What this covers

Gary Stern, former president of the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank, sits down with Russ Roberts to discuss his book Too Big To Fail and the machinery of moral hazard in financial markets. The conversation traces a history of government rescues—from Continental Illinois in 1984 through the 2008 crisis—and examines how each bailout signals to creditors that they will be protected from losses. Stern's central claim is that the damage flows not through equity holders but through creditors, whose expectation of protection causes them to stop pricing risk accurately and therefore stop policing how much leverage and risk systemically important institutions take on.

The discussion moves through the specific incentive mechanics: how a leveraged firm can maximize returns on its asset base by betting with creditors' mispriced money, why equity losses alone leave this problem untouched, and how creditors' behavior at moments of crisis—such as repo lenders' sudden refusal to fund Bear Stearns—reveals their residual doubt about whether protection will actually materialize. Stern and Roberts examine the legislative and institutional record: the 1991 FDICIA law's "systemic-risk exception," the Long-Term Capital Management resolution, Fannie Mae's design as a de facto government guarantee, and the forbearance of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The conversation concludes with Stern's argument that the only credible fix is advance preparation—regulators identifying and constraining counterparty exposures in normal times so that spillover effects become limited enough that creditor losses become politically and economically feasible when failure actually occurs. Stern contends that announcing "no more bailouts" persuades no one; only changing the underlying regime can shift creditors' expectations and restore market discipline.

Sharpest takeaway

Stern argues that 'too big to fail' creates moral hazard not through equity holders but through creditors, who—expecting government protection—stop pricing risk, causing systemically important institutions to lever up excessively; the only credible fix is advance preparation to limit spillovers so creditors can plausibly be allowed to suffer losses.

  • Imposing losses on equity holders does nothing for moral hazard because equity is diversified; only putting creditors at risk restores market discipline.
  • Protected creditors mispriced risk too low, leading firms to take on excessive leverage and risk.
  • Bailouts cannot credibly be refused mid-crisis unless spillover effects were limited through preparation beforehand.

The claims · ranked34 claims · weighted by value

This asset isn't compiled yet

You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.

0.81

Investors can rationally buy paper from a poor-quality institution by adding a timing dimension: even believing a firm may eventually fail, they ask whether something terrible will happen in the next 30 days, and if not, they buy short-dated (one or two month) instruments—as illustrated by a money market manager who bought one-to-two-month Continental Illinois CDs because Continental would fail 'but not in the next month or two.'

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Gary Stern

“he was willing to buy one month or two months CDs because... he said to himself you know continental will say may fail but not in the next month or two”

0.80

Predicting the timing of a financial crisis is virtually impossible; even people who correctly identified that residential real estate was overvalued and subprime lending was a problem could not have called whether the crisis began in August 2007 versus 2005 or 2011, and anyone who got it right likely could not repeat it.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Gary Stern

“trying to predict in advance what's going to set off a financial crisis is virtually impossible”

0.78

When creditors expect to be protected, they have no incentive to monitor the risk an institution takes, which means risk-taking is mispriced too low; and when something is priced too low, too much of it is consumed—so protected institutions take on excessive risk and leverage.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Gary Stern

“if creditors expect to be protected then they have no incentive to worry about the risks the institution is taking which is just another way of saying that risk taking is mispriced it's priced too low and we know that when something is priced too low too much of it will be taken on”

0.78

In a too-big-to-fail world, a leveraged firm has a strong incentive to maximize leverage—betting less of its own assets and more of other people's money—because creditors, expecting a bailout, are comfortable lending at relatively low rates, allowing the firm to raise its return on its asset base by taking riskier and larger bets; the key driver is the creditors' mispricing of risk, a failure of market discipline.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Gary Stern

“if I'm at the 50-50 and I'm living in a world of too big to fail don't I have a natural incentive to increase that leverage as much as possible and bet little of my assets and more and more of other people's money”

