
A History of Philosophy | 28 Summing Up Ockham's Revolution
What this covers
This is the closing lecture in a university history-of-philosophy series, delivered by an instructor who takes questions from students along the way. It sums up William of Ockham's break with medieval thought and follows its consequences into the seventeenth century. The first stretch is technical. Ockham sorts the old problem of universals into three questions: whether universals exist before things as exemplars in God's mind, in things, or after things as concepts in human thinking. He answers differently from both realism and conceptualism on each. The lecture also covers his distinction between primary and secondary intention, and his claim that a term like "beauty" refers to many particulars through a particular mental act. An aside on how children learn "mama" and "dada" supports the view that classification is a social convention.
The second part turns to what followed. The lecture argues that once nominalism dismantled the hierarchy of being, Aristotelian epistemology lost its footing, and skepticism rushed into the gap. It then looks at the Reformation. Luther is drawn to nominalist voluntarism but rejects what he sees as Pelagian leanings in Ockham's ethics, while Calvin, trained as a lawyer, keeps a Stoic, unchanging natural law. The lecture treats Ockham's appeal to "right reason" as a kind of consequentialism, a reading it flags as contested. It also traces how philosophy shifted from theological to scientific guidance, with mechanistic science keeping only material and efficient causes.
The last section sets two answers to the crisis side by side. Francis Bacon turns skepticism into a diagnostic tool, cataloguing the "Idols" of false thinking and proposing inductive evidence-gathering, and he pairs this with an optimistic, utopian vision of science. René Descartes instead starts from nothing and works his way out of doubt. The lecture also notes Renaissance Platonism pulling against empirical science, and a Scotist and Ockhamist logic aimed at dialectical criticism more than systematic syllogistic proof.
The speaker traces how William of Ockham's nominalism and rejection of universal forms created an epistemological vacuum that broke the medieval synthesis of philosophy and theology, leading to the rise of empiricism and rationalism in the modern period as alternative methods to avoid skepticism.
- Ockham's nominalism denies real universals and redirects philosophy from theology toward mechanistic science
- The breakdown of scholastic authority combined with Protestant rejection of church interpretation created intellectual crisis that skepticism exploited
- Bacon's empirical methods and Descartes' mathematical methods emerged as competing solutions to fill the epistemological vacuum left by medieval collapse
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The breakdown of the medieval synthesis resulted in the separation of philosophy from theology, as the metaphysical hierarchy of being that bonded them together was abandoned; subsequently, in the 17th-18th centuries, philosophy became guided by science rather than theology, with scientific methods and models replacing theological guidance.
“keep in mind one the breakdown of the Scholastic approach over the problem of universals which led to the separation of philosophy from theology notice how Thomas was doing philosophical theology all the way through and theologically oriented philosophy you see and those two now seem to fall apart because there isn't the metaphysic which bonded them together the glue is gone and instead of philosophy then being Guided by theology what going to happen in the 17th and 18th century is that it becomes Guided by science the methods are the methods of science the model they're using is the model of the science you see and so the relationship between Revelation and reason breaks down”
The Protestant Reformation, by insisting on 'sola scriptura' (scripture alone) as the sole authority and rejecting church authority in interpreting scripture or speaking on matters outside scripture, created an epistemological vacuum and generated intellectual uncertainty and the fear of intellectual anarchy.
“the Protestant Reformation in its insistence on scriptura solar scripture alone having Authority rejected the authority of the church either in interpreting scripture or in speaking on things on which the scripture does not speak and so uh there was the development of UN certainty about how we know there was the fear of intellectual Anarchy with the idea of the priesthood of Believers each interpreting scripture for himself”
Ockham's suggestion that loving God (a virtue formed by living under reason) is necessary for salvation seemed to make reason necessary for salvation, whereas Luther insisted that God's grace alone—not human reason or virtue—provides salvation through faith.
“um Aram had suggested out of the uh the medieval emphasis on all creation imitating God and loving God akam suggested that loving God is requisite for salvation but loving God is a virtue a virtue is a habit in Aristotelian language a habit that can be formed by living under the rule of Reason well if that's the case then reason is necessary for love which is necessary for salvation so reason is necessary for salvation”
Luther was attracted to nominalism because of its emphasis on divine sovereignty and voluntarism, which aligned with his theological concern for the individual before God—the essence of his doctrine of justification by faith alone.
