
What this covers
This is a lecture by Francis Fukuyama followed by a discussion with Martin Wolf, recorded at the RSA. Fukuyama sets out the Three Institutional Baskets: a state with a monopoly of legitimate force, a rule of law that binds the ruler, and democratic accountability through free elections. Countries hold these in different combinations, and he insists that the quality of a state matters more than its size. His example is Denmark, a large and well-liked state, set against small African and Latin American states that collect little tax and deliver poorly. He also traces the move from patrimonial rule, where the state is the ruler's property, to impersonal government, and notes that China built a merit-based bureaucracy in the 3rd century BC, about 1,800 years before any European state.
The middle of the talk compares China and the United States as opposite cases. China has state capacity but nothing constraining the Communist Party, and Fukuyama says it has never solved the problem of the "bad emperor", with Mao as the recent example. He doubts corruption can be dealt with there without a free press. The US has the reverse problem. Its founders feared tyranny and fragmented power, and this now combines with sharp polarization between the Republican Party) and the Democratic Party (US)) to leave the country unable to make basic decisions. He cites the Progressive Era as evidence that democracies can correct themselves.
The foreign-policy sections are the most contested. Fukuyama argues that Iraq and Afghanistan show Western state-building going wrong. Elections were held, but states that deliver services and command legitimacy were not built. He reads Ukraine's uprisings as revolts against insider capture more than demands for democracy. Wolf pushes on culture, the values behind institutions, and on whether China can keep growing without free speech. Fukuyama admits that the cultural argument leads to depressing conclusions about how malleable societies are. They end on why no true state is likely above the nation, with the EU an intermediate case.
Fukuyama argues that modern political order requires three independent institutional baskets—state capacity, rule of law, and democratic accountability—in balance, and that Western democracies face 'political decay' as organized interests capture institutions while non-Western state-building efforts fail because they misunderstand which institutions matter most and cannot transplant cultural prerequisites for good governance.
- The three institutional baskets can be possessed in different combinations; state capacity without rule of law (China) or rule of law without state capacity (failed states) both produce dysfunction
- Political decay in developed democracies occurs when organized interests recapture impersonal institutions, not because institutions are inherently flawed
- Western interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan fail because they prioritize elections over state capacity and legitimacy, ignoring that 'getting to Denmark' requires centuries of cultural and institutional evolution
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Martin Wolf (speaking in discussion) makes the point that behind modern institutions is a set of values, attitudes, and behaviors within the population—in people's hearts; the Romans called this virtue, and the Chinese created this within their context through Confucian ideology and their bureaucracy; changing this broader culture of a society simply takes an immense amount of time.
“behind these things is and they're obviously different in different context a set of values attitudes and behaviors that are within the population they're in people's hearts they evolve obviously in different ways vber discusses that at Great length um the Romans would have called it virtue um and the Chinese obviously created this within their context through this Confucian ideology and their bureaucracy so it's not just about some sort of mechanical system of institutional structures it's about actually how people think about themselves their relationship to others in their society their relationships to power that what they expect of the powerful”
The Chinese government has never solved the problem of the 'bad emperor'—if you have a good emperor with unchecked power they can do a great deal of good and do it faster than a democracy with checks and balances, but the moment a bad emperor arrives that same lack of constraint can lead to disaster, and most Chinese believe the last bad emperor was Mao who killed tens of millions through famine and the Cultural Revolution.
“the one problem the Chinese government never solved either in dynastic times or today is the problem of what they call the bad Emperor so if you have a good Emperor and I think this pretty common sensical if you have a good Emperor with unchecked power and the emperor is really good they can do a lot of good and they can do it much faster than a democracy with all the checks and balances so uh and in fact if you think about what dong sha ping did in terms of reforming the Chinese system overcoming the resistance of all the old Communists and maist and so forth no democracy could have changed its economic system as rapidly as China did...but in Chinese history there's this Trope about the bad emperor that uh all of this is premised on having a good Emperor but the moment you get a bad one in there that same lack of constraint can lead to disaster and I think most Chinese believe that the last bad Emperor they had was maong who killed you know tens of millions of people through famine”
Identity is critical to state-building and state formation; without an overarching sense of identity corresponding to your political unit, you won't get people to be loyal to that unit as opposed to their tribe, ethnic group, or family.
