What this covers

Russ Roberts talks with Sam Peltzman of the University of Chicago about two bodies of work: his 1975 study of the first wave of US auto safety rules (seatbelts, collapsible steering columns, padded windshields) and his later work on FDA drug regulation. Method is as much the subject as findings. Peltzman objects to before-and-after comparisons, like the chart the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration publishes, and to credit given to the 55 mph limit, since fatalities were already falling at a similar rate. His preferred test is counterfactual analysis.

On autos, he reports no detectable change in total highway deaths: occupants died less, while pedestrians, cyclists, motorcyclists and other drivers died more. He treats safety devices as lowering the private cost of an accident, a price effect that invites faster driving. He also suggests that much of the apparent offset may be a wealth effect, since safety was improving before regulation. Both claims are contested. He adds that airbags killed small front-seat passengers, and he admits the offset theory is flexible enough that the net effect for occupants need not be zero.

On drugs, he judges the 1962 efficacy amendments mixed in effect, but concludes that approval delays cost more lives than screening saves. He cites the AIDS activists who won looser testing rules, and argues that regulatory know-how favors large firms over small biotechs. Alternatives he raises include reputation, tort liability, and private certification such as Underwriters Laboratories and kosher supervision. Regulation persists, he says, through rational ignorance among voters. The episode closes with a listener email from Josh Knox about concert tickets and opportunity cost.

Sharpest takeaway

Peltzman argues that well-intentioned safety and drug regulations routinely trigger offsetting behavior and costly delays, so their benefits are overstated when judged against a counterfactual, and rational voter ignorance lets them persist.

  • Auto safety devices cut occupant deaths but raised non-occupant deaths, because drivers compensated by taking more risks
  • Drug efficacy requirements from 1962 delayed approvals and cut innovation, with costs judged to exceed the benefits
  • Voters and the public compare regulated outcomes to the past rather than to a counterfactual world without regulation, so the regulatory record looks better than it is

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0.80

Over the thirty years since the 1975 paper, many follow-up studies in different countries and on different kinds of regulations have applied the same idea, and the general lesson is that trying to regulate human behavior changes incentives in ways that often offset the regulation's intent.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Sam Peltzman

“if you try to regulate human behavior you you change incentives and the general point that comes out of that is it often the incentives are changed in a way which offsets the intent of the regulation”

0.78

Safety devices such as seatbelts and collapsible steering columns did not directly reduce accident likelihood; instead they lowered the private cost of an accident to the driver, which is economically like a price reduction, so drivers responded by taking more risks such as driving faster and taking shortcuts.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Sam Peltzman

“what these devices did was reduce the who you might think of as the price of having an accident”

0.78

Market innovations such as externally mounted rearview mirrors and automatic turn signals, though minor, had large safety effects, and they, along with other private improvements, produced gradual safety gains from the dawn of the automobile until regulation arrived.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Sam Peltzman

“a rearview mirror mounted on the outside of the car look at that that didn't wasn't standard equipment in the twenties and the thirties but when it came in it had a big effect on safety”

0.78

Regulators do respond to unintended consequences, but when regulation is blanket (every car must have airbags) its mistakes happen on a grand scale, whereas a market process would have confined a new technology to a few leading-edge models, allowing errors to be detected and reversed at lower cost.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Sam Peltzman

“you issue a regulation every cars got to have airbags instead of a market process which would have limited this maybe to a few leading edge models”

0.78

Regulations persist not mainly because voters are ignorant but because of rational ignorance: voters have little incentive to study complex regulatory trade-offs, the average citizen sees progress and attributes it to regulators, and without a widely felt sense that the system is broken, there is no pressure for change except from organized interest groups.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Sam Peltzman

“it's what we like to call rationally I don't think that the large body of voters”

0.78

Demand for safety rises with income, so over time cars would become safer even without regulation; the historical record from the early automobile era to the 1960s shows gradual improvement in safety before regulation, and an economist would attribute that to wealth-driven demand.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Sam Peltzman

“people want safer cars because they want more safety”

0.75

The AIDS epidemic of the early 1980s showed that delayed approval of beneficial drugs is costly: patient advocates organized to demand that promising drugs be released without requiring double-blind placebo tests on terminal patients, and they won.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Sam Peltzman

“the FDA says you got to do a double-blind test on terminal AIDS patients”

0.73

The auto safety regulation studied had no detectable effect on total highway fatalities; while occupants of cars died less, non-occupants such as pedestrians, bicyclists, motorcyclists, and occupants of other cars suffered an increase in deaths.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Sam Peltzman

“there seemed to be no effect on the number of fatalities on the highway”

