What this covers

This is a university lecture, number 46 in a history of philosophy series, devoted to David Hume. A single lecturer carries it, with one stretch where a student's question is taken up. The lecture sets Hume against the preceding generation. Barely fifty years separate John Locke's Essay (1690) and Hume's Inquiry (1748), yet Locke's rationalist optimism about empirical knowledge has turned into skepticism. The lecturer frames the Treatise, subtitled as an attempt to bring the experimental method into moral subjects, as a descriptive psychology of belief and action rather than an effort to justify knowledge by evidence. The Inquiry then separates abstruse philosophy, which is precise but offers no footing for morality or knowledge of the world, from practical philosophy.

The middle of the lecture works through Hume's theory of ideas). Impressions replace Locke's simple ideas as the original input, and they are told apart from ideas by force and vivacity, an affective measure rather than the clarity and distinctness of René Descartes. The lecturer's examples are a flash of light that hurts before it is conceptualized and a shout that startles before it is understood. From there the lecture applies the empiricist criterion of meaning to necessary connection, miracles, infinity, abstract universals, and substance. Causation is reduced to observed constant conjunction, and existence is said to be no property of ideas, which the lecturer ties forward to Immanuel Kant's critique of the ontological argument.

Two turns stand out. One is the account of the self as a bundle of perceptions linked by memory, pictured as a theater with no stage behind it. The lecturer notes that Descartes, Locke, and George Berkeley never turned the criterion on "mind." The other is the student discussion, which argues that the criterion leads straight to nominalism. The lecture also looks ahead to logical positivism, whose verification principle undermines itself because it cannot be verified empirically, and it briefly describes language as playing games beyond naming, including mathematics and poetry.

Sharpest takeaway

Hume's empiricism fundamentally revises the rationalist project by grounding knowledge and belief in psychology and experience rather than reason, making the empiricist criterion of meaning—tracing ideas back to impressions—the test of philosophical validity rather than logical proof.

  • Hume rejects Locke's evidentialist rationalism, arguing belief follows from psychological habit and affective force, not proportional evidence
  • The empiricist criterion of meaning (ideas must trace to impressions) eliminates abstract universals, substance concepts, and God proofs as meaningless
  • Hume's theory of personal identity as a stream of perceptions—not an underlying self—demonstrates phenomenalism over realism

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0.80

Hume's theory of ideas departs from Locke's view that simple ideas are the original input to consciousness by inserting instead impressions—affective, forceful, and vivacious sensations—as the original input, with ideas being copies of impressions.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“whereas Lo takes it that simple ideas are the original input to the Consciousness clear and distinct simple ideas on the other hand Hume inserts as the original input not ideas but Impressions Impressions impressions are the original stimula with force and vivacity there it is not clear and distinct but for forceful and vivacious force and vivacity so forceful as to be irresistible so Lively as to capture us forceful and vivacious now his point is simply that an impression that emotive affective State as it arises arouses the Consciousness and as it declines gives place to an idea so an idea is the cognitive state that follows an impression that provides you with a copy of the impression okay a copy of the impression”

0.80

Hume's main emphasis in the Treatise is on giving a descriptive psychology of human belief and human action related to ethics, not on validating knowledge through logical proof or evidential justification as Locke advocated.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“his main emphasis is on giving a descriptive psychology of human belief and related to that of um human nature as it affects ethics uh put that one other way um if we want to explain human belief according to human we have to turn from rationalist explanations we believe what can be proven We Believe proportionately to the objective empirical evidence remember John Lock's evidentialist Criterion you have to turn away from that to an account of human psychology human nature leads us to believe there a psychological account of belief”

0.80

Hume treats the key to settling philosophical disputes as the study of human nature, subtitling his Treatise 'with an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects' where 'experimental' refers to empirical appeal to experience rather than hypotheses and confirmation.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“in the treaties he takes it that the key to settling philosophical disputes is the study of human nature the study of human nature that's uh why the book is entitled a treaties um a treaties on human nature you see um and he he subtitles it uh to indicate that he's dealing with human nature by what he calls experimental method the word experimental then had nothing to do with hypotheses and Confirmation uh it referred simply to the appeal to experience”