“identity is really critical to State Building and state formation and uh in a sense I mean I got a couple chapters devoted to this that if you don't actually have an overarching sense of identity for your that corresponds to your political unit you're actually not going to get people to be loyal to that unit as opposed to their tribe or ethnic group or family or whatever”
A patrimonial state treats the state as private property to be exploited for the ruler's or ruling family's benefit, whereas a modern state treats citizens with impersonality regardless of whether they are connected to the ruler or ruling elite; this transition from insider-run organizations to impersonal governance is one of the hardest transitions and one least well understood.
“there's another definition that distinguishes between uh what Max faer called a patrimonial state uh and a modern State a patrimonial state is one where the ruling Elite regards the state as a species of private property to be exploited for their own use or the use of their families uh and uh I would say in in a modern state by contrast is one that is impersonal meaning it treats its citizens uh with some degree of equality not not depending on whether you're Pals with the ruler and the ruling family or whatever the ruling Elite uh but simply as a citizen and I think that this is basically what distinguishes a poor country from a developed country today...this transition from a highly corrupt Insider run uh organization to one that is um impersonal is one of the hardest Transitions and one of the ones that we understand uh the least well”
American political institutions worked fairly well through much of the 20th century because the two political parties substantially overlapped, allowing majorities to support major legislation; but American society has drifted into extreme polarization such that the most liberal Republican is now much more conservative than the most conservative Democrat, resulting in partisan warfare that combined with checks and balances means the country cannot make basic governance decisions.
“that system through much of the 20th century worked okay because the two political parties overlapped uh largely and you could get majority to support major pieces of legislation but American society has been drifting apart into an extremely bitter and I think extreme uh degree of polarization so that the most liberal Republican is now much more conservative than the most conservative uh Democrat and as a result they have engaged in a kind of partisan Warfare which quen combined with a check and balance political system means that the country simply cannot make any of its most basic uh governance decisions”
Park Chung-hee, the military general who took over South Korea in 1961, demonstrated cultural difference by publicly humiliating corrupt Korean chaebol leaders and forcing them to reinvest a large proportion of their earnings into their own companies, whereas an authoritarian leader in Nigeria or Mexico would have simply taken 75% of their wealth for himself while letting the rest stay with the oligarchs.
“Park Chang for examp example who was the military General that took over South Korea in 1961 uh one of the first things he did was he got all the leaders of the big Korean chyall these big companies like Samsung and Hundai uh who were corrupt themselves and he paraded them down the street of soul in duns caps and he told them you uh you know I will let I will let keep you out of jail but you have to plow a very large proportion of your earnings back into your own companies now if this had been Nigeria or you know uh Mexico or some other place an authoritarian leader in that position would have said to these people he wouldn't have put them out in public he would have said okay give me you know 75% and I'll let you I'll let you stay out of jail”
Without a free press and grassroots ability to hold officials accountable, it is unclear whether you can actually deal with corruption, which is a serious question about China's sustainability.
“there is a serious question about whether without actually free press and you know ground uh uh uh Grassroots ability to hold officials accountable whether you can actually deal with corruption”
The quality of the state is much more important than the size of the state; Denmark had a top marginal tax rate of 63.5% and was a huge state but people liked it because it delivered services well, whereas many small states in Africa and Latin America take in only 10% of GDP in taxes and do a miserable job at it, making everyone unhappy.
“one of the arguments I make in the book is that the quality of the state is much much more important than the size of the state that we Americans obsess about whether the state is too large or too big and we should be much more worried about the quality so you know in Denmark my favorite Denmark they used to have a top marginal tax rate of 63 a half% and you hit that at €1,000 Euros uh so they had an enormous state but you know people liked it because it delivered Services pretty well uh whereas there are many small states in Africa and Latin America where they don't take in more than 10% of GDP in taxes and they do a miserable job at that and everybody's really unhappy”
Fukuyama argues that beyond usefulness in mobilizing innovation, there is an intrinsic value for human beings to have a share in rule over themselves; Aristotle said man is a political animal, meaning that without exercising some degree of share and rule, you're not leading a full life, and the Chinese will not have that because their government treats them as children.