“why was he attracted uh to nominalism apart from the fact that he had been taught by nominalists which is usually the reason people are attracted to things you see why was he attracted uh to nominalism because he shared aam's jealousy for the sovereignty of God voluntarism you see voluntarism and he was concerned therefore about the individual before God that's the very essence of um Martin Luther's justification by faith alone the individual by Act of will is involved”
John Calvin, trained as a lawyer, was influenced by Stoic jurisprudence and natural law theory; he saw natural law as invariable and unchanging (following Stoic metaphysics) rather than contextual and mutable (following Ockham's approach via right reason).
“John Calvin had written an early work on the Roman Sena in the stoic tradition and of course Calin was a lawyer by training and so he was very much taken with stoic jurist Prudence stoic natural law and he talks of natural law in the stoic tradition when he's dealing with ethics so one of the interesting things is that Luther sees natural law in relationship to right reason like aab whereas Calvin sees natural law as invariable and unchanging universally like the stoics”
Young children learning language typically do not initially distinguish between proper names and general nouns, calling other women 'mama' or other men 'dada' before gradually recognizing that some terms have single reference (proper names) while others have reference to a class of particulars (general nouns), suggesting that universal classification is learned through social practice rather than innate universal concepts.
“in the process of learning language uh we um we don't initially make distinctions between proper name and um General nouns common nouns it's typical for a young child learning to talk uh to speak of other women as other mamas or other men as other dadas or whatever you see and uh gradually it's recognized that um particular term has either a single reference or a whole class of references”
William of Ockham was an extreme nominalist who rejected the classical theory of universals transmitted from Plato and Aristotle and developed in theistic fashion by figures like Aquinas, representing a fundamental break from medieval realism.
“Arkham uh we've done two things with Arham so far just to catch on to what we have been doing um on Monday uh I briefly introduced Arham as a kind of extreme nominalist who rejected the classic theory of universals transmitted from Plato and Aristotle”
The key concepts of the emerging mechanistic science are matter, forces that produce motion, absolute space (uniform extent infinite in all directions), and absolute time (uniform endless duration), which require the rejection of Aristotelian formal and final causes and the retention only of material and efficient causes.
“the basic ideas are that of matter in motion and talking of matter in motion invokes two other Concepts one the concept of absolute space that is to say a uniform extent of space infinite in all directions absolute space within which matter can move but also time a uniform and endless duration of time within which change and motion occurs so you have four key Concepts matter the forces that produce motion absolute space absolute time and of course if you go back to the Greek model that means rejecting formal and final causes keeping just material and efficient causes okay”
God's ideas according to medieval theology are not universals but ideas of particulars: God willed to think of particular individuals (like David, Sue, or unborn children), and He willed to create some of these particulars while not creating others, so God's mind contains ideas of particulars that He chose to think of, some of which He brings into existence and some He does not.
“Roselin says no and in effect okam says no although okam does stop to ask about God's ideas how God knows his creatures you see and the answer is that God's ideas are not ideas of universals but ideas of particulars there are not Eternal archetypes in the mind of God they are ideas God made those ideas they're ideas he came up with God willed to think of this particular that particular God though David Sue may be God will to think of him he say as an idea first in the mind of God ideas of particulars”
The classification and grouping of things into classes (like all beautiful things) is not a matter of discovering objective universals but a social and conventional matter shaped by community language use and individual experience.
“if there are no real universals then the classification of things is who's doing yep so experience a term for ourselves yes yes um that's uh that's the sort of way in which uh which things work um and I I don't know that he puts it this way but in the process of learning language uh we um we don't initially make distinctions between proper name and um General nouns common nouns it's typical for a young child learning to talk uh to speak of other women as other mamas or other men as other dadas or whatever you see and uh gradually it's recognized that um particular term has either a single reference or a whole class of references”
Descartes's radical methodological change in the Meditations and Discourse on Method involved starting with nothing at all and working one's way out of skeptical doubt rather than starting with what one believes and thinking through that, a change motivated by the threat of skepticism looming over all minds of the period.
“day cart in his meditations and his discourse on method uh decides to begin by opposing the skeptical position there is nothing that we can know without doubt and he sets himself the task of arguing his way out of skepticism now why do that if it's not that skepticism is the threat looming over all their heads you say and so in that sense the radical methodological change that came in philosophy with cart where instead of starting with what you believe already thinking through that you start with nothing at all and work your way out of it you see that radical methodological change the influence of skepticism”
Ockham distinguishes three historical questions about universals: (1) whether universals exist ante rem as exemplars in God's mind, (2) whether universals exist in rebus within particulars, and (3) whether universals exist post rem as universal concepts in human thinking—with his position differing from both realism and conceptualism on all three.
