veto points
Institutional choke points (House, filibuster-empowered Senate, presidency, Supreme Court) where legislation can be blocked, making governance require broad consensus.
As defined in 81 | Ezra Klein on Politics, Polarization, and Identity
Where it comes up · 4
- 81 | Ezra Klein on Politics, Polarization, and Identity3 claims
- Jamal Greene2 claims
- Steven Teles on Kludgeocracy2 claims
- Terry Moe on the Constitution, the Presidency, and Relic1 claim
Most important claims · 8 of 8Search all claims for “veto points” →
- Unlike most polarized democracies where a majority can govern, the American political system was designed to resist parties and requires high levels of consensus to act, so polarization uniquely produces paralysis and makes ambitious governance nearly impossible over the long term.81 | Ezra Klein on Politics, Polarization, and Identity
- The two-house Congress, with a Senate of aristocrats chosen by state legislatures to check the popular House, plus the electoral college as a buffer between the people and the Presidency, were deliberate devices to multiply veto points and distance government from direct democracy.Terry Moe on the Constitution, the Presidency, and Relic
- Rights federalism does not mean creating more absolutist rights but recognizing that rights are grounded in political negotiation; multiplying the sites where such negotiation occurs gives people leverage, and because nothing is quite a 'trump,' people who know they won't necessarily win in court are less likely to resort to litigation—reducing veto points and making government more effective.Jamal Greene
- Polarization combined with the American system's many veto points increases paralysis, and because parties can rarely enact their agendas, citizens are left frustrated by unsolved problems and unable to judge parties on actual outcomes—a dynamic that would be healthier if majorities could simply govern and be evaluated.81 | Ezra Klein on Politics, Polarization, and Identity
- New York's poor subway infrastructure performance is real but Greene has no story connecting it to veto points; construction costs are far higher in New York for unclear reasons, while jurisdictions with more flexible rights conceptions (Canada, Western Europe) have good public infrastructure, suggesting rights regimes are not the primary driver.Jamal Greene
- Because the feedback loops driving polarization are very hard to reverse, the realistic and better goal is to redesign the political system to function well amid polarization—removing self-inflicted risks like the debt ceiling, abolishing the filibuster, adopting proportional representation for multi-party systems, and adding states like DC and Puerto Rico—rather than trying to reduce polarization itself.81 | Ezra Klein on Politics, Polarization, and Identity
- The same veto points that gum up the system and stop action are also entry points where reformers can start something going (e.g., a congressional hearing) without first securing universal agreement, introducing dynamism that produces long periods of stability punctuated by sudden wrenching changes that put seemingly indestructible interest groups on the back foot.Steven Teles on Kludgeocracy
- The separation of powers and multiple committee veto points function less as devices to stop government action and more as 'toll booths' where actors extract a price for passage -- and that price is usually preserving existing arrangements, since toll-takers are tied to interests invested in the status quo, which means the constitutional design that slows government on the way up also makes it nearly impossible to undo or redesign existing programs.Steven Teles on Kludgeocracy