What this covers

William MacAskill and Tyler Cowen explore the place of utilitarian-style moral reasoning in an era of radical technological change. MacAskill defends the application of large-scale consequentialist thinking—focused on the vast majority of moral value lying in the far future—while acknowledging the real paradoxes and intuitive costs this creates. Cowen pushes back on where such reasoning breaks down, particularly at extreme scales. Their exchange circles through population ethics, extinction risk, the conditions under which moral reasoning remains reliable, and whether this historical moment qualifies as unusually influential for shaping the long-term future.

The conversation covers the standard objections to consequentialist thinking at large scales: the repugnant conclusion, Pascal's Wager, the problem of infinite ethics. Rather than abandoning these frameworks, MacAskill argues that every coherent moral view faces equally unintuitive implications when pushed to population-ethics questions, so the paradoxes don't indict consequentialism uniquely. He advocates for a meta-pluralist approach—holding credence across multiple moral views while treating longtermism and impartial altruism as overwhelmingly important. The discussion turns on whether we occupy a genuinely hinge-y moment: MacAskill argues that historically anomalous rates of technological change cannot persist, creating a narrow window where human decisions shape the trajectory of an otherwise long future. Both speakers examine how moral reasoning can remain principled without collapsing into absurdity, and where practical leverage for improving the world lies—in growth, institutions, values, or some combination. Questions about measurement in altruism, wild-animal suffering, and the sustainability of exponential growth weave through their disagreement.

Sharpest takeaway

MacAskill argues that utilitarian-style moral reasoning should be pursued ambitiously across all scales rather than abandoned when it produces counterintuitive results, defending a meta-pluralist approach that weights multiple moral views while still taking the long-term future and impartial altruism as overwhelmingly important.

  • Almost all moral value lies in the vast potential future, so reducing extinction risk and shaping values dominates near-term concerns
  • Population-ethics paradoxes afflict every moral view, not just consequentialism, so they don't justify abandoning consequentialist reasoning at large scales
  • The current era is unusually 'hinge-y' because the rate of technological change is historically anomalous and cannot persist indefinitely

The argument · threads8 threads · 37 claims
0.66

Future generations vastly outnumber present ones, so efforts should prioritize existential survival and values over near-term aid.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • The best guess from the Fermi paradox—that we don't observe advanced intelligent life—is that we are probably alone in a very large section of space, so as an empirical matter it is quite likely that if humanity dies off no other civilization will take our place; this is why alien existence does not straightforwardly undermine concern about existential risk.

    “I think the best guess from the Fermi paradox... is that, probably, we’re just alone, at least in a very, very large section of space. So, as an empirical fact, I think it’s really quite likely that if humanity dies off, no one else will take our place to build some flourishing civilization.”

  • If having more happy flourishing people is good, then by overwhelming amounts the focus should be on how many people may exist in the future rather than now, because losing future life if humanity goes extinct is measured in trillions upon trillions of lives, dwarfing even a 10 percent (≈1 billion) boost from a successful present-day fertility program.

    “the loss of future life and future very good life if we go extinct — that’s being measured in the trillions upon trillions of lives. The question of just how many people should be alive today is really driven by, how would that impact the long-term flourishing of humanity?”

  • Indefinite exponential economic growth is implausible: 2 percent growth for 10,000 years would require producing about 10^87 worlds' worth of output—roughly a trillion trillion current civilizations per atom within 10,000 light-years—so technologically delivered growth must decrease in the future, making arguments that hinge on hundreds of trillions of years of continued growth extremely brittle and low-probability.

    “if we had economic growth of 2 percent per year for 10,000 years, then we would be producing 10 to the 87 world’s worth of economic output... There are 10 to the 67 atoms within 10,000 light-years. So, we would be producing about a trillion trillion current civilization’s worth of economic output for every atom within 10,000 years. That just seems like, okay, that can’t happen.”

  • We are at least plausibly at a very influential ('hinge-y') time because the current rate of technological progress is anomalously high both relative to history (only ~200 years old) and relative to what must occur in the future (since growth must decrease), making this a tiny distinctive window in the whole story of civilization—though not necessarily the single most influential time.

    “the rate of technological progress is very high compared to history, and also very high compared to what must happen in the future... That actually suggests we’re living at a time of unusually high technological change. This is actually a very tiny window.”

0.63

Longtermism converges on supporting growth, institutions, democracy, and innovation because they have proven track records over centuries.