0.78

Stiffened capital requirements and similar regulatory rules tend to be flexible and subject to a political dynamic that erodes them over time, so proposals to recreate Fannie and Freddie with 'different regulatory strictures this time' are self-deluding because the incentives are preserved.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“those regulations tend to be flexible there's a political dynamic that's often ignored”

0.73

Bear Stearns failed when overnight repo lenders finally refused to roll over funding; they stopped despite possible bailout expectations because they made a risk-reward calculation that the government might rescue Bear but they did not want to be there to find out, reflecting residual uncertainty about whether protection would materialize.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Gary Stern

“the plug gets pulled on them when lenders finally in the overnight repo market... say no more”

0.73

Imposing losses on equity holders does not address the moral hazard problem because equity holders of large institutions are broadly diversified, holding small proportions across many companies, so even a bankruptcy has little effect on their portfolio—unlike a family-owned community bank whose wealth is concentrated in its equity.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Gary Stern

“imposing losses on equity holders is it doesn't do any good in terms of dealing with moral hazard”

0.73

Bear Stearns and Lehman's extreme leverage (33-to-1, 40-to-1, 50-to-1) is puzzling because it put the firm's existence at risk from small asset-value changes; the explanation is that cheap borrowing let them make much larger and riskier bets they believed would more than compensate, and a partial explanation for why they could borrow so cheaply is that they were lending to each other, raising the perceived likelihood of mutual bailout.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“Bear Stearns or Lehman that leveraged 33 to 1 40 to 1 50 to 1 meaning they're putting in a dollar or two of their own assets for every hundred dollars... when you do that... a small change in asset value wipes you out”

0.73

The fire-sale argument against forced liquidation overstates the importance of selling 'quickly'; the real problem in cases like LTCM was not the speed of sale but that the assets simply were not worth nearly as much as their holders believed—making fire-sale concerns and mark-to-market criticism partly misdirected.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“it gets too much of mileage out of the quickly part... the real problem isn't the speed at which they have to sell them it's that the assets aren't worth very much”

0.73

Preparation in normal times—identifying where large institutions have major exposures, to which counterparties and markets, and using authority to reduce excessive exposures in advance—is essential because it limits spillover effects, lowering the cost of letting an institution fail so the benefit-cost equation favors allowing creditor losses; doing this analysis mid-crisis is too late.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Gary Stern

“preparation means identifying and then taking steps to limit those spillover effects... a lot of that information is already available you look at where do these large institutions have major exposures”

0.71

Continental Illinois (1984) is the forefather of modern too-big-to-fail: all its creditors, large and small, were protected by the federal government because policymakers feared spillover/contagion effects given its roughly 5,000 counterparties and the fact that community banks had exposures to it in excess of their own capital.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Gary Stern

“continental Illinois at the time was a very highly regarded commercial bank... The creditors of continental Illinois large and small... were protected by the federal government and the reason for that protection... was policymakers concerns about spill overs or contagion effects”

0.71

The Long-Term Capital Management resolution in 1998—where the New York Fed convened private Wall Street counterparties to put in funds for an orderly unwinding—reinforced too-big-to-fail expectations even though no government money was used, because the government's convening was effectively coercive rather than a voluntary matchmaking.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Gary Stern

“the Federal Reserve Bank of New York sort of convened a group of... large Wall Street counterparties and persuaded them to... put in enough funds and so that long-term capital management positions could be unwound in an orderly way”

0.71

Following the Continental Illinois episode, the Comptroller of the Currency testified before Congress that there were roughly 11 banks considered too big to fail, which sent a strong signal to creditors of those institutions that they would not be exposed to losses no matter how large the risks taken.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Gary Stern

“the controller at the core of the currency at the time indicated that there was something like 11 banks in the country that he considered too big to fail and of course that set a pretty strong signal to the creditors of those institutions”

0.71

Fannie Mae was inherently unstable and dysfunctionally designed—as close to a legally written guarantee as possible—because creditors and securities buyers correctly believed the government would bail them out, creating unhealthy incentives that economists widely recognized would eventually corrupt its regulation and cause it to blow up, though the timing was unpredictable.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Gary Stern

