Bruno Maçães
What this covers
Bruno Maçães traces the reversal of Western geopolitical dominance to a loss of appetite for change itself. In this conversation, he argues that Europe and the broader West once led the world through technological and social innovation—a willingness to remake the world and accept its remade form. That spirit has hollowed out. Where the West now resists, constrains, and second-guesses—treating technology as a threat, blocking disruptive businesses, fretting over cultural transformation—China and Russia project state capacity, appetite for the next technological wave, and the political will to reorganize societies around new possibilities. The result is not that the West has been outmaneuvered through superior force, but that it has voluntarily withdrawn from the competition for shaping what comes next. This inversion appears most sharply in technology adoption: East Asian states deploy self-driving cars and digital infrastructure without the regulatory friction that stalls Europe and America.
The conversation ranges across how power actually operates in this emerging order. Maçães challenges the Western habit of lumping non-democracies into a single "authoritarian" bucket—Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, he argues, are radically different places despite both lacking liberal elections. He examines state capacity not as repression but as organizational depth, noting Russia's centuries-long integration of diverse ethnicities and religions. He explores how One Belt, One Road succeeds partly through marketing genius, how countries as footloose multinationals now hold stakes worldwide rather than governing only within borders, and why Fukuyama's vision of history's end misreads human nature. He also confronts uncomfortable truths: that Europe's current comfort rests on "wages of the past"—historical dominance whose royalties will eventually expire—and that projecting soft power requires the credible capacity for something harder.
Maçães argues that the West, especially Europe, has lost its 'spirit of adventure' — its openness to the unknown and willingness to lead change — while China and Russia retain or project state capacity and vitality, making them the real ideological and geopolitical challengers in an emerging Eurasian world order.
- Adventure (openness to the unexpected) has been drained from contemporary liberalism, especially in Europe, which now resists technology and change
- China projects state capacity, efficiency, and a hunger to lead the next technological wave that the West lacks
- Countries increasingly extend beyond their borders (Chinese diaspora, Russian influence), creating a world ripe for conflict
China is the main ideological and geopolitical competitor to the West through demonstrated state capacity.
- The main ideological competitor to contemporary liberalism is China — not Islam or Russia — because China projects an image of state capacity, efficiency, and getting things done, which is precisely the opposite of what the West currently projects, making the Chinese model increasingly appealing worldwide.
“It has to be China.”
- East Asian states (China, South Korea, Japan, Singapore) are adopting new technological transformations with an appetite the West has lost; self-driving cars will likely be fully operational in China before the US or Europe, partly because the strong Chinese state can override those who suffer from such transformations, whereas European countries captured by special interests block them (e.g., banning Uber).
“I’m pretty sure they will be fully operational in China before they are here or in Europe, in part because the strength of the Chinese state and its ability to go against people who will suffer from these transformations is much higher.”
- China will essentially run the politics of a number of countries from Beijing — candidates include Cambodia, Laos, parts of Central Asia, some Southeast Asian states (less conflict-ridden and thus easier to control), Pakistan in some respects, and African countries — just as a number of countries were run from Washington over the last 70 years.
“I think there will be countries that will be essentially run from Beijing.”
- One Belt, One Road will almost inevitably be seen historically as a success because the structural force of China's rise is so strong that it will change the world regardless; Xi Jinping has set things up so the changes coming anyway are attributed to the Belt and Road — a public relations and marketing coup.
“it’s almost inevitable that it will be seen as a success because the structural force of China’s rise is so strong”
- China's so-called coming-out party of a year ago was a disaster rather than a triumph; China made many mistakes by pushing too hard and not understanding the countries and cultures it was dealing with, creating problems from Australia to India to Europe to the US, and is now worse off everywhere than two years ago — even Chinese authorities openly talk of self-correcting.
“There isn’t a single place where they are not in a worse positon now than they were two years ago.”
- Borders are becoming diffuse and countries footloose like multinationals: a country like Russia or China no longer stops at its borders but holds stakes and participations elsewhere — China holds a 20% stake in Djibouti and an '80% stake' in the Chinese diaspora — so a country is becoming a diagram of stakes worldwide rather than an organized national community within borders, making the world ripe for conflict.
“China has a 20 percent stake in Djibouti, and it has an 80 percent stake in the Chinese diaspora. When you look at a country, it is a combination, a diagram of different stakes all over the world, and not an organized national community within borders.”
- China will not give up on mobilizing its overseas citizens, and the strong Western reaction against this will feed into xenophobic tendencies, with people quickly assuming every Chinese person is working for the Chinese state — and similar, if less acute, dynamics will appear with India's diaspora.
“we see already very strong reaction against this in the West, which, by the way, will feed into xenophobic tendencies in the West itself. Very quickly, people will start to assume that every Chinese is working for the Chinese state.”
