What this covers

Russ Roberts hosts economist Clifford Winston of the Brookings Institution in this conversation about occupational licensing of lawyers and its economic consequences. Winston, drawing on his book First Thing We Do, Let's Deregulate All the Lawyers, argues that the combination of supply restrictions—enforced through ABA accreditation and bar exams that reject roughly half of applicants—and government-generated demand for legal services through regulation and litigation has inflated lawyers' earnings far beyond what competition would sustain. The two examine how this dual pressure produces what Winston estimates as deadweight losses in the billions and warps incentives across related sectors of the economy.

The conversation ranges widely across the mechanisms and political economy of licensing. Winston details how only lawyers can own law firms, barring corporations and banks from offering integrated services; how "unauthorized practice of law" rules shut down vocational alternatives that could handle routine work like wills and divorces; and how the ABA actively discourages quality ratings rather than treating licensing as an information problem. Roberts and Winston explore the special interest dynamics at work—how lawyers' disproportionate presence in politics reflects not the need for legal expertise but their outsized stake in legislation, and how the profession resists efficiency-improving reforms in tort, regulation, and tax policy that would reduce the demand for their services. The discussion includes historical points (that licensing arrived without evidence of quality failures) and comparative cases (teacher certification, retail health services) that parallel the legal profession. Winston sketches what deregulation might enable—online schools, corporate legal services, retail legal windows, rating systems—arguing that the biggest gain lies not in predictable cost reduction but in unanticipated market innovation. The episode closes on a pragmatic note: incremental state-level experiments, rather than national reform, could demonstrate whether loosened entry actually delivers lower prices and broader access without the professional disasters its defenders warn of.

Sharpest takeaway

Winston argues that occupational licensing of lawyers—mandatory ABA-accredited law school plus bar exams—combined with government-generated demand for legal services produces large earnings premiums and deadweight losses, and that deregulating entry would lower costs, spur innovation, and weaken lawyers' incentive to defend inefficient status-quo policies.

  • Licensing restricts supply (only ~half of applicants get into accredited schools) while regulation, liability, and tax complexity inflate demand, jointly pushing up wages.
  • Estimated earnings premiums grew from ~20-25% to near 50%, implying deadweight losses in the billions.
  • Deregulation would unleash hard-to-anticipate market responses (vocational/online schools, corporate-owned legal services, retail legal windows) rather than a flood of incompetents.

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0.81

Only lawyers are permitted to own and run a law firm, so corporations, banks, MBAs, and economists cannot offer integrated legal services—a structural restriction that blocks competition at the high end and helps sustain the premium.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“you have to be a lawyer to run a law firm mm-hmm right right”

0.80

The 'bootleggers and Baptists' dynamic applies to licensing: a high-minded consumer-protection rationale coexists with a venal self-interested motivation (protecting incomes), and proponents always invoke protection rather than admitting the wage-preserving effect; whether protection actually occurs is an empirical question.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“there's a bootlegger and Baptist problem... you have a sort of high-minded idea for why this regulation might be good which is a protected and consumer then you have a venal self-interested motivation”

0.73

Much routine legal work (wills, divorces, services like LegalZoom provides) does not require three years of law school and could be delivered by someone with about a year of vocational training, analogous to physician's assistants in medicine, yet such providers are shut down under broad 'unauthorized practice of law' rules.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Clifford Winston

“a lot of this stuff really is not the kind of thing you need three years of law school somebody could go to vocational school for a year or so and provide that kind of services is we now are seeing on the medical profession”

0.73

The disproportionate presence of lawyers among politicians historically is better explained not by the standard story that legislators need legal skill to write law (which would only justify legally-trained staff), but by the cynical observation that lawyers as a special interest have the biggest gains from writing legislation, share a common framework and language with one another, enjoy self-regulation, and rotate between government and private practice, making them a powerful interest group shaping policy in ways that benefit themselves.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“who has the biggest incentive thinking in the most cynical terms about this... liars is a special interest you know lawyers have the biggest gains perhaps from writing legislations”

0.73

When the ABA's accreditation and licensing regime first took hold, there was no evidence of real quality problems with legal services, no consumer complaints, and no retrospective assessment showing quality improved; moreover early on lawyers themselves had not attended accredited schools, so they would have had to declare themselves unqualified, indicating the regime was not a response to a demonstrated quality failure.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Clifford Winston

“those were lawyers weren't accredited themselves and hadn't gone to accredited law school and so they themselves would be saying we're not qualified”

