
Peter Leeson on Pirates and the Invisible Hook 05/25/2009
What this covers
Peter Leeson of George Mason University joins Russ Roberts to examine 18th-century pirates as economic actors whose institutional innovations emerge from rational self-interest rather than exceptional character. The core argument is that piracy's illegality—which stripped pirates of legal recourse and conventional financing—forced them to develop sophisticated governance structures: elected captains and quartermasters, written constitutions, checks and balances between offices, and systems of workers' compensation. These were not experiments in democracy or idealism, but profit-maximizing responses to the specific constraints of operating outside law. Leeson contends that pirates were ordinary people whose behavior became distinctive only in context, and that their institutions warrant serious study precisely because they demonstrate order and cooperation arising without government.
The conversation moves through the machinery of pirate self-governance: how written articles made distribution explicit so crews could coordinate against predatory captains; how the quartermaster functioned as a ballast against unchecked authority; how the Jolly Roger signaled an outlaw status that coast guards could not credibly imitate without legal peril; and how workers' compensation—paying specified amounts for loss of limbs—both insured against injury and aligned crew incentives with the enterprise's success. Leeson addresses pirate racial tolerance, conditional mercy to captives, enforcement through positive incentives rather than punishment, and the role of reputation in deterring actual violence. The conversation also examines early Somali pirates to test whether the model holds when governance structures emerge in modern contexts, and closes with implications for understanding modern business organization and principal-agent problems—with the caution that pirate solutions do not translate directly to legitimate firms operating in different economic circumstances.
Leeson argues that 18th-century pirates were rationally self-interested economic actors whose criminality, paradoxically, drove them to develop sophisticated self-governance—constitutional democracy, checks and balances, and social insurance—decades before such systems appeared in legitimate political philosophy, demonstrating the robustness of order without government.
- Pirates' outlaw status removed legal recourse, forcing them to make contracts self-enforcing and to invent democratic checks merchant ships couldn't use
- Pirate institutions (elected captains/quartermasters, written articles, workers' compensation, the Jolly Roger signal) were profit-maximizing responses to their specific economic circumstances
- There was nothing exceptional about pirates as people—their distinctive behavior emerges from rational self-interest in a particular context
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Pirates ran a system of workers' compensation that paid specified amounts in pieces of eight for the loss of particular body parts, with values reflecting each part's value in pirating, which both insured against injury and incentivized crew to give full effort in battle.
“if you have your left leg lopped off or blown off by a cannonball you get a certain number of pieces of eight if it's your right leg it's you know a higher or lesser amount”
The very illegality of piracy was responsible for desirable features of their system: by removing the legal penalty for mutiny, it destroyed the captain's opportunism, and by depriving pirates of external financiers (forcing them to steal ships), it eliminated the principal-agent problem that made merchant ships adopt autocratic captains, allowing pirates to organize as a seagoing workers' co-op.
“the very criminality of pirates is in fact responsible for a desireable... part of their system”
Early Somali pirates were uninteresting from a governance standpoint because their 'six guys in a skiff' in-and-out ransom operations did not form floating societies, but as their population grew and they spent extended time together at land bases, a new pirate society with private law, rules on inter-pirate theft and prisoner treatment, and a mobile court emerged—because the cells are connected yet geographically separated.
“they don't spend very much time together on their ships which means there are no floating societies for governance institutions to emerge on”
Pirate cooperation was sustained by making contracts self-enforcing: because a broken-down criminal organization meant capture and hanging, every member had a powerful shared incentive to maintain cooperation, unlike the betrayal narratives of Hollywood thieves.
“if you are a pirate and you were caught if the criminal organization broke down it wasn't simply that you couldn't pursue profit that way anymore but you were liable to wind up at the hanging at the end of the hangman's noose”
The written pirate constitution made the terms of distribution explicit—such as the captain's exact share—creating common knowledge so the crew could collectively observe and agree when a captain overstepped, coordinating their enforcement against predation by leadership.
“by making those things explicit we common knowledge among the crew members that we can actually all observe and agree upon when in fact the captain is overstepping his bounds”
Pirates regulated drinking, smoking, and gambling not out of morality but because these behaviors generated severe negative externalities on a crowded, highly flammable wooden ship—smoking risked igniting gunpowder, and drinking and gambling could spark conflict among men crammed together for long periods.
“those sorts of behaviors were liable to generate significant negative externalities on pirate ships”
Both the captain and the quartermaster were popularly elected by the crew and could be readily deposed if they overstepped their narrowly circumscribed authority, creating a democratic check on pirate leadership.
“both of these guys were popularly elected by the crew and just as importantly if they went outside their bounds... they could be popularly deposed and were readily deposed as well”
Pirates were a motley multinational group, mostly only semi-literate (capable of signing their name, hence 'making their mark'), with the articles usually written in English because a large proportion of early-18th-century pirates were English; the quartermaster, likened to a Roman Tribune, helped relay the articles to crew members.
