WTO accession
China's formal entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, which locked in its trading status permanently and resolved policy uncertainty even without large nominal tariff changes.
As defined in David Autor on Trade, China, and U.S. Labor Markets
Where it comes up · 4
- The Challenge of China5 claims
- David Autor on Trade, China, and U.S. Labor Markets1 claim
- A Threat Bigger than China | MIT Economist David Autor1 claim
- Exploring the Future of US-China Relations, Part 21 claim
Most important claims · 8 of 8Search all claims for “WTO accession” →
- China viewed WTO accession as a mechanism to force difficult economic reform internally (including making tens of millions of Chinese unemployed as they restructured state-owned enterprises) and to lock itself into a commitment to stay on a path of economic liberalization, not merely to gain market access.The Challenge of China
- The goal of the United States from 2001 onward (following China's WTO accession) was to work with China as a way to gain market access and integrate China into the global economy, but this policy has not achieved its intended results.Exploring the Future of US-China Relations, Part 2
- China's accession to the WTO in 2001 caused a dramatic inflection in U.S.-China trade even though it did not nominally change tariffs (China already had Most Favored Nation status); the best interpretation, per Peter Schott and coauthors, is that it resolved policy uncertainty, making firms confident that property rights and market access were secure enough to move production overseas permanently.David Autor on Trade, China, and U.S. Labor Markets
- China's WTO accession in 2001 and permanent normal trade relationship with the United States in 2000 induced a surge in exports to the United States because of falling tariffs and changed investment environment, making China more competitive as a result of having to reform and open.A Threat Bigger than China | MIT Economist David Autor
- Chinese leadership at the time of WTO accession was conveying a trajectory toward economic liberalization and reform that Western observers believed to be inevitable and durable, but subsequent developments under Hu Jintao and then Xi Jinping showed that this path did not go as far, as fast, or as linearly as expected, suggesting either overly optimistic Western assessment or misleading Chinese signaling.The Challenge of China
- China viewed WTO accession as a mechanism to force difficult economic reform domestically, deliberately exposing Chinese companies to foreign competition to make them stronger, sending students to American universities even knowing some would stay in the US, and leveraging the certainty that WTO membership gave foreign investors so they could invest with predictability, rather than primarily seeking market access and tariff reduction.The Challenge of China
- Before China's WTO accession in 2001, China was already receiving the same market access as every other country through annual votes for Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, so they were already exporting to the US market at comparable rates; WTO membership therefore did not primarily grant them market access that they did not already have.The Challenge of China
- The reform trajectory that Chinese leadership appeared to commit to after WTO accession did not go as far, did not go as fast, and was not as linear as many Western observers expected and were led to believe by Chinese leadership; this divergence occurred first under Hu Jintao and then very much under Xi Jinping.The Challenge of China