What this covers
Stephen Jennings discusses the economic future of African cities and the model behind Tatu City, a privately built municipality in Kenya. Rather than treating Africa's urban problems as technical puzzles or capital shortages, he contends that they stem almost entirely from governance failures—missing institutions, regulatory capture, and misaligned incentives—which explains why cities across the continent struggle with water, power, transport, and land titling despite having no shortage of engineering knowledge or money. The conversation moves from demographic trends (falling birth rates unlocking savings capacity) through specific urban design failures (Nairobi's induced-demand road congestion) to the structural advantages a privately governed city can achieve: centralized solutions to the holdup problem, permanent incentive alignment between costs and revenue, and the ability to build agglomeration economies from the ground up rather than retrofit them into chaos.
Jennings anchors his broader argument in a claim about development itself: given the post-Industrial Revolution historical record, where an enormously diverse range of institutional settings (communist and liberal, centralized and devolved) have produced economic takeoff, the default expectation should be growth, not stagnation. This challenges the pessimistic bias applied to Africa. He draws on examples from New Zealand's 1980s-90s asset sales and Brazilian agricultural innovation to show how government can enable private-sector performance without micromanaging it. The conversation also covers the long-term capital problem facing Africa's cities—most investors operate on five- to seven-year horizons, making Tatu City's 40-year commitment itself a competitive advantage—and addresses contentious questions about mixed-income development, diversity as a driver of innovation, and the tension between providing amenities that residents actually want and subsidizing what developers think they should have.
Jennings argues that economic development and urbanization in Africa are nearly inevitable given post-Industrial Revolution patterns, and that the core barriers to African cities functioning well are governance failures, not technical or capital constraints—which is why a privately-built, well-governed new city like Tatu City can capture the agglomeration benefits existing African cities have failed to achieve.
- Most African urban problems (water, power, transport, land titling) are 99% governance problems, not technical ones
- A private municipality with devolved authority can solve holdup and scale problems that fragmented private solutions cannot
- Since the Industrial Revolution, a wide range of institutional settings have produced economic takeoff, so growth should be the default expectation
World-class cities attract top global talent and require mixed-income, mixed-use development with excellence in planning and human capital.
- There is a qualitative difference between a merely good school and a world-class school: a world-class school will draw the best professionals in the world to the city because their children can attend a school as good as or better than anywhere else, making top-tier amenities a lever for attracting top-tier human capital.
“if you have a world-class school, you will bring world-class professionals. The best professionals in the world in whatever that industry might be, they’ll want to come to your city because their children could go to a school that’s as good or better than anywhere else.”
- Gated communities for the elite are not real cities; mixed-use, mixed-income development is a key dimension of building an efficient city with agglomeration economies, and it is in the developer's own interest—not just lip service to NGOs—to provide a full range from $30,000 world-class homes to million-dollar plots, and to ensure even a worker earning $250 a month has affordable shopping and restaurants.
“A key dimension of building a city that’s efficient and as agglomeration economies is mixed use, mixed income. You can’t just pay lip service to that to make NGOs happen. It’s actually in our interest to do that.”
- Most urban planning principles are paid lip service but compromised because 99% of the time urban designers are retrofitting existing cities; building from a clean sheet of paper lets you reverse the default by designing human green corridors first and roads around them, 'creating an invitation' for people to walk and cycle, thereby baking radically reduced car dependence into the city from the beginning.
“If you ask the urban planner, he will still start with designing a road, but maybe you start by saying, “No, let’s do human green corridors first, and then we’ll talk about the roads”
- Throughout history the cities that prospered and were hugely innovative were diverse—safe havens that mixed people of all backgrounds, including foreigners and the persecuted—so embedding diversity, a crossroads/global-marketplace concept, in everything (including mosques for a Somali community and institutions respecting Chinese culture) is vital, and segregation must be avoided.
“if you look through history, the cities that really prospered, that made a difference, that were hugely innovative, they were diverse. They were safe havens for people for all kinds of backgrounds including foreigners”
- Tatu City is the only operational special economic zone in Kenya, comprising 5,000 hectares of fully planned urban development at an advanced stage, with 70 large-scale industrial companies, 3,000 students attending four new schools daily, the region's first new CBD under construction, and thousands of residential units across a wide range of price points.
