What this covers

This is the second part of a conversation between Damodaran and the host, and it moves from macro questions to valuation craft and then to individual industries. The early stretch revisits the idea that Fed forecasting is beside the point, then applies that to corporate practice: firms still using the 6% to 7% hurdle rates from the last decade should rework project selection, debt-equity mix, and payout policy. The Silicon Valley Bank failure is read as a duration mismatch plus a bet on deposit stickiness among a homogeneous, interconnected base of startup depositors, not as a story about risky assets.

The middle of the conversation is about active management and its limits. Damodaran leans on the Grossman-Stiglitz Efficiency Paradox to argue that far fewer active investors can be sustained than exist today, and that 80% to 90% of active work is mechanical and ripe for AI replication. The more contested claims are that the average PE and VC investor roughly matched the S&P 500 over a decade, that later Instacart rounds underperformed the index, and that winner stories suffer from selection bias. He also argues that impact investing can backfire by raising the cost of capital of the companies it sells, and that ESG was marketed as costless.

The rest ranges across valuation and industries. He revisits his early Uber valuation, which Bill Gurley criticized for missing market expansion, and discusses how intangibles belong in cash flows rather than as appraiser premiums. He then covers music after Napster, sports franchises as media businesses, the Warriors and Stephen Curry, US versus European equity returns, and China as the largest macro risk after Beijing turned on its tech giants in 2019.

Sharpest takeaway

Damodaran argues that the 2022-2023 rate and inflation regime is the normal state rather than an aberration, so investors and companies must abandon decade-old assumptions about cost of capital, risk capital, and active management, while markets rather than central banks ultimately determine outcomes.

  • Long-run comparison suggests roughly 4% rates and 3% inflation as a normal equilibrium, not a shock
  • Low-rate-era assumptions about cost of capital, deposits, and risk capital are now broken
  • Active management is largely mechanical and will be replicated by AI, so only niche, disciplined active investors survive

The argument · threads11 threads · 66 claims
0.85

Investing success rests on consistent philosophy, temperament, self-knowledge, and independent thinking rather than imitation.

12 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Writing a public blog makes Damodaran accountable because past predictions are on the record, and confessing errors there forces him to identify what he missed and how to fix it.

    “I'm accountable because I can never say, I never said that because it's right there.”

  • Over the last decade the average PE and VC investor earned about the same as the average S&P 500 investor, and visible winners reflect selection bias, so there is no identifiable group of smart money, just money that eventually runs into a wall.

    “The average VC investor, the average PE investor made about as much money as the average S&P 500 investor.”

  • Roughly 80% to 90% of active investing, including PE, VC, and mutual funds, is mechanical, so AI will replicate it cheaply and quickly, as ETFs did to mutual funds, and the edge of strategies like high-frequency trading that lasted two years may last only two months.

    “80% to 90% of all active investors, including PE, including VC, including mutual fund investing is mechanical. And if it's mechanical, a machine is going to do it much better than you can.”

  • The best companies have a narrative they consistently act on, as Patagonia, Birkenstock, and Amazon under Bezos did, even when that means turning away growth or profit, and such consistency is rarer than most investors expect.

    “So what I'm looking for is companies that have a narrative about themselves, where their actions are consistent with the narrative. That's actually rarer than you think.”

  • Value investing requires patience and the ability to withstand peer pressure, which are psychological traits rather than knowledge, so people who are impatient or crowd-driven will fail as value investors regardless of how many books about Buffett they read.

    “If you're naturally inpatient and you're swayed by the crowd, I don't care how many books about Warren Buffet you read, you're not going to be a successful value investor.”

  • When a major shift such as the dot-com boom exposes a flaw in a long-held investing belief, the investor should not blame the market but should incorporate what they are missing, expanding their valuation approach while keeping the core belief that value matters.

    “It's not the market that's wrong. It's something you're missing that you have to start to incorporate into your philosophy.”

  • Across successful long-term investors such as Buffett, Lynch, and Soros, there is no single path to success, but consistent winners share two traits: an unchanging core philosophy and a personality that matches that philosophy.

    “they have a core philosophy that remains unchanged over their investing lifetime.”

  • AI is not new; it is the culmination of two trends over about 20 years, big data collected from personal lives by apps and steadily more powerful chips, and ChatGPT only brought it into public consciousness by making its effects visible in daily life.

