had enough; the Cold War ended because the Soviets, under Gorbachev, got sick of it and quit, and the Korean War wound down partly because Stalin's death created domestic unrest that made the Soviets want it over.
“One thing you should know about warfare, you think the winners win it. No, actually, it's when the losers decide they've had enough. That's when a war ends. Otherwise it doesn't end. So the Russians got sick of it and they quit.”
A key to Kremlinology and understanding dictators is to read what they say, because they must communicate with their own populations and quite often state exactly what they intend to do—plans that seem insane but are real—so reading broadly in the original languages and across archives is how you find the important unknown unknowns.
“pay attention to what dictators say because they've got to communicate at some level to their own populations. They quite often tell you exactly what they want to do and you think that's insane. Who would do that? Well, hello.”
Mao's decision to reconquer Tibet (1950) and build all-weather road systems through it by 1957, especially the western route, eliminated the large Tibetan buffer zone between China and India, allowing China to deploy troops into disputed Himalayan areas where India could not, and reducing the buffer to the small kingdoms of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim.
“Now China's built roads so it can get into places where India cannot deploy troops until it gets into the road races with the Chinese. And so it reduces the buffer zone between China and India to these small Himalayan kingdoms of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim.”
By teaming up with China after the Sino-Soviet split, the US forced Russia to militarize its entire Chinese border in addition to its European border with mechanized, nuclear-armed forces, which was financially unsustainable and overextended the Soviet Union in the Cold War, while the US gained listening posts and gave China naval technology that posed no threat to America.
“with this Sino, Soviet split and all the rest of it, Russia has to militarize its entire border with China. It's already militarized its entire border with Europe... It is not cheap. Imagine if the United States had to do this on our Canadian and Mexican borders. Bankrupting”
Because the US shared no permanent primary enemy with Pakistan, US interest in Pakistan rose and fell with episodic strategic needs—U2 bases and listening posts before satellite imagery, carrying mail to China, arming the Afghan insurgency against the Soviets—and during the high-need periods the US ignored human rights and nuclear proliferation, producing steady proliferation and blowback like 9/11.
“in these periods when we really need the Pakistanis, we don't pay attention to human rights or the really big one, nuclear proliferation. And so the proliferation is pretty steady.”
The generous peace after WWII—rebuilding democratic institutions in West Germany and Japan and reintegrating them into the family of nations—turned former enemies into wonderful allies, in contrast to the punitive post-WWI peace that ostracized Germans and Russians and, combined with the mismanaged Great Depression, allowed fascists to rise.
“the generous peace with Germany, look at them. They're the most wonderful allies, as are the Japanese... realizing In World War I, ostracizing Germans, ostracizing Russians, it probably doesn't. You need to bring them back into the family of nations”
Common enemies cannot be conjured into existence, so before intervening one must check the actual alignments—each player's primary objective, primary adversary, and primary theater of interest—for all possible players who might crash the party, because countries sharing a primary enemy and existential threat will cooperate even if unlikely partners, while ideological allies without a shared primary enemy will not.
“common enemies cannot be conjured. So check out the alignments of who these common enemies are before you leave the parking lot and figure it out for all possible players who might want to crash the party.”
China won the 1962 Sino-Indian War and got the Aksai Chin Plateau it wanted, but the cost was turning an idealistic, non-militarized India into a permanent enemy that doubled its army to 750,000 and built ten mountain divisions; had China and India teamed up instead, the global order might look very different.
“But what they have done is taken a country, India, which had its leadership terribly idealistic, not interested in becoming militarized at all and making them angry forever. India immediately doubles the size of its army within the next 10 years to up to 750,000 people.”
Past civilizational greatness can impede later development because a society that was the cultural and institutional center of its region finds it hard to reform and tells itself a self-flattering myth that it only exports ideas and never absorbs foreign ones; China believed this despite having absorbed Manchu institutions, while Japan, comfortable absorbing Chinese then Western institutions, industrialized nearly a century earlier.
“If you've been such a successful civilization in Asia the way they had been... With that kind of success, it's pretty hard to reform yourself. And so they also fed themselves the Kool-aid that the Chinese never absorbed foreign ideas.”
A genuine commitment to free elections means accepting outcomes you don't want; the US undermined its own stated principles by not pushing for elections in Vietnam because it knew Ho Chi Minh, the only national figure, would win, and this may have been a terrible mistake since the Vietnamese, who dislike the Chinese, would have served as a counterbalance to China.
“in Vietnam, we didn't want to hold, we didn't push the South Vietnamese to hold elections because we knew Ho Chi Minh would win... if you're for free elections, it means you don't get the outcome you want. And I wonder if that wasn't a terrible mistake, because the Vietnamese actually can't stand the Chinese.”
