proleptic reasons
Reasons one acts on while working into a new domain of value before fully having that value; they have a distal face (the future valued self) and a proximate face (current graspable motivations), letting one act rationally even without yet possessing the right reasons.
As defined in Agnes Callard
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- Agnes Callard1 claim
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- Proleptic reasons solve the paradox of how people get themselves to care about things they don't yet value: they are the reasons one acts on while working into a new domain of value, and they are divided into two faces—a 'distal' face that points toward the valuable person one will become (e.g. citing the intrinsic value of classical music, though the words ring hollow) and a 'proximate' face one can currently grasp (e.g. admired people are in the class, or a fantasy of an enriched life).Agnes Callard