“I would go further than you it's not just useful to have the whole population engaged I think it's an intrinsic value value for human beings that they should have a share in rule over themselves so Aristotle said that man is a political Animal by which you know he meant if you don't exercise some degree of share and Rule you're not leading a full life and I think the Chinese will not have that because their government treats them as children”
The Progressive Era in American history demonstrated that democracies do have self-correcting mechanisms; when small elites became corrupt or seized undue influence, the vast majority of citizens mobilized and voted to change the rules so these people could no longer do this; FDR's New Deal coalition then put the American welfare state in place after the 1930s depression mobilization.
“and another story that I tell in this book uh is actually when that happened during the Progressive Era so and this is the theory of how democracies are supposed to work so in a democracy if a small Elite is corrupt or it's seizing undue influence because you have one man one vote or one person one vote everybody you know the vast majority of citizens should not want this to happen they mobilize and they vote uh to change the rules so that these people are not allowed to do this that's the theory the problem is and and that's actually I think pretty much what happened uh in the Progressive Era when you had civil service reform so they got rid of uh the patronage system because of this General mobilization after the uh depression in the 1930s you had a general mobilization that Franklin Roosevelt you know put together uh in in the form of the New Deal coalition”
China developed the first modern state in world history at the time of the Chin unification in the 3rd century BC—a bureaucratic administration that was merit-based and sought to treat its large population relatively impersonally—approximately 1,800 years before any European state achieved this level.
“a lot of countries had States early on like Egypt and Mesopotamia and you know Mexico in the valley of Mexico the Aztecs but China was really the first country to develop a modern state in the sense of a bureaucratic Administration that was merit-based and that sought to treat its large population relatively impersonally and they did this uh at the time of the chin unification in the 3rd Century BC so 18800 years before any state in Europe got to this level the Chinese were already doing that”
Rule of law and state-building are both much harder to construct than holding elections; creating rule of law requires training lawyers, judges, bar associations, and legal culture, then making them independent of government—a generational or multi-generational task—whereas elections are easy to do quickly.
“both State Building and rule of law construction are much much harder to do if you think about what's required for rule of law first of all you got to train lawyers you got to train judges you got to create bar associations you got to create a a kind of legal culture and then make them independent of the government and that's a generational or multi-generational task whereas the I think the reason we go for elections quickly is that they're just easy to to to to do”
The US Supreme Court's decision that money is speech and corporations are people makes reversal of interest group capture difficult because if a Supreme Court majority holds this position it constrains democratic ability to regulate campaigns and curb interest group influence.
“if you get a supreme cour majority that decides that money is speech and that corporations are people is going to become rather difficult to reverse this isn't it yeah and this is why I think that the rigidity is part of our problem of Decay that you know the Supreme Court is one of those checks uh that that the constitution creates it's actually the rule of law as it were is actually subverting Democratic accountability”
Afghanistan has been undermined because Hamid Karzai and his people are unbelievably corrupt, which undermines the legitimacy of the whole NATO project, and the alliance has not figured out a way of dealing with this.
“Afghanistan is a great case of that I mean we've known that carai and you know his minions are just unbelievably corrupt and that this is undermining the legitimacy of the whole NATO project in Afghanistan and we have not figured out a way of dealing with this”
On the international level, Fukuyama believes we will never get anything like a true state because the state requires delegation of authority to executives who can use power, and without underlying political consensus about how that power will be used and resources allocated, it is not just dangerous but politically unworkable.
“I think that uh I don't think that on an international level we will ever get to anything like the state because the state requires this huge delegation of discretion AR authority to some executive agency that can then basically use power and if you don't have an underlying uh political consensus about how that power is to be used and how to allocate resources and everything else it's just it's it's well it's it's first dangerous but then even before it's dangerous it just is politically unworkable”
The EU is a 'bit of an intermediate creature' not purely intergovernmental but not a true state, and for Asia there is no way to get anything beyond the nation state in the near future.