0.80

The principle of cause and effect is problematic because empirically we can only observe constant conjunctions and uniform associations, never the causal force, causal power, or necessary connection itself.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“when he comes to the relationship of cause and effect the principle of cause and effect is a principle of Association that is where the difficulty occurs that's the problem points up in section four of the inquiry because it turns out as you try uh to describe empirically uh what we call cause effect types of relationship that uh all we can observe is constant conjunctions uniform associations but we never have any observation of the force that is exerted of causal power of what he calls causal connections”

0.80

Hume argues that personal identity is constituted only through memory: the self is empirically nothing but a stream of ideas and impressions traced backward through memory as a bundle of related perceptions.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“all that we know of personal identity is through memory you know search yourself if you're looking for some empirical basis for talking about the eye what is the ey what is your eye to you empirically...the eye that I know is the inner eye I know through what they call reflection you think the eye that was the thinking thing on such an occasion the feeling thing another occasion the um speaking thing on another occasion the eye that I experienced inwardly you and and so personal identity for Hume is is really cons really consists in this whole stream strain of ideas and Impressions Sensations and Reflections that in my memory I trace all the way back along complex streams of ideas and Impressions that were mine”

0.80

Hume develops a psychology of belief showing that belief is not voluntary (as Descartes and Locke claimed) but rather follows inevitably from psychological habit and perception, even without empirical proof.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“he's skeptical about reason how does he resolve the doubt by developing a psychology of belief which shows that belief isn't always voluntary as day carton said as Lockett said you remember their attitudes if there is insufficient evidence withhold belief the will must not go ahead of the intellect to which Hume is in effect responding the will may not go ahead of the intellect but you do but you do even if you haven't come up with any proof of the existence of an external World notice how you behave in the world around as if and were thoroughly real”

0.80

Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley failed to apply the empiricist criterion to the concept of 'mind' or 'soul' because they each assumed an underlying mind-substance that thinks, rather than asking what empirical impression justifies this concept.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“you might say well why didn't Berkeley see that or lck that matter dayart well dayart had started by saying no we don't have any direct clear and distinct idea of the mind but we have a notion a notion a a notion that it's there so that when dayart goes through his I think therefore I exist a thinking thing the notion he has is of that continuing eye that is the agent that's thinking...and Loch and Berkeley follow that line of thought but not so H not so H what is the eye you see if it's not eye substance well what is it empirically”

0.80

Hume uses the empiricist criterion of meaning to demolish abstract concepts by showing they have no basis in original impressions: necessary connection has no impression, miracles have no impression, abstract universal ideas have no impression, and the concept of mind/soul/substance has no impression.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“it's this um empiricist Criterion of meaning which he uses with such Effectiveness when he talks of the idea of necessary connection there's no original impression of necessary con ction of the idea has no meaning when he's talking of Miracle he takes it that the idea of a miracle is something un un um unrelated to any original impression therefore um impossible to Asain um the idea of of anything abstract abstract ideas real universals in the same situation again this goes it turns out even for the concept of Mind as a substance as an entity of Soul you remember as we were talking about it a bit last time because he looks at that well we have um impressions of our own mental states of our wishing and hoping and feeling but where's the impression of Mind substance Soul substance it doesn't leave any Impressions”

0.80

Hume describes the self metaphorically as a theater in which ideas and impressions appear and pass one after another, but clarifies that it is only the appearances (perceptions) themselves, not the stage or building—a purely phenomenalist view with no realist substance behind.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“he he says in the in the final analysis that the self um is like a theater in which um ideas appear and pass one after the other fleeting as they come and go that's all there is to Identity then he adds another sentence by way of qualification don't let this mis understand you the eye is a stream of ideas not the stage on which they stand not the building of a theater but just the appearances so when it comes to the nature of the self he's plainly only only a phenomenalist not a realist only a phenomenalist we can only talk about how the self appears not what the self is”

0.80

Hume maintains that we have no empirical idea of infinite space or infinite time because there is no ultimate impression of infinity; therefore concepts like infinite divisibility of matter are meaningless because we cannot think clearly about infinity.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“it's not in the inquiry he maintains that we have no empirical idea because no ultimate impression of Infinite Space or infinite time and when um people thought of uh when people like um some of the presocratic talk of the of infinite divisibility of particles of matter on and on and on well if we have no concept of infinity we can't think with any clear idea of infinite divisibility and so those Notions associated with traditional discussion uh are out all we can think of is finite spatial relations and temporal relations”