0.73

Licensing is a peculiar way to address an information problem because information problems are normally solved with direct information policies—disclosure signs, inspections, ratings, fraud suits, general business law—yet the ABA actively discourages ratings of law schools and lawyers, opting instead to tell consumers not to investigate quality because certification handles it.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Clifford Winston

“most information problems are presumably addressed with information policies directly”

0.73

Lawyers are unique in benefiting from a double pressure on wages: a supply restriction via licensing combined with a demand expansion generated by government—regulation, liability, and litigation all create demand for lawyers—so the combination of restricted supply and government-induced demand pushes earnings up.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Clifford Winston

“they have a very nice situation which you arguably is pretty much unique to the legal profession that you have a restriction on the supply side because of these licensing requirements yet you also have pressures on the demand side to use lawyers”

0.73

Among roughly 100 top monetary scholars who plausibly think they have a real shot at becoming Fed chair, that ambition gives them a muted incentive to speak honestly about the impact of the Fed on the US economy—an example of how career and political-appointment incentives can compromise economists' scholarly objectivity.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“how many of them think they have a decent shot... given that what's their incentive to speak honestly about the impact of the Fed on the US economy I'd say it's muted”

0.73

Critics over-focus on the supply side, but expanding law school slots by 20-25% would mainly lower the cost of everyday legal services (wills, divorce, real estate, closings) rather than affect high-end activity like mergers, acquisitions, and regulatory work; therefore the estimated premiums largely reflect government-generated demand via regulation rather than the profession's licensing structure, making regulation the deeper problem.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“the real problem here is the demand side the real problem is the regulations that don't there aren't good regulations”

0.73

Forcing rejected law school applicants into other professions pushes down wages in those fields, lowering the cost of those activities and causing society to over-consume them—a labor-market distortion caused by restricting legal entry.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“all the rejected lawyers who don't get into law school... now they have to go into something else absolutely which pushes down the wages in those fields which makes those activities less expensive which means we do too much of those things”

0.70

Retail chains like Walmart, CVS, and Walgreens now legally offer in-store services such as flu shots administered by non-physicians despite initial warnings of danger, showing that prohibited innovations in licensed professions can prove safe and useful—a model for imagining legal-services windows at retailers.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“Walmart and CVS and Walgreens now offer a legal but innovative... where you can walk in and could say get a flu shot... administered by somebody who's didn't get it out of em D”

0.70

The legalization of legal-services advertising, though feared at the time as a wasteful arms race that would raise prices, instead resulted mainly in advertising whose information content is the existence of services rather than explicit prices, and it happened despite law firm opposition—offering hope that competition-encouraging reforms can succeed.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“a lot of people said well this is a bad idea it's going to lead to higher prices because all that advertising is going to be wasted expenditure”

0.69

The book's empirical analysis estimates lawyers' earnings premium grew from about 20-25% early in the sample to close to 50%, consistent with tightening entry restrictions plus growing demand, and converts this into deadweight losses in the billions of dollars plus labor-supply distortions and reduced innovation; the premium cannot be cleanly decomposed into rents versus unobserved ability, but the policies driving the growth (liability, regulation, patent policy) lack clear evidence of offsetting social benefits.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Clifford Winston

“premium have been in the legal profession you know anywhere from I think 20 to 25 percent at the beginning part of our sample but but the interesting thing is they've grown... up to close to 50 percent”

0.68

Whatever the absolute number of lawyers, America has too few of them competing as intensely as they could be and too many earning very high wages; with more competition those premiums would fall.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Clifford Winston

“we have too few of them competing as intensely as they could be and probably too many that are getting paid you know very very high wages and that that with competition we would those kinds of premiums fall”

0.68

The biggest interest group fighting tax simplification is not ideologues on either side of the size-of-government debate but accountants and tax lawyers who benefit from the labyrinthine, complex tax code that generates their work.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“the biggest interest group that fights Tax Simplification isn't the ideologues on one side of the size of government debate or the other it's the people who benefit from the system which are accountants and tax lawyers”

0.68

Occupational licensing of lawyers exists ostensibly to solve an information-asymmetry problem—certifying that a practitioner has passed a quality threshold—but it functions primarily as a supply-side entry barrier, since most states require graduation from an ABA-accredited law school plus passing a bar exam, and roughly half of applicants fail to get into accredited schools (an underestimate, since many are discouraged from applying).