0.73

Large drug companies built in-house expertise for navigating FDA regulation, and this regulatory know-how acts as a barrier that keeps small biotech companies out, funneling drug development into large firms.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Sam Peltzman

“they built up this in-house knowledge of how to cope with this regulatory oh yeah major asset of the American drug industry and so it keeps out small companies”

0.73

Peltzman's 1975 study of the first wave of US auto safety regulation (seatbelts, collapsible steering columns, padded windshields) found no reduction in total highway fatalities.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Sam Peltzman

“there seemed to be no effect on the number of fatalities on the highway”

0.73

Without the FDA, drug safety and efficacy would still be policed by market reputation, since companies that repeatedly sell ineffective drugs lose their revenue streams, plus tort liability and private certification as in kosher food codes and Underwriters Laboratories.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Sam Peltzman

“the market runs to buy basically drugs that that work if you as a company get a reputation for not serving that demand you're going to be gone”

0.73

Methodologically, the right question for regulation is not whether deaths declined but what the world would have looked like without regulation; the comparison shows little or no effect for the auto regulation studied.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Sam Peltzman

“the question is what would the world's laipply have been like without the regulation”

0.73

The 55 mile per hour national speed limit is an example of the flawed before-and-after analysis: fatalities were falling steadily before the law took effect, at a similar rate, so the post-law decline does not show that the law had a significant effect, although it may have had some marginal impact.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Sam Peltzman

“if you look at fatalities after the law was put in place they fall steadily core fell steadily before it was put forth not exactly the same rate”

0.73

The correct method for judging safety regulation is counterfactual: compare actual outcomes with what would have happened without regulation, and because safety had been improving without government pushing, a decline in deaths after regulation does not prove regulation helped.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Sam Peltzman

“what would the world have been like without the regulation and the answer is it there would have been a decline because that's the way people behave without government pushing them”

0.71

Airbags caused deaths of small people seated in the front passenger seat, an unintended consequence of a different kind than behavioral offset; and it may have had a side benefit by making drivers more careful when they feared harming their children, who were moved to the back seat.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Sam Peltzman

“airbags which killed short small people in the passenger seat but that's a different kind of unintended consequence”

0.70

Most of the apparent offsetting behavior may be explained not by the direct price effect of cheaper accidents but by a wealth effect: during the period without regulation, people would have made cars safer anyway, so the regulation's measured effect is smaller than naive comparisons suggest.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Sam Peltzman

“part of the reason why you're getting what looks like offsetting behavior I think maybe even most of the reason is not the direct behavioral response”

0.69

The vast majority of drugs that drug companies seriously pursue are good, and the delay imposed by the approval process means that the cost, in lives of people who could have benefited earlier and some who died, is overwhelming compared to the benefit of screening out inefficacious or unsafe drugs, so Peltzman concludes that this kind of regulation kills more people than it saves.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Sam Peltzman

“this kind of regulation kills more people than it saves”

0.68

Tort liability would have provided a comparable incentive for drug safety in a world without the FDA, since the courts' growing willingness to impose liability would induce defensive testing, though Peltzman thinks reputation is the more important mechanism.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Sam Peltzman

“some argue that that the increase in the courts willingness to impose liability would have had approximately the same effect on on drug development as the FDA”

0.68

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration publishes a chart comparing traffic deaths before and after regulation, implying that regulation produced the decline, which misses the correct comparison with what would have happened without regulation.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Sam Peltzman

“what the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration does every year is it publishes a chart and it says here was the world before regulation here is the world after regulation”

0.68

The 1962 drug amendments requiring proof of efficacy before marketing a new drug had mixed effects: they caught drugs that were unsafe or ineffective and benefited consumers, but they also delayed the approval of drugs that would have helped patients.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Sam Peltzman

“the requirement that there be a proof of efficacy before you can market a new drug and that came into the world in 1962”

0.68

Private certification is viable: Underwriters Laboratories tests appliances, and kosher food certification shows that competing private rabbinic organizations can certify products and monitor sellers' incentives to cut corners, without government.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Sam Peltzman

“my favorite example is kosher food codes yes a lot of private competition among various rabbinic organizations to certify a product is kosher”

0.68

Josh Knox's email about found versus scalped concert tickets suggests people's apparent irrationality, keeping a found ticket rather than selling it for $1,000 while refusing to pay $1,000 to a scalper, reflects fear of fraud and unfamiliarity with the transaction rather than a pure failure to count opportunity cost.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“the fear of fraud could the fear of fraud be the rational explanation for the behavior”

0.64

After initial hostility faded, other researchers in different countries studied the same drug-regulation issue, and the finding is now conventional wisdom embedded in legislation, though the FDA's fundamental system has changed little since the 1970s.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Sam Peltzman

