
Exploring the Future of US-China Relations, Part 2
What this covers
This is the second of three conversations among Ray Dalio, Kevin Rudd, and David McCormick, focused on how economic competition between the U.S. and China might play out over the coming decade. The talk moves through trade, technology, and capital markets. McCormick supplies much of the policy history. He recalls that in 2005-2006 the worry was China's dependence on American technology and intellectual property protection, and that U.S. policy after China's WTO accession in 2001 aimed at market access and integration, which he says did not deliver its intended results. He describes the resulting posture as a "more humbled approach."
Technology is where the speakers disagree least and the stakes sound highest. McCormick points to real Chinese breakthroughs that are independent of the U.S., and to winner-take-all dynamics in emerging technologies. Rudd argues that decoupling is driven by both governments, not only Washington: Beijing wants to avoid exposure to American economic instruments and will pursue self-reliance wherever it is technically feasible. He also says trade is usually the first casualty of geostrategic tension.
The capital-markets portion is mostly Dalio's. He argues that China is becoming a net capital importer because of a structural current account deficit, so it will need foreign funding. He explains that Beijing has held back on internationalizing the Renminbi (RMB)) so as not to look like a challenger to the dollar. He also covers China's recurring capital controls, the uncertain future of Hong Kong as a financial center, and how easily capital is frightened. He adds that U.S. financial strain belongs in the picture.
McCormick's most contested claim is that U.S. policy is shifting from sector-specific restrictions to economy-wide ones, citing federal pension investment limits and talk of curbing Chinese investment in the U.S. He sees growing bipartisan concern, and he treats tariffs under the Trump administration as a new form of leverage whose durability is unclear. He also sketches what full disentanglement would involve.
The U.S.-China relationship is transitioning from decades of engagement and integration to structural decoupling across trade, technology, and capital markets, driven by mutual strategic concerns about technological dominance and economic vulnerability, with significant implications for global markets and investors.
- China has developed indigenous technological capability and is pursuing national self-reliance, no longer dependent on the U.S., creating winner-take-all competition in emerging technologies
- U.S. policy is shifting from targeted sectoral restrictions to broad economic decoupling across trade, investment, and capital flows, signaling a fundamental reassessment of the integration model
- Both countries face structural incentives to decouple: China fears U.S. economic power instruments, while the U.S. seeks to prevent Chinese dominance in critical technologies
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China is becoming a net capital importing economy due to an emerging structural current account deficit, which means China will need to raise international capital through markets outside its borders.
“the chinese dilemma is this it is over time becoming a net capital importing economy and that's because structurally there is emerging a current account deficit and therefore under those circumstances china is going to need to be able to raise uh international capital through one market or another”
China has made real breakthroughs in technology that are independent and autonomous of the United States or any other country, driven by government investment, R&D dynamics, and the scale and size of the Chinese economy.
“because of some of the dynamics of r d and government investment and so forth and the scale and size of the economy have made real breakthroughs that have been independent and autonomous of the united states or anybody else in terms of technology adoption technology breakthroughs and and technology leadership”
Technological decoupling is being driven equally by both Chinese and American strategy, not by American unilateral decision—China is making internal decisions about not remaining vulnerable to global technology markets and systems due to concern about U.S. economic power instruments.
“the inference that it is only america's decision to decouple technologically is a flawed assumption china is of itself right now making a series of internal decisions about not leaving itself vulnerable to global technology markets and systems and in fact the semiconductor example is often used in the chinese domestic debate more broadly across technology and across finance about the undesirability of china remaining vulnerable to these ultimate instruments of american economic power”
China is pursuing a national strategy of technological self-reliance in critical technology areas wherever that is technologically achievable, and will achieve full technological decoupling from the United States except where China cannot technologically achieve independence.
“china's national strategy of national self-reliance in critical technology areas wherever that is technologically achievable that that would have occurred where it is not technologically achievable for example the continuing gap in china's ability to develop the most advanced semiconductors in the world then of course the chinese will carve out exceptions”
When David was in government in 2005-2006, the primary concern about China was its dependence on the United States for technology and intellectual property protection, but this has fundamentally changed because China has now developed much more indigenous technological capability.