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Clifford Winston

“the key part about lawyers that we call occupational licensing that is presumably for reasons of information quality that people can't really tell in advance whether they're going to get a lawyer that's competent honest and reliable”

0.68

Lawyers writing and litigating regulations are not hired to step back and assess whether a law is good in terms of economic efficiency or social welfare; their training and incentives orient them toward understanding and executing policy rather than evaluating it, leaving a powerful group with major input to public policy that never asks whether what they do promotes welfare.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Clifford Winston

“one thing you're not hired to do is to step back and fess assess is this a good law in the sense of economic efficiency or social welfare”

0.68

Lawyers' status-quo bias and large political contributions help preserve inefficient policies—liability/tort, regulation, and the patent regime—where external academic evidence makes it hard to show positive net social benefits, so the profession resists efficiency-improving reforms that would reduce transactions costs and litigation.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Clifford Winston

“we have a status quo bias which you know I think continues to benefit the legal profession”

0.68

Education schools and teacher certification illustrate the same licensing pattern: K-12 teachers must earn an education degree while university professors need none, yet examining what education schools actually teach shows it does not necessarily make people better teachers—paralleling how law school, an interesting intellectual experience, does not necessarily help with the practical work lawyers do.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Clifford Winston

“when you look at what goes on in education schools you realize it doesn't necessarily require helping people to become better teachers similarly going to law school... doesn't necessarily help you very much in a lot of the practical things”

0.63

The ABA accreditation process is far from pro forma—it stretches over years, turns down applicants without making the rejections public, and refuses to accredit online or foreign law schools even for specialized work—clearly restricting the supply of law schools.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Clifford Winston

“it's it's hardly pro forma... this stretches out for a number of years... they obviously don't let online law schools become accredited they do not let foreign law schools become accredited”

0.59

Deregulating legal entry would unleash hard-to-anticipate market responses—online and vocational law schools, one-year degrees, corporations and banks offering legal services (currently barred because only lawyers can own a law firm), retail legal windows at stores like Walmart/CVS, and rating services like Angie's List to address quality—rather than producing a flood of incompetent practitioners; the biggest payoff of deregulation is unanticipated innovation.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Clifford Winston

“people will sort of statically look at the legal profession and don't anticipate that when you open things up and deregulation you start seeing other parts of the economy change”

0.57

Because efficient public policy is hard to achieve directly, deregulating legal entry is a tractable 'back door': introducing competition in some areas would reduce the premiums government can deliver to lawyers, which in turn could weaken lawyers' incentive to defend status-quo-biased policies and open a positive direction for reform.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Clifford Winston

“if we could reduce the incentives were keeping status quo bias possibly with competition in a number of these areas... that might be an effective first step and so that's why we focus on deregulating entry”

0.52

Reform of the legal profession should proceed incrementally at the state level rather than as national policy, exploiting the US ability to experiment—as airline deregulation was first observed in California and Texas—by relaxing entry requirements or letting paralegals practice certain services without lawyer supervision, demonstrating lower prices and expanded access for lower-income people without the predicted horror stories.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Clifford Winston

“we have the possibility of experimenting you know Airlines was not a national deregulatory policy at first you know we could learn from the state that had basically a form of deregulation California and Texas”

0.44

California is unusual in letting anyone sit for its bar exam without requiring an ABA-accredited law school, and its exam is reputed to be one of the hardest, which the profession justifies as a screening device.

factualestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Clifford Winston

“California is unusual in that they let anybody sit for their bar exam... it's thought to be one of the hardest tests that are out there”

0.38

The bar review course industry is a private-sector response to the regulatory barrier of the bar exam, functioning like a 'mini law school' for passing the test; it is highly profitable and widely used, creating an odd dynamic where lawyers who write exams to keep entrants out coexist with a private market helping entrants pass.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Clifford Winston

“it really goes to show how markets look for opportunities that are sometimes created by regulations that's the bar Review course”

0.34

Lawyers within the profession often argue there are already too many lawyers and too many law schools, urging slower accreditation—an attitude that aligns with their self-interest in restricting supply.

factualcontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Clifford Winston

“people in the professions think they're having a big enough effect that if anything they say look you know we just have too many lawyers and this obviously starts with too many law schools”

0.33

Bar exams are written by lawyers, who have a conflict of interest giving them an incentive to make the exam hard, though political backlash would result if almost nobody could pass, creating a balance.

causalcontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“presumably lawyers write the exam and they're... kind of a conflict of interest in that they have an incentive to make the exam hard obviously they make it so hard that almost nobody passes there'd be a political uproar”

0.22

A 15-year-old who had not finished high school successfully gave legal advice on a website by reading law in a library, illustrating that useful legal services can be provided without formal credentials.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 1/4· Clifford Winston

“we mentioned one guy that actually did that he was was quite successful was 15 with high school he was giving advice on a website”