fact
In Wittgenstein's ontology, the existence of a state of affairs; facts are complex entities composed of simpler atomic facts, and they are distinct from things or objects
As defined in A History of Philosophy | 75 Ludwig Wittgenstein
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- Ambiguity arises because one word can be used to name many different things; for example, 'green' can refer to the name of a person (William Green), a property (the color green or envy), or a place (the green at Cambridge), creating philosophical confusion.A History of Philosophy | 75 Ludwig Wittgenstein
- A fact is not a thing, but the existence of a state of affairs, which can be atomic or molecular; things are constituents of states of affairs, and facts are the existence of states of affairs.A History of Philosophy | 75 Ludwig Wittgenstein
- We picture facts to ourselves mentally; a mental picture (or thought) is a mental state that is a model of reality, composed of elements representing objects, with a one-to-one correspondence between elements in the picture and things in the state of affairs being pictured.A History of Philosophy | 75 Ludwig Wittgenstein
- Russell argues that to avoid ambiguity and multiple reference, philosophy needs an ideal language in which every name refers to exactly one fact, creating a strictly logical language where atomic facts are described by atomic propositions.A History of Philosophy | 75 Ludwig Wittgenstein
- Hume's theory of meaning held that any statement that cannot be translated into language of empirical facts is meaningless; this is the origin of the principle of burning metaphysical textsA History of Philosophy | 75 Ludwig Wittgenstein
- Modern science's conception of nature rests on the illusion that the laws of nature are explanations of natural phenomena; in fact, laws of nature are not explanations and contain no necessity—they are merely descriptions of patterns.A History of Philosophy | 75 Ludwig Wittgenstein
- Ethical language serves an emotive rather than propositional function—to say 'thou shalt not steal' is to vent feeling about behavior rather than state facts; this leads to the emotivist theory of ethics.A History of Philosophy | 75 Ludwig Wittgenstein
- In the world of facts (empirical facts), everything is as it is and happens as it happens; no value exists in this world because value is not an empirical fact and is not observable.A History of Philosophy | 75 Ludwig Wittgenstein
- Isolated words do not assert facts: if someone enters a room saying only isolated words like 'brown house,' they are not asserting anything and would be perceived as acting bizarrelyA History of Philosophy | 75 Ludwig Wittgenstein