
How China Might View a Second Trump Administration: A Conversation with Mr. Rick Waters
What this covers
This ChinaPower Podcast episode, hosted by Bonnie Lynn, features Rick Waters, a former State Department China policy lead who now runs Eurasia Group's China practice. He reads the 2024 US election results from Beijing's side. The conversation starts with how China sorted Trump's first term into two phases. In the first, it saw a dealmaker and a transactional relationship. After 2018, tariff escalation and harder rhetoric from Mike Pence and later Mike Pompeo changed that view. Waters argues that Pompeo's 2020 Reagan Library speech was received as an attack on the party's legitimacy, not as foreign-policy criticism. He also covers the 2017 Taiwan phone call crisis, which he says required Xi Jinping's direct intervention to repair, and the communications collapse during COVID, including the journalist expulsions and General Milley's two calls to his PLA counterpart.
The second half looks ahead. Waters says Chinese scholars saw tactical rather than strategic differences between the Trump and Kamala Harris campaigns, and that Beijing tends to overestimate what Congress will pass. A Republican push to end PNTR (Permanent Normal Trade Relations)) would be read as an economic divorce, with symbolic weight beyond its tariff effects. He describes Beijing as waiting to see whether early US moves point toward bargaining or unilateral decoupling, noting that China has prepared for decoupling for years, especially in ICT. China has also studied 1980s US-Japan voluntary export restraints as a possible model, while acknowledging overcapacity at home.
The talk then widens to the region and to Russia. Waters discusses China's growing defensive posture and its unease at the Quad and new trilateral groupings. He also covers dual-use technology transfers that he says rebuilt Russia's defense base, and the limits of Chinese discomfort with North Korean troops in Russia. Several of his judgments are flagged as contested, including the claim that Vladimir Putin has strongly shaped Xi's view of US intentions. Waters also argues that any Trump-brokered Taiwan deal would fall outside the bipartisan consensus and would not outlast his administration.
China views both US political parties as fundamentally hostile to its interests, differing only tactically; Beijing is preparing for potential decoupling while seeking clarity on whether Trump's second administration intends negotiation or unilateral separation, with domestic Chinese economic weakness driving a near-term stabilization imperative that could be overridden by nationalism.
- Chinese leadership has concluded the US has adopted a bipartisan strategic consensus that China is a threat, with differences being tactical rather than strategic
- China's assessment of Trump evolved from transactional (2017) to recognizing ideological opposition (2020-2024), shaped by COVID, trade escalation, and rhetoric from figures like Mike Pompeo
- China's deteriorating economic position—structural slowdown, property crisis, unsustainable export-driven growth—is driving Beijing's stabilization efforts with US, Japan, Australia, and India, but this could reverse if nationalism dominates
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Over the past four years, China has developed and deployed a robust toolkit of response measures against the US, including entity listings, export controls, sanctions against individuals via visa designations, and anti-foreign sanctions legislation, mirroring US tools developed against China.
“they've taken the last four years to Super copy a lot of the tools that the US has developed against China not just against China but entities listings by the Commerce department and Export controls sanctions including individual Visa designations anti-foreign sanctions legislation there's a pretty uh robust toolbox that the Chinese have put in place over the past four years they are only I think starting to experiment with its use against Taiwan uh us defense contractors on Taiwan or their component suppliers against uh pbh the holding company of Calvin Klein over implementation of us uh restrictions on shinjang based Force labor”
China has rebuilt the Russian defense establishment through dual-use technology transfers to a degree that has fundamentally changed the dynamics on the Ukraine battlefield and will create issues for European security for years to come, establishing a relationship that while not a formal mutual defense treaty has become profoundly deep
“China has rebuilt through you know dual use transfers the Russian defense establishment to a degree that it has not just changed the Dynamics on the Ukraine Battlefield this is going to be an issue for European security for years to come so you know I think the it's not a formal Mutual defense treaty but I think the depth of the the China Russia relationship at this point is pretty profound”
China has been preparing for decoupling for years, particularly in the ICT sector, and was shocked but not surprised by the advanced computing restrictions Biden imposed two years ago, integrating these expectations into their longer-term industrial policy strategies
“the Chinese I think have been preparing at a certain level for decoupling for years now in fact they've been driving it in parts of ICT sector they were shocked and you know surprised by the advanced Computing restrictions President Biden imposed two years ago and so a big element of their domestic industrial policy buildout and they're signaling that they will remain open to other markets as a hedge against losing the US I think those pieces are well under way they are now baked into China's longer term strategies”
Chinese system-level activities in the US (propaganda, cyber operations) are distinct from election interference: they consist of constant efforts to assert narratives of US political dysfunction and cyber espionage for traditional intelligence gathering or economic theft, not targeted support for specific candidates in the manner of Russian interference.