0.76

As an impression leaves and is remembered, the memory itself leaves a new impression which then leaves an idea, creating a comingling of impressions and ideas in streams of consciousness rather than discrete units.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“the interesting thing is that while the impression leaves you with an idea that idea as it comes to mind comes back to mind in memory remembering the impression that idea remembered also leaves its own impression and that impression leaves its idea so that what you have is this comingling of Impressions and ideas the initial sensation the initial feeling giving rise to an idea which is a copy of it the impression of which which is associated know the impression of which is um desire dislike something of that sort”

0.76

Instead of clarity and distinctness, Hume uses the affective criteria of force and vivacity to distinguish impressions and ideas, where force and vivacity are effective (emotional/felt) criteria rather than cognitive ones.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“you'll will'll notice as we get into his theory of ideas that Hume in place of talking of clarity and distinctness talks of force and vivacity force and vivacity notice that those are effective criteria not cognitive criteria it's not so much a matter of thinking with Clarity but feeling with forcefulness the becomes important now”

0.76

Complex ideas formed by association are ideas of particulars, not abstract universals; for example, the idea of 'substance' comes from repeated association of similar impressions into a mental habit of thinking of particular things as unified objects.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“the complex ideas that I get are not ideas of some abstract universals they're ideas of particulars you see not abstract General ideas but ideas of particulars and um if I do get ideas of um markers in general General ideas again it's because of resemblance that it does it um...the idea of substance um... it's as if a mental habit is being formed of thinking of this marker that way”

0.75

In the Inquiry, Hume distinguishes between abstruse philosophy (like Descartes and Locke's work) which has logical precision and intellectual curiosity but provides no basis for morality, external world knowledge, or natural theology, and practical philosophy which guides action and belief.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“abstruse philosophy is the sort of thing in which day cart engaged John Lock to it's uh its value in talking theoretically about ideas and knowledge so forth its value is in logical Precision it's motivated by intellectual curiosity but it provides no basis for morality for knowledge of the external world or for natural theology that is to say the the rational rationalist kinds of approach are impotent in grounding morality grounding scientific knowledge of the external world and grounding one's belief in God in rational proofs”

0.74

Existence is not a quality or property of ideas; therefore we have no empirical impression of existence itself, only of particulars. This will be significant later when Kant critiques the ontological argument by claiming existence is not a proper predicate.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“no idea of existence only of particulars that we think um as we say exist but you don't have a conception of existence no impressions of existence you get impressions that have qualities of their own existence is not a quality of an idea and that is going to be significant when we get to Emanuel Kant and he talks of the ontological argument you see um the idea of a perfect being such that um it must necessarily exist well if existence is not a concept you cannot predicate it of anything it's not a proper predicate as K says”

0.74

The logical positivists' criterion of meaning—that factual statements must in principle be empirically verifiable—becomes self-refuting, because this criterion is itself not empirically verifiable; so positivists were forced to reframe it as a methodological stipulation rather than a factual claim.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“uh the way the logical positivists stated the Criterion uh it was to this effect that any factual statement in order to have empirical meaning must in principle at least be empirically verifiable now is that a factual statement if so is it empirically verifiable you know it becomes obvious that it's not an empirical statement that's it's not a factual statement that's empirically verifiable and so the positivist had to back up and say no this is a methodological stipulation on our part and in saying that they've really shifted ground and said we're going to act as if uh empirical reference is the only kind of meaning”

0.74

Hume illustrates the primacy of affective impressions over cognitive ideas by examples: a bright flash of light first hurts (impression) before being conceptualized as 'bright light' (idea); a sudden shout produces physical reaction before being understood conceptually.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“take it for instance if there's a bright flash of Light which dazzles you what you experience initially is not a clear and distinct idea of a bright flash of light what you feel initially is the hurt the blinding force of it you see and if all of a sudden I yell at you you see the the initial impact is um going to be physical rather than did I wake you up it's going it's going to be physical uh rather than conceptual quite plainly yes”