The Soviet Union was an inverted 'doughnut' empire: unlike a normal empire where the metropole is the most developed core, Russia was the poorer center sucking wealth from richer peripheries like Czechoslovakia and Poland, so when it lost Eastern Europe the loss was devastating because Russians did not realize how much they had been living off Western-produced wealth.
“they had what I would call a doughnut empire... it was an inverted empire. Russia is the donut. The rich places are places like Czechoslovakia and Poland had been much richer places.”
Because the US shared no primary adversary with either India or Pakistan, any arms or aid given to one would be aimed at the other, so the US could not befriend both; befriending one necessarily made it the enemy of the other, leaving the US with no playable cards in the regional game.
“if you arm either India or Pakistan in this period, it's going to aim it at the other one”
Under Deng Xiaoping the requirements for economic reform and for Communist Party power ran in parallel, but they now run at cross purposes: to maintain its monopoly the Party must suppress the more educated Chinese who no longer accept it, and that suppression will undermine continued economic growth.
“For a while there, under Deng Xiaoping, it ran in parallel what the economic reforms needed to be to produce wealth and what the Party needed in order to be more powerful. But now that's running at cross purposes, because for the party to maintain its monopoly, well, all these much more educated Chinese aren't going to be interested in that anymore.”
When the Reagan administration funneled $3.2 billion through Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence directorate to arm Afghan insurgents, it made the ISI extraordinarily powerful and let it choose which fighters to arm, including anti-Western elements, while also diverting money into Kashmir, producing 9/11-related blowback and a Kashmir insurgency that persists.
“when you put that kind of money into that kind of bureaucracy, you're going to make them incredibly powerful. And then they're the ones who decide how they're going to allocate money to insurgents in Afghanistan... they're arming some really anti-Western folks in there, probably some guy named Osama, last name Bin Laden.”
Marxism appealed to colonized peoples scarred by World War I and the Depression because it framed capitalists as wasting lives, but the technicalities of Marx's labor theory of value are inaccurate since it is not just labor that produces value—intellectual contributions like those in Silicon Valley produce tremendous value—and pursuing equality through expropriation eliminates liberty.
“the technicalities of Marx's labor theory of value don't actually turn out to be accurate. It's not just labor that produces value like Silicon Valley, you understand, it's what comes up here that produces a tremendous amount of value.”
Communism provides a powerful, transferable doctrine for taking power within a broken state—turning campus intellectuals into cadres, then guerrillas, then a conventional army—and is very effective at that and at staying in power, but it is lousy at producing prosperity afterward.
“What the Communists have is a really powerful doctrine for how you go from nothing to something in a failing state... they have a really good program that works the world over, and it's very effective for taking power within a broken state. It's lousy at producing prosperity thereafter.”
Modern international law and the rules-based order freeze existing borders rather than relitigating ancient historical claims, which—like Europe after centuries of mutual slaughter deciding to trade and travel instead—is the only way to achieve compounding rapid growth, whereas focusing on seizing territory is negative-sum because you fight over and destroy it.
“It's like musical chairs. We're now freezing whatever chair you're in. That's it. And that's modern international law.”
The US could not have meaningfully aided Chiang Kai-shek the way it aided Stalin because delivering Lend-Lease requires railways and ports, and Japan controlled China's coast and rail systems, leaving only airlift over the Himalayan 'hump'—flying in aviation fuel to bomb Japan—which was logistically a non-starter, so the disparity in aid reflected geography, not preference.
“if you want to deliver Lend-Lease... There's no way to get the aid in... So to get aid in, you need railways and you need ports. The Japanese had covered all that and they owned all the railway systems.”
Iconic leaders like Mao and Stalin were canonized by winning their wars (Stalin via WWII, Mao via reunifying China and fighting the capitalist powers to a stalemate in Korea), so their successors inevitably lack that prestige and the system devolves toward the mean, with successors also wanting to escape the terror of constant purges.
“iconic leaders like Mao and Stalin, they were canonized by winning their wars, Stalin by winning World War II... Whoever comes after them is not going to have that level of prestige. It's just going to devolve.”
A power should be careful where it intervenes because it may be unable to stop the violence and will then be blamed for it, as the US was after idealistically creating democracy in Iraq triggered a massive civil war; intervening in everything leads to overextension, and such problems might better be handled through the UN.
“the Iraq war, goes in, they create democracy in this place. It's a massive civil war, and then we're blamed for it. So be careful about where you intervene because you may not be able to stop a thing and then you'll get blamed for what's going on.”
When the great powers refrain from putting their fingers on the scale of local civil wars, casualties stay low, but when Russia and the US both arm a conflict, industrial-age weapons send casualties through the roof; the magical inner-Cold-War period when this proxy intervention stopped saw tremendous growth across the Third World precisely because insurgencies were not tearing up wealth.
