What this covers

This is a conversation between Tyler Cowen and Julia Ioffe that moves from the late Tsarist period to the present war in Ukraine. It opens with the teenage girls who fought in World War II as machine gunners, pilots, and paratroopers, as recorded in Svetlana Alexievich's oral histories. Ioffe notes that they did not see it as transgressive, since they were the first generation raised after 1917. She also covers the origins of women's medical education in Russia, which began when the Tsar's secret police pulled radical women students back from Switzerland to be watched. The Bolsheviks, she explains, opposed feminism on principle, following the Class Trumps Gender Doctrine, even when their reforms helped women.

The middle of the discussion is about sex, reproduction, and demography. Alexandra Kollontai's 1911 case for sexual and economic freedom is set against the later clampdown on youth sexuality. Abortion was legalized in 1920, before birth control, and Stalin banned it in 1936. Ioffe gives the scale of the losses: about 27 million dead in World War II, about 21 million of them men, and an imbalance that began before 1941. She describes Khrushchev-era policy on divorce and out-of-wedlock births, mothers' medals she says were borrowed from Nazi Germany, and women working about 40 hours a week at home on top of paid jobs.

The last stretch turns to Vladimir Putin's Russia. Topics include the decriminalization of domestic violence, which Ioffe's interviewees describe as a steam valve for frustrated men, and Defense Ministry ads that sell soldiering as manhood. She sets Ukraine's use of women soldiers against Russian reaction, and contrasts Putin's "year of the family" with a record-low birth rate. She also covers a 2016 Russian hashtag that preceded #MeToo and the due-process objections to it. Her claims about male incentives and fatherhood are the most contested.

Sharpest takeaway

Ioffe argues that the Soviet and post-Soviet 'superwoman' gender order was built by state policy after WWII's demographic catastrophe, and that the Putin state now reinforces the same essentialist gender norms to serve militarism and pronatalism.

  • Postwar gender imbalance and Soviet family policy institutionalized single motherhood and made women the default workers, carers, and providers.
  • Men were coddled and marginalized at home while being expected to be macho, which produced a low-expectation male culture and a competitive female culture.
  • Post-2014 and post-2022 Russian state messaging ties traditional gender roles, abortion restrictions, and domestic violence policy to military mobilization.

The argument · threads1 threads · 74 claims
0.85

Repeated flower giving signals ongoing loyalty in a low-trust, high-purge society with tight groups.

1 pointcentrality 5/5
  • Cowen proposed that flower giving in Russia functions like holding a door open, a repeated signal of ongoing loyalty in a low-trust, high-purge society where groups are tight but members get purged, and admitted this remained somewhat mysterious to him.

    “Something about it's a lower trust society, and one has to signal certain things repeatedly and frequently.”