    “Big data plus powerful computing power is effectively AI. So AI has been building up for years.”

  • There is no single right investment philosophy, only one that is right for you, and it should be built by understanding what makes you comfortable or uncomfortable rather than by studying other successful investors.

    “there is no right investment philosophy, but there's one that's right for you.”

  • Investment firms should aim for a size they can sustain rather than the biggest possible, often settling for a niche where they have an edge and capping assets around $10 billion to $20 billion, which requires discipline to avoid growth temptation as assets flow in after success.

    “I would want to firm that I can sustain, which often means settling for smaller scale”

  • Good teaching means making students able to think through problems without the teacher, so Damodaran asks each year whether he is still needed, and he is open to AI replicating his blog-post valuations.

    “I want to make myself unnecessary and dispensable. That's the essence of good teaching”

  • Damodaran's best thinking comes from letting problems sit during unstructured walks by the ocean, and having no to-do list lets him get more done than a full schedule would.

    “an idle mind is often where you get your best connections of ideas.”

0.56

Hype-driven valuations must be checked against realistic market size, revenue models, and sustainable profitability.

6 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Netflix broke the sequential studio model by producing many shows at once, Disney spent around $30 billion on content seven years later, and COVID-era direct-to-streaming releases accelerated the replacement of theaters and cable, but no one yet knows how to run a profitable streaming business.

    “The only problem is people are not sure how to run a streaming business.”

  • Damodaran's first Uber valuation sized the total market at about $100 billion using the existing taxi and limousine business, but he missed that disruptors can enlarge the total market, as Bill Gurley pointed out, and later valuations of Uber and Airbnb incorporated this, with Airbnb's market sized at about three times the hotel business.

    “these disruptors in addition to taking share away from existing players could actually change the size of the total market.”

  • Damodaran will not value Moderna because he cannot judge which mRNA applications will create revenue beyond his medical knowledge, so intrinsic valuation is perhaps impossible even though the company may be a good investment; he is comfortable valuing traditional pharmaceutical companies built on blockbuster drugs.

    “But if you want to do an intrinsic valuation of Moderna, it's going to be really difficult to do, perhaps impossible with what I know about medicine”

  • NVIDIA added about $700 billion of market cap in one year, and its AI chip market is about $25 billion now with potential to reach $350 billion where it holds about 80% share and roughly 50% operating margins, but even after doubling the value for AI Damodaran's estimate was still 40% below the market price.

    “I doubled the value of NVIDIA as a company with AI in there, but I was still 40% below the market price.”

  • The COVID-era valuation of Instacart near $39 billion assumed half of Americans would shop online permanently, which was overwrought; Damodaran values it as a niche business for 10% to 15% of Americans at about $8 billion to $9 billion, and not $20 billion to $40 billion.

    “I'm okay with $8 billion to $9 billion, but not with $20 billion or $30 billion or $40 billion.”

  • A company is not a business until it has a revenue model, so many so-called AI companies are movements or ideas, and investing in them is buying an option rather than a business, which may be justified but should be understood as such.

    “Unless you tell me how you plan to make money, you're not a business. You're just a movement.”

0.56

Consistent outperformance is elusive, and central-bank narratives and expert forecasts mislead investors.

6 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Tracking every Instacart venture round from 2012 onward, Damodaran found that every VC investor entering from the Series C round in 2015 onward did worse than the S&P 500, which he uses to argue VC investors are not systematically better judges of businesses.

    “every VC investor since 2015, that's, I think, Series C has essentially done worst than the S&P 500.”

  • Damodaran builds valuation models so macro variables largely cancel out: low rates lower the discount rate but also imply lower inflation and growth, which reduces projected growth and pricing power, so the two effects offset and valuations do not change dramatically.

    “So the same low inflation that pushed interest rates, and also when my growth rates were low, my pricing power was lower, the effects in a sense offset.”

  • Active managers blame the Fed for their underperformance, and the investing world's fixation on FOMC meetings substitutes central-bank narratives for analysis of fundamentals, which Damodaran calls the most unhealthy and off-consensus view he holds.

    “I think it's become a reason for copping out -- the reason for not dealing with fundamentals is the Fed will do it”

  • Markets are set by demand and supply and inflation arises from behavioral factors rather than from above, so investors should stop expecting central bankers to provide answers, because experts have repeatedly been wrong and markets deserve more respect.

