
Richard Epstein on Property Rights, Zoning and Kelo 9/17/2007
What this covers
This is a single-speaker conversation in which Richard Epstein walks through how American land-use law handles zoning, landmark preservation, and eminent domain. The legal backbone is the rule that a regulatory taking requires compensation only when a restriction wipes out all economically viable use, as in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. Short of that, diminution in value is treated like a competitive loss. Epstein calls this equating of regulation with competition a mistake, since people fear one and welcome the other. He also traces the origin of the modern approach to Penn Central and William Brennan, where a comprehensive city plan justified blocking a tower over Grand Central.
The middle of the discussion is about incentives. Epstein describes a regulatory trapdoor equilibrium: because the last increment of lost value is the costly one, regulators stop near a 90 percent loss, which he treats as a kind of game of chicken in litigation. He ties NIMBY resistance and anti-sprawl rules to a political externality of nonresident exclusion, since only residents vote. He also takes up the boundary-line externality problem, the difficulty of spot zoning doctrine, and the point that landmark statutes bar demolition without requiring upkeep. He casts the early twentieth-century land-use reforms as part of the broader progressive movement.
The prescriptive part is the most contested. Epstein would make diminution presumptively compensable, with exceptions for a real common-law nuisance or traffic problems, and he contrasts that with the private covenants a single owner can impose reciprocally on a large parcel. On Kelo, he argues that zoning makes assembly impossible without city help, so condemnation becomes the developer's only route, and that John Paul Stevens never explained what private use would be improper. He also argues that privatizing public land could settle conflicts, such as snowmobiles versus wilderness, through trade.
Epstein argues that US land-use law has eroded property rights because zoning and regulatory restrictions are imposed without compensation, and that the fix is to compensate diminution in value and return to a common-law system that lets developers assemble land.
- Zoning-driven value losses can reach 80 to 90 percent of land value without compensation because courts apply only a total-wipeout test
- Uncompensated restrictions let regulators gain political benefits cheaply, which reduces housing supply and fuels NIMBY opposition
- Kelo shows that once zoning blocks assembly, only condemnation lets developers build, so the fix is presumptive compensation and a common-law right to assemble
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Private covenants running with the land, imposed reciprocally by a single owner of a large parcel, are a powerful way to give notice and control soft externalities, and the owner's willingness to impose them and the resulting price adjustments reveal that the restrictions benefit everyone on net.
“if the restrictions were on net harmful the owner of the property when he sold it off would get less from the sales than he would”
Requiring compensation for restrictions that do not implicate nuisance would eliminate low-density gaming, because those imposing an 80 percent restriction on someone else's land would gain only about 10 percent themselves and would not indulge if they had to pay for it.
“the people who are willing to impose a eighty percent restriction on the value of somebody else's land will probably gain ten percent from their effort”
Government-owned property generates pitched political battles because public land has multiple incompatible uses, such as snowmobiles versus wilderness, and without buying and selling among groups these trade-offs cannot be negotiated, so privatization can yield bargains that match uses to values.
“where the government owns the property these trade-offs become pitched battles between those groups that want snowmobiles in the park”
Penn Central established that a land-use restriction is not a taking of air rights when it is part of a comprehensive city plan, giving administrators wide discretion; Epstein argues this expanded discretion means aggressive plans can ignore the broad gains of other owners.
“you're simply regulating a mayor of land use and it's not a spot zoning because it's a comprehensive city plan”
Under the prevailing rule, unless a regulation wipes out all economically viable use of property, a phrase open to much interpretation, diminution in value is treated as a competitive loss for which no compensation is required.
“unless you put wipe out all economically viable use of property a phrase which is subject to much interpretation the rule is the diminution in value is treated as though it's a competitive loss”
Landmark preservation statutes prevent owners from demolishing or changing buildings but do not require maintenance, so buildings without viable economic use deteriorate.
“one of the real difficulties with landmark preservation statues is they prevent somebody from ripping things down and from changing it but they don't require them to maintain it”
Under current doctrine, a reduction in land value from regulation is treated like a competitive loss requiring no compensation unless all economically viable use is wiped out. The Supreme Court in effect treats regulation and competition as the same for legal purposes, though they have very different economic consequences.