“a good percentage of them though we're capable of at least signing their name so they that's what I mean they had basic literacy and even when they couldn't they as they say made their mark which is where the the x marks the spot kind of idea comes from”
The success of the workers' co-op model on pirate ships does not imply legitimate businesses should be organized that way; the correct solution to principal-agent problems differs case by case, and profit-oriented firms resolve them to the point where marginal cost equals marginal benefit using methods suited to their circumstances—Walmart's stock options being one such method to reduce free-riding.
“we also can't conclude from the success of... the workers co-op model on a pirate ship that therefore this is how modern legitimate businesses in general should be organized there are costs and benefits to all sorts of different organizational structures”
The Jolly Roger was an effective signal because flying it was cheap for pirates (already outlaws) but extremely costly for coast guard ships, which would step outside legal bounds and become subject to being hunted and hanged as pirates—so coast guards refrained from using it, preserving the flag's meaning.
“the cost of using flying the Jolly Roger was much higher for Coast Guard ships than it was for pirates”
Pirates overcame the free-rider problem of the reputational benefit of mercy (which otherwise mainly helps the next crew) through captain- and crew-specific reputations and distinctive Jolly Roger designs, allowing them to internalize the benefit; Blackbeard's reputation was so effective that, per the leading historian, he apparently never actually killed anyone.
“the way that Pirates overcame this was through captain and crew specific reputations”
The Jolly Roger functioned as a signaling device to communicate that an attacking ship was an unconstrained outlaw pirate rather than a legally-restricted coast guard vessel, which mattered because pirates—being outlaws—could brutally retaliate against resisting merchant ships while coast guards (and privateers) were legally restrained from doing so.
“the flag was was used as a way to communicate if you were a pirate ship that I am pirate and not another sort of belligerent”
Pirate self-interest generated conditional social benefits including racial tolerance: at a time when black slaves were brutally treated in the legitimate world, pirates in many cases granted them freedom with equal pay and equal suffrage—not from racial enlightenment but because enslaving fellow crew often cost more than it was worth, bolstering the bottom line.
“pirates were basically granting them in many cases their freedom which not only meant equal pay rights but also equal suffrage which is quite striking”
Pirates kept their word and released cooperative captives alive precisely because 'dead men tell no tales' worked against them—they wanted survivors to spread word of how scary pirates were and how well surrender was treated, which made future merchant crews surrender more easily.
“it's exactly because dead men tell no tales that pirates didn't want to do that they wanted people to tell tales about how scary the pirates were”
The quartermaster functioned as a separation of powers and ballast against the captain: the captain had unquestioned authority only in battle, while the quartermaster held most day-to-day power, was democratically elected, was checked by the crew on major decisions, and indirectly competed with the captain for the top office—so both played to ordinary crew members' interests.
“the captain wielded unquestioned authority during times of battle when autocratic decision-making was critically important basically at all other times the quartermaster wielded the lion's share of the power on the ship”
The ultimate check against a tyrannical pirate captain was crew sentiment backed by the credible threat of a violent revolt, which—unlike on a merchant ship—carried no legal penalty since mutiny against a pirate captain was not a punishable crime, whereas a merchant crew's mutiny was punishable by death.
“the threat ultimately of a kind of a violent revolt if need be against a captain I would say at the end of the day was probably a very important check you know number 150 to one on a on a pirate ship”
There is no evidence that pirates were more sadistic, brutal, democratic, or rule-following than ordinary people; they were simply rationally self-interested economic actors, and their distinctive and entertaining behaviors are the result of rational self-interest in their particular context—we should reject 'pirate exceptionalism.'
“we need to get out of our minds this notion of pirate exceptionalism they were not... somehow inherently more sadistic more brutal more democratic more rule-following”
Governance—a system of privately created rules and means of enforcement—can emerge without government; a punishment one voluntarily agreed to ex ante (even violent punishment by a third party like the quartermaster) is governance rather than coercion, distinguishing voluntary self-governance from a non-contractual 'social contract.'
“governance refers to a system of you know privately created rules and means of enforcement... as opposed to the top-down creation of government which I distinguish”
Pirates enforced effort and discouraged shirking through positive incentives—bonus shares of booty for being first to spot a prize or for exceptional valor in battle—rather than through legal threats like court-martial, since they lacked formal legal institutions.
“they primarily incentivized crew members to kind of give their full effort by giving them bonuses especially if you were the first to spot a potential prize”
Pirates wanted to avoid violent battles because resistance damaged their stolen ship, killed crew, and could destroy or sink the prize and its cargo—all of which hurt their bottom line—so nearly everything pirates did was directed at getting merchant ships to surrender peaceably.