“they recognize there is a problem but they wish to defend the basic system so that they the there has been regulatory change but not very much”

0.64

The 1962 efficacy requirement caused a dramatic drop in the rate of new drug innovation, and Peltzman's findings on this were received with great hostility by the government and medical establishment.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Sam Peltzman

“the rate of innovation dropped dramatically yes yes the rate of innovation dropped dramatically”

0.64

The offset theory is so flexible that the net effect need not be zero or even clearly positive for occupants, since drivers may gain speed and time, and the central point is that the regulation's accident-reducing potential is partly offset by behavioral responses.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Sam Peltzman

“the theory that we have is so flexible in these matters that it's not even clear that the people inside the car would be protect”

0.63

Requiring efficacy proof raised drug development costs and delayed the profitability of drugs, and the resulting process came to take about ten years and roughly one billion dollars to bring a new drug to market, largely because of expensive double-blind trials and repeated testing demanded by the FDA.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Sam Peltzman

“it now takes a decade ten years plus a billion dollars 1 billion to bring any new drug to the market”

0.57

Public faith that government regulation can easily manipulate human behavior has declined over time, and the generation now voting is far more skeptical of regulation than the one Peltzman entered the profession with thirty or forty years ago, partly because economic research has documented offsetting effects.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Sam Peltzman

“the general electorate faith that you can easily manipulate human behavior by regulation I think it's been reduced over time”

0.56

Anti-lock brakes, according to an academic study, were counterproductive over their initial period because they led to an increase in accidents, reflecting a steep learning curve for the technology.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Sam Peltzman

“one of the academic studies that we talked about before was was a study of anti-lock brakes which actually indicates that they they were at least over the initial period counterproductive”

0.52

The establishment, including the government and much of the academic medical establishment, was hostile to the drug study, and the government generates a coterie of 'supplicants' who live off the regulatory system and defend it.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Sam Peltzman

“the government in all these cases generates a coterie of supporters and you might think of them as supplicants people who live of the regulatory system”

0.52

The safety establishment viewed the world through crash-test dummy results, which show survival in most crashes, and rejected the idea that human behavior responds to safety devices, because a behavioral response threatened the justification for regulation.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Sam Peltzman

“they wanted the world to think that if you crash a dummy into a world and in in a vast majority of the cases the dummy comes out”

0.52

Industry becomes entangled in regulation and, perceiving no large payoff from organizing to change things in Washington given the bad publicity and risk, does not push for reform, which allows the Washington hangers-on to continue unmolested.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Sam Peltzman

“the industry itself in the sense that they they don't perceive that there's a large payoff to organizing”

0.52

Mike Munger's puzzle, relayed by listener Josh Knox, is that people who refuse to pay $1,000 to a scalper often keep a found concert ticket rather than sell it for $1,000, which seems inconsistent because the concert costs $1,000 in both cases.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Josh Knox

“many people who would refuse to pay $1,000 in cash for the tickets to the scalper are happy to give up the thousand dollars they could get from selling the ticket”

0.52

Economists find offsetting behavior intuitive, while non-economists find it bewildering and doubt that people really take lower costs into account when making decisions, so the unintended consequences of such laws often fail to reach voters' awareness or the incentives of regulators.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Sam Peltzman

“as economists we often find these kind of effects very intuitive non-economists find them a little bit bewildering”

0.49

People experienced with auction platforms such as eBay or StubHub would be more likely to resell a found ticket for $1,000 than to use it, because they understand the transaction and trust the process, while inexperienced people may keep the ticket out of uncertainty about collecting payment.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“my guess is that if you took people who had experience with eBay or stub with auction experiences on the web they'd be much more likely to sell the ticket”

0.47

Drug companies do not want to market bad drugs and balance the risk of premature release against the benefits, so market incentives already discipline quality, making the government's extra screening less necessary.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Sam Peltzman

“they don't want to market bad drugs per se they may want to take a chance but they don't want to market this bad drugs”

0.47

Peltzman's findings do not show that regulation per se is bad or misguided; they show only that policymakers should not overestimate what regulation can achieve.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Sam Peltzman

“nothing in my research of the subsequent research suggests that the regulation per se is bad or is going down the wrong track it just says you shouldn't overestimate it its potential”

0.47

Government monitoring, which people presume is in the public interest, is itself often self-interested in different ways, so private monitoring should not be dismissed simply because it is not governmental.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Sam Peltzman

“the government monitoring which we all presume to be in our own self-interest of course is often self-interested in different ways”