“the great achievement of the United States Supreme Court is to treat regulation and competition as though they are the same for legal purposes”
Anti-sprawl regulations can raise the property values of current residents at the expense of potential residents from outside the city, because the people voting for council members are residents, while nonresidents who would be affected have no vote.
“the other folks who weren't voting because they don't live there don't get us a welcome stranger”
When a regulation takes value without reaching a common-law nuisance, the compensation should be the full value of the diminution, whereas restrictions that stop a truly noxious use, such as a coke factory in a residential district, can rightly be imposed without compensation.
“I think the compensation should be the full value of the D munition”
Because zoning makes large assembly impossible unless the city is on the developer's side, city support lets developers bulldoze anyone, and the better regime is the old common-law system in which a developer can buy many plots and no one in town can block them without showing traffic or nuisance harms.
“what you want to do is to have a regime which is more like the old common law regime in which if a developer goes in and buys a bunch of plot of land everybody in town can't block them”
Epstein's proposed reform is to make diminution in value presumptively compensable, with exceptions only for preventing a bona fide common-law nuisance or controlling a traffic problem, and this rule would need to apply to all land use restrictions, not just formal condemnation orders.
“I would change the rule on compensation with respect to land use restrictions and say that Aldi munitions and value are presumptively compensable”
Even conservative judges regard zoning as a political issue and assume any alternative system would be messier; Epstein thinks this is wrong because the value lost to regulation is huge while the values gained are probably an order of magnitude smaller.
“the value is lost through regulation are just huge the values that are gained through regulation are probably an order of magnitude smaller”
The Penn Central case began a modern regime in which the Supreme Court, through Justice Brennan, held that a restriction preventing a tower above Grand Central Station was mere land-use regulation, not a taking of air rights, because it was part of a comprehensive city plan.
“all of this started in its modern form with the so called case involving Penn Central”
The Supreme Court in Kelo was willing to accept any project labeled comprehensive planning, and Justice Stevens could never articulate what counts as private use inappropriate for the eminent domain power.
“justice Stevens who allowed all this to happen could never tell you what counted is a private useful which the eminent domain power would be inappropriate”
Spot zoning doctrine is very hard to administer because it cuts both ways: an owner seeking a commercial exception gains an advantage that courts strike down, but when neighbors single out one owner to block any building, the doctrine is far harder to apply because the relevant circle is infinitely variable.
“the doctrine itself is very difficult to administer but there is at least within the zoning tradition a doctrine”
Markets account for non-territorial preferences, but political elections are restricted to local voters, and this mismatch is the origin of the NIMBY problem.
“markets always taken to account non-territorial preferences political elections are essentially restricted to the local voters so that's the origin of the NIMBY problem”
Zoning designed to eliminate one set of landowner externalities creates new boundary-line externalities, such as zoning that places industry next to a neighboring community so that its harm falls on people there, who then reciprocate.
“you can't get rid of one set of externalities without creating enough and so a lot of times”
The progressive movement that pushed industrial policy, unionization, and minimum wages also pushed land-use reforms in the first third of the 20th century, reflecting a shared belief that any private market shows market failure.
“the same progressive tradition which introduced all of the reforms in labor markets became very active in the land use market at exactly the same time”
Local resistance is greater to displacing current residents than to keeping outsiders out, so local governments are predictably more cautious about condemnation than about zoning, which Epstein regards as a welcome development.
“there is always a greater local resistance to knocking people out than there is to keeping people who are not in from coming in”
Freedom to use land as one sees fit is consistent with the rule of law so long as owners respect restrictions protecting neighbors from harm, but current land-use practice gives public officials immense discretion so that a permit can raise a parcel's value from $100 to $1 million while a denial leaves it unchanged.
“if I get a permit to build on my land its value goes from a hundred to a million dollars and if you don't get a permit on yours it stays exactly where it was”
Restraint from nuisance-like activity is mutually beneficial: if both sides refrain from polluting or disrupting one another, each gains more freedom than he loses, producing a giant global trade in which everyone surrenders the right to pollute in exchange for the right to use property free of pollution.