0.74

Language plays multiple games beyond naming and denotation, including mathematics (analytic thinking with non-factual statements), poetry (which uses words to evoke general ideas symbolically without picturing particulars), and other abstract uses.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“one of the games that language plays is abstract thinking which is most noticeable in the um way in which mathematics works or a dictionary works you though that kind of abstract thinking where the statements are not factual statements but analytic statements um is not the only one I think I think poetry is another another kind of abstract thinking where the words of the poet conjure up whole General ideas without picturing particulars sometimes by picturing a particular but other times just the word itself gain symbolic significance symbolism”

0.74

The empiricist criterion of meaning states that for a term to have factual, empirical meaning, it must refer to original impressions; if no original impression can be found for an idea, the idea has no empirical meaning.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“the Criterion of meaning for an empiricist is going to be that the language must refer to some original no not original ideas of an empirical sort but original impressions of an empirical sort...when we entertain therefore any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without meaning or idea as is but too frequent we need but inquire from what impression is that supposed idea derived and if it be impossible to assign any impression this will serve to confirm our suspicion”

0.70

Hume agrees with Berkeley's nominalism: there are no empirical impressions of abstract entities, only of particular qualities; general words are used indiscriminately of similar particulars by customary usage.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“the um the first observation is an obvious one that he agrees with Berkeley's nominalism he agrees with Berkeley's nominalism that's obvious isn't it that if we're going to be strictly empiricists tracing everything back to Impressions then there are no empirical impressions of abstract entities or of abstract ideas our ideas are all of them about particular qualities that are seen or felt and words only become General names by customary usage that uses them indiscriminately between similar particulars”

0.69

In less than 50 years between Locke's Essay on Human Understanding (1690) and Hume's Inquiry (1748), there was a remarkable shift from Locke's rationalistic optimism about empirical knowledge to Hume's skepticism about it.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“I said English empiricists I should have said British empiricists he's a Scotsman um and uh Hume oh coming as he does really only uh 50 years after John Lock 1690 was John Lock's essay on human understanding and 1748 was hume's inquiry concerning human standing so in less than 50 years a remarkable change takes place from John Lock's uh optimism almost rationalistic optimism about the possibilities of empirical knowledge to David hume's skepticism about it”

0.68

The big question in Hume's epistemology is how we have knowledge of matters of fact, where the empiricist criterion of meaning becomes most important, and this question is developed in section four of the Inquiry, which is the crucial section.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“the big question and the question where the empirical Criterion of meaning comes into play most has to do with uh knowledge of matters of fact and it's that which uh he is going to question now his line of argument for this is um what develops in that crucial section four of the inquiry that crucial section four”

0.68

Knowledge consists of propositions affirming relationships between ideas, which have a subject and predicate and involve at least two terms/ideas; there are two kinds of propositions: analytic (about logical relations of ideas) and synthetic (about matters of fact).

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“knowledge consists of propositions of propositions which affirm something about the relationship between ideas a proposition has a subject and a predicate involves at least those two terms two ideas and so um there are two kinds of propositions says Hume two kinds that have become known ever since is analytic and synthetic”

0.68

Analytic propositions have to do with logical relations of ideas and are logically true; they are about the meaning of terms (language) rather than about what terms represent, so they don't depend on whether external things exist.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“analytic propositions have to do simply with the logical relation of ideas logical relations of ideas and so if such propositions are true they're called logical truths logical truths...logical relations of ideas have to do simply with the idea ideas not about what they represent so if we say for instance that um a bachelor is an unmarried male we're talking about uh the word Bachelor and its meaning unmarried male we're talking about the language and the meaning of these terms is such that they are logically equivalent”

0.68

Synthetic propositions have to do with matters of fact, and the contrary of a synthetic statement is logically possible (you can think of it being false); therefore synthetic statements are falsifiable unlike analytic statements.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“the synthetic have to do with matters of fact and so these are called factual truths if they're true now logical relations of ideas have to do simply with the idea ideas not about what they represent...if you say well bachelor's are miserable that would be a factual statement um now Hume spends very very little time on relations of ideas um that is most evident in mathematics and um he wants to say nothing further about that then that's where abstruse philosophy abstruse reasoning has its value...his concern is with matter of fact statements where the contrary of such a statement is logically possible it's not logically possible to have a bachelor who's married it is logically possible to have a bachelor who is not miserable so the contrary