What this covers

Steve Teles and Brink Lindsey make the case that much of contemporary inequality and economic stagnation flows not from market forces or skill differences alone, but from policy-protected rent-seeking—regulations, intellectual-property regimes, and licensing systems that funnel wealth upward while slowing growth. The conversation ranges across economics, politics, and social change, grounded in the observation that invisible regulatory capture operates far more effectively than visible fiscal policy because it escapes public scrutiny. They argue for what they call a "liberaltarian" synthesis: reforms that a coalition spanning left and right could support by targeting rules and institutions that harm both equality and dynamism.

The scope spans finance and patent law (where they argue empirical support for existing protections is weak), higher education (recast as a rent-capturing institution that has shifted resources from research to administration), and occupational licensing (defended by incumbents as sole proprietors rather than consolidating corporations). Teles and Lindsey push back on several settled positions: that Walter Scheidel's claims about inequality requiring war rest on too few cases; that catch-up growth and technological frontier growth follow radically different rules, making emerging-market comparisons misleading; and that executive compensation, while rising, is better explained by high stakes than by collusion. They invoke Bill Nordhaus's finding that innovators capture only 2 percent of innovation value to question why IP law assumes otherwise. A recurring theme surfaces how lobbying imports civil-society inequality into policymaking by functioning as scarce information provision, and how separation of powers and limited political agendas suppress the Tullock paradox—the puzzle of why lobbying spending seems so low relative to the rents at stake.

Sharpest takeaway

Lindsey and Teles argue that a significant share of high-end inequality and slowed growth stems from policy-driven, often invisible regulatory rent-seeking that redistributes wealth upward, and that a liberal-libertarian ('liberaltarian') synthesis can identify reforms boosting both growth and equality.

  • Regulatory and litigation systems are more easily captured for upward redistribution than visible fiscal policy because they operate in obscurity
  • Lobbying functions as legislative subsidy (information provision) that imports civil-society inequality into policy outcomes
  • Areas like finance, IP, occupational licensing, and higher education exhibit policy-protected rents

The argument · threads10 threads · 39 claims
0.85

Rent-seeking is substantial and measurable through observable economic distortions despite lobbying spending appearing low.

6 pointscentrality 5/5
  • There is no good aggregate way to measure the extent of rent-seeking or how it compares to skills/human-capital causes of inequality, because rent-seeking is partly a judgmental category rather than something captured by a neutral measure; the best one can say is that the evidence in the book shows it is substantial and its distribution is changing.

    “We dug around to try and figure out for good, aggregate ways to measure the extent of rent-seeking, and its interaction with skills, and the extent in the market, and we weren’t able to find them.”

  • The massive distortions visible in the economy, many bearing the fingerprints of insider influence, mean the facts deepen Tullock's paradox rather than resolving it in favor of rent-seeking being unimportant; low lobbying spend coexisting with large distortions makes the puzzle harder, not evidence against rent-seeking.

    “I say the facts deepen Tullock’s paradox rather than resolving it in the favor of rent-seeking not being a problem.”

  • The Tullock paradox (that lobbying spending is far lower than the rents government distributes) is explained by institutions absent from Tullock's model: a strong separation of powers locks in the status quo and a limited political agenda restricts what can be debated, so incumbents need not spend heavily to protect existing rents and instead direct effort toward expanding rents they don't yet have.

    “we have a very substantial separation of powers that tends to lock in the status quo and reduce therefore the incentives for investing in lobbying”

  • Drawing on Rick Hall's 'Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy,' lobbyists are essentially providing scarce information that is a source of power; if the state does not produce information itself it must import it from outside, and in doing so it imports the inequality in information gathering and processing that exists in civil society, making this a strong source of inequality in policy outcomes.

    “what lobbyists are essentially doing is providing information, that information is scarce, it is a source of power”

  • Insider influence flourishes in the shadows; regulatory policymaking is far less transparent, more obscure and arcane than fiscal policymaking whose top-line numbers (budget size, deficit, top rate) are public, so it is much harder to police insider abuses in the regulatory sphere than in the fiscal sphere.

    “insider influence and shenanigans flourish in the shadows, flourish in obscurity and regulatory policy making, relative to fiscal policy making, I think is much less transparent”

  • The default hypothesis that policy doesn't change the distribution of wealth much (a Pareto's-law-style equilibrium where progressive fiscal effects and regressive regulatory effects cancel out) is flawed because it posits no mechanism connecting the two sides; the two might equilibrate only accidentally, and treating lobbying as just another sector does not supply such a mechanism.

    “the argument from Pareto you made doesn’t have a mechanism. That is, it might accidentally be the case of the two sides would equilibrate.”

0.85

Bad policy, particularly regulatory and intellectual-property regimes, artificially inflates top-end incomes and redistributes wealth upward.