“I see no root by which we're going to you know ever see the emergence of truly International institutions with those sorts of power so for the time being I think we're stuck with you know intergovernmentalism or transnational you know cooperation uh that still takes the nation state I mean some some exceptions like the EU which is a bit of a intermediate creature but uh you know you got to Asia I mean there's no way that you're going to get anything beyond the nation state anytime in the near near future”
Wolf (in discussion) argues that in addition to good governance, giving people freedom of speech and freedom to engage in economic activity means the future of the country relies on the efforts and energies of the entire population, and asks whether as societies approach the frontier, this is a pretty big advantage that China cannot easily replicate when everything must be approved by the Communist Party.
“by giving people however corrupt and problematic of an is a Sayan public life freedom of speech and freedom also to engage in economic activity you are ultimately relying to a very very large extent for the future of your your country on the efforts and energies of the entire population yeah and it's not perfect sort but don't you feel that in the very long run particularly as you get closer and closer to the frontier a society for all the incredible mess and and so forth like the US with its constant ability to innovate to change know where are the the new ideas coming from even now um that this is a pretty big Advantage which China cannot easily replicate if everything to some degree has to be approved by the Communist Party”
The core failure of Western state-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan is not an inability to hold elections—democratic elections have occurred in both places—but an inability to create modern states that can deliver services, provide security, and be regarded as legitimate.
“we've had Democratic elections in both Iraq and Afghanistan the really hard part is getting to to actually a modern state that can deliver Services provide security and is regarded as uh legitimate and that's really the the overweening failure I think in both of those places in in the area where we didn't really understand how to do things”
Ukraine's Orange Revolution and Euro-Maidan uprising were fundamentally about corruption and insider capture of the state rather than primarily about democracy, because even the winning coalition admitted Yanukovich was democratically elected; the issue was that he ran an insider ring extracting state resources with oligarchs.
“in 2004 Ukraine was run by an elected president a legitimately elected president Victor yanukovich who was basically a uh an Insider you know kleptocrat uh who uh was highly corrupt and ran a very corrupt Administration you had a democratic Uprising called the Orange Revolution uh they forced a new election and he was basically removed from power but the new orange Coalition did not know how to govern they were themselves corrupt they did nothing to fix the underlying Corruption of the Ukrainian State...Mr yanukovich was reelected in 2010 in a free and fair election and the Euro maidon Uprising that took place earlier this year was really about that it was not so much about democracy as about corruption because everybody admitted that yanukovich actually had been democratically elected the problem was he was running this Insider ring uh that was uh extracting resources from the Ukrainian state”
Fukuyama responds to Wolf's point about culture by noting it leads to depressing conclusions about the malleability of societies, and illustrates with the example that East Asian developmental states (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China) work because East Asian elites have a sense of public responsibility even if personally corrupt, whereas in Nigeria or Mexico authoritarian leaders would simply pocket resources themselves.
“I think it's absolutely correct as an observation I haven't emphasized it because it leads you to some rather depressing conclusions in terms of the malleability of different uh societies so for example um East Asia is home to a large number of what uh are called developmental States so this is like Japan South Korea Taiwan and China itself in which the government doesn't just provide a platform for the free market it actually directs economic development...it's worked pretty well in East Asia and why is it that you you get these developmental States in this part of the world and not in other regions and I think it is a cultural uh thing where East Asian Elites have this sense of public responsibility even if they're actually personally corrupt”
Corruption can smooth transactions in some views, but it is definitely a second-best alternative to having a non-corrupt system in the first place where you don't have to pay bribes; corruption is corrosive of legitimacy in China and has always been corrosive in Chinese history.
“I just want to say yeah I know a lot of people have made the argument that corruption smoo Smooths transactions and so forth but it's definitely a second best alternative to actually having a non-corrupt system in the first place where you don't have to pay the bribes and and and so forth a really big issue in China that you didn't emphasize you talk to Chinese people I mean that is corrosive of legitimacy and has always been corrosive of legitimacy in China”
China's problem is that it has developed state capacity but lacks institutions of constraint—it has no rule of law that constrains the Chinese Communist Party and no democratic accountability.