“an institution like Fannie Mae was inherently unstable... it was dysfunctionally designed in that there was that impression... that creditors and lenders and bond buyers... of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stuff believed correctly as it turned out that the government would bail them out”

0.71

The core solution to too-big-to-fail is to credibly put creditors of systemically important institutions at risk of loss; simply announcing 'no more bailouts' is not credible—policymakers must take actions that change the regime so creditors understand there is a much higher (though not 100%) probability they will lose money if an institution fails.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Gary Stern

“we've got to find a way to credibly put creditors of these systemically important institutions at risk of loss you can't simply say... we're not going to bail you out that's not a credible statement you have to take actions”

0.70

Communicating the preparation and the reasons behind it to creditors in advance produces better pricing of risk in the marketplace, making crisis events less likely (not zero) and potentially setting up a virtuous circle.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Gary Stern

“if you communicate to creditors in advance the nature of your preparation and the reason behind it... you'll get better pricing of risk taking in the marketplace which will make these events less likely”

0.70

Forbearance during the late-1980s/early-1990s banking crisis—where large institutions that would have been insolvent if marked to market were given time to recover instead of being resolved—was recognized by sophisticated creditors and reinforced the expectation that creditors of systemically important institutions would be protected directly or indirectly.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Gary Stern

“there was also an episode of forbearance where some large financial institutions had you marked their balance sheets to market would have been seen to be insolvent but that wasn't done in fact they were given time to recover”

0.70

The 1991 FDICIA legislation required least-cost resolution to impose losses on creditors, but contained a systemic-risk exception that allowed regulators to avoid it—an exception requiring agreement of the FDIC, Federal Reserve board, President, and Treasury Secretary, the very same parties who had bailed out Continental Illinois—so the law merely formalized the existing too-big-to-fail practice rather than ending it.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Gary Stern

“the government had to engage in least cost resolution... the idea behind that was to in fact impose losses on creditors”

0.69

Lehman's ability to keep borrowing after Bear Stearns—despite books that looked much like Bear's—and the Reserve Primary money market fund's large lending to Lehman both strongly suggest market participants believed Lehman creditors would be protected; the fund 'broke the buck' partly because they had assumed a decent chance of a bailout.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“as Lehman becomes more leveraged Lehman whose books look a lot like Bear Stearns... is somehow able to continue borrowing money to me suggests strongly that people thought that they would be taken care of”

0.68

Over the last 15 months the average American sent hundreds of billions of dollars to some of the richest people on earth via too-big-to-fail bailouts; the more the public understands this, the better the chance political incentives will change, while ignorance keeps the bailout-favoring political incentives in place.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“what has in fact happened over the last 15 months is that the average American has sent hundreds of billions of dollars to the richest some of the richest people in the face of the earth”

0.68

Concerns about inflation from the expanded Fed balance sheet are exaggerated because the strong money-inflation relationship operates only over the long run (5 to 10+ years), so balance-sheet changes over a year or two are not decisive unless they persist; and the US/global record of diminishing, low inflation since the early 1980s gives some confidence central banks may manage the timing of tightening correctly.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Gary Stern

“while there's a very strong relationship between money inflation in the long run you have to emphasize long run which is periods of 5 and more likely 10 years... so what happens to the balance sheets for a period of a year or two is not going to be decisive unless it persists”

0.68

Executives were insulated from the downside of their firms' collapse because they couldn't have cashed out equity at its peak anyway, earned very large salaries along the way, sold some stock in good times, and prudently diversified their personal wealth into safer assets—so despite stocks falling, many remained worth hundreds of millions.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“they were comforted by the fact that one they couldn't have cashed that out when they were high and secondly they may very very large sums of money in salary along the way and they did sell some of their stock in the good times so they're worth many of them are worth hundreds of millions of dollars despite the fact that their stocks went down”

0.68

Managers and large shareholders of failed institutions were not more greedy than past generations; they were rationally responding to the incentives they faced, and it strains credibility to claim people became more greedy in the 2000s than 20, 30, or 40 years ago.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Gary Stern