“Tatu City is the only operational special economic zone [SEZ] in the country. It is 5,000 hectares of fully planned urban development.”
Government failures and political obstacles, not technical capacity, prevent solutions to infrastructure, utilities, and urban problems across Africa.
- Government creates holdup problems at every level—bureaucrats withholding water, licenses, or creating tax issues—and there are economies of scale in mitigating those problems once on behalf of all residents and developers, rather than each of thousands of actors solving the holdup problem individually.
“Every element of government you touch, there’s a holdup issue. There’s economies of scale in solving that or mitigating that on behalf of everybody else.”
- Most economic and urban problems—water, power, municipal transport, congestion pricing—are technically easy but politically complicated; they are 99 percent problems of governance, not technology, which is why, given persistent governance failures, these problems in Kenya and most of sub-Saharan Africa won't be solved for at least 25 years, generating sustained demand for new modern urban environments.
“technology is really — it’s like so many economic problems. They’re technically easy, but they’re politically complicated.”
- Invoking Stigler's view that all regulation is rationally devised, the inefficiency in Kenya's land titling and land offices is purposely designed to facilitate corruption, cartels, and rent-seeking; digitalization could create transparency in roughly six months, so the obstacle is purely political will to confront the cartels benefiting from the existing system, not technical capacity.
“Stigler said all regulation is rationally devised, so the inefficiency in land titling and land offices is very purposely designed to be inefficient and to facilitate corruption and cartels and land offices. So it’s a huge source of rents.”
- New Zealand is one of the most over-analyzed countries in every area of reform—the work has been done and is 'sitting on the shelf'—so the obstacle is not technical knowledge but the desire of society and politicians for change, the same governance/will diagnosis Jennings applies to African development.
“It’s not a technical issue, again. Every area of reform, the work has been done. It’s sitting on the shelf. It comes back to the desire of society for change and the desire of the politicians to implement that change.”
Kenya's political stability, devolved governance, demographic dividend, and modernization trajectory make it a safer and more promising investment environment than peers.
- Urbanization is the key variable for Kenyans developing a single national identity, because once people move into urban settings—living and working together—tribal barriers gradually melt away; the underlying integration is already very pronounced, and although politicians stir up tribal divisions each election cycle, the issue is much smaller than the outside world thinks.
“It’s probably urbanization, because once people move into an urban setting, those tribal barriers and differences, they gradually melt away”
- Kenya has been on a path of political and economic modernization since the 1980s, averaging over 5 percent GDP growth while moving from one-party dictatorship to vigorous democracy and pluralism, with broad improvements across every development indicator including infrastructure, school enrollment, and life expectancy.
“It’s averaged over 5 percent GDP growth over that period, but it’s also modernized as an economic and political system, moving away from one-party, essentially, dictatorship, to very vigorous democracy and pluralism, as we saw last year.”
- Kenya's more pluralistic system, with checks and balances and an organic political transition rather than coups or dictators, makes it a safer environment for very long-term investment than countries like Nigeria, Rwanda, or South Africa.
“We have the checks and balances of a system that you’d like to see in a country you’re investing in for the very long term. That’s not necessarily the case in the likes of Nigeria, Rwanda, or even in South Africa today.”
- Overconcentration in a capital city is driven by incentive structures: the UK and New Zealand have the highest proportion of tax revenues flowing to central government, which biases development toward the capital, whereas Kenya's devolved constitution gives substantial revenues to local counties, so the structural reasons for capital overconcentration don't exist there.
“UK and New Zealand have the highest proportion of tax revenues that go to central government, so it creates this huge bias towards development in the capital city and centralization. Here we have a very devolved constitution”
- There is no universally right amount of devolution—Switzerland is the most devolved and one of the most efficient countries while the UK and New Zealand are the most centralized and not working well—and the optimal number depends on culture, experience, and skills; Kenya's new devolution will take decades to work efficiently and carries short-term transition costs, but is vastly better than the centralized model in the medium term.
“We know that Switzerland is the most devolved country in the world and also that it’s one of the most efficient. We know that New Zealand and the UK are the most centralized, and that model’s not exactly working.”