“a very important part of the cost of piracy was something that clearly affected their profitability was whether or not the merchant ship resisted them”
Pirate ships were significantly more cooperative and orderly than their popular depiction, and this order was grounded in a system of early constitutional democracy with elected officers and a written code that functioned to keep the criminal enterprise together.
“the idea of pirates as being disorderly as he referred to is in fact completely wrong pirate ships it seems were incredibly cooperative and orderly”
Pirates deserve qualified admiration because, while all thieves should be condemned, some give the world something back—pirates demonstrated the effectiveness of self-governance and experimented with checks and balances, separated powers, and constitutional democracy more than half a century before Madison and before the English Bill of Rights, and their doing so as violent outlaws shows the robustness of these forms of social organization.
“they are experimenting with a system of checks and balances separated powers and so on more than half a century before Madison puts pen to paper”
The pirate constitution system likely evolved from the buccaneers (c.1630–1690), who were intermediate between privateers and pure pirates and had a less detailed, less thoroughly democratic 'chase party' system, which itself traces back to privateering ships' articles—showing carryover of Seaborne rules of order from legitimate society.
“it seems to derive most directly from pure pirates predecessors which are actually the Buccaneers the Buccaneers operated from about 1630 until about 1690”
Around 1721 the British government passed a law subjecting armed merchant crews to prison and wage forfeiture if they failed to defend against pirate attack, which is evidence both that merchant ships were overwhelmingly surrendering and that the pirates' Jolly Roger strategy was highly effective.
“the British government created a passed a new law that said if you're a merchant ship and you're armed and you do not attempt to defend against the pirate attack then in fact you are subject to prison time and wage forfeiture”
A great pirate leader could extract some rents from his crew because crew members would willingly sacrifice autonomy or accept a lower expected return to be allied with a superior strategist who raised their chances of success—illustrated by Blackbeard shooting a crew member in the kneecaps to remind everyone what he was capable of.
“if you're a great leader you can extract some rents from your crew you know Bill Belichick can get his crew to work harder for him then say another captain could”
Because pirates carried weapons freely while merchant sailors' arms were often locked away, the non-monopoly on force among the crew acted as an important check on the captain's tyranny—analogous to the Second Amendment's logic that distributed force checks sovereign power.
“the non monopoly on force the competitive role of force on the part of the people is an important check on the tyranny of the sovereign”
The harder pirate promise to keep was the threat to brutalize resisters (costly to carry out) rather than the promise of mercy to those who surrender (which is not costly); for the average money-motivated pirate, sparing peaceful captives was the natural, low-cost choice.
“the tough promise to keep perhaps counter-intuitively is actually the one where I follow through on brutalizing you the one where I don't brutalize you... is not costly”
Knowledge of pirate practices comes mainly from two books—Exquemelin's buccaneer chronicle and Captain Charles Johnson's 1724/1728 General History of the Pyrates—corroborated by Colonial Office archival papers, trial records, and early-18th-century newspapers, with pirate constitutions appearing nearly verbatim in both Johnson and newspaper accounts, making the relied-upon portions well corroborated.
“the parts that I rely on in in my book are well corroborated by these other records in the Colonial Office papers”
Modern Somali pirates behave as rational economic actors: of 815 hostages taken in a recent year, none were intentionally killed (four died apparently accidentally) and only two were injured—under half of 1%—not from niceness but because dead or injured prisoners do not fetch a ransom, so it is better to be captured by a greedy pirate than one who doesn't care about money.
“815 it turns out last year taken by the Somali pirates pretty much none of them are ever injured or killed four have died it appears accidentally”
Shirking on a pirate ship is subtler than on a barge: where the barge task is straightforward (pull hard, constant maximum effort), pirate work requires wise rather than unrelenting effort, so crews wanted a thoughtful captain rather than one simply driving everyone forward under the lash.
“in the pirate case unrelenting effort is not always the best policy you need wise effort”
The added cost of writing down pirate rules was very small because, by the 1720s, anyone captured and suspected as a pirate was almost certain to be hanged regardless of whether the articles existed in writing.
“by the time in the 1720s when you really have a very high probability of being captured as a pirate you pretty much going to be hanged no matter what it doesn't matter whether the rules are written down”
Pirate articles often included a clause requiring signatories to remain part of the crew until a certain sum had been earned, to prevent members from quitting early once they had made enough money or decided piracy wasn't for them.
“there was a clause that often said that asked the signee... to promise to remain part of the crew until a certain sum had been made”
Pirates spent an inordinate amount of time drinking, and crews likely formed in taverns or brothels on New Providence island because there was little else in commerce in those days.
“since pirates we know spent an inordinate amount of time drinking it was either at a tavern or a brothel”
Our popular image of pirates is schizophrenic—we hold both the idea of disorderly criminal rogues and the idea of a 'pirate's code.'
“our views of Pirates are somewhat schizophrenic because well we have this notion of disorderly pirate communities we also in pop culture have this idea of a pirate's code”