What this covers

Cass Sunstein joins Russ Roberts to discuss mechanisms for aggregating dispersed knowledge—the central problem of decision-making when information is scattered across many minds. Sunstein draws on his book Infotopia to argue that four approaches exist: statistical averaging of independent judgments, deliberation among groups, prediction markets, and internet-based collaboration. The heart of his case is comparative: prediction markets and price-like systems, modeled on Hayek's 1945 insight about how prices aggregate dispersed information, systematically outperform deliberation, which suffers from structural flaws that deliberating groups reliably cannot escape.

The conversation traces these flaws with precision. Deliberating groups suppress uniquely-held information—what Sunstein calls "hidden profiles"—while amplifying existing biases rather than merely propagating them, a pattern the Condorcet Jury Theorem explains: groups work only when members are individually better than random; systematic bias makes larger groups worse, not better. Real judicial voting data show group polarization in action: Democratic judges vote more liberally on all-Democratic panels than when a Republican is present, and vice versa. Yet Sunstein argues the fix is not to abandon deliberation but to restructure it—having members state views privately before discussion. Prediction markets, by contrast, show no empirical vulnerability to these failures; even low-stakes virtual markets perform as well as real-money ones, suggesting reputation and self-conception drive accuracy without large financial incentives. Roberts presses back on several fronts: whether Sunstein has misread Hayek, whether judicial polarization might reflect strategic calculation rather than bias, and whether parlor-trick crowd wisdom tests (ox weight, jellybean jars) prove much about high-stakes judgment questions where even hindsight cannot settle the answer.

Sharpest takeaway

Sunstein argues that dispersed knowledge can be aggregated through four mechanisms (statistical averages, deliberation, prediction markets, and internet collaboration), and that prediction markets and Hayekian price-like systems often outperform deliberation, which is systematically vulnerable to polarization, error amplification, and the suppression of uniquely-held information.

  • The Condorcet Jury Theorem explains why averaging large groups works when members are better than random, and fails when there is systematic bias
  • Deliberation reliably produces group polarization, error amplification, and hidden profiles where unique information is suppressed
  • Prediction markets aggregate dispersed information Hayekian-style and have a strong empirical track record (e.g., Google's prices acting as probabilities)

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0.86

Deliberating groups tend to emphasize information that everyone already shares while neglecting uniquely-held information that only one member possesses, producing 'hidden profiles' where crucial private knowledge is downplayed and the group marches in the direction indicated by common knowledge.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Cass Sunstein

“groups emphasize shared information at the expense of uniquely held information”

0.86

The Condorcet Jury Theorem shows that if each member of a group is more likely than not to get the right answer, the probability that the majority gets it right approaches 100% as group size grows; but if the group suffers a systematic bias making them more likely wrong than right, that probability falls to 0% as the group grows.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Cass Sunstein

“if you have a group of people each of whom is more likely to get the right answer than the wrong answer... the likelihood that the majority will get a right approach as a hundred percent as the size of the group expands”

0.86

Deliberating groups often amplify cognitive errors rather than just propagate them—groups can be worse victims of biases like the availability heuristic than individuals—so 'garbage in' leads to even more 'garbage out.'

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Cass Sunstein

“errors with respect to human cognition are frequently not just propagated in the deliberating group and actually amplified”

0.86

The best way to structure a deliberating group is to have members state their views anonymously and privately before deliberation, so the deliberative process cannot strip members of the independent conclusions they held beforehand.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Cass Sunstein

“the best way for a deliberating group to go is for in general is for there to be anonymous private statements of view first before the deliberative process can deprive group members of conclusions that people hold”

0.86

Deliberation works well on 'Eureka' problems where, once the answer is announced, everyone immediately recognizes it as correct—which is why large groups can solve crossword puzzles better than small groups.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Cass Sunstein

“where there's a Eureka problem when once the answer is announced everyone says Eureka their deliberation succeeds which is why large groups can solve crossword puzzles better than small groups”

0.81

Federal judicial voting demonstrates group polarization with real (non-experimental) data: Democratic appointees vote much more liberally on all-Democratic three-judge panels than when a Republican is present, and Republicans likewise vote far more conservatively on all-Republican panels, with each becoming more moderate when an opposing appointee is present.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Cass Sunstein

“Democratic appointees to the federal Brandt bench are much more liberal when they're sitting on three-judge panel is just with Democratic appointees than they are with one republican there”

0.79

The important point is the mechanism, not the example: when a large group of people are mostly more likely than not to get it right, statistical aggregation outperforms picking the single expert you trust most, which is why statistical collections of experts typically outperform individual experts in forecasting business and economic outcomes.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Cass Sunstein