- African birth rates are falling rapidly and the decline is accelerating; per Charlie Robertson, the demographic dividend really kicks in when birth rates fall from about 3.5 to 2.5, because that is when people can save and dependency ratios improve, and Kenya is at the vanguard of this process, with the dividend set to kick in over the next decade as it moves toward 2.25-2.3 birth rates.
“the demographic dividend really kicks in when birth rates fall from, say, 3.5 to 2.5, because that’s when people can save. That’s when dependency ratios really start to improve.”
Private municipalities and long-term committed capital can deliver sustainable cities without sovereignty, solving problems that government subsidies and short-term investors cannot.
- Charter cities have rarely happened because seeding or taking sovereignty is an intractable problem; Tatu City instead operates as a private municipality with devolved authorities, giving it charter-city-like decision-making power and the incentive to optimize the long-term net present value of the city, thereby realizing many of the envisaged benefits—quality governance, infrastructure, security, environmental amenities—without the sovereignty obstacle.
“The whole issue of sovereignty — seeding sovereignty and taking someone else’s sovereignty — is a pretty intractable issue. We are like the first cousin to a charter city. We’re a private municipality with a lot of devolved authorities.”
- Unlike heavily government-subsidized city projects, particularly in petrostates, Rendeavour's model defines sustainability as commercial viability—it doesn't matter what the developer wants or would pay for; what matters is what residents and clients want and are prepared to pay for, and it is wrong to impose levels of infrastructure or styles people don't want.
“Sustainability means it’s commercially viable. You have a lot of city projects that are massively subsidized by governments, particularly in petrostates. Our models are exactly the opposite.”
- There is very little genuine long-term capital anywhere—PE money is nominally seven years but really five, and DFIs do not have long-term capital despite the myth—so committing to 30-50 year projects is itself a comparative advantage because it is very hard for anyone else to spend billions on a 40-year project, leaving a less competitive space.
“PE money is supposedly seven years, but you have to sell before the seven years, so PE is really five years... DFI money: DFI, say they don’t have long-term capital at all. It’s one of the many myths about DFIs.”
- Rendeavour's business model is to be a pioneer—dealing with issues other investors avoid and getting set in the best position before anyone else, like a surfer positioning exactly where the wave will break—because it is aligning a 30-40 year asset class with a 30-40 year development transition, which made early, committed entry sensible.
“In surfing terms, where the — we want to be exactly where the wave’s going to break, before anybody else. We also have an asset class where we’re trying to align 30-, 40-year asset class with a 30-, 40-year transition”
- Any really good business has alignment between its capital structure, values, and senior executive selection; a 40-year project is undermined by investors or executives with a five-year exit view, so disciplined shareholder selection—avoiding people who will seek premature exits or extra cash at suboptimal moments—is vitally important to maintaining the long-term mission.
“It’s no use having a 40-year project, and you have some guy who wants to make all his money in the next two years. There’s an underlying inconsistency there. Capital structure and shareholder identity are vitally important.”
African cities lack agglomeration economies and efficiency because planning broke down and utilities were never modernized, unlike Asian cities that grew more efficient.
- Unlike Asian cities that became more efficient with growth, African cities show low or zero agglomeration externalities because proper planning and controls broke down in the 1960s, development was haphazard, and utilities were never modernized—so as cities grew they became more congested and less efficient rather than more.
“Proper planning and controls really broke down in the ’60s. The plans were not enforced. The development was completely haphazard. Utilities were not modernized, and capacity was not built.”
- Where municipalities fail to provide utilities, everyone builds their own water, power, sewer, and security solutions, which yields zero economies of scale and patchwork, inefficient, unsustainable results; a city can solve those problems for everybody at once, gaining tremendous quality and cost advantages over fragmented self-provision.
“Clearly, there’s zero economies of scale, and people don’t have the expertise or even the desire to solve those solution. You have these very patchwork, extremely inefficient and nonsustainable solutions to these very basic problems.”
- Driving housing costs down from $30,000 toward $15,000 requires eliminating car parking—not because cars are costly but because the land they consume is—and building for residents who live within walkable distance of work; the binding constraint is achieving sufficient scale, which is a chicken-and-egg problem nobody in sub-Saharan Africa has cracked.