6 pointscentrality 5/5
  • A significant, non-trivial chunk of high-end inequality (the top 1%'s share of income) is due to bad policy, such that reforming the policies that artificially inflate top-end incomes would meaningfully lower the top 1% share — though this sits on top of underlying trends that would produce more unequal distribution even under perfect policy, and finer quantification is beyond social science.

    “if all of these policies that currently artificially inflate top-end incomes were reformed, the percentage of total income going to the top 1% would be significantly lower than it is today”

  • Despite how universal and long-standing patent law is, the empirical basis for it as an affirmative policy is shockingly weak; data show it is hard to demonstrate benefits, and absent a really good reason to make a law, the default should be not to have patent or copyright laws if their purpose is to encourage innovation.

    “given how universal patent law is now and how long it’s been around, the actual empirical basis for having this affirmative policy is shockingly weak”

  • The more salient and visible a policy instrument, the easier it is to capture for upward redistribution is the reverse of the truth: the regulatory and litigation systems, being less transparent and more arcane than fiscal taxing and spending, are where anti-growth, incumbent-protecting capture is most likely, while the tax-and-benefit system is on net progressive and arguably too progressive to raise needed revenue.

    “it’s really these other parts, other ways the government influences the economy other than directly through taxing and spending that are most likely to have these anti-growth, incumbent-protecting kind of qualities”

  • The tax-and-fiscal side has been roughly neutral over the last 30-40 years (and state/local taxes push regressive), but both the finance and intellectual-property regimes have led to very substantial upward redistribution and have in fact changed the distribution of income, so the claim that policy is a wash is wrong.

    “there’s evidence in our book that both the finance and the IP regime have led to very substantial upward distribution and have in fact changed the distribution of income in the economy”

  • Bill Nordhaus's estimate that innovators capture only about 2% of the value of their innovations (the rest going to society) belies the fundamental premise of IP law that without strong ownership of ideas people won't innovate; innovation occurs constantly even when innovators capture only a tiny fraction, putting IP-status-quo defenders on the defensive because the problem they aim to solve may be a non-problem.

    “innovation is occurring all the time when the innovators are capturing only a tiny fraction of the gains. The fundamental fear that undergirds IP... I think is fundamentally belied by the Nordhaus estimate.”

  • Nothing conveys the intense raw creative power of capitalism as well as the first few pages of the Communist Manifesto; reading Marx is bracing and interesting because even when he is profoundly wrong he frames questions in interesting ways, and useful concepts can be extracted from him and repurposed in ways he would have found horrible.

    “I’ve never read anything that conveys the intense raw creative power of capitalism that matches the first few pages of the Communist Manifesto.”

0.66

Feasible policy reforms and incremental steps are superior to fatalistic historical determinism or grand international schemes.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Big monocausal historical explanations that lock in inequality leaving nothing to be done should be rejected; there are plenty of feasible things we can do to make outcomes better even if success is not guaranteed, and one should not guide one's life by fatalistic historical narratives.

    “I am generally dubious of big monocausal, historical explanations that fixes in and we’re just riding along and there’s nothing we can do about it.”

  • Because he has been badly wrong on international-affairs issues before, the speaker adopts a stance of rational ignorance and conservatism in foreign policy—favoring incremental change and observing results rather than grand schemes (such as completely eliminating nuclear weapons)—on the grounds that small, observable steps are the most prudent path when you don't know what you're doing.

    “because of my rational ignorance, I’m a conservative about international affairs. I don’t wanna see any big sudden movements this way or that.”

  • Secession is an idea that always sounds awesome in theory but rarely turns out effective in practice; as a temperamental conservative obsessed with unintended and unpredictable consequences, the speaker cannot think of many secessions that were fabulous successes.

    “I think secession’s one of those ideas that always sounds awesome in theory and rarely turns out to be very effective in practice.”

  • With a different set of parole and probation institutions—building the complementary institutions to handle released individuals—the US could probably get the current jail/prison population down below 50% of its present level in an acceptable way; the share that shouldn't be incarcerated cannot be answered in isolation from those institutions.

    “I think with a different set of parole and probation institutions, you could probably get it down below 50%.”

  • Nuclear weapons are overrated as usable but underrated as a peacekeeper; the MAD scenario of chastened, disciplined policymakers may be real, but inferring uniquely stabilizing properties from only ~70 years without a nuclear war between two nuclear powers risks getting ahead of oneself.

    “Overrated as usable, underrated as a peace keeper.”

0.61

Education and skill-development systems replicate stratification rather than enabling mobility through misaligned human-capital policy.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Education as it currently exists is absolutely a replicator of social stratification rather than a disruptor, even though there have been past episodes where education served as a real transmission belt of upward mobility.