“I think the Chinese system is always very actively asserting through propaganda and other channels a view of the US political system in disarray as part of their Global narrative effort...I think a second thing that's going going on is they do a lot of cyber operations in the US and I think Microsoft has had some very good analyses of what they're doing but these operations I think are not necessarily about interfering in the US election in the sense of how the Russians do it in support of one candidate or the other I think these operations can often be traditional Espionage they can be cyber theft for economic gain or they can again fit into that first category which is the the always present effort to push their Narrative of the relative disadvantages of the US system”
Trump's acceptance of a phone call from Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen during the transition period before his February 2017 reconfirmation of the One China policy created a diplomatic crisis that 'unsettled everything' in US-China relations, requiring Xi Jinping's direct intervention to restore the strategic relationship.
“the second phase really played out more after the new administration's decision in that transition period to accept a phone call from then Taiwan President saying win and that basically unsettled everything...there was a period of time between the Trump's ey call and February 9th I think it was of 2017 when things had unraveled and they were only put together again when the president reconfirmed his adherence to the US One China policy in a call with President XI”
Xi Jinping manages US-China relations at the strategic level with a highly disciplined, top-down approach rather than a bottom-up process, meaning any substantive engagement with a new US administration requires explicit authorization from Xi himself and cannot occur through lower-level bureaucratic initiative.
“the US China relationship is managed at a strategic level by xiin ping so I think you know the strategy is very disciplined on the Chinese side it's very much top down and not bottom up”
China initially viewed the first Trump Administration through a transactional lens, seeing Trump as a dealmaker with whom agreements could be struck, but this view eroded significantly after 2018 as tariff escalations and hardening rhetoric—particularly from Vice President Pence and later Secretary Pompeo—convinced Beijing that Trump himself was being influenced by ideologically opposed cabinet members pursuing anti-CCP agendas that Trump may not have fully endorsed.
“there was the early period where they viewed president Trump and and particularly the trade channels as a transactional relationship that was in Seeking a deal um so while the phase one agreement you know unraveled for reasons that we can discuss there was the transactional Trump and then there was a separate period in 2020 after covid when the Chinese concluded that because president Trump was angry at them over what happened there was a lot more space for more ideological perhaps members of the cabinet to pursue agendas that maybe Trump himself was not all that aligned with”
The Chinese Premier at a recent economic and trade conference reiterated points about China remaining open and tried to position China as the guardian of the global trading order, despite limited introspection about what has happened at the WTO that makes it impossible for that system to protect other countries against China's industrial policy
“they are now baked into China's longer term strategies and I think a good example of this was just this week when the premere at a big economic and trade conference reiterated the points about China remaining open and trying to position China as the guardian of the global trading order with you know not a lot of introspection to be frank about what has happened uh at the WTO that makes it impossible for that system to protect other countries against China's industrial policy”
China's next moves after January 20, 2021 depend on its assessment of whether the Trump administration intends a new negotiated deal or unilateral decoupling; if China concludes the US strategy is decoupling, it will shut down many engagement channels rather than maintaining them for negotiation.
“once they have made that valuation they will then you know want to either make a calculus about what channels to open and preserve to negotiate or conversely they may well be inclined to just shut a lot of channels down if they think that the next Administration strategy is really a more of a unilateral decoupling and not an effort that aims to eventually achieve a new negotiated equilibrium”
China perceives recent geopolitical trends in its own neighborhood as moving unfavorably: the Quad is being enhanced, new trilateral mechanisms have been created (Tokyo-Seoul, Tokyo-Manila-US, Australia-US-others), creating an arc of containment mechanisms that China interprets as a coordinated effort against it.