    “The answers are in the market.”

  • Active investing persists because people want to be above average, and stories of big winners such as early Uber investors are promulgated with selection bias, so the search for outperformance will not go away.

    “Who wants to be average? Everybody wants to be above average. I don't think that search is ever going to go away.”

  • After 40 years of searching, Damodaran has found no investor group that consistently gets in early and out early; what looks like smart money is greedy money that eventually hits a wall.

    “There is no group of investors that I can point to and say that money is smart money. It's just greedy money that ultimately runs into a wall sooner or later.”

0.53

China's policy unpredictability and well-meaning political risk create discontinuous, perverse outcomes for multinationals and investors.

10 pointscentrality 3/5
  • China's authoritarian predictability, which made foreign companies willing to bet on decades of stable policy, has become a source of discontinuous risk because the same state that guaranteed policy can change rules overnight, making China the biggest macroeconomic risk.

    “the same forces that make things predictable can create what I call discontinuous risk. They can change overnight.”

  • Companies are trying to move production out of China, but full exit would take years, and walking away from 1.4 billion consumers, where 20% to 50% of growth may come from, creates a dilemma that multinationals and their investors must face.

    “How do you walk away from 1.4 billion people? And that's where 20% or 30% or 50% of your growth is going to come.”

  • Many multinationals such as Apple and Nike set aside their own stated values to enter China because the market was so large, and now that the risks are visible, the gloss is off and withdrawal from China will spread regardless of US-China politics.

    “Some of them took -- made a Faustian bargain to enter China.”

  • Alibaba, Tencent, and JD were rewarded for years because Beijing seemed to be on their side, but in 2019 Beijing declared it was an adversary and the value of those companies was roughly halved.

    “suddenly, magically, in 2019, Beijing said, No, we're not on your side. We are adversaries, halved the value of those companies”

  • Damodaran valued the Adani Group, an Indian infrastructure company targeted by Hindenburg Research for alleged fraud and self-dealing, and found it trades at roughly 50 to 60 times EBITDA, a multiple he considers unusual for infrastructure.

    “It's an infrastructure company that trades at about a 50 to 60x EBITDA.”

  • Equity value is only meaningful if legal ownership rights are protected, and because Russia effectively eliminated non-Russian ownership stakes in 2021 and 2022, Damodaran will not value Russian companies and is increasingly unwilling to value Chinese ones.

    “the more uncertain you feel about legal protection of your ownership rights, the less willing you should be to value a company”

  • Impact investing has three forms (buy good companies, sell bad companies, or engage bad companies to change), and selling bad companies pushes down their price, which raises their cost of equity and capital, leading to less exploration and growth, so good intentions can produce perverse outcomes.

    “By doing so, you increase their cost of equity and cost of capital, by increasing the cost of capital, they do less exploration, less growth”

  • ESG advocates faced no pushback for a decade because they framed investing as virtue without acknowledging tradeoffs, selling it as all cake and no calories, which made the backlash harsh; a healthier version would admit investors may give up returns for goodness.

    “they overreached in what they claimed basically sold it as all cake, no calories.”

  • Of all macro variables, the biggest concern is China, because it is the second largest economy with deep interconnections to multinationals, so its troubles spill over into companies worldwide and can become political risk.

    “The biggest macro issue to me is China because China is in trouble. And the problem is, unlike Russia, if China goes down, it takes the rest of us down with it.”

  • Companies that entered China set aside their stated values for market size, a Faustian bargain they are now reconsidering, which will drive withdrawal of many firms and shift investment toward alternatives such as India, Vietnam, or Brazil.

    “Because some of them took -- made a Faustian bargain to enter China.”

0.49

Cheap risk capital distorted investor and corporate behavior, so hurdle rates and cash deployment must be reset.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • With 3% to 4% inflation and higher short-term rates, idle cash in brokerage accounts loses purchasing power, so investors must actively deploy it, a discipline they neglected when cash earned around 0.3%.

    “idle cash is losing cash. Because when you have 3% or 4% inflation, that cash is losing value”

  • Companies still using the 6% to 7% cost of capital hurdle rates set during the last decade should let them go, and project evaluation, debt-equity mix, and payout policy must be revisited because a 1% risk-free rate implied 2.5% cost of debt and 6.5% cost of equity while rates are now much higher.