Western leadership inevitably fades as successful societies prioritize preservation over change.
- Europe's high incomes and comfortable lifestyle are sustained by the 'wages of the past' — its historical leadership of technological revolutions and the resulting royalties and licensing fees; once those dry up under global competition, this way of life won't last and there will be pain.
“Europe still benefits from the wages of the past, the fact that it was leading different technological revolutions. Once that’s no longer the case... that will be felt. There will be pain.”
- It is human nature — true of individuals, countries, and continents — that those who successfully led the last wave of change want to preserve things and enjoy the fruits, so the vital energy needed to change the world fades and leadership of the next wave passes to others; this explains why Europe, having led previous revolutions, turned conservative.
“If you’ve been successful bringing about the last wave of change, then you want to preserve things as they were... Then it will be up to others, in other parts of the world, to lead the next wave.”
- Portugal was the first European country to lose its sense of adventure: having made great money in the early empire, the prevailing idea became that the point of the money was to go home, build a small palace or villa, and enjoy life — illustrating that the vital energy to change the world doesn't last and passes to others.
“there was always this idea that the point of making all that money was to go back home and to build a small palace or a villa and enjoy your life.”
- Silicon Valley's big transformative changes happened roughly 30 years ago; visiting now versus 10 years ago shows little difference, and longtime residents confirm a sense that things have slowed down — not particularly good news.
“If you’d been to the Valley 10 years ago and you go now, you don’t see much difference. There’s a sense that things have slowed down.”
- After reading tens of thousands of books, you become good at identifying whether a book is worthwhile by page 10, so you can stop without regret — and with limited time it pays to reread and selectively pick from new releases rather than read indiscriminately.
“you get pretty good at identifying a book that you think is worthwhile, so that you stop at page 10 and you are absolutely sure you have no regrets about it.”
Contemporary liberalism suppresses adventure and openness by over-emphasizing control and predetermined answers.
- Adventure is fundamentally about being aware that there may be a completely different lifestyle you are not aware of, passing you by because you are not looking for it — an anxiety and openness Maçães finds absent in contemporary liberalism, which instead 'knows the answers' and constantly preaches how to live.
“Adventure is fundamentally about being aware that there may be a completely different lifestyle that you’re not aware of, and they’re just passing you by because you’re not looking for it.”
- Contemporary liberalism does not promote or accommodate the ideal of adventure; to find the practice and appeal of adventure one must go outside liberalism, which over-emphasizes control, the life plan, and choice.
“Now I’m more and more convinced that it doesn’t and that you have to go outside of liberalism to find something like the ideal, the practice, and the appeal of adventure.”
- Europe exhibits a negative spirit toward technology, treating it as against us and something to be resisted rather than embraced, which is a clear example of how the spirit of adventure has disappeared from the European psyche.
“You see in Europe the idea that technology’s against us, and we should resist this rather than embrace it. A very negative spirit”
- A big theme in Hitchcock is the hidden pathologies of modern life — psychoanalytic repressions, repetitions, and fixations that destroy our lives by trapping us in patterns we cannot escape while life passes by — which can be read as Hitchcock exploring the contradiction between liberalism and human nature, which don't fit well together.
“A big theme in Hitchcock is the hidden pathologies of modern life. The psychoanalytical repressions, and repetitions, and obsessions or fixations, which in fact destroy our life.”
- The predominant sense in Brazil is not adventure but dolce far niente — a well-distributed enjoyment of life and its small things, living not in the moment but in the second without worrying about the future — found across both upper classes and the whole of Brazilian society.
“The predominant sense in Brazil is of dolce far niente, of a certain enjoyment of life and the small things of life.”
The United States retains capacity for fundamental political renewal that Europe structurally lacks.
- The United States remains capable of a fundamental break with the past, while Europe is not; phenomena like Trump reflect a deep discontent and an attempt to find other ways that, though likely misguided at first, may eventually work out.
“I still think the United States is capable of this and that Europe isn’t.”
- The most adventurous, least complacent part of American society is its politics: a democracy is healthy when it is rough, dirty, and full of nonsense as long as there is nonsense on the other side to counter it; American politics has an openness that European politics — where everything is predetermined and preset — lacks, and even European commentators watch American politics rather than their own.
“you want a democracy to be rough and dirty and full of nonsense as long as there is nonsense on the other side to counter it.”
- American exceptionalism is correct in its time but won't last forever; the political message that America was always great and always will be may be useful, but as a philosophy of history it is bonkers.
“American exceptionalism is correct in its time. I think it won’t last forever.”
- Fukuyama's 'end of history' will never be right because history is fundamentally a human creation, and humans do not want it to be over — they want it to continue to be open; if they wanted to end it, they could, but they don't.
“The reason it can never be right is that, actually, human beings don’t want it to be over.”