“Their problem is they don't have institutions of constraint so they really don't have anything like a rule of law that constrains the Chinese Communist party uh and of course they don't have Democratic accountability”
The United States is at the opposite end of the spectrum from China: the American founding fathers were very concerned with tyranny and the abuses of state power, so they created a constitutional system that divided, separated, and checked power in multiple ways such that the exercise of concentrated government authority has always been very difficult.
“I would actually put a country like the United States at the other end of the spectrum uh we do have a strong and and very large state that can be very effective at times but the American founding fathers in a certain sense uh created you know they were very very concerned with tyranny and the abuses of state power so they created a constitutional system that divided and separated and checked power in uh multiple ways uh such that in the United States the exercise of concentrated government Authority has always been uh very difficult”
Deng Xiaoping reformed the Chinese economic system overcoming resistance from old communists and Maoists; no democracy could have changed its economic system as rapidly as China did because it was authoritarian and unconstrained.
“if you think about what dong sha ping did in terms of reforming the Chinese system overcoming the resistance of all the old Communists and maist and so forth no democracy could have changed its economic system as rapidly as China did and it's only because it was authoritarian and unconstrained that you could do this”
A modern political order requires three institutional baskets possessed in different combinations: (1) the state, defined as a monopoly of legitimate force with the ability to enforce rules through coercion; (2) the rule of law, constraining the ruler themselves and requiring the ruler feel bound by law; and (3) democratic accountability through procedures like free elections to force rulers to consider the whole population's interests.
“in my view a modern political order really needs to consist of three baskets of Institutions uh that can be possessed in different combinations by different societies so the first institution is the state the state is defined by the famous sociologist Max vber as a monopoly of legitimate force uh over uh a certain territory...so that's one set of Institutions another set of Institutions has to do with the rule of law many countries rule through law I mean they're basically commands of the the ruler uh but rued by law means that the ruler uh himself or herself feels constrained by law...and then finally you have uh instit tions of democratic accountability uh which are things like free and fair multi-party elections”
The US Congress has not passed a budget since 2008 under its own rules, and the entire federal government shut down last year because of a dispute over raising the debt limit, during which federal employees were subject to criminal penalty if they showed up for work—demonstrating how checks and balances produce crazy governance outcomes.
“US Congress has not passed a budget since 2008 uh under its own rules and if you remember last year the entire federal government shut down because of this dispute over raising the debt limit which is basically an agreement to pay back uh past debts and under American law in that period when the government was shut down if you're a federal employee you showed up for work you were subject to a criminal penalty where you could go to jail for actually coming to your job uh and you know and this is the United States of America I mean it's it's a completely crazy system”
Islamist terrorist organizations like ISIS can expand into weak state areas (Mali, Northern Nigeria with Boko Haram) not because they are inherently powerful but because they fill vacuums created by governments that cannot provide security to their citizens.
“the reason that these islamists have flowed through into places like Mali and Northern Nigeria you know with boo Haram and uh regions like that is that they don't have governments that can actually provide security for their citizens and they're filling this kind of a a vacuum”
The world is bifurcated into two broad areas of instability: one stretching from North Africa through sub-Saharan Africa, the Arab world into Afghanistan and Pakistan characterized by crisis of state authority where states cannot keep order, and another in Eurasia where Russia and China are organized as hierarchical centralized bureaucratic states making traditional territorial claims against neighbors.
“I think the world is bifurcated into two broad areas uh so honestly 2014 has been an awful year uh we have multiple crises going on and actually uh I've not seen the world as unstable uh as it is right now in quite a lot of time but the forms of instability are actually quite different so in one part of the world it goes from North Africa through subsaharan Africa the Arab world uh and into Afghanistan and Pakistan uh you have uh basically uh I would say now a crisis of State Authority where simultaneously Libya Syria Iraq Afghanistan Yemen all have um failed Central States”
In India, despite decades of effort at political reform, the share of school teachers not showing up for work remained at 50% ten years after an initial study found the same 50% absence rate, demonstrating the Indian government's huge struggle to deliver basic services like electricity, clean water, and education.