“It’s the planning, the technology, and the scale. If you want to get the costs way, way down for a unit, you can’t have car parking... It’s a chicken-and-egg problem in getting affordable housing in sub-Saharan Africa because no one has cracked that scale problem”
- Lack of land and the poor enforcement and definition of property rights is one of the biggest barriers to development in the region, so titling all land is desirable even though it would raise rents.
“Lack of land, poor enforcement and definition of property rights is one of the biggest barriers to development in the region.”
Tatu City demonstrates that large-scale, properly governed urban infrastructure generates normal city demand and delivers real economic and social benefits.
- If you create new large-scale, world-class urban infrastructure and administration, the development will function as a normal, efficient city and generate the demand a normal international-standard city would, which Tatu City has demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt over 15 years.
“I think we’ve proven beyond a shadow of a doubt, if you create new large-scale, world-class urban infrastructure and administration, they will function as normal cities, and you’ll have the demand that you would normally have for a normal, efficient, international-standard city.”
- Rendeavour's biggest constraint is not land, capital, or financing—it is human capital: much of the world-class technical expertise (city-scale landscaping, urban realm, execution) does not exist in the Kenyan market, and the fly-in/fly-out foreign consultant model is unfocused and extremely inefficient, so the real challenge is embedding world-class technical people within a Kenyan team.
“Biggest constraint we face is human capital. We’re obviously not land constrained. We’re unleveraged... We’re absolutely not capital constrained in any way.”
- The more Rendeavour solves holdup problems and raises the value of the land and community, the more it creates one large concentrated holdup risk—the incentive for politics to confiscate the rents from the land rises and the project becomes a juicier target; the counterbalance is to continuously add jobs and benefits so the project is recognized as providing huge value to the wider community.
“The way you have to counterbalance that risk is, you have to be adding more and more to the community and to the overall economy. Tens of thousands of jobs become hundreds of thousands of jobs”
Kenya's tourism, agricultural production, and regulatory efficiency have enormous untapped potential that could be realized through non-difficult improvements.
- Successful agricultural revolutions, as in Brazil, come from a sophisticated interplay between government institutions, R&D, and the private sector, where government plays a catalyst and enabling role—crop/climate/seed-specific research, drought-resistant hybrids, cold chain infrastructure—while simultaneously getting out of the private sector's way, a subtle balance Kenya currently isn't particularly good at.
“in countries like Brazil for example, where there’s this very sophisticated and effective interplay between government institutions, R&D, application of new ideas, and the private sector. The government has a very important enabling role”
- Kenya's tourist assets are among the best in the world and large-scale, but promotion and supporting infrastructure (including air transport) have been extremely poor; benchmarked against Costa Rica, which has similar amenities but achieved tenfold visitor growth, Kenya could grow tourism a lot and quickly with non-difficult work.
“benchmarked against the likes of, say, Costa Rica, which has similar amenities but has had a tenfold growth in visitor numbers. The tourist assets here are amongst the best in the world... But the promotion and the support for infrastructure has been extremely poor.”
- Nairobi's recent cost-of-living increases stem largely from unfavorable external shocks given that Kenya imports both fuel and grains, which have been the big two short-term drivers and will likely unwind to some extent, layered on top of pervasive government and economic inefficiency.
“Fuel is imported here, and grains are imported here. They’ve been the big two short-term drivers — and clearly they’ll unwind now to some extent.”
- Nairobi has done what everyone does—built more and more road capacity—but more capacity creates more demand, so it achieves nothing and has actually clogged the city center further; the real fix is congestion charges, which should be used everywhere.
“as everybody knows, more and more capacity creates more and more demand, so it achieves nothing, and it’s actually clogged up the center of the city more and more. Clearly, there should be congestion charges as they should be everywhere.”
Development economics lacks predictive power; most countries follow similar development trajectories across vastly different political and economic systems.
- Because humans evolved over a long period in which no change happened, we are cognitively wired to assume the world doesn't fundamentally change—a default at variance with post-Industrial-Revolution experience, where an ever-wider and more institutionally diverse set of countries has achieved economic takeoff; so the correct default is that, unless things are done extremely badly, per capita GDP will grow, often quickly, contrary to the pessimistic bias people apply to Africa.