“they may feel some Trends have worked in their favor geopolitically certainly the value they have leveraged from the the tragedy in Gaza in parts of the global South but it's in their own neighborhood where Trends are moving arguably in in the wrong direction what they see in their own neighborhood is the enhancement of some existing structures the quad among them and the creation of new ones whether it's the trilateral mechanisms between Tokyo and soul or between Tokyo and Manila in the US or Aus itself and so you see this Arc of new and existing but repurpose mechanisms that looks to China as if it's a containment effort in their backyard”
The strength of ties between Washington and Taipei in the unofficial relationship and the domestic US political consensus on Taiwan mean that any Trump-brokered Taiwan deal would fall outside the bipartisan consensus and thus would not survive a subsequent administration.
“the linkage to Taiwan is interesting because I've heard a number of people say and these may just be isolated views in their system but I do think they reflect a strand of leadership thinking that a similar type of deal that somehow brought in Taiwan would fall outside the US domestic political consensus the strength and Affinity of the ties between Washington and taipe in The Unofficial relationship and therefore it wouldn't be transferable after Trump steps down”
Trump's November 2017 visit to China was significant because he forcefully raised the fentanyl crisis at the presidential level and at his press conference with Xi Jinping, leading to subsequent diplomatic engagement where former Senator Lamar Alexander and bipartisan senators visited China to explain that effective fentanyl control required banning the entire class of fentanyl compounds rather than individual molecules.
“when President Trump went to China in November of 2017 he he didn't just talk about trade he talked uh including at his press conference with xiin ping very forcefully about the impact of fenyl and synthetic opioids on American communities and I think the Chinese took notice and and there were a number of subsequent engagements where the Trump Administration sent messages or signaled they would take strong actions but but there was also a diplomatic component that was complimentary that was run by former Senator Lamar Alexander and a bipartisan group of senators who came out to China the following year and walked the leadership through the specific actions the US thought would be helpful to help stem the flow of fentanyl into the US and the specific action basically was to ban fentanyl as a class of drugs because the ease with which fental producers could modif a compound slightly to get around existing law meant that if you don't ban it as a class you're not doing anything effective”
A serious Republican move to repeal Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with China would be viewed by Beijing as an economic divorce and would be perceived politically as going far beyond its actual tariff impacts, because PNTR was the original foundational economic pillar of the post-1980s China relationship.
“one key issue will be that if the Republicans control both the house and the and the Senate is there a serious move to repeal pntr permanent normal trade relations legislatively and I think the reason this matters is that that you know to the Chinese was the original bargain it's the foundational economic pillar of the relationship and so it would be seen I think politically in a way that goes beyond the actual resulting tariff levels as essentially an economic divorce”
The Chinese system does not understand Congress well, tends to overestimate the likelihood of bills passing into law, and dislikes the narratives from the House Select Committee on China.
“I have to say Bonnie I I think the Chinese system doesn't understand Congress all that well you know I think they tend to overestimate the likelihood of a given Bill passing into law they don't like the the narratives particularly that are coming from the house select committee”
Beijing's primary focus regarding Taiwan is not on Trump but on dynamics on the island under President Tsai's tenure and her concerns, which are not normative judgments about their validity but reflect real strategic concerns
“I think their focus is more on Dynamics on the island under President Li's tenure and we can talk about what their concerns are and I'm not taking a normative judgment about the validity of those concerns but I guess my my assessment would be that beijing's primary concerns emanate from taipe not Washington”
There are voices within the Chinese system unhappy with the direction of the Ukraine war, China's alignment with Russia's Ukraine strategy, and particularly the deployment of North Korean troops on Russian soil; however, these voices do not translate into significant Chinese action against Russia or North Korea because China's primary strategic fear remains an existential threat from the US.
“I think there are plenty of voices in the Chinese system that are unhappy about the direction of the war in Ukraine about how China is tied to Russian strategy and particularly about this newer element of dprk troops now being present on the battlefield inside of Russia's borders and what that means for this perception of a a block or a coalition forming with them at the center they don't like it but I don't think that's going to lead them to take significant action against those countries so long as their primary fear is an existential threat from the US”
COVID-19 triggered a structural rupture in US-China communication channels in 2020: US travel restrictions, COVID-origin disputes, and mutual expulsions of journalists froze diplomatic channels at a time when no one could physically travel, creating a vacuum in which informal channels also ceased functioning and misunderstandings could escalate unchecked.