- Obama's underlying flaw was that he genuinely believed history has a direction and is going somewhere, to the point where he stopped trying to change reality and instead tried to 'get out of the way' of reality — a disposition that recurs across every issue in his Atlantic interview with Jeffrey Goldberg.
“he really took seriously this idea that history has a direction, that it’s going somewhere, to the point where... he wasn’t even trying to change reality. He was trying to get out of the way of reality.”
- Hitchcock's films, because they are so ambitious, always contain obvious mistakes (which he discusses in his interviews with Truffaut), but Vertigo is the one where it is very difficult to find a mistake of structure, script, acting, or casting — a perfect movie.
“I would say Vertigo is the one where, by chance or effort, it’s very difficult to find a mistake of structure, of script, or acting, or casting, or anything really.”
Russia's organizational power and resistance to Western social change appeal to discontented Westerners.
- Russia is underrated as a world power because its most impressive and underappreciated trait is the power of organization — the ability of the Russian state to keep together a vast empire of many ethnicities and religions over centuries, including arguably integrating its ~15% Muslim population better than any other major country.
“The power of the Russian state, the ability to organize, to dispose, to connect, is one of the great political stories of mankind”
- Russia's resistance to Western social changes is not a failure but a conscious, active decision, and this is increasingly attractive to Westerners who dislike the changes of the last 40 years; Russia has its own political will and no appetite to follow the West's 'obvious and inevitable' direction on gender dynamics.
“those people who don’t like the changes that happened in the West in the last 40 years look to Russia and see a country where not only they haven’t happened, but they haven’t happened because people don’t want them to happen. It’s not seen as a failure. It’s more of a conscious, active decision.”
- Asking why Russia has never been liberal assumes everyone should be liberal and therefore treats non-liberalism as the thing requiring explanation; there is no strong reason why Russia should be liberal, and in the absence of forces pushing it that way, it simply isn't.
“you assume that everyone should be liberal, and so what needs to be explained is why they are not liberal.”
- The Soviet Union, in a short period, was able to change the culture of places like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan so deeply (e.g., openness toward women) that the change persisted after the USSR's collapse, demonstrating the Russian state's ability to penetrate and organize life very deeply.
“you really have to wonder how the Soviet Union, in a short period of time, was able to change this culture so deeply, in a way that actually has continued after the collapse of the Soviet Union.”
Connecting diverse cultural and geographic regions creates both business value and geopolitical significance.
- Connecting Europe and Asia will be both critical and profitable; the most successful people in business today are aware of cultural differences and work by connecting different cultural areas rather than reducing them — those who assume markets like wealthy Chinese are becoming like the West lose a lot of money.
“people that are very successful in business today are people that are aware of the differences. They don’t try to reduce them. They work by connecting different cultural areas.”
- If Europe wants other countries like Turkey to become like it, it must project power across them; the belief that countries will be attracted to the European model without any projection of power is utopianism — in order to be loved, you also have to be feared.
“in order to be loved, you also have to be feared. This idea that you find in Europe now, that without projecting any kind of power, other countries will be attracted to the European model, that’s a form of utopianism.”
- To build Belt-and-Road connectivity despite the surveillance state in Xinjiang, China is breaking the province into separate parts — isolating and controlling the Uighur minority in the south while making the north (e.g., Urumqi) increasingly Han, keeping the connections to Kazakhstan in working order.
“the Chinese are approaching it by breaking Xinjiang in separate parts, one in the south, where the Uighur minority would be isolated and controlled, and one in the north, which is becoming less and less Uighur, more and more Han.”
- Azerbaijan is uniquely hard to classify — once you are convinced it is fundamentally European, something proves otherwise, and vice versa — making it the best place to start if you want a country that truly combines East and West.
“If you want to look for a country that truly combines East and West, I would start with Azerbaijan.”
The European Union functions well in specific domains but lacks scope and adventurous ambition.
- The EU will not disintegrate, but it may become ineffective — a repetition of the Holy Roman Empire that remains around and receives tribute but doesn't actually do anything; full-scale disintegration cannot happen.
“It will become a repetition of the Holy Roman Empire. It will be around. People will still pay tribute to it, but it won’t do anything.”
- The European Union does a few things very well: it introduces rationality and a scientific spirit into politics, dilutes and counters the nonsense of national politics, and effectively opens borders within Europe; Maçães's main critiques are about what the EU doesn't even attempt, not what it attempts.
“It introduces rationality, almost a scientific spirit, into politics... All the nonsense that you get in national politics — the European Union dilutes it, counters it”
- The most productive form of learning is being forced to teach subjects in which you are completely uncomfortable; Maçães's three years teaching Darwin, Copernicus, and economics (without a PhD in economics) at an unusual Berlin university were the years he learned the most in his life.
“those three years were the three years I learned the most in my life, just being forced to teach something where you are completely uncomfortable.”