3 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Given the difficulty of predicting the future, at some margin longtermism converges on pushing the robustly correlated goods—technology-delivered growth, good institutions, democracy, liberalism, cooperation, high trust, innovation—because their track record over the last 200 years makes them reliable bets, so longtermism comes to look more common-sense, like building a flourishing society.

    “From the sheer track record of how helpful these have been over the last 200 years, let’s just keep pushing on that... at some margin, that’s what I think long-termism turns into. It looks more common sense-y, like building a flourishing society.”

  • Because growth will plateau, the more important long-term levers are changing the values that guide the future or ensuring humanity survives at all, since those make differences that persist for all time, whereas accelerating growth merely shifts an outcome that would arrive anyway.

    “The more important thing is to either change the values that guide the future or ensure that we have a future at all because that’s a difference that really persists for all time.”

  • Plastic, short-lived moments—like the four-month drafting of the US Constitution—can have enormous long-term impact, so a skilled lawyer could find high leverage by anticipating and preparing for influential future events such as the eventual writing of a world-government constitution that almost no one currently works on.

    “The forming of the Constitution of the United States was enormously impactful from a very long-term perspective, and yet it was done over the course of about four months. We can think in terms of these plastic moments that have a real impact over the future.”

0.52

Moral truth is uncertain; we should hold credence in multiple views rather than commit fully to one framework like utilitarianism.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Rather than being a utilitarian (one source of moral reasons) or a first-order pluralist (moral reality is intrinsically complex), MacAskill holds a meta-level view: the moral truth may be simple, but because we are uncertain, we should hold some credence in a variety of moral views and take a compromise between them, which in practice resembles pluralism.

    “I think we should have some degree of belief in a variety of moral views and take a compromise between them.”

  • Every moral view, not just consequentialism, faces extremely unintuitive implications in population ethics—this has been formally proven—because every view must decide under what conditions bringing a new flourishing life into existence is good; so paradoxes like the repugnant conclusion don't single out consequentialism, and abandoning consequentialism over them would require something more radical like abandoning moral consistency itself.

    “any view that you have in population ethics has extremely unintuitive implications. That’s actually been formally proven.”

  • Moral philosophy is a 'train to crazy town': starting from commonsense intuitions, careful theorizing builds simpler, more explanatorily powerful theories that move us away from those intuitions, raising the methodological question of how far we are willing to go; MacAskill gets off the train before accepting Pascalian wagers about infinite value from a possible God.

    “There is what we might call the train to crazy town. We have all these starting moral intuitions. What I see as the project of moral philosophy is reconciling them, using theory and careful reasoning to make moral progress, which often involves creating simpler and explanatorily powerful theories that move away from your commonsense intuitions.”

  • MacAskill would not take a 51/49 double-or-nothing bet on the world's value because he has rapidly diminishing returns to value and because expected value theory itself runs into problems, particularly with low probabilities of large amounts of value; the issue is located in how we juggle probability against value rather than in a scale-dependent breakdown of utilitarian reasoning.

    “intuitively, I have very rapid diminishing returns to value. So, intuitively, I think that you take a galaxy, and it’s full of bliss, best possible galaxy — 50/50 for that versus all accessible galaxies are flourishing... and I’m like, “Nope, don’t want to take that bet.””

0.47

Coercion cannot be justified by good intentions because prediction is hard and unintended consequences easily outweigh benefits.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Holding that something is good (more happy people, donating to charity) is a far cry from justifying coercion to bring it about (locking up non-donors, restricting reproductive rights), because the coercive route can easily be counterproductive and very bad; full moral reasoning must take into account different moral perspectives.

    “I think it’s good for people to donate to charity... Having that view is a far cry from saying, therefore, we should go and lock people up who don’t donate to charity. That could easily be very bad, counterproductive.”

  • There is a big difference between having an optimization mindset (aiming to do the best) and demanding that we always be able to measure what we are doing against some metric; the latter requirement is a straw man against EA, since one can pursue hard-to-measure, high-value activities like cultural change without measurable metrics.

    “there’s a very big difference between having an optimization mindset — do the best — and having a mindset that’s like, “Therefore, we always need to be able to measure what we’re doing and have some metric that we’re optimizing towards.” That latter thing, I think, is a bit of a straw man against EA.”

0.44

Simulation hypothesis and metaphysical idealism deserve serious consideration but should not override practical action in the residual likely world.

11 pointscentrality 2/5
  • No matter how confident you are that you are in a simulation, you should act as if you are not, because conditional on being in a simulation all bets are off (like nihilism—who knows the impact of your actions), so practical guidance comes only from the residual probability that you are in the real world, where you do what seems best.