“each will gain in freedom more than he loses in the actions that he's allowed to take and so what happens is a kind of a giant global trade”
Under current doctrine, a regulator can wipe out 80 percent of a $100,000 parcel's value for nothing, but the last 10 percent (from 90 percent down to 100 percent loss) costs $90,000 in compensation, so the political equilibrium stops near 90 percent loss.
“you could wipe out $80,000 worth of land use values for nothing”
Because the Supreme Court has never clarified how far regulators can go before a de facto wipeout, takings litigation becomes a game of chicken in which each increment of regulatory burden carries more risk, producing a trapdoor effect in which cutting value to roughly 10 percent of its prior level is treated as safe but the final increment is very costly.
“there's a funny kind of trapdoor effect you could wipe out $80,000 worth of land use values for nothing”
The Supreme Court treats regulation and competition as though they are the same for legal purposes, on the silly assumption that they have essentially the same global economic consequences, even though people fear regulation while loving competition.
“the great achievement of the United States Supreme Court is to treat regulation and competition as though they are the same for legal purposes”
Many great cities with hodgepodge mixed uses that work well together could not be developed under today's zoning restrictions.
“many of our great cities which have hodgepodge uses which work very well together could never develop today”
Low-density residents keep amenities by restricting development, and even when property values rise they do not sell and do not want higher taxes, so they push low-density zoning onto undeveloped land, while developers representing people who want to leave crowded neighborhoods cannot get in.
“lots of people who live in a community like the low-density it puts basically kind of amenities into their own hands”
Regulation is in enormous demand when it can be imposed at zero price, so pricing it through compensation would leave only the important forms of regulation, raising land values and increasing population mobility and development.
“there is an enormous demand for regulars a regulation if it could be acquired at zero prices and is a very short supply”
The Takings Clause's public use requirement historically allowed takings for holdout problems, such as a landowner blocking a railroad's right of way, but Kelo shows how zoning prevents assembly, so developers must go to the city to condemn property.
“the early cases always allow the government to take land when there was a real standoff”
US land-use policy is organized at the constitutional level by New Deal precepts, and while the retreat from unionization and skepticism of minimum wages have made some headway, zoning remains strong because its externalities are larger and the price of an ideal regime is higher there than elsewhere.
“the zoning stuff continues on fairly strong because in fact the externalities are larger and the price for the ideal regime is higher”
Backlash against Kelo has been more important than the decision itself, because displacing existing community members raises the political cost, and local governments have become more cautious than they were before Kelo.
“I think the backlash is more important than the decision because now as a political matter the price of knocking people out of their owns homes is higher”
The current regime is a trap: zoning makes large projects impossible without city support, and once the city is on your side it can bulldoze anyone, so the system forces owners either to sell or be barred from selling.
“the zoning laws make it impossible unless you've got the city on your side to do anything which is large and ambitious”
In Kelo, the land taken was largely vacant farmland in some cases, but the houses taken, about 13 to 15 modest homes on 90 acres, were demolished to build a development that never materialized, leaving the land empty.
“they had 90 acres of land that they could use whatever purpose they wanted and somehow rather they decided they'd rather have 92 acres”
In Kelo, developers went to the city to buy the blocking owners out and the state condemned the property for them, because under strict zoning no one would fight the system without the city on its side.
“the only way ever going to get anything done is for the state to condemn the property to give the developer a clean bill of health”
After Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council held that barring all building on land is a taking, local zoning boards responded by replacing outright bans with roadblocks, delays, and value-reducing restrictions, leaving some residual value to claim they had met their constitutional duty.
“immediately every local zoning board including the one in South Carolina said you know this is just not the way in which to do these things”
Eminent domain can rightly be used to take a destructive private use, such as a Frank Lloyd Wright house being burned, but the government is a poor caretaker, and landmark statutes block demolition without requiring maintenance, so buildings deteriorate.