“basically by that spring the US and China are in a period where the the for channels have Frozen and even the informal channels are not functioning because no one can travel and that's where things started to unravel so you had tit fortat expulsions of journalists uh in March of that year”
Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's July 2020 Reagan Library speech, which declared the failure of engagement with China and signaled US efforts to appeal to Chinese citizens for systemic change, was perceived by the Chinese party as an attack on the CCP's legitimacy and governance rather than criticism of foreign policy.
“you have former secretary Mike Pompeo in a speech out at the Reagan Library in July actually declaring the failure of the engagement strategy with China and and you know there are a lot of things in the speech that were meant to signal that the US was kind of looking around the party to Chinese citizens uh to press for changes in their system or at least changes in its behavior that I think the party saw as an attack on the system”
In October 2020 and January 2021, General Milley called his Chinese PLA counterpart twice out of concern that China misunderstood US intentions; Waters assesses the calls were made because China, isolated by frozen diplomatic channels and lacking good information, had convinced itself the US was planning a surprise military attack.
“the Chinese were so in isolation at this point they were so devoid of good information in their system they started to put one and one together and get three and they convinced themselves somehow that the US was planning a sneak attack and while I'll let you know former chairman Milley's words speak for themselves about his motivations in making the call I do think the lesson that I took away from that period is that when these channels erode to a certain point the bureaucracies will start doing things to each other and misunderstandings can escalate”
Chinese leadership and Xi Jinping view the US through a lens shaped by Putin's perspective; Putin has been as significant a factor as any in shaping Xi's worldview of US intentions, with Putin's views particularly influential in convincing Xi that the US represents an existential threat.
“another factor that that I think is important in setting the stage is the impact of Vladimir Putin on xiin Ping's thinking because they they do have frequent conversations and I think Putin has been as big a factor as any in shaping she's view of the world and view of the US's ultimate intentions”
Chinese strategic communications about their global role and US-China competition have manifested this fatalistic outlook through a focus on 'fortress economy' defensive insulation from geopolitical risk, as articulated by scholar Jimmy Goodrich, rather than integration strategies.
“the clear signals there the clear manifestations of that are not just in the US relationship they are in the way in which the party talk about their Global role and in the way that they talk about uh us China competition now to to the point that you're asking about during the campaign how did they see things well again they viewed the US political parties both sides as having basically adopted a similar strategic view of the U of China and therefore from their perspective the big questions now are tactical what level of tariffs is it full decoupling or drisking but the intentions at this point are seen as very hostile and that is why I think a lot of Chinese strategy at this point is built around insulating their system from geopolitical risk or as you know uh Jimmy Goodridge has put it in a very good recent paper building a fortress economy”
China acknowledges internal and academic discussion of overcapacity problems in its economy, recognizes unsustainable growth models driven by investment into export-oriented sectors with low profitability, and understands that tariff barriers are rising globally; in response, China has studied 1980s US-Japan trade negotiations and voluntary export restraint mechanisms as potential models for negotiation.
“there are some in the Chinese system and certainly among their academics who acknowledge the problem of overc capacity even if they don't like the word you know I think they they've looked at their own growth data they realize it's just unsustainable I mean the last quarter you know very little of their economic growth is coming from domestic consumption now it's coming from investment and largely into sectors that are exporting at unsustainable rates and lower profitability abroad they see this reality of tariff barriers going up and so you know they're starting to talk about how the US and Japan managed their trade issues in the 1980s they talk about the tools of voluntary export restraints”
China likely does not mind the US being bogged down in the Middle East or channeling military resources to a European battlefront, reflecting a view that US strategic overextension serves Chinese interests
“my sense is that you know China probably doesn't mind the us being bogged down in the Middle East or to some extent having to channel resources militarily um to a European Battlefront”
Tit-for-tat journalist expulsions between the US and China in March 2020, beginning with Chinese expulsion of Wall Street Journal reporters and followed by US reciprocal moves and additional Chinese responses, represented a significant erosion of the relationship despite potentially not seeming central, because it exemplified the pattern of mutual retaliation
“you had tit fortat expulsions of journalists uh in March of that year and again that that story may not sound as Central but I think it is because it from you know from the Chinese perspective um you know they don't tend to have a lot of introspection about Why Us concerns about press freedom and about journalist access are there but the the expulsions that they had done against I think a few Wall Street Journal reporters were met by the US with another with a reciprocal move and then the Chinese made another move and so you had these tit for tats playing out in various areas of the relationship”
The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson mentioned overnight that they will operate according to past precedent, meaning Beijing should be expected to send congratulatory messages and attempt to find an authoritative channel to the transition team, though they may not succeed
“the Chinese foreign Ministry spokesperson mentioned overnight they will operate according to past precedent so we should expect congratulatory messages and we should expect a very early effort to find some authoritative channel to the transition team they may not be successful”
During the recent US presidential campaign, Chinese experts and leadership did not express a clear preference for Harris or Trump; instead, different parts of the Chinese system held different views, but the leadership's official stance was neutrality, allowing internal debate to continue.