    “Maybe that means that no matter how confident you are that you’re in a simulation, you should act as if you’re not, because 99 percent you’re in a simulation — it’s like nihilism... One percent that you’re not in a simulation, and then you just do the kind of things that seem best.”

  • Idealism as a metaphysical view is underrated: given that we have direct awareness only of our experiences, the idea that there may be no external world has more going for it than most philosophers credit, and it relates to taking the simulation hypothesis seriously.

    “the fact that it’s our experiences that we have direct awareness of and the idea that maybe there’s no external world. I think there’s more on the table than maybe more than philosophers give it credit for.”

  • Whether living in a simulation matters morally depends on decision theory: under causal decision theory, being simulated heavily penalizes long-term-future arguments because simulators will likely shut things off once they have their information (making the future short and one's causal impact low), favoring near-term help; under non-causal decision theory it matters far less because one's action is evidence about what the non-simulated self would do.

    “Causal decision theory says, “I should care about what I cause.” If so, then, if I’m living in a simulation, the argument for taking the very long-term future seriously gets a massive penalty... once they’ve got that information, it’s much less likely that they’re going to keep simulating things.”

  • MacAskill has been helping Sam Bankman-Fried launch the Future Fund foundation, which has moved about $140 million in its first year.

    “I’ve been helping Sam Bankman-Fried launch his foundation, the Future Fund... We’ve been able to move a lot of money, about $140 million this year.”

  • Quine's famous attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'—that one cannot non-circularly define truth-in-virtue-of-meaning—is a weak argument, because one can clearly hold positions involving primitive concepts without defining them in non-circular terms; Quine's reputation rests partly on vivid closing metaphors that readers like even when they don't follow the technical arguments.

    “I think you can clearly have positions that involve primitive concepts without being able to define them in non-circular terms. That’s regarded as one of the great papers of analytic philosophy over the last century. I think the arguments are pretty weak.”

  • While donations to top universities are not among the worst charitable gifts, a generic gift to a school like Harvard is unlevered because universities with enormous endowments are not especially good at promoting research compared to independent research-focused organizations, so targeted donations or independent institutes pay off more.

    “if I’m going to promote research, I think a generic gift to Harvard is going to look pretty unlevered. I don’t think universities are, in general, in a great state in terms of how they can promote research compared to, say, independent research-focused organizations.”

  • MacAskill holds it as roughly a toss-up whether a human-originating future civilization would be more valuable than an alien-originating one, but because he weights both an impartial view and a more partial pro-human view, he gives some extra weight to human-originating civilization while refusing to favor humans by extreme ratios like 10,000 to 1.

    “My honest view is more like it’s a toss-up. I don’t see a particular reason for thinking that a civilization that comes from human beings is going to be much greater in value than from aliens.”

  • Charities founded with very specific missions can become increasingly absurd over time as the environment changes, illustrating the 'dead hand problem'; therefore people doing good for the future should design aims flexible enough to keep making sense as conditions change.

    “I like it as an example of what gets called the “dead hand problem” in philanthropy, where the founding of nonprofits can have a very specific mission, and that mission can become increasingly absurd over time.”

  • People can be both clueless and right about living in hinge-y times: early Christians thought their era was hinge-y for wrong reasons yet Christianity proved enduringly important, while the US Founding Fathers (per John Adams) were genuinely aware their institution-building could last thousands of years—suggesting humility about today's judgments since in a century people may view our AI and bioweapon concerns as misguided as Mill's worry about running out of coal.

    “It’s perfectly plausible to me, maybe even more likely than not, that in a hundred years’ time, people would look back and say, “Oh, wow, these are the people they cared about, AI and worried about bio weapons,” in the same way as I look back at John Stuart Mill... who was fighting for future generations by trying to keep coal in the ground.”

  • If your additional project (e.g., another opera performance) makes no difference even in expectation, that indicates the class of projects is being overfunded and you should take it at face value rather than inheriting value from the good the tradition already did; just as a vote only carries enormous expected value when it has some chance of being decisive, a marginal contribution to an over-determined good outcome adds nothing.

    “if you think that even in expectation, your additional project, let’s say one of the opera, is not making a difference, then that actually suggests that this class of projects is being overfunded. You should just take that at face value. The value doesn’t get inherited from the fact that it already has done a lot of good.”

  • Saying utilitarian-style reasoning breaks down once scales get large is ad hoc, because there is no qualitatively different threshold (a thousand, a million, or a billion lives) at which the reasoning that compels us in small cases suddenly fails; a more principled move is to locate the problem specifically in how probability is weighed against value.