“I don't think that the management or large shareholders of some of the institutions that got into serious difficulty were excessively greedy or greedier than management in the past or anything like that I think they were responding to the incentives they confronted”

0.68

Consistent mark-to-market accounting pursued over time would be helpful rather than detrimental to financial stability, contrary to claims that mark-to-market exacerbates crises.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Gary Stern

“if a mark to market accounting were pursued in a consistent way over time it would clearly be helpful rather than that detrimental to financial stability”

0.66

A policy of letting less-interconnected institutions fail creates an incentive for firms to become MORE interconnected to qualify for protection—an objection Stern concedes but argues is countered by ongoing supervisory authority to force reduction of excessive exposures.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“if it became known and it was a credible promise that we were going to make some suffering take place then you have an incentive to be more [interconnected]”

0.65

Alan Meltzer told Hank Paulson to use the FDICIA systemic-risk exception in the current crisis, but Paulson asked the banks, who were against it because invoking it would remove their management.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“I interviewed Alan Meltzer about this... I asked Alan why we didn't use [FDICIA]... he said well I told Hank Paulson to use it and I said what did Paulson say and he said well I asked the banks and they were against it”

0.65

Lehman Brothers receives too much blame and AIG not enough as the trigger of the deepening crisis, because AIG was a triple-A rated institution with worldwide exposures and no effective comprehensive supervision whose failure came out of the blue, whereas Lehman's creditors had ample opportunity over the six months after Bear Stearns to adjust their exposures.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Gary Stern

“I think maybe Lehman gets a little too much blame there frankly and AIG not enough because AIG was a triple-A rated institution with exposures around the world with no effective comprehensive supervision”

0.63

Stern would place at least a small bet that had Bear Stearns been allowed to fail or Lehman handled differently, the economy today would be much weaker with much more dire prospects; he cannot quantify it but believes the consequences would have been exceedingly severe and that history cautions against inadequate responses to major financial disruptions.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Gary Stern

“I would be willing to place at least a small bet that if we were having this conversation in today but in the wake of a different decision we would be looking at a much weaker economy with much more dire prospects”

0.63

The Fed's purchase of $600-800 billion in Fannie/Freddie mortgage-backed securities was driven primarily by a macro objective—reacting to a deep recession after short-term rates hit zero—choosing broad, deep markets rather than picking among corporate credits, rather than principally by concern about supporting housing prices.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Gary Stern

“what really is dominant there is the macro objective... when short-term interest rates hit zero then obviously you had to look for other ways to have a macro effect and these were the logical places to look not so much in my judgement because of concern about housing”

0.61

Supervision and regulation, however effective, cannot by itself solve the too-big-to-fail problem given the incentives involved, and there is little evidence it can; relying on better supervision while preserving the same incentives is 'kidding yourself.'

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Gary Stern

“we should not kid ourselves that supervision of regulation by itself is capable of dealing with the too-big-to-fail problem”

0.40

The technical name for the dynamic in which protected creditors stop monitoring risk is 'moral hazard,' an ugly phrase that conveys little about what it really is.

definitionestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“the technical name for that is moral hazard that's what the economists call it... it's a really ugly phrase doesn't convey anything about what it really is”

0.36

Drexel Burnham was allowed to fail and wound down in an orderly way, with the government letting it go.

factualestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“one was 1991 when drexel burnham went out of business... at drexel the government let him go... and wound them down in an orderly way”

0.36

Bear Stearns was the only Wall Street firm that refused to participate in the LTCM rescue and paid a reputational price with its counterparties for that refusal.

factualestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“Bear Stearns was the only Wall Street firm that refused to go along with that and they paid a reputational price with their counterparties”

0.30

Continental Illinois was the largest bank in the United States (or about seventh largest) at the time of its failure, yet most people today have never heard of it.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“They were the largest bank in the United States at the time I think seventh largest or something like that they were big... the irony of course is that most people listening have never heard of them”