- Euro membership is sustainable even for a lower-productivity country like Portugal because the Euro crisis showed that adjustments could be done inside a year, proving wrong the many economists who thought it couldn't be done; and Portugal's problems are common to or more serious in other parts of Europe (5 of the EU's 10 poorest regions are in the UK).
“The Euro crisis shows that the adjustments could be done inside a year. Lots of economists that thought it couldn’t were proven wrong.”
- Maçães plans to become a full-time, very productive writer and to write roughly 15 books over the next 15 years on different subjects — technology, America, the future of Europe, and possibly one or two novels — rather than 15 versions of the same book.
“I’d like to, in the next 15 years, let us say, to write 15 books.”
- Though Maçães once thought Strauss's esoteric method was too fanciful, his political experience and writing convinced him it is helpful: being aware of different ways to communicate lets you say something to certain people without getting into trouble by being too open, and almost no good writer entirely avoids doing a little of this.
“you can say something to certain people without getting in trouble, necessarily, by being too open about your views. I think that’s helpful for everyone.”
Russia cannot modernize its economy without political will its current leadership lacks.
- Russia cannot modernize its economy because doing so requires making many people angry, moving money between sectors, changing laws, breaking the power of oligarchs, and letting small startups have a chance — all of which require political will the current leadership lacks.
“You have to break the power of oligarchs. You have to let small startups have a chance. All of this takes a lot of political will, which, simply, the current president and his people don’t have.”
- Until Putin goes, Russia will be unable to do the reforms it needs and will become more focused on energy — expanding control of energy sources and connectors like pipelines in the Middle East and Syria; claims of industrial parks or technology zones are not to be taken seriously anymore.
“You have to break the power of oligarchs. You have to let small startups have a chance. All of this takes a lot of political will, which, simply, the current president and his people don’t have.”
Ukraine cannot achieve stability without stopping Russian interference due to war's economic crowding-out effects.
- Ukraine cannot achieve stable prosperity or democracy as long as Russian interference is not stopped; it is beyond human power to make a country successful under those conditions, partly because the budget devoted to the war effort crowds out investment in education, healthcare, and infrastructure.
“if Russia is not stopped, and if their interference is not stopped, it’s simply impossible. It’s beyond human power to make a country successful under those conditions.”
Cultural transformation fundamentally changes national character and invalidates historical arguments about persistence.
- Judgments about what China was 200 years ago cannot be applied to China today because the entry into modern, technological society constitutes a fundamental break that changes everything; China transformed its cultural tradition into something modern, so deep-cultural-roots arguments about persistent national instability don't hold.
“you can’t make judgments about what China was 200 years ago and compare it to what it is today because there’s been a fundamental break.”
Western categorical thinking about authoritarianism obscures real differences among non-democratic states.
- The Western tendency to lump all non-democratic states together as 'authoritarian' is a big mistake; the term itself may project Western experience onto other parts of the world, and in reality countries like Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan are very different — one can 'breathe an air of freedom in Kazakhstan' absent in Turkmenistan.
“We in the West tend to say they’re all the same. Because they’re not like us, they’re all the same. I think this is a big mistake.”
- Even authoritarian regimes must grant freedom in some areas (e.g., China leaves sexual life uncontrolled) so people have rewarding lives without demanding more; closing some areas to initiative may actually increase willingness to innovate in the areas that remain open, as human effort is diverted and concentrated there — like producing great chess players in the Soviet Union.
“I even wonder sometimes whether the fact that other areas are closed to human initiative doesn’t, in fact, increase the willingness to do new things in the areas where it is possible. Human effort is diverted to those areas and concentrated in those areas.”
- Brazil is 'a giant Portugal' that shares Portugal's virtues and flaws, such that the two seem to develop in synchrony for good and bad — illustrated by recent leaders of both, who were close friends, being in jail or under investigation for corruption.
“We always say that Brazil is a giant Portugal... We do seem to have a certain synchrony in our historical development, for good and bad.”
Africa demonstrates indigenous problem-solving capacity and genuine economic dynamism warranting optimism.
- Africa warrants optimism: some of the fastest-growing countries in the world are there, there is an industrial revolution happening in Ethiopia, and recent diplomatic movements (Ethiopia-Eritrea relations, possible recognition of Somaliland) show internal energy and an indigenous ability to solve colonial-era problems rather than solutions imposed from outside.
“there’s finally an internal ability that doesn’t come from the outside to solve some of the problems that go back to colonial times.”
- A place like Djibouti is valuable precisely because it forces you to break from your habits — there is no local café to read in, no normal food — and after two weeks this rupture from routine becomes a good thing, embodying the ideal of adventure.
“finally you have a place that forces you to break from your habits. You cannot carry your habits there... It forces you to break with your normal habits, and that’s a good thing.”