    “It seems like nothing qualitatively different has happened. Whereas the thing that I want to say is a qualitative difference, something to do with when we’re juggling probability against value.”

0.38

Effective altruism is fundamentally a cultural movement recruiting bright, altruistically motivated people toward truth-seeking and impartial values.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Effective altruism attracts very smart young people partly because there was an untapped market of altruistically minded people: consequentialism-flavored ethical views correlate with high educational performance, which also correlates with material security, and altruism behaves like a luxury good—the more secure you are, the more you can focus on it.

    “I think of altruism like a luxury good. The more secure you are, the more you can focus on that.”

  • Effective altruism is best understood as a cultural innovation—creating a new subculture of impartial, altruistically motivated people obsessed with truth and accurate beliefs—analogous to how the scientific revolution was primarily a revolution in culture (people began experimenting, testing, and tinkering), and this is a major channel through which EA could drive moral progress.

    “I actually see effective altruism, as a whole, as cultural innovation. It’s creating this new subculture, a culture of people who are impartial and altruistically motivated, extremely concerned about the truth and having accurate beliefs.”

  • At a broad scale, human beings are better understood as homo culturalis—people who hold a vision of how the world should be and go out to make it happen, with hard-to-measure but important long-run effects—rather than homo economicus motivated mainly by self-interest understood in terms of income.

    “my understanding of human beings — rather than homo economicus, which are mainly motivated by self-interest... at least when you’re looking at a much broader scale, I think we’re much more like homo culturalis, where people have a view of how the world should be, and they go out and try to make that vision happen.”

  • Although effective altruism selects only for caring about questions like cost-effective life-saving (not politically hot-button issues), its members systematically tend to be very socially liberal and economically moderate, and inertia would likely keep EA in that category absent a known mechanism (like the one driving other foundations left) to shift it further.

    “There does tend to be a pretty systematic tendency towards being very socially liberal and being economically moderate or something... But perhaps you could convince me otherwise if I understood what’s the mechanism by which these other foundations are shifting left-wing.”

0.36

Wild animal welfare deserves moral consideration because moral worth should not depend on whether a being is domesticated.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Concern for wild-animal suffering, though it sounds wild, is only a few steps from commonsense morality: people value their pets' well-being, the moral worth of a creature shouldn't change based on whether it is a pet or born in the wild, so it can be good to invest resources improving wild animals' well-being—though caution is warranted because interfering with poorly understood ecosystems can backfire.

    “Does the moral worth of a creature change whether it happens to be your pet or is born in the wild? I think there’s a good argument for thinking “no.””

  • Even if wild animal lives were net negative, destroying nature would be very unlikely to be the best action, because if one is willing to reason that far philosophically, one should take far more seriously the enormous potential impact on the long-run future, where vastly more value lies than in present nature.

    “There’s a lot of nature, but there’s far more future. If we’re willing to take philosophical reasoning far enough, where we’d be seriously considering removing nature, then you should be taking much more seriously the fact that we can have this enormous impact over our long-run future.”

  • The choice between hedonistic and preference-satisfaction theories of well-being makes a huge difference: under hedonism it is non-obvious whether wild animal lives are net good, whereas under preference satisfaction the world looks much better because beings generally want to keep living, and the future also looks more positive since future beings will likely have satisfied preferences even if they lack conscious experience.

    “if you have a preference satisfaction view, then I think the world looks a lot better because beings, in general, want to keep living.”

0.33

People have intrinsic value through happiness, innovation, and moral agency; focusing only on carbon costs ignores these positive contributions.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • The idea that having children is bad because of their carbon footprint only looks at one side of the ledger: while people emit carbon dioxide with negative effects, they also innovate, live intrinsically valuable happy lives, and may become moral changemakers, so the net effect of raising people to live good lives can be to make the world better.

    “there’s this idea at the moment that it’s bad to have kids because of the carbon footprint. I think that only looks at one side of the ledger. Yes, people emit carbon dioxide, and that has negative effects, but they also do a lot of good things.”

  • MacAskill is considering founding a new college that recruits the brightest, morally motivated people worldwide—especially those missed in places like rural India—hiring dedicated teachers rather than research-split faculty and using under-used learning-acceleration techniques, with the aim of scaling the model if it works in one instance.

    “Really trying to take some of the brightest people from all around the world, especially in countries where very bright, promising, morally motivated people are being missed... hiring people who are dedicated as teachers rather than having their attention split between research and teaching, which is the standard university model.”