“it's mecca's mechanisms that's important not the example”

0.79

After deliberation, people typically end up holding a more extreme version of what they thought before the discussion began (group polarization), and this is close to an iron law of social interactions, demonstrated in controlled experiments such as the Colorado study where Boulder liberals became more pro-affirmative-action and Colorado Springs conservatives more anti.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Cass Sunstein

“people end up after deliberation typically thinking a more extreme version of what they thought before they started to talk”

0.79

The best-functioning companies, boards, and investment clubs deliberately cultivate dissent and disagreement and take institutional steps to counteract group polarization, demonstrating that deliberation can be structured to work better rather than being abandoned.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Cass Sunstein

“the best functioning companies in the US often have boards of deliberate errs that are contentious full of dissent they take steps to avoid the Group polarization phenomenon they cultivate disagreement”

0.78

Sunstein has placed Hayek into a 'Samuelsonian Arrow-Debreu box' that Hayek explicitly rejected: Hayek never claimed prices were right or that a correct price was knowable; rather he was concerned with how society solves the problem of order and responds to dispersed change in supply and demand while allowing people to keep making decisions.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“Hayek never claimed that prices were right he never claimed that you need to get the right price or that it's or that it's measurable... what Hayek I think was interested in was was solving the problem of order and this dispersion of information in the face of social change”

0.76

The CIA's Intellipedia, based on Wikipedia software, attempts to capture the Hayekian process of aggregating dispersed intelligence information without monetary incentives, and works as long as knowledgeable people contribute their bits of information and the system is protected from vandals.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Cass Sunstein

“the CIA now has something called in talat idea which is based on Wikipedia software... Intel appear really is Wikipedia for intelligence”

0.75

Crowd wisdom fails when there is a systematic bias—for example, when people systematically underestimate the number of times the Supreme Court invalidated laws because salient examples are few, or systematically overestimate the share of the workforce earning minimum wage.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Cass Sunstein

“they actually were way off in terms of the number of times with Supreme Court had invalidated state or federal law there was a systematic bias in favor of small numbers on that because the salient examples are few”

0.75

When you ask a large group to estimate an objective quantity (like the weight of an ox or a horse, or beans in a jar), the statistical average of their independent judgments is often uncannily accurate and frequently better than any individual member, even an expert.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Cass Sunstein

“if you get a bunch of people together and you ask them what they think the weight of courses or how many beans are in a jar... typically as if by magic the statistical average will get it right”

0.74

When a small minority does the bulk of the work in a collaborative aggregation system (as with Wikipedia or the Oxford English Dictionary's volunteer contributors), the system still works because the larger 'tail' of participants keeps an eye on it and corrects egregious errors.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“if a small group is doing an enormous amount of the work the tale the rest of us of that dog are keeping an eye on it so if there's there's an egregious error we can we can fix it”

0.73

A Republican appointee sitting with two Democratic appointees votes about as liberally as a Democratic appointee sitting with two Republicans, making the two essentially indistinguishable—a striking testimony to the power of social influence over ideology.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Cass Sunstein

“Republicans show about the same percentage of liberal voting when they're sitting with two Democrats as Democrats do when they're sitting with two Republicans they they are these people are indistinguishable”

0.73

Sunstein's behavioral critique of Hayek is that the same problems that make deliberation go wrong can make the price system go wrong—producing fads, fashions, and mispricing for non-trivial periods (as Shiller's 'Irrational Exuberance' argues)—but markets have correctives that make such errors less enduring, and prediction markets specifically show no empirical evidence of such failures.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Cass Sunstein

“the same sorts of problems that can make deliberation go wrong can make the price system go wrong though there's a there correctives that make the errors in the price system less robust”

0.73

There is strikingly little difference in predictive power between high-incentive real-money prediction markets and low-incentive 'virtual' markets, suggesting that reputation, honor, and self-conception motivate participants to get it right even without large financial stakes.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Cass Sunstein

“there's been done finds a strikingly little difference in terms of the predictive power of the strong economic incentives and those in the predictive power of the virtual markets”

0.73

The judicial polarization findings might be partly explained by strategic incentives: on a unanimous-party panel the outcome is known, so there is little cost to voting with colleagues, whereas on a mixed panel where the outcome is uncertain a judge has incentive to think harder about what the law actually requires.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“when you're on an all democratic or an all Republican panel of judges the you know how the outcome is going to turn out so you may as well join and there's no real cost to to voting along the lines of your colleagues”

0.73

There is no evidence of prediction markets seriously failing in domains where dispersed information exists; attempts to inflate prices for candidates like Pat Buchanan and Hillary Clinton on the Iowa Electronic Markets failed because traders saw the inflation and profitably bet against it, straightening prices out.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Cass Sunstein

“there have been efforts to inflate pat buchanan and hillary clinton's on the Iowa the Iowa electronic markets... but they failed because the traders look this these are getting inflated and we can win a lot of money by by betting against”

0.73

Knowledge is fundamentally dispersed across many people and even within individual minds, and the central problem of decision-making is how to aggregate that knowledge across people and across time.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“knowledge is dispersed it's spread out among many people inside our own individual minds and the book deals with the question of how can we aggregate that knowledge across people and sometimes across time”

0.73

Hayek's 1945 article 'The Use of Knowledge in Society' established that information is profoundly dispersed—each person holds a bit of it—and that the price system is a marvel because it aggregates this dispersed information into a single signal, an insight whose implications have yet to be adequately exploited.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Cass Sunstein

“information is really dispersed that each of us has a bit of information... the price system is a marvel in high X words because it can aggregate the information in one place it provides a signal of our beliefs”

0.68

Crowd-wisdom parlor examples (ox weight, jellybeans) are problematic test cases because they involve unimportant questions and offer no incentive to get it right, whereas the harder, high-stakes questions are matters of judgment where the answer is difficult to know even after the fact.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“I've always been a little bit skeptical the wisdom of crowds in those settings where people don't have any incentive to get it right and certainly have often have biases”

0.68

Wikipedia achieves surprising accuracy—comparable to Encyclopedia Britannica in a contested study—because it aggregates dispersed information and its contributors outnumber and outwork the vandals.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Cass Sunstein

“the Wikipedia and the Encyclopedia Britannica were about the same and them in terms of their errors”

0.68

Open source software succeeds by exposing source code so a culture of hackers can improve it, but it will not outperform proprietary software in all domains because the economic incentive of ownership can be a real spur; its success surprises economists who underestimated non-monetary incentives like love, passion, and fascination.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Cass Sunstein

“whether in the end open source software will outperform proprietary software in all domains is doubtful because the economic incentive of ownership can be a real spur”

0.66

Prediction markets improve on surveys by giving participants an incentive to enter only when they have confidence in their judgment, and by allowing prices to dynamically self-correct over time; at Google, prediction-market prices function as accurate probabilities (events priced at 80% occur about 80% of the time).

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Cass Sunstein

“if the price suggests that something is 80 percent likely to come true it actually does come true 80 percent of the time that's been Google's track record”

0.53

A survey or prediction market inside the CIA on whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction would likely have produced a less confident answer than the official government position, because there was substantial dispersed information within the agency about the difficulty of that question.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Cass Sunstein

“there's every reason to believe that the outcome would be less confident than the government was officially just because there was pretty good disbursed information in the CIA about the difficulty of that question”

0.53

Government should make much greater use of prediction markets—for example the EPA on climate change and environmental problems, and the FCC on the effects of deregulating cross-ownership rules on program content—because they are the most successful mechanism for compiling dispersed information.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Cass Sunstein

“I think the EPA should be using prediction markets in terms of thinking about climate change and other environmental problems”

0.52

Gambling laws and securities laws are the first and most serious obstacles to prediction markets flourishing: companies fear that an internal market signaling trouble would trigger disclosure obligations, and substantial deregulation is needed to allow beneficial experiments.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Cass Sunstein

“if you have an internal market that suggests things aren't going so great you probably have to disclose that or at least your lawyers will tell you might have to disclose that”

0.40

Diversity in broadcast programming is a reflection of consumer demand rather than of who owns the media, because owners (even white Republicans) have a lot to gain from serving an audience such as a Hispanic one, so they will locate and serve that audience.

causalcontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“what the diversity on the atmosphere is a reflection of consumer demand and not of who happens to own it”

0.36

The Supreme Court's diversity (nine justices) and the strength of will of its members serve as a safeguard against the polarization, hidden-profile, and cascade problems that afflict other government agencies and businesses.

factualcontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Cass Sunstein

“there are nine of them and they're there there's a fair bit of diversity there and so the notion that they're going to Stampede in one direction or another that's not so likely”

0.31

The Supreme Court confirmation process, due to its inherently combative nature, has ruled out many of the most creative and interesting legal thinkers on both left and right who would enhance intellectual diversity on the court.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“the confirmation process is ruled out the inherent combative nature of it has ruled out a lot of the more interesting people on the left and the right who I think would enhance that diversity a great deal”

0.12

Welcome to EconTalk and details about the website and email address.

factual· Russ Roberts

“welcome to econ talk part of the library of economics and liberty”