“in India there was a study done by Jean Dre in the late 199 s it showed that in Northern India in some of the poor states 50% of school teachers were not showing up for work uh despite the fact that they were being paid 50% uh so this creates a big hu and cry in the country there's efforts at political reform 10 years later they do a similar survey and they find that the number of school teachers not showing up for work is exactly 50% after 10 years of effort”
The Lebanese constitution was a pragmatic effort to deal with extreme sectarian fragmentation through power-sharing agreements; Afghanistan is moving to something similar where the president will be Pashtun, the Prime Minister Tajik, and other offices shared.
“I think the Lebanese Constitution was actually a pretty pragmatic effort to deal with this extreme degree of sectarian fragmentation and that it's very interesting if you look at the power sharing agreement that's now evolving in Afghanistan they're moving to something that looks very much like Lebanon where the president will be a push tune the Prime Minister will be a tajik and then other offices will be shared and I think they're getting that to that point on their own”
The problem with the current moment despite the huge financial crisis that hurt ordinary people is that the only mobilizations have been right-wing populist ones aimed at the wrong targets like immigrants rather than the appropriate response of getting adequate regulation and addressing financial sector power.
“despite the fact that you've had this huge financial crisis that's hurt the interest of a lot of ordinary people the only mobilizations you've had are right-wing ones that are populist and I think aim the gun at the wrong people like immigrants and so forth uh and and you know there hasn't been the appropriate response to get for example adequate uh you know regulation and and and this sort of thing”
Democracies have self-corrective mechanisms and are generally slow and inefficient but eventually correct their problems, though there is no guarantee this will continue in the future and depends on the agency of individuals and collectives.
“we who live in democracies like to tell ourselves that we have these self-corrective mechanisms and whatever our problems we may be slow and inefficient but eventually we get around to correcting them uh so far uh that's happened but uh there's no guarantee that that'll happen uh in the future and it really does depend on the agency of us as individuals and as collectivities”
Interest groups have captured the American political system and blocked effective regulation; a route to regulate the banking sector after the financial crisis would have dramatically raised capital requirements on banks to prevent them from becoming too big to fail and requiring taxpayer bailouts, but this avenue was blocked because banking industry lobbyists were too powerful, resulting instead in clumsy Dodd-Frank legislation.
“there was an actual route to I think fairly decisively regulate re-regulating uh that sector to that would I think have uh solved a lot of the underlying problem which was to you know for example dramatically raise uh Capital requirements uh on the banks that would keep them from getting you know that large and then they could fail without it being H you know bringing about taxpayer bailouts and so forth but that whole avenue uh was blocked I think uh I mean this is something I cannot prove to you standing here uh because a lot of this stuff is very murky but uh I uh you know honestly believe that that was really blocked because the lobbyists of the financial industry were simply too powerful and so we got this very clumsy piece of legislation called dodf Frank”
Fukuyama argues for federalism in Europe but worries it is beginning to look too much like the United States system, which does not truly observe subsidiarity; instead, the US has duplicated and overlapping authorities at every level with different agendas, creating many entry points for lobbying manipulation.
“I actually think that it's beginning to look uh unfortunately too much like the United States so the United States is a federal system but it doesn't really observe the principle of subsidiarity in which powers are clearly advocated to allocated to the appropriate level what we have in the United States is a set of duplicated and overlapping uh authorities at every single level so there's a municipal and a state and a Federal Environmental Protection Agency all of which have different uh agendas and so forth and one of the problems is that in terms of things like lobbying it produces a lot more entry points into government where you know uh things can be manipulated”
The best-governed countries in northern Europe and the United States often had Calvinist or Calvinist-influenced populations with austerity and belief in personal morality, which is part of the story of how good governance developed in Prussia, Holland, Britain, and the United States.
“if you look at the best governed countries in northern Europe or in the United States or in this country a lot of them were Calvinists you know uh or they had this calvinist kind of austerity and belief in you know personal morality that I think uh is actually part of the story of how you got to good government in Prussia you know in Holland in Britain and in the United States”
The problem Fukuyama frames as 'getting to Denmark'—turning countries like Iraq and Afghanistan into versions of Denmark, which is democratic, secure, prosperous, and not corrupt—is the beginning of his historical inquiry, and he realized that the West keeps failing at this because it doesn't understand how Denmark itself got to be Denmark.