    “Education as it exists is absolutely a replicator of social stratification, it is not a disruptor of social stratification.”

  • The US runs a two-track human-capital development system where track one is completing a four-year degree and entering the meritocracy and track two is being labeled a failure; while the rising demand for highly skilled symbolic analysts makes the basic college trend functional, the failure to build a parallel skill-development program for non-managers and non-professionals, plus over-cramming everyone into the college model, is a misdirection of resources and talent.

    “Track one is complete a four-year degree at a university and enter the meritocracy. Track two is you’re a failure. This seems to me to really be a terrible way to go about things”

  • Universities are classic beneficiaries of economic rent through reputation, which matters to employers, parents, and alumni; they capture that rent partly via alumni contributions and distribute it internally without outside control, and over the last 20-30 years have shifted that rent away from research into administration, ending the socially productive spillovers that research-directed rent once provided.

    “universities have been taking a huge amount of that rent and actually putting it into administration over the last 20, 30 years”

  • Star Trek's appeal is its fundamental optimism—a hopeful future where technology improves lives and people get along across racial, national, and even planetary lines—which contrasts with Washington's cynicism and worldliness where the smart positions are that nothing can get done and things will always get worse.

    “it’s very easy in Washington to find earnestness and optimism, sort of gauche but cynicism and worldliness... those are the stock worldly smart positions, but I like a little bit of earnest clunky optimism”

0.53

Cross-ideological collaboration remains possible and necessary despite polarization, paired with anti-statist scrutiny of government failure.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Talking and writing across ideological boundaries is still possible, though less possible than it used to be, and the co-authored book was written in part to prove to others that such cross-ideological collaboration remains achievable in a polarized age.

    “talking across ideological or other boundaries. And that’s still possible and it’s less possible than it used to be, but it’s still possible. We wrote this book in part to prove that it’s possible to other people.”

  • People on the left focus too much on what government can do to solve problems and not enough on where government actually produces them, so the left needs a more vigorously anti-statist agenda to pair with its statist one—even in areas like finance and taxation—as it had in earlier historical periods.

    “people on the left tend to focus a lot on what government can do to solve problems, not enough on where government actually produces it”

  • Even if regulatory reform were impossible, liberaltarianism would survive rather than collapse into mainstream liberalism, because it retains a lively libertarian sense of how government goes wrong—alertness to agency capture, corruption, unintended consequences, and interaction effects producing kludgeocracy—amounting to a distinctive concern with the hygiene of the liberal state and a sense that things get rotten quickly unless actively pushed back.

    “I still retain the lively libertarian sense of how government can go wrong. And so I am alert to more so than the typical liberal issues of agency capture and corruption of policy, also to unintended consequences and particularly interaction effects that produce Kludgeocracy.”

  • A key to the speaker's academic success was being good at listening—specifically not forcing what people say into his existing mental categories—which let him gain access to and respectfully document subjects like the conservative legal movement; people will tell their stories to those they find trustworthy, where trustworthy means taking them respectfully rather than agreeing with them.

    “I’m very good at not forcing what people say into my existing mental categories.”

  • The speaker's intellectual approach is to be attracted to ideas he disagrees with rather than dismissing them—first encountering Ayn Rand and finding it awful but wanting to know why and argue with it—and he deliberately consumes a conservative-heavy media diet because he can already produce liberal arguments himself, an instance of seeking arbitrage opportunities outside one's comfort zone to counter confirmation bias.

    “I first picked up Ayn Rand and thought it was awful but wanted to know why and wanted to argue with it.”

0.51

Second-wave feminism dissolved accumulated male rents from sexual division of labor, fueling political backlash among less-skilled men.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Second-wave feminism since the 1960s can be seen as an anti-rent-seeking movement: white men had accumulated rents from a society structured around a sexual division of labor that paid them a breadwinner premium and kept women out of direct competition; the last half-century has dissipated those rents, and the resulting loss for less-skilled white men has fueled angst, frustration, and political acting out in recent years.

    “One can see the whole sort of second wave feminist movement since the 60s as an anti rent-seeking movement, that white men were accumulating a lot of rents because of the way society was structured”

  • Walter Scheidel-style claims that inequality only unwinds through war and destruction rest on too few cases to support a theory; politics shows secular change, not eternal recurrence, and recent secular changes have made it harder for those at the bottom to organize while lowering transaction costs for those at the top to organize, and states have learned to manage riots that once forced redistributive responses.

