offsetting behavior
The tendency of people to change their behavior in response to a safety measure in a way that partly or fully cancels its intended benefit, such as driving faster when cars are safer.
As defined in Peltzman on Regulation 11/13/2006
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- Over the thirty years since the 1975 paper, many follow-up studies in different countries and on different kinds of regulations have applied the same idea, and the general lesson is that trying to regulate human behavior changes incentives in ways that often offset the regulation's intent.Peltzman on Regulation 11/13/2006
- Safety devices such as seatbelts and collapsible steering columns did not directly reduce accident likelihood; instead they lowered the private cost of an accident to the driver, which is economically like a price reduction, so drivers responded by taking more risks such as driving faster and taking shortcuts.Peltzman on Regulation 11/13/2006
- The auto safety regulation studied had no detectable effect on total highway fatalities; while occupants of cars died less, non-occupants such as pedestrians, bicyclists, motorcyclists, and occupants of other cars suffered an increase in deaths.Peltzman on Regulation 11/13/2006
- Peltzman's 1975 study of the first wave of US auto safety regulation (seatbelts, collapsible steering columns, padded windshields) found no reduction in total highway fatalities.Peltzman on Regulation 11/13/2006
- The offset theory is so flexible that the net effect need not be zero or even clearly positive for occupants, since drivers may gain speed and time, and the central point is that the regulation's accident-reducing potential is partly offset by behavioral responses.Peltzman on Regulation 11/13/2006
- Economists find offsetting behavior intuitive, while non-economists find it bewildering and doubt that people really take lower costs into account when making decisions, so the unintended consequences of such laws often fail to reach voters' awareness or the incentives of regulators.Peltzman on Regulation 11/13/2006
- Regulators should be aware of the possibility of offsetting behavior when designing safety rules, since the evidence suggests regulators can underestimate how people respond.Peltzman on Regulation 11/13/2006