“I describ this problem as the one of getting to Denmark where Denmark is actually not a real country but it's a imagined place that is democratic secure prosperous uh and uh not corrupt uh and we are constantly trying to turn countries like Iraq and Afghanistan into some version of Denmark and we fail constantly and I uh began to realize that the reason that we keep failing at this is that we don't understand how Denmark itself got to be Denmark”
Fukuyama estimates that culture explains perhaps 10-15% of the variance between countries' performance, whereas Lawrence Harrison estimates 80%; Fukuyama believes it's important but that other things are more important, and that people often attribute institutional outcomes to culture when they actually result from institutions or public policies subject to change.
“he thinks that culture is like 80% of the variance between the performance of different countries and I think it's more like 10 to 15% it's it's there it's important uh but there are many other things that are more important and it turns out that you can change institutions and all of a sudden things that people thought were cultural obstacles uh disappear so max vber himself wrote this entire book in which he's got this one great line it's a book on Daoism and Confucianism and he says at one point the only country less likely to create a modern capitalist system less likely than China is Japan and he wrote that book in about 1920 um and so things change and it turns out people you know are kind of lazy and attribute things to culture that actually are the result of Institutions or public policies that are uh subject to change”
The ObamaCare legislation is a horrible bill running 900 pages because it involved payments to many different interest groups necessary to get them on board to pass it, meaning nobody who voted for it has any idea what's in those 900 pages.
“the big healthc are legislation that Obama was that was his other big achievement but it's a it's a horrible bill in in many ways it runs to 900 Pages nobody that voted for it has any idea what's in those 900 Pages because it involved payments you know to a lot of different uh interest groups that were necessary to get them on board so that the thing could be uh passed in the first place”
The failure of states in the Middle East resulted from both local politics and outside interference from the United States; Western support for authoritarian regimes like Mubarak's Egypt was more important than post-hoc interventions in triggering Arab Spring failures, but the bulk of ISIS's rise resulted from Prime Minister Maliki's failures in Iraq.
“the survival of many of those authoritarian regimes like the Mubarak regime in Egypt was due to Western interference I mean the United States was supporting this guy and so the fact that uh you know we did something after the tier Square uprisings I think is much less important than what we were doing you know prior to that that and so the you know the success of these authoritarian States was was also the the result of uh of meddling uh so you know that's there that did happen but I do think in a place like Iraq if you say why did why did Isis arise you know as it did this year I would say the the bulk of the failure is really um prime minister Malaki”
Narendra Modi was elected Prime Minister of India partly because many Indians are fed up with the government's inability to deliver services and want strong government that can make decisions and move ahead to sustain the country's rate of economic growth.
“I think one of the reasons that uh Narendra Modi was elected uh uh uh prime minister this year was that many Indians are fed up with this and they want strong government they want the government that can actually make decisions and uh move ahead and do things that are necessary to sustain uh the country's rate uh of uh uh of economic uh growth”
There has been a tendency to emphasize smaller and smaller local identities since the 'end of history,' but this is enabled by the existence of larger institutions of global mobilization, free trade, and democratic peace; if Scotland left the UK without connection to a larger economic entity it would get very poor, so citizens won't even contemplate this; current identity politics takes the foundation of these larger institutions for granted.
“there's been this uh tendency to emphasize you know smaller and smaller uh local identities I actually think that this is very much connected to uh the you know what I label the end of history I mean if if you didn't have an agreement fundamental agreement on democracy and a market system system underpinning uh Prosperity you actually couldn't indulge in identity politics so for example if Scotland uh by leaving the United Kingdom were cast off by itself not connected to any larger economic entity and they would get very poor as a result you know I don't think they'd even for a minute contemplate that so in a sense the current you know type of identity politics takes as a foundation the existence of these larger you know institutions of glob mobilization free trade uh and Democratic peace”
Political decay describes the process in which an impersonal government that is well-run and effective is vulnerable because elites constantly attempt to recapture it, and societies create institutions for certain circumstances but when circumstances change they don't adapt mentally or rebuild institutions, becoming stuck with ineffective structures.