“distinguish three questions about universals uh questions which in the literature are often worded with regards to their relationship ship to particulars to the particular thing the race um are there universals an prior to the particular are there universals in rabus in particulars and are there universals in some sense after post Rum After particulars”
Throughout Western intellectual history, competing worldview traditions (philosophical naturalism, idealism/pantheism, and theism) have each incorporated changing conceptual models drawn from the science of their day, with Greek science (Platonic, Pythagorean, and Aristotelian) shaping medieval philosophy across all traditions.
“what we find running through history is a variety of world viw Traditions a variety of worldview traditions if you like um philosophical naturalism explaining everything in terms of physical processes some kind of idealism or pantheism as in the neoplatonic tradition and theism whether Christian Jewish Muslim different worldview traditions and we've been noticing how um the other variable that stands out in the course of history is changing conceptual models drawn from the science of the day”
In early modernity there is a conflict between Platonic influences renewed by the Renaissance and the influences of empirical science; this tension is more visible than competition between Aristotle (now in decline) and Plato, as Aristotle loses epistemological authority in the modern period.
“so if um you you've seen sort of a competition between Plato and Aristotle going on in medieval times Aristotle now goes into decline Plato goes into the aent and the conflict that develops is more between platonic kind influences and the influences of empirical science and obviously there's a tension there”
The logic of Scotus and Ockham was oriented more toward dialectical criticism of opposing views than toward systematic development of syllogistic proofs characteristic of Aristotelian and Thomistic logic, reflecting a shift in rational methodology.
“as we mentioned before the logic of scotus and aam is more oriented towards a dialectical criticism of other people's views than towards the systematic development of syllogistic proofs for this that and the other the way it was in Aristotle and Thomas”
Francis Bacon addresses skepticism by proposing skepticism itself as a diagnostic tool; he identifies 'Idols'—false ways of thinking inherited from past philosophies, naive observation, popular beliefs, and linguistic misuse—and proposes empirical methods and inductive gathering of evidence as means to escape these errors and determine causes.
“you're going to be reading Francis Bacon for Monday are you not you'll find that Francis Bacon talks of certain Idols interesting term to use when you're talking of wrong ways of thinking see he talks of certain Idols about which he is skeptical you see they include all traditional philosophies passed down from the past they include um naive observation popular viewpoints uh ideas that are suggested by misuses of language in other words he's posing the very kinds of problems which skepticism was concerned with how are we going to know for sure and what bacon does is to propose methods methods for empirical learning inductive Gathering of evidence drawing conclusions about causes”
The old Aristotelian epistemology (which grounded knowledge in abstracting forms from particulars and thinking analogically about the hierarchy of being) lost credibility when nominalism rejected the theory of forms and hierarchy of being, creating an epistemological crisis to which skepticism was a natural response.
“if the Tom mytic epistemology is about um abstracting forms from particulars and thinking analogically about the hierarchy of being and that sort of thing and you're no longer talking of forms and a hierarchy of being then what good is the Aristotelian epistemology in any case”
Bacon, in his Elizabethan utopianism, envisions a magnificent utopian society built on the foundation of the new empirical mechanistic science of efficient causes, representing an optimistic vision of human progress through scientific method.
“what bacon in his Elizabethan utopianism does is to Envision a magnificent utopian Society built on the new empirical mechanistic science of efficient causes yeah fascinating stuff”
Ockham appeals to 'right reason'—reflection on our experience of contingent events in creation—as the basis for ethics rather than natural law, representing a kind of consequentialist approach where moral assessment depends on evaluating particular consequences rather than deriving from essential natures.
“and beyond that he appeals to Simply what he calls right reason right reason is a reflection on our experience of the contingent uh events of creation so it's simply our empirical way of seeing what would seem to be best in this sort of contingent creation a kind of consequentialist approach”
The Renaissance (15th-16th centuries) witnessed a rediscovery of classical manuscripts leading to renewed study of classical philosophy, particularly Platonic and Neoplatonic thought, which became influential in English and Italian Renaissance philosophy.
“the richness of the Renaissance the um 16th 15th 16th centuries um the kind of Renaissance of classical learning which went on triggered in measure by the rediscovery of classical manuscript leading in turn to a Renaissance of classical scholarship leading in turn to a Renaissance of various kinds of classical philosophy and particularly influential in the English Renaissance in the Italian Renaissance Plato and neoplatonism Plato and neoplatonism”
Augustine and other church figures resisted and rejected Pelagianism in the 4th-5th centuries, making Pelagianism recognized as heretical by the time of Luther, so accusations of Pelagianism against Ockham and his followers represented a serious theological charge.