“I have this idea that humans evolved over a period of time where no change happened, so we are wired to think that the world doesn’t actually fundamentally change. I think that’s like a cognitive default, but that’s actually at variance with the world’s experience since the Industrial Revolution.”
- Development economics is a black box with almost no predictive power—most explanations (policy, location, culture) are ex post and some are tautologies; because development happens across an enormous range of settings from communist dictatorships to liberal systems, with many feedback loops we can't quantify, we cannot predict it, yet the descriptive record shows most of the world following a similar, merely time-shifted, development trajectory.
“Development is a black box. I don’t think there’s anything that has much predictive power. There’s a lot of ex post explanations... I think 90% of them are ex post; very few of them are predictive. Some of them are just tautologies.”
New Zealand's cultural complacency and centralized governance produced regulatory inefficiency and underperformance that Australia avoided through dynamism and competitiveness.
- The New Zealand asset sales of the 1980s-90s went extremely well, judged by large productivity improvements in poorly managed assets like telecoms, power, and forestry, and virtually every change has withstood the test of time without reversal; societies that cannot take the medicine generally underperform, whereas successful societies undergo wave after wave of painful reform and are good at absorbing the structural-adjustment costs—if you can't do that, it's a major weakness (as with critics who blame Thatcher yet never reverse her reforms).
“I think societies that can’t take the medicine generally don’t perform very well... if it’s so bad, just go ahead and reverse everything she did.”
- New Zealand has hugely underperformed on nearly every economic and social indicator, partly for cultural reasons; high immigration that was expected to add dynamism hasn't, because immigrants either self-select to a culture they like or are swamped by a native Kiwi culture that—after being one of the world's richest, best-educated countries—put its feet up around the 1960s-70s and grew complacent, most visibly in education where NZ went from world-leading to one of the worst and most unequal in the OECD.
“We have very sadly been a huge underperformer on just about every economic and social indicator you can look at. I think there’s partly a cultural element.”
- Auckland has some of the least affordable housing in the world despite only 2 percent of New Zealand being built upon, making housing costs the biggest source of inequality in the country; this is a self-inflicted regulatory problem—an apartment that costs $35,000 to build at Tatu City costs $400,000 in Auckland—that could be fixed through regulatory change in months.
“Auckland has some of the least affordable housing in the world, I think number five, last time I looked. Yet only 2 percent of New Zealand is built upon. It’s just a massive paradox.”
- New Zealand and Australian cultures differ sharply: Australians are comfortably competitive, in-your-face, and direct—which Kiwis find offensive but is really just truth-telling and getting things done—whereas Kiwis are very polite and unassertive (as cultural surveys show), and over time Australia has proven a much more dynamic, outward-looking, competitive economy while NZ remains one of the world's most restrictive countries for FDI.
“Australia is much more competitive. They’re comfortable being competitive. Kiwis are very polite, and cultural surveys show this. We’re not very assertive at all.”
Selecting talented, trustworthy people requires observing actual behavior in unstructured settings rather than relying on formal interviews.
- Interviews are a well-documented, very inaccurate way of selecting and evaluating people, so Rendeavour checks prior work in detail and deliberately observes candidates in unstructured situations they don't realize are tests—dinners, deal negotiations—to see whether they listen, are respectful, honest, timely, and genuinely interested, relying on these away-from-interview data points.
“interviews are a very inaccurate way of selecting and evaluating people.”
Jennings's prior experience across utilities, SEZs, and property rights directly informs city-building and he seeks deeper understanding of African human capital.
- Despite long experience, Jennings believes Rendeavour does not understand as well as it might the best way to manage and work with people in Africa, and the next thing he wants to learn is how to get the most from and create the most opportunity for African human resources.
“I’m trying to understand... the best way to manage and work with people in Africa. Because I think we thought we knew a lot, but I think there’s some things we don’t understand as well as we might.”
- A city is far more multifaceted than expected, and every area of reform and business Jennings worked on—SEZ legislation and governance, water and power utility structuring, and Treaty of Waitangi work with Māori on community and property-rights issues—fortuitously informs the city-building project, since understanding how those businesses should be structured makes it easier to set them up.
“The work that I did in New Zealand on Treaty of Waitangi issues with Māori has also informed a lot of thinking around community and property-right issues. It’s been this bizarre experience of all of these threads fortuitously being drawn together”