0.47

Voters do not evaluate regulation through counterfactual analysis; they use a gross filter such as whether the country is on the right or wrong track, so policy is judged on general impressions rather than on the careful comparisons economists make.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Sam Peltzman

“it's only a very gross filter like that it's going to set the average person”

0.42

The typical path for a new drug is that a small firm, funded by venture capital, takes the drug through about ten years of testing with no revenue, then sells the accumulated results to a large drug company, which supplies the capital to finish testing and handles the regulatory process.

factualestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Sam Peltzman

“the common channel for it for a drug to make it to the market is somebody's got a bright idea they may be they may if they may push the process up”

0.40

Peltzman's 1975 paper in the Journal of Political Economy evaluated the first wave of U.S. auto safety regulation, about ten years old at the time, which mandated seatbelts, collapsible steering columns, and improved windshields.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Sam Peltzman

“the piece was a was really evaluating the first wave of safety regulation that was then about 10 years old”

0.40

Psychologists, especially in the mid-1970s and before Peltzman's paper, pursued an incentive-based line of research compatible with offsetting behavior, so the idea is not exclusive to economics; yet outside academic areas that take incentives seriously, reception is less friendly, with more indifference or disbelief.

factualestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Sam Peltzman

“some of the literature actually started it started before my piece in the mid 70s some of the psychological literature was going down the same track”

0.35

Reforms such as the orphan drug law and a 1990s fee-funded program that cut several years from review represent partial recognition of the problem, but they leave the fundamental efficacy-based system intact.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Sam Peltzman

“there's an orphan drug law right all right so one of the effects of this kind of regulation is you're not going to spend a billion dollars on something that's going to benefit a thousand people”

0.35

The offset-by-behavior principle has been applied to many regulatory areas beyond auto safety, including airbags and mandatory helmet laws, and an academic search can now surface an enormous number of such papers.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“not just airbags or mandatory helmet laws but lots of regulatory areas outside of safety”

0.35

Economists tend to differ from the general population on safety regulation because they compare a world with regulation to a counterfactual world without it, rather than simply observing that safety improved.

normativeestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Sam Peltzman

“we're economists tend to differ from the rest of the population”

0.31

The safety-regulation findings drew violent hostility: the editor of the Journal of Political Economy was threatened with being browbeaten into not publishing, on the grounds that the paper would justify policies that kill babies, and the safety community, heavily subsidized by government and aligned with Detroit, viewed the offset idea as a threat.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Sam Peltzman

“the editor of the Journal of law of a political economy where this piece appeared”

0.30

Post-1962 reforms include the orphan drug law, which effectively reduces regulation for drugs treating small populations, and a law from the early 1990s that taxed the industry to accelerate the last stage of review by a couple of years.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Sam Peltzman

“there's an orphan drug law right all right so one of the effects of this kind of regulation is you're not going to spend a billion dollars on something”

0.27

Regulation persists because of a permanent government, the bureaucracy in Washington, which outlasts the temporary elected government, and its perpetuation depends on the bureaucracy and the interest groups around it.

causalspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“there's what you call the the temporary government and the permanent government the permanent government being what the people were talking about the bureaucracy in Washington”

0.26

A reputable-looking reseller website can make buyers willing to trust unconventional transactions, since a firm with substantial web resources would not want to jeopardize them by cheating customers.

causalspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“he had this reseller had a big website they'd obviously put a lot of resources in it and I assumed that they wouldn't want those resources to disappear”

0.25

Regulators should be aware of the possibility of offsetting behavior when designing safety rules, since the evidence suggests regulators can underestimate how people respond.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“I'd encourage them to be aware of the possibility of offsetting behavior”

0.21

Peltzman discussed 'wealth effect' and 'price effect' in safety outcomes, but this is a matter of thinking through methods and does not require a numerical estimate.

definitionspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Sam Peltzman

“methodologically what was I doing when I was studying automobile safety regulation”

0.21

Economists tend to have faith in evidence, and in Peltzman's view the profession's attitudes changed substantially once it began empirically studying regulatory effects, since older economists had much greater faith in government regulation before researchers began looking at outcomes.

causalspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Sam Peltzman

“once they started looking I mean the economics it as a field is a nice place to work because you're surrounded by colleagues who will look at evidence”

0.13

Roberts's own purchase of resold Wicked tickets from a seller in Texas, using a PDF with a barcode, worked out, illustrating that people sometimes trust uncertain resale channels when the seller appears to be a legitimate operation.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 1/4· Russ Roberts

“so I trusted him as we do many times in these kind of situations”

0.10

Let me close with a thanks to the guest and a sign-off mentioning the next episode.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 0/4· Russ Roberts

“talk to y'all Monday you”