“we are subject to uh something I've described as political uh Decay uh because an impersonal government that is well-run uh and and effective is a vulnerable thing uh because Elites in the country are constantly um trying to recapture it and and and rep patrimonialization rigidity that we create a set of Institutions for a certain set of circumstances and then when the circumstances change we don't adapt mentally we don't uh uh rebuild the institutions and as a result we're stuck with things that are quite uh ineffective”
America has become a 'vetocracy'—a government in which it is extremely easy for minorities to veto actions by the whole that are necessary for public interest.
“America's ended up as what I call a vitrac meaning uh a government in which uh it is extremely easy for minorities to veto uh actions by the U you know the whole that are necessary I think for uh public interest”
There has been a reappropriation of the American government by well-organized and well-heeled organized interests; public sector unions in the United States are extremely powerful, as exemplified by the California Teachers Association spending $100 million in a referendum to block extension of the tenure waiting period from two to three years.
“I think that you know in many respects there's been a reappropriation of the American government by well organized and well healed uh organized interests and by the way they're not all on the right I mean public sector unions in the United States are extremely powerful just to give you one little example in my home state of California uh the California Teachers Association uh you get tenure as a teacher in California if you work for two years as a teacher and uh and uh there was a reform proposal to make that three years instead of two years and this teachers union put up a $ hundred million in a referendum to block uh the you know the extension of the 10e waiting period from two to three years”
Fukuyama declines to emphasize the cultural dimension because it becomes discouraging from a public policy perspective—one cannot say 'we need more Calvinists running Zimbabwe or Nigeria'—but it does suggest that the idea (current not so long ago) that one could overthrow a government and inculcate modern democracy in 10 years was completely absurd.
“that's why I say I don't like emphasizing this part of the story because it becomes very in terms of public policy it becomes very discouraging because you can't say well we just need more Calvinists running you know Zimbabwe or you know Nigeria or or something but it does suggest doesn't it the idea which was after all very current not so long ago and then we'll go to us that you could arrive in a country overthrow its government and inculate a modern State and democracy in 10 years was completely absurd”
Despite problems in developed democracies, Fukuyama still fails to see a convincing alternative model; if the liberal democratic project doesn't succeed, he considers it a great tragedy, so the book ends with a call to arms to Western audiences to work harder to make their existing system work better.
“I do however um as a normative issue uh still fail to see how there's a really convincing alternative out there so if this project doesn't succeed I think that's actually quite a great U quite a great tragedy so in some sense the end of the book is it's at least as it address Western audiences like this it's a sort of called to Arms we we can't envisage a better system so we really should make work harder to make the one we have work better”
The three institutional elements (state, rule of law, democratic accountability) are actually at war with one another in some profound way, with the U.S. having too much law and too much democratic accountability, while needing to shift the balance back.
“your three elements are actually at war with one another in some profound way... we have too much law and we have actually in certain ways uh too much Democratic accountability uh uh in uh in our society and we need to shift the balance back”
Institutional change can cause things attributed to culture to disappear; Max Weber wrote a book on Daoism and Confucianism claiming Japan was less likely than China to create modern capitalism, but this proved wrong when institutions changed, showing people are lazy attributing institutional/policy results to culture.
“it turns out that you can change institutions and all of a sudden things that people thought were cultural obstacles uh disappear so max vber himself wrote this entire book in which he's got this one great line it's a book on Daoism and Confucianism and he says at one point the only country less likely to create a modern capitalist system less likely than China is Japan and he wrote that book in about 1920 um and so things change and it turns out people you know are kind of lazy and attribute things to culture that actually are the result of Institutions or public policies that are uh subject to change”
Among realistic alternative models to Western liberal democracy, China is the only serious contender because it is growing rapidly and has its act together, whereas alternatives like the Islamic State, Iran, or Ugo Chavez's Venezuela are ridiculous.
“on the first question I would say definitely that of all the Alternatives out there this is the only one that I take seriously as as an alternative who wants to be the Islamic State of the lant you know I mean or Iran or you know Ugo Chavez's Venezuela I mean these are ridiculous but China is a serious Contender because it's growing very rapidly and it's got its act together in many ways”
Fukuyama notes that the idea of political self-rule was never really central in any pre-Imperial notion of statecraft in China.
“that's an idea as far as I can see was never really Central in any at least any po Imperial notion of statecraft in China”