“Augustine and um others resisted rejected pelagianism so that by the time you get get to Luther it's recognized to be certainly heretical and he accused aam of the heresy of pelagianism”
In Ockham's framework, primary intention refers to the mind's direct reference to particular objects, while secondary intention refers to the terms or concepts through which we think about those objects; when we think of particular things, we use both but the primary intention is directed to the particulars, the secondary to the mediating term.
“the primary intention in knowing is um reference to the particular object that's the primary intention reference of the particular object”
Pelagianism was a 4th-5th century heresy articulated by the British monk Pelagius, who emphasized human free will and the capacity to obey God through reason and the example of Christ, denying original sin and hereditary bondage.
“pagus as um you you may recall back in the 4th century was a British monk who had emphasize the free will to the extent that he found it necessary to deny any original hereditary sin that um holds Us in bondage and maintained that we are perfectly free to um obey God um simply by virtue of the influence of the example of Christ in his life and his suffering”
In Ockham's account, universal terms refer to classes of particulars through an act of reference that is particular (a mental act) but has universal application, so that one can use a term like 'beauty' to refer to all beautiful things (wife's face, Monet painting, Chicago Picasso) without presupposing a universal form or concept of beauty.
“when I refer to Beauty which sounds like an abstract general idea um aam would say that I'm using that word with a reference to a whole lot of particular things and I'll name some of them for you if you ask me my wife's face is one um a um Monae painting is another the Chicago Picasso is a third yeah I really think that's beautiful the Chicago Picasso am I odd well um all right my examples you see so I use the word with reference to things”
The Scientific Revolution was not purely empirical but involved two distinct traditions: an empirical tradition influenced by inductive methods (beginning with Bacon) and a rationalistic tradition influenced by mathematical methods (beginning with Descartes).
“be be careful not to um make a further jump and say that the new science was completely empirical um the fact is that um what we going to be tracing is um two different scientific and philosophical movements in modern times one of which is um basically an empirical tradition and the other of which being more mathematically oriented is more of a rationalistic tradition from an epistemological standpoint the empirical tradition begins with bacon Francis Bacon”
Martin Luther was educated in nominalism at the University of Erfurt and admired Ockham as his 'dear master,' but later advocated eliminating Aristotle from university curricula (except logic and rhetoric), showing a complex relationship with medieval Scholasticism.
“Martin Luther was um educated um at a um German University at airort by nominalists of emist persuasion he knew the writings of Aram and at one stage relatively early he called aam my dear master interesting huh oh he he also um there in school studied Aristotle and the Scholastics and in his early teaching years he had to teach Aristotle's ethics and hated the job uh there was a stage later on when he advocated eliminating Aristotle from the University curriculum apart from the logic and rhetoric”
A student's question reveals that Ockham's account of universal terms seems to presuppose some understanding of the nature of being, suggesting that even a nominalist must have some concept of the form or essence to which to apply the term—exposing a potential tension in Ockham's position.
“it seems implied within using that sort of terminology that you would have to have some sort of concept or form of of beauty yes to which to to apply that term”
Both the British empirical and Continental rationalist traditions attempted to address epistemological problems (particularly skepticism), but they ran into respective kinds of problems, prompting attempts to bring the two traditions together, which Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781) represented as a curious synthesis.
“what happens is that as these two run into respective kinds of problems some of which were sketched out by Willard on Wednesday night um an attempt arises to bring the two together in um a curious Way by Emanuel C critique of pure reason 1781 big date”
In the 20th century, Anglo-American philosophy continued largely in the empiricist tradition while Continental philosophy continued largely in the rationalist/idealist tradition, representing a sustained divergence of philosophical approaches.
“in the 20th century um well it's largely a continuation of the empiricist tradition in anglo-american philosophy and largely a continuation of the Continental tradition still in the Continental philosophy further development those from those Beginnings”
Erasmus was more Platonic, Melanchthon was the holdout for Aristotelianism, creating a rich and contested picture of Reformation theology's philosophical sources.
“Erasmus was more the platonist meenon was the hold out for aristotelianism and so the picture is rather interesting”
Even figures like Bacon and Hobbes who rejected Plato's theory of forms nonetheless paid philosophical compliments to Plato, showing the continued intellectual prestige of Platonism despite opposition to it.
“so that even though people like bacon and Hobs and lock want nothing to do with Plato's forms they all pay their compliments to Plato yes”
Ockham had no idea where his philosophical ideas would lead historically; the instructor explicitly declines to blame Ockham personally for the emergence of scientific naturalism, even while tracing the historical connection between nominalism and modern scientific philosophy.
“no I don't want to blame it all on a I don't suggest you to um no um aam had no idea where this was going his concerns were other than that but um this is the Intriguing story”