“when i was in the government in 2005 2006 the primary conversation as it related to chinese technology was around its dependence china's dependence on the united states and intellectual property protection of u.s firms export controls to protect against china taking u.s technology through supplier relationships and so forth those are still concerns but the whole focus within china and risk have changed because i think it's indisputable that in the last decade or more china has developed a much more indigenous capability in in terms of technology development”
The goal of the United States from 2001 onward (following China's WTO accession) was to work with China as a way to gain market access and integrate China into the global economy, but this policy has not achieved its intended results.
“if you looked at china's wto succession in 2001 and then you look at the subsequent efforts that were pursued by by multiple administrations the goal was very much to work with china as a way to get market access to give china an opportunity to engage with the global economy a big piece of that has not come to fruition in the way that the way the united states had hoped in the way that policy makers on both sides of the aisle had hoped and in congress and the white house”
Emerging technologies have winner-take-all dynamics, meaning that control of these technologies provides significant competitive advantage, so both the United States and China have strong incentives to prevent the other from controlling them.
“those technologies have as i said some winner winner-take-all dynamics so if you're the united states you don't want those technologies controlled by china if you're in china and chinese leadership you don't want those technologies controlled by the united states”
Capital can be scared very easily if you treat it badly, and doing so can eliminate the entire benefit of developing a global reserve currency and financial center status.
“capital can get scared very easily if you do the wrong things uh to capital uh it can do um it can lose all that”
China has intentionally not been aggressive in the internationalization of the Renminbi and has not denominated loans in Renminbi, because doing so would signal a threat and aggressive challenge to U.S. dominance.
“in terms of the financial war um the chinese have intentionally not been aggressive in the internationalization of the remnb and that there is a reluctance to do that because that is almost a signal of a threat that they have intentionally not denominated their loans in remnb and not done a number of things that will build the uh remnb as a reserve currency so they've actually held it back”
U.S. policy is shifting to much stronger bias toward quid pro quo arrangements where market access in the United States is explicitly predicated on market access in China, a significant departure from the inconsistent historical practice of the past 20 years.
“a much stronger bias to quid pro quo kinds of thinking where market access in the united states is predicated on market access in china which is really not the way it has historically been over the last 20 decade 20 years at least not consistently”
Capital controls on outflows have been a perennial problem for China due to lack of confidence among high-wealth individuals and successful private corporations in China's domestic economic model and personal security for entrepreneurs.
“on the capital restriction side that is outflow this has been a perennial problem for china in terms of a lack of confidence on the part of its high wealth individuals but in addition to that it's more successful private corporations who have exhibited a less than robust confidence in china's domestic economic model and or the personal security of high-profile private sector investors and entrepreneurs”
China periodically imposes hardline capital controls to maintain balance in its current account, and will continue to do so in a high-risk, highly competitive environment.
“what from time to time the chinese have done in a marxist veterans system is simply impose hardline capital controls in order to maintain their overall balance for their current account purposes and therefore under those circumstances i think in a high risk highly competitive environment in the future you would still see the real and continuing risk of the chinese system uh imposing capital controls in the future as they've done in the past”
One of the most powerful ways in negotiation is to deal with individual companies or individuals and bring them to your side as a way of affecting the policies of the government.
“one of the most powerful ways in negotiation um is to uh deal with the individual companies or the individuals and have them on your side china's side as a way of affecting the policies of the government”
Trade is usually the first casualty of international political friction and geostrategic tension unless dealing in the arms trade or critical energy markets.
“trade is usually the first casualty of international uh political friction and geostrategic tension unless of course you're dealing in the arms trade itself or in critical energy markets”
Full economic disentanglement between the U.S. and China would involve much smaller or non-existent bilateral trading relationships, the elimination of U.S. companies based in China and Chinese companies based in the U.S., and massive changes to supply chains and capital flows.