“I do think the Chinese leadership took a decision early on not to express a view of which candidate they preferred and so what you saw in their debates was actually a lot of debate different parts of the system had different views and I think that probably was true up until the US election”
China's assessment of its relative position after the first Trump administration is complex: in 2020 China believed it had managed COVID better than the US and its economy was more resilient, but currently China is experiencing difficult economic conditions including structural slowdown coinciding with the end of COVID, cyclical contraction from the property sector collapse, and reduced relative international position.
“if you recall in 2020 the Chinese were on a little bit of a hubris High thinking that their system had done a better job of managing covid than than anyone else and the US was you know in a bit of disarray over questions of masing and testing and all of this I think they you know their economy was holding up reasonably well um and so I think that during that period the Chinese assessment would probably have been that they were in a better position but I I think the more interesting question now is how that has changed I think the Chinese today probably wouldn't put it this way but but given that their covid strategy ultimate was ultimately was seen by many in the country as a failure or at least one that went on too long at too high a price given that the structural Slowdown and their economy coincided with the end of the covid period and you had a cyclical slowdown on top of that driven by the property sector you now have a China that I think is going through a very difficult period economically”
After China banned fentanyl as a class, the nature of the drug flow evolved, with China becoming the producer of precursor chemicals that were assembled and reconstituted in Mexico rather than producing finished fentanyl, and during the downturn in the relationship China simply did not apply political will to addressing this challenge
“unfortunately I think the nature of the drug flow evolved after that China became the producer of precursors that were assembled and and reconstituted in Mexico and second during that period of the downturn in the relationship I do think that the Chinese simply didn't apply political will for a long period to addressing that challenge”
China does not significantly differentiate between US political parties in their strategic assessment, viewing differences as mainly tactical, which reveals that China assesses the differences are at the operational level rather than the strategic level
“much since we don't see too much differentiating between Chinese experts between the two US political parties and they seem to assess that the differences are mainly at the Tactical level”
The Mara Lago meeting between Trump and Xi in April 2017 represented a strategic turning point where the Commerce Department under Wilbur Ross and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson had more central roles, resulting in a slimmed-down dialogue framework focused on diplomacy, economics, law enforcement, and other issues to support leader-level diplomacy
“the president invited shei to Mara Lago in April of that year for their first face-to-face meeting and you know in that meeting I think that was a period of time where the Commerce department and particularly Wilbur Ross who was secretary at the time had a much more Central role in the economic relationship than would be the case later similarly uh Rex Tillerson who was secretary of state was more Central in setting up the architecture so they had their meeting at Mara Lago and what emerged on the back end was a slim down version not of the old sned or security and economic dialogue framework but rather a Slimmer framework of cabinet level meetings built around diplomacy around economics around law enforcement”
The Trump administration's slimmed-down dialogue framework with China proved non-durable, failing to sustain the support structure for leader-level diplomacy despite its design to facilitate such engagement
“this was meant to be this supporting structure to the leader level diplomacy but again for reasons you know we'll get into later in the in the podcast that structure didn't really prove durable”
In July 2020, President Trump signed an executive order ending most aspects of the preferential treatment the US had given to Hong Kong following its 1997 reversion to China, in response to China's erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy, representing a major escalation
“in July when because of the very consequential erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy president Trump signed an executive order ending most aspects of the preferential treatment that the us had given to Hong Kong as part of the original autonomy bargain after the reversion in 97”
Multiple factors beyond just US strategy influence Beijing's thinking on Ukraine, and China will weigh the impact of US policy shifts on Russia against European concerns and other considerations
“I think there are a lot of factors that go into China's Ukraine policy Beyond just the us but”