    “those secular changes seem to have made it much harder for people at the bottom of the income spectrum to organize and have made much easier… The transaction costs have gone down, lots of other things have gone down, to make it easier for those at the top to organize”

0.43

Institutional quality requirements differ between developing catch-up economies and advanced technological frontiers.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • The politics and economics of rent operate very differently at the technological frontier (US, Germany, Britain) than in developing countries; developing countries have abundant catch-up growth (10-12% potential), so substantial rents siphoned into payoffs and lobbying are less damaging, and some cronyism may even facilitate growth there in ways it would not in an advanced economy.

    “developing countries, first of all, have a lot of catch up growth that they can do”

  • Catch-up growth requires lower institutional quality than blazing trails at the technological frontier; as countries get richer the stakes for policymakers rise and they must continually up their institutional game or fall into a growth slump, so South Korea and China are poor analogies for advanced economies.

    “It takes less high quality institutions to catch up than it does to blaze trails at the technological frontier.”

  • The biggest hole in conservative law and economics is comparative: there is no universal set of market-optimal laws or rules, because different political systems can generate different, often desirable economic equilibria—South Korea's insider-rent rules produced economic returns in that setting but would not be recommended for Argentina—so we should study why different laws, regulations, and customs produce surplus in different places.

    “the idea that there’s a universal set of laws or rules that are the market optimal ones, I think is a problematic one”

0.43

Executive compensation reflects enormous stakes and uncertainty rather than primarily collusion or shareholder pillaging.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • High executive compensation is likely driven by the enormous stakes in play rather than primarily by collusion: the difference between a successful and a failed CEO is gigantic in market valuation, nobody knows in advance who will work, and privately held corporations pay similarly exorbitant sums as public ones, suggesting it is a big bet on the right person rather than managers pillaging shareholders against the common good.

    “if I look at privately held corporations versus publicly held corporations, the privately held seem to be paying similarly exorbitant sums to CEOs”

  • Executive compensation probably does play some role in inequality—executives are a large part of the 1% and their pay rose without clear corresponding firm-productivity gains, and cross-country variation in compensation governance suggests institutional effects—but one can explain an enormous amount of the inequality problem without looking at executive pay, which is where most people look first.

    “Executives are a very large part of the 1%, and their compensation does seem to have gone up at a period in which it’s not that clear that productivity of these firms in general has gone up.”

  • Contrary to the assumption that pro-corporate policy increases industrial concentration, many professional licensing and protection regimes are anti-consolidation: optometrists, dentists, doctors, and undertakers seek regulation that protects them as sole proprietors rather than employees, and many firms benefiting from these rents have very few employees, so their wage levels barely affect the overall income distribution.

    “a lot of professional licensing and protection regimes actually have the effect of being anti-consolidation. So optometrists want regulation that protects them as sole proprietors rather than employers.”

0.29

NAFTA's economic importance is modest for the US though consequential for Mexico and vulnerable low-wage workers.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • If NAFTA collapses it would be very bad for the overall economy, causing disruptions in the short to medium term, and because bad economic times are usually worst for those at the bottom, the distributional effect of pulling out of NAFTA would likely fall hardest on people at the bottom.

    “bad economic times are worse off or worst for those at the bottom. I think on the whole, kind of neolistic economic disruption of pulling out of NAFTA would be worse on people at the bottom”

  • NAFTA is overrated as something hugely important; from the US perspective it was a minor adjustment because US tariffs on Mexican goods averaged only about 2% at implementation, so US policy barely changed, though it mattered more for Mexico.

    “US tariffs against Mexican goods, at the time NAFTA was implemented, were an average of 2%. So we just didn’t change our policy very much at all.”

  • Singapore should not be characterized as crony capitalism but as interventionist government paired with an extremely high-quality civil service focused laser-like on the public interest rather than on private payers, so it does not exemplify the possibilities of crony capitalism.

    “I would characterize it as interventionist, but with an incredibly high quality civil service that is focused laser-like on the public interest rather than on what some money bags has paid them to think.”

0.24

Gradual decline and kludgeocratic mediocrity are more likely than sudden systemic collapse or snap points.

2 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Theories in which dysfunction builds up and then suddenly snaps are overrated functionalist accounts; countries more typically slide into gradual decline (as Argentina did, never getting its act together), and kludgeocracy could continue for a long time if one is willing to accept gradual economic and political mediocrity.

    “theories in which things build up and then snap are overrated. I think there’s very rare… That’s a functionalist kind of theory and generally I tend to be suspicious of those.”

  • Britain's much more compressed system of agenda-setting and high barriers to entry to the agenda reduce the overall creativity of its system but enable decisive action; the US system, with many entry points (states, branches, bureaucracy, courts) but many veto points, is more deliberative and makes it harder to do big stupid things through legislation, whereas Britain can produce disasters like the poll tax.

    “Britain has a much more compressed system of agenda setting and that dramatically reduces the overall creativity of the system, although it does mean that when you actually get a desire for action, you can produce it.”