“if you play that out through it's a large logical extension and you really do have a disentanglement of those two economies where the trading relationships are are are much smaller or non-existent where the ability to have have uh u.s companies based in china and vice versa that's a that's a huge shift in the global economy it's a huge shift in how u.s businesses and chinese businesses have viewed one another in terms of opportunity it's a huge shift in terms of supply chains and capital flows”
China's growth from 2001 to present has been remarkable and the economy has evolved in many of the ways the United States had hoped, but now China poses a real challenge to U.S. leadership in both economic terms and in leading industries and leading technologies.
“about 20 years china's growth has been remarkable the economy has really evolved in many of the ways that we had all hoped and now china poses a real challenge to u.s leadership not only in economic terms but also in terms of some of these leading industries and leading technologies”
The United States is in financial difficulty, which is a critical factor in the U.S.-China competitive dynamic and must be part of the picture when considering military expenditures and geopolitical competition.
“at the same time the united states is in a financial difficulty i mean this has to be part of that picture how is the united states and the three major reserve currencies how what is their viability and when you're dealing with um economic viability in this this is a very important question because if we look forward how much can the united states literally afford to build up its military and to have these expenditures”
Heightened geopolitical tensions between China and the United States over the last several years have contributed to an overall contraction in the vibrancy of the U.S.-China trade and global trade more broadly.
“heightened geopolitical tensions between china and the united states over the last several years have in fact contributed to an overall contraction in the vibrancy of the u.s china trade and of course more broadly geopolitical tensions combined with the mechanicalism of the us administration in particular has led to a contraction in the growth of global trade”
There is growing bipartisan concern about China in the United States, with both Republican and Democratic administrations pursuing more restrictive policies regardless of electoral dynamics.
“this growing uh aggressiveness and growing concern over china is very much a bipartisan issue”
China currently prioritizes Hong Kong as a source of international capital, but the future role of Hong Kong as an international capital market is uncertain due to questions about legal, political, and geopolitical risk confidence.
“china currently is placing much priority in hong kong but the six thousand dollar question there is what will happen to the future status of hong kong as a international capital market in which the rest of the international economy continues to have confidence both legally politically and in terms of geopolitical risk”
U.S. policy recognition of China's real challenge to U.S. leadership has led to a 'more humbled approach' to engagement going forward, replacing the optimism that characterized the 2001-present period.
“so what you're seeing now is a refactoring of that reality a recognition that during that period from 2001 until now about 20 years china's growth has been remarkable the economy has really evolved in many of the ways that we had all hoped and now china poses a real challenge to u.s leadership...so what that's going to mean is a much more humbled approach to our level of engagement going forward”
The Trump administration's use of tariffs as a means of creating pressure and leverage in trade discussions represents a new development that will be important to watch in determining the future scope and sustainability of trade restrictions.
“the new thing that's been introduced by the trump administration is a reliance on tariffs as a means for creating pressure and leverage in those discussions that'll be an interesting thing to watch uh going forward is how pervasive tariffs are are used uh going forward”
U.S. policy is shifting from selective, technology-specific restrictions to broader, economy-wide restrictive policies affecting the entire scope of the U.S.-China economic relationship, including university endowments, federal pension plans, and foreign investment restrictions.
“what you used to see with with great clarity was very targeted segmented responses around very specific technologies and very specific markets that had implications for national security or global significance and a focus on restrictions on our interactions with china to protect those things what you now see a shift toward are much broader sets of restrictive economic policies in terms of the the breadth of the economic relationship”
Restrictions on federal pension plan investments in China and broader discussions of limiting Chinese foreign investment in the United States indicate a movement from targeted sectoral restrictions to economy-wide disentanglement.
“you see that in the uh in the debate over the uh federal pension plan you see this in a much broader discussion around simply letting china invest in the united states”
Recent guidance to university endowments to be wary of investing in China more broadly (not just specific companies or technologies) represents a significant expansion in the scope of restrictions beyond national security rationales.