“one of the real difficulties with landmark preservation statues is they prevent somebody from ripping things down and from changing it but they don't require them to maintain it”
In many zoning cases, the reduction in land value attributable to zoning for improper purposes, without compensation, runs as much as 80 to 90 percent of the value of the land.
“many of these cases the reduction in land value attributable to zoning for what I would regard to be improper purposes without compensation runs as much as eighty to ninety percent”
Shifting from a participatory system where neighbors hold a veto over projects to one where owners may build as of right unless condemned would produce much more development, and traffic could then be regulated directly.
“clearly if you can change the process from one a participatory democracy where the neighbors have a veto right”
Land-use restrictions alter the tax and school-funding base of communities, so loosening them would disrupt many decisions about education and local services, making local government a hard nut to crack and producing balkanization without judicial action.
“it alters the base with respect to a whole variety of decisions having to do with education schools and other kinds of things”
Many suburban Republicans who favor restrictions resist easing land-use rules because changing the land-use base affects education, schools, and other local fiscal matters, making the overall local government system extremely hard to dismantle.
“many republican types are proprietors of servants suburban communities but they don't want to relax the restrictions”
Zoning persists more strongly than other forms of New Deal-era economic regulation because the externalities involved are larger and the price of an ideal regime is higher, and local interests resist moving to avoid regulation.
“the zoning stuff continues on fairly strong because in fact the externalities are larger”
Private voluntary preservation easements tend to outperform government landmark commissions, which Epstein says are rigid and dogmatic and can block building permits unless developers comply with their opinions.
“there are many private organizations that try to get voluntary preservation easements who do a lot better job”
Where land is already built on or has many separate owners, private covenants cannot be assembled, so restrictions must be imposed through government regulation, and that shift is where the trouble begins.
“when you have parts of land that are already built upon or parts of lands which don't have common owners it's much more difficult to impose that kind of a building scheme”
Some land regulations, such as rules against building fines that jut over busy sidewalks, benefit all owners, but many land regulations are adopted for anti-competitive purposes, such as a town zoning a rival's land residential to block a competing supermarket.
“I've got my supermarket on the west side of the road you want to build one on the east side of the roads”
Courts in urban settings have been largely unaware of the anti-competitive impulse behind land use regulation, while in rural areas regulation takes the form of habitat and wetland protection, and governments tend to regulate rather than buy an easement to use land in particular ways.
“instead of buying the land or an easement to use the land in particular ways the tendency is to always to regulate”
Courts are tired of getting injected into zoning disputes, so they demand a really blatant abuse before intervening, and otherwise let the zoning plan govern, making individual landowners nearly unable to overturn a zoning decision once the board acts consistent with a plan.
“show me a really blatant abuse or otherwise just don't bother me at all”
Measured against the nuisance-law baseline of mutual restraint, the freedom to use land has declined enormously, because modern law treats nuisance limits as a floor and then layers additional restrictions on top of it.
“there's been an enormous decline in the level of freedom of land because the nuisance law is regarded only as the baseline of limitations”
The United States lacks a true rule of law for land use; instead it has arbitrary and capricious permit decisions with little recourse in the courts.
“with respect to use rights we don't have a rule of law I think we have a rule of arbitrary and capricious behavior for which there's very little recourse in the courts”
New York City's high apartment prices reflect the inability to expand supply: permit requirements and environmental statements add to zoning limits, so a city of eight million adds housing for only about 25,000 people a year.
“in a city of eight million people you may put up you know enough new housing for twenty five thousand people a year”
Zoning is a fiercely local activity, unlike wetlands controls that can be set at state or national level, and the spot zoning doctrine holds that zoning a small parcel inconsistently with its neighbors is suspect.
“if you take a small part of land and zone is in a way which is inconsistent with everything to its neighbors that zoning is suspect”
Land differs from other goods because neighbors cannot be escaped, since you can move away from your neighbors but your land cannot move, so land problems and adjacency conflicts are inherited by whoever buys or takes the property.
“land means that your neighbors and whereas you can move away from your neighbor your land cannot and so the problems will be inherited”
Some zoning enhances property value, and other land restrictions such as offsite parking requirements, road widening, and stop signs for large apartment buildings on narrow streets are legitimate responses to real traffic problems.