    “for those companies that got used to using 6% or 7% cost of capital, it's time to let go.”

  • A decade of excessively accessible risk capital let companies raise billions of dollars easily, enabling founders with poor judgment to burn through the money, and Damodaran doubts this dynamic will fully return after the downturn.

    “businesses that should never have become businesses with founders who are borderline sociopaths were able to raise billions of dollars and then burn through them”

0.45

Interest rates revert to inflation-anchored levels, making the recent low-rate decade an aberration.

7 pointscentrality 3/5
  • One of two prevailing narratives must be wrong: either the last 18 months are an aberration that will revert to the Fed-dominated pre-2022 regime, or they are the norm and the prior decade was the aberration, and the latter is the more reasonable assumption.

    “The other is that maybe the last 18 months are the norm, not the exception. And what we saw in the decade leading into that was actually the aberration.”

  • Damodaran's rule of thumb sets the natural interest rate at expected long-term inflation plus 1% to 1.5%, and interest-rate forecasts should begin from an inflation forecast because interest rates have no anchor without it.

    “It's inflation plus 1% to 1.5%. So expected inflation in the long term, not last year's inflation plus 1% to 1.5%.”

  • A 4.5% rate feels shocking to investors under 30 only because a decade of low inflation, low rates, and abundant risk capital skewed their perspective; looking over longer history, rates at this level are not unprecedented and are closer to normal.

    “You look at a 4.5% rate, you are shocked, especially if you're 25 or 30... We've seen much worse than this.”

  • Interest rates are not set by the Fed; the rate is determined by the natural rate tied to expected inflation, so rate forecasts that ignore inflation expectations are, in his view, empty.

    “The Fed doesn't set rates.”

  • After the inflation shock and recession work through the system, Damodaran would not be surprised to end up near 2007 conditions of roughly 4% rates and 3% inflation, with markets pricing that environment.

    “I wouldn't be surprised if we ended up where we were in 2007, 4% rates and 3% inflation and a market that reflects that.”

  • Even though the economy has broken the back of 8% to 10% inflation, inflation is not going back to the roughly 1.5% level of the last decade, and the inflation genie is hard to put back in the bottle, so resolution will take a long time and may spill into 2024.

    “I don't think we're going to go back to the 1.5% inflation we saw in the last decade.”

  • Holding cash flows constant and raising the discount rate by 2 to 4 points would imply stocks down 40% to 50%, but stocks have not fallen that much because companies adapt, pass inflation on to customers, and firms with pricing power are better protected.

    “stocks should be down 40% or 50%, they're not.”

0.45

Technology and media businesses face fragile winner-take-most disruption, concentrating market value.

7 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Venture-funded bike app companies such as Lime and Bird entered cities like San Diego giving product away for free, destroying existing bike rental businesses, and once they ran out of capital they left the economic damage behind because the incumbents cannot be restored.

    “In a period of months, they destroyed an infrastructure of bike rental businesses”

  • Grossman and Stiglitz showed that efficiency is sustained by investors searching for mistakes, so markets cannot become perfectly efficient, and the steady-state number of active investors will be far below today's level, implying that much of the activity at large asset managers is noise rather than value creation.

    “the steady-state number of active investors is going to be far lower than the number we see out there.”

  • Napster revealed that the album bundling model, where consumers had to buy 16 songs to get one, was fragile, and after Napster and iTunes the music business's nominal revenues fell by half from 1999 to 2015 as streaming reshaped who produces, sells, and gets paid.

    “In 2015, the revenues of the music business had have relative to 1999. In nominal terms, the business had become half what it was.”

  • Netflix, despite possibly having the highest market cap, is like a hamster on a wheel because it must keep producing content to retain subscribers, and no company in the entertainment status quo has figured out a solid business model.

    “Netflix is like a hamster on a wheel because it's created a model where it's got to create more content to keep its consumers”

  • Over the next decade AI will produce a few big winners, many wannabes, and quite a few big losers, and while companies such as NVIDIA and Microsoft will make money, Damodaran is not sure society as a whole will be better off.

    “There will be a few big winners. There'll be a lot of wannabes, and there'll be quite a few big losers.”

  • The FANGAM stocks alone accounted for about $1 of every $6 of market cap created across all US companies over the last decade, roughly $8 trillion to $10 trillion of value in six companies.