“if you have Russia put its finger on the scale, then of course we're going to put our finger on the scale... What happens? Casualties just go through the roof... And then there was this magical inner Cold War period when all that stopped. And that's when you get this tremendous growth across the third World”
A continental power prefers to be surrounded by small, broken states, which is why Stalin wanted a divided China (telling Mao to halt at the Yangtze for a 'breather'), a divided Germany, and a divided Korea, rather than a strong unified neighbor.
“Because he wants a divided China like the divided Germany he has, and then the divided Korea he's going to get. You want to be surrounded by these little broken states around you if you're a continental power.”
The right question is why Europe, not China, had the Industrial Revolution, and the answer lies in Europe's fragmentation: a peninsula with good river systems and many competing states where no lasting empire could form, forcing commerce and innovation to survive, plus institutions like marine insurance, banking rules, and international law that a moat-protected Britain could anchor.
“you don't have one big empire that can just sit there, be fat, dumb and happy that you have to innovate in order to survive against all these other little states.”
Although there are only a few great powers, the aggregate wealth of all the small and medium powers exceeds that of any single great power, so if smaller powers agree on what they want, the great powers must pay attention—a positive feature of the international system.
“the small and medium powers, if you add them all up, are by far the aggregate. Their aggregate wealth exceeds any one great power. So if the smaller powers agree on what they're up to, then the big powers have to pay attention.”
The US brokered the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty—the only India-Pakistan agreement that massively benefited both, funding shared dams with US money—and it has operated successfully ever since, yet the US received zero enduring gratitude from either country, illustrating that even successful interventions yield no lasting goodwill when no shared primary enemy exists.
“this treaty has been, it's been operating some of these dams ever since to the enormous benefit of both countries. Does the United States get any enduring gratitude from either one for doing this? No. Zip.”
Under international law, recognizing another state's sovereignty over territory is permanent and cannot be legally retracted, which is why India's recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet in its friendship treaty was binding, whereas China's vaguer promises of peaceful coexistence had no such permanence.
“under international law, if you recognize someone's sovereignty over territory that is permanent, you cannot back out of it legally under international law.”
Russia's exceptional historical cruelty may stem from living on dangerous, indefensible real estate, leading to a scorched-earth survival strategy of being meaner than everyone else; this coercion is embedded in the language itself, where 'sila' means both strength and coercion and 'detente' means unloading a gun, and persists today in execution battalions that murder retreating soldiers.
“if you're living in a really dangerous piece of real estate, which they are, no defensible boundaries. So you're always fighting people. And their answer to surviving that is to be meaner than anybody else.”
Because the Soviet Union fractured just as China rose, Putin is depleting his Cold War stockpile on Ukraine while leaving Siberia—rich in resources China covets, including Lake Baikal's roughly 20% of the world's surface fresh water on land the Tsars stole—wide open, so it is only a matter of when, not whether, China corners a desperate Putin through negotiation at the least convenient moment.
“Putin is dumping all his ordnance on Ukraine, his Cold War stockpile, and he is leaving Siberia open, wide open to Chinese predations. And I believe Siberia has precisely the resources that China covets on lands the Tsars stole.”
Nehru, his advisor Krishna Menon, and Indira Gandhi were skilled at making insulting remarks to American VIPs that hit their targets but bruised egos that, like elephants, never forgot, while Pakistan played the welcoming host, producing bad trend lines for India as US support shifted from backing India in 1962 to neutrality in 1965 to backing Pakistan in 1971.
“Nehru and his very controversial, but devoted advisor Krishna Menon and his daughter Indira Gandhi were really good at making these totally insulting remarks to American VIPs... the ego that has just been hit is huge and like an elephant is not about to forget.”
The US sent the nuclear carrier Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 war as an instrument of national power, but it had no effect on the war's outcome—Pakistan lost anyway—and merely enraged India, which regarded it as a threat, suggesting it would have been better left in port.
“during the '71 war, the United States sent this into the Bay of Bengal... had no effect on that war: Pakistan lost... The Indians were furious... maybe it would have been better to have left Enterprise in their home port”
China's large aggregate economy is misleading because its per capita standard of living is very low once divided across roughly 1.3 billion people, and for human beings it is family income—the per capita figure—that actually matters, so China has a long way to go.
“they've got a big economy because they're... it's huge. And divide the 1.3 billion, whatever it is, you come up with a low number for per capita standard of living. And I think for human beings, that's the number that matters”
India and Pakistan are natural trade partners, so the cumulative costs of their wars plus the opportunity costs of money not spent on roads and education and the lost trade reveal the enormous real cost of their conflict.
“India and Pakistan are natural trade partners. So if you take all these wars and just add up all the costs and then think of the opportunity costs”
The story of South Asia is one of three protagonists—Russia, the United States, and China—all wanting to work their magic on India and Pakistan, which did not appreciate it.
“today I'm going to tell you a story of three protagonists, Russia, the United States and China, that all wanted to work their magic on India and Pakistan, which didn't exactly appreciate it.”