“recently there was a a statement put out uh by the uh by the the current administration which by the way as i said this growing uh aggressiveness and growing concern over china is very much a bipartisan issue but to refer to this particular policy it was guidance to university endowments um to be very wary of investing in china china more broadly not specific companies not specific technologies”
There are five or six types of wars—technological war, trade war, capital controls, sanctions, and military conflict—and they are all one integrated war where all forms are used interchangeably as instruments of power.
“there are these five or six types of wars and they're all one war and they're all used interchangeably you know you you could see it everything relates to sanctions and so on”
All forms of competition between nations—technology, trade, capital flows, sanctions, military—are markers for each other, meaning that moves in one domain signal and correlate with moves in other domains.
“i think all of these things are markers for each other in other words the technology move and so on you could see the cutting off of exports to each other all of those five wars each is a marker for each other”
China will not respond to American economic competition by cutting off or adversely responding to American or foreign investment in China, because doing so would undermine China's development of a world financial center and reserve currency status, which are key to its imperial development arc.
“i believe a chinese response to that would not be to curtail um to respond to um adversely to american businesses or american or foreign let's call them foreign any foreign investment in the country because um if you look at the rises and declines of empires um i don't know if you've seen my piece the changing world order but if you look at that and you look at the arc of the dutch empire of the british empire and so on one of the key things in terms of its development of a reserve currency and also development of it as an empire is to have a um financial center that becomes one of the world's financial centers”
The U.S.-China relationship is evolving along a continuum from the current state to various possible future states, with uncertainty about exactly how restrictive the U.S. posture will become.
“i think um i i think it's it really is a continuum but the short answer is yes i think we'll um see a more restrictive posture from the u.s perspective”
China will pursue an evolutionary course of developing a reserve currency rather than taking aggressive action to internationalize the Renminbi, and does not want to threaten U.S. reserve currency status through aggressive internationalization.
“i think it'll move more toward the evolutionary course of developing reserve currency i don't think the china wants to threaten the u.s reserve currency status i think the united states threatens its own reserve currency status more than china threatens its status by some of the policies that it's doing”
Despite past Chinese restraint on Renminbi internationalization, China will now make more moves toward capital market opening and the elimination or dramatic reduction of capital controls out of necessity, as China's current account position shifts.
“at the same time they will now make more moves in that direction almost out of necessity you'll you know besides the opening of the capital markets you you will see a plan coming soon for eliminating capital controls or dramatically reducing capital controls”
China may pursue engagement with continental European financial centers, particularly Germany and Frankfurt, as a potential source for international capital raisings.
“so i think you may in fact see a chinese play in relation to continental europe itself and whether in fact germany could become and frankfurt become a greater source for international capital raisings for the uh for the chinese”
Alternative international capital markets to Hong Kong for China include Singapore, Tokyo, and London, but each faces geopolitical obstacles: Tokyo is unlikely to be trusted due to close U.S.-Japan security ties, London due to traditional U.S. affiliation, while Singapore has greater potential but is small in absolute size.
“the other candidates singapore you look to tokyo you look to london in the case of tokyo because of the closeness of the u.s japan relationship anchored in security china is unlikely to have confidence in that market if you look to london there is a separate question about the uk's traditional close affiliation with the united states as well although when you look to singapore with greater potentiality but of course on these questions singapore is still in net terms rather small”
The question of which model—the United States model or China's model—will prevail in the race for leadership in emerging technologies is very much open.
“it's very much an open question of which model the united states model or the china china's model will prevail uh in this race for leadership in emerging technologies”
There are significant uncertainties about whether current restrictive U.S. policies represent temporary election-year signaling or mark a fundamental shift in how the United States views economic competition with China.
“the thing that's evolving and it's very difficult from the u.s side from where i sit on the u.s side to know whether this is sort of near-term election politics or what i'm about to describe marks a fundamental shift in how the united states thinks about such things”
There are some dimensions of changing U.S. policy that are evolutionary and widely understood, and some new developments that are worth noting, but all involve a much higher premium on concern about critical emergent technologies.
“there are some dimensions of that that are evolutionary and i think widely understood and there are some new developments that are worth worth noting but i think what that's going to mean is a much higher premium and concern on uh on those critical emergent technologies”