    “the FANGAM stocks alone accounted for $1 in $6 of market cap created across all U.S. companies in the last decade”

  • Taylor Swift has probably raised the value of every NFL team by 15% to 20% by attracting women viewers to TV, which increases the value of streaming and media rights.

    “Taylor Swift alone has probably increased the value of every NFL team by 15% or 20%”

0.35

Valuation should make intangibles and business drivers explicit rather than hidden premiums or accounting artifacts.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Damodaran is breaking Birkenstock's value down into components such as celebrity-driven brand strength, the Barbie-driven buzz that lifted revenues about 30% over a summer, and the contribution of an outside CEO who balanced growth with brand preservation, so that the intangible value is explicit rather than an add-on premium.

    “it pushed up their revenues 30% over the summer”

  • Accounting balance sheets are backward-looking and try to separately value intangibles like customer lists and brand names, which is an impossible task that produces artificial numbers, whereas a financial balance sheet is forward-looking and can accept aggregated intangibles, such as the claim that 80% of Apple's value comes from intangibles.

    “The biggest difference, I think, is the financial balance sheet is forward-looking. The accounting balance sheet is backward looking.”

  • Netflix's strategy of producing 100 shows and hoping some stick was rational because the company was judged on subscriber counts rather than revenue, earnings, and cash flows, which initially led industry observers to call it doomed.

    “Netflix said, no, we're going to produce 100 shows, throw it against the wall and hope something sticks. Why, because people judge us on the number of subscribers”

0.21

Technology waves and geographic bets hide downsides, so diversification and humility matter.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Every prior technology wave came with promises that failed: PCs were supposed to free people from grunt work but made work more mechanical, the internet promised reach but left people drowned in data, and social media promised connection but weakened real friendship, so every change has a dark side that AI will likely also have.

    “They told us that PCs would reduce the mechanical stuff we did... It actually made us more mechanical.”

  • The US has dominated international equity returns because it benefited most from the shift from a 20th-century to a 21st-century economy, while European ecosystems make it almost impossible to challenge the status quo, so the next great company is unlikely to come from Europe.

    “you can almost guarantee that the next great company is not going to come out of Europe because it creates an ecosystem that makes it almost impossible to challenge the status quo.”

  • An investor who held Coca-Cola and Washington Post over the last 20 years missed the US straight-line return, so betting on a US or international geography is in practice a bet on a subset of that geography, such as tech, and investors must diversify across it.

    “this isn't just a betting on geography, it's betting on a subset of that geography.”

0.19

Bank failures stem from deposit mismatches and concentrated depositor bases, which can be screened for stickiness.

2 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Silicon Valley Bank did not fail because of risky assets, since it held Treasuries, but because it had a duration mismatch and assumed deposits were sticky, while its homogeneous, highly interconnected depositor base in venture startups allowed the bank to go from healthy to failed in two days.

    “they discovered that deposits are not that sticky, especially if your depositors all are homogeneous.”

  • Deposit stickiness can be screened: older depositors, depositors spread across geographies and sectors, and low-growth banks are stickier, while rapidly growing deposit bases are more likely to flee, and regulatory capital requirements should rise for less sticky deposit bases.

    “If you increase your deposits 50%, these are new people you brought in, they're more likely to turn and run if there's a problem.”

0.07

Sports franchises are valued as entertainment businesses driven by media revenue and owners' non-financial motives.

3 pointscentrality 1/5
  • The Golden State Warriors rose from a mid-level NBA team to one of the two or three most valuable franchises because of Stephen Curry's signing and new tech owners who treated the team as a streaming and national-profile business, showing that teams can change their revenue magnitude through actions.

    “the Golden State Warriors are now the second or third most valuable NBA franchise”

  • Sports franchise prices will bear little resemblance to cash-flow-based value and may be two to three times higher, because many owners buy for the business but also for non-financial reasons, while for owners like the Rooneys and Maras the team is most of their wealth.

    “It's going to be 2, 3x, why?”

  • Sports franchises are now mainly entertainment businesses whose value comes from media contracts rather than gate receipts, which is why teams like the Oakland A's are leaving stadiums that look bad on TV, and a valuation must project gate, merchandise, and media revenue.

    “The value of sports franchise now is almost entirely as an entertainment business.”