“some of them actually enhanced value”
Community hearings on proposed high-rises routinely draw opposition from many residents, who forget that their own neighborhoods were built under far less restrictive regimes and that they survived without today's regulations.
“they forget the fact that they managed to survive in an environment where these regulations were not in place”
The Constitution's Takings Clause says private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, and the central question is what counts as public use; Kelo turned on that ambiguity.
“nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation that's all it says”
Freedom to use one's property is not unlimited license; no serious defender of laissez-faire believes property owners have no obligations, and the chief obligation is not to use land as a means of aggression against neighbors.
“there is a constant confusion of course between freedom and license”
Zoning is freely permitted in most US states, and the variation across states in tolerance for these restrictions is surprisingly small.
“the variation across States is I would say surprisingly small in terms of the willingness to tolerate these kinds of restrictions”
The land-value cost of zoning depends on geography: in flat places like Fresno or downtown Chicago zoning is usually rational, but in areas with natural amenities, environmental zoning can produce extensive wipeouts of land value.
“in other areas the environmental stuff is much more valuable and so you'll see a lot of pressures”
Anti-competitive zoning has one partial saving grace: the party being restricted has a strong incentive to fight back, though the back-and-forth with the city council is wasteful.
“at least there's a party on the other side who has an incentive to fight back”
Private owners routinely mix uses, for example leasing forest land for recreation until trees are harvested, or allowing drilling under conservation land in exchange for a royalty, showing that compatible uses can be bargained out in private hands in ways political processes cannot manage.
“private landowners do this all the time you're building a forest in order to harvest trees”
Zoning is least costly in communities that welcome developers and want to increase their tax base, but in major cities like New York and San Francisco expensive zoning regulations block housing and business markets, making it costly to convert a single apartment for three people instead of two.
“you take really important cities like New York and San Francisco and so forth and you will find very expensive zoning regulations which completely royal housing and business markets”
Wealthy owners exploit restrictive zoning by assembling several plots and building on them at very low density to keep property values high and yield high tax revenue relative to use, as in an example of Steven Spielberg doing this at Lake Tahoe.
“Steven Spielberg or somebody who's exceptionally ritual um amalgam made several plots of land and build on it so that they get very low densities”
Aesthetic externalities from new buildings are hard to evaluate because some people consider towers negative, while others find a tastefully done tower on an old building beautiful; the Soldier Field redevelopment in Chicago was an economic giveaway that became a public eyesore.
“when you put the Boleyn Soldier Field in Chicago was a public piece of property”
Government agencies such as the Forest Service can override concerns about cultural values, such as Native American tribal interests, when they decide to build roads, and existing bureaucracies and overrides make land use highly uncertain.
“the Forest Service will knock down anything if it wants to build the road and it doesn't have to pay much attention”
Land-use law has become so uncertain because environmental, endangered-species, and wetlands overrides from bureaucracies and aggressive constituencies make political agreement impossible, so Epstein sees little hope for massive improvement.
“I don't put much hope for the massive improvement in this particular area”
Virtually all zoning cases that reach litigation today have nothing to do with nuisance and instead concern lofty environmental goals or anti-competitive restrictive zoning.
“virtually all the zoning cases that make it through the system into litigation have nothing whatsoever to do with nuisances today”
Epstein worked with the Landmark Preservation Council of Illinois, a private organization, to try to derail a city Soldier Field scheme, but the effort got nowhere in court.
“I actually worked for the landmark Preservation Council of Illinois a private organization in an effort to derail the effort of the city”
If the United States could get only four things right, the priorities would be free trade and the international market, a sensible flat tax, a coherent market-based employment law, and a sensible set of land-use regulations.
“free trade and the international market would probably be number one a sensible flat tax system would be probably number two”
In places like Seattle and much of California, new building is often confined to very narrow neighborhoods at very high densities because residents resist development in areas they like as they are.
“in places like Seattle and in much of California if you really want to build um you've often confined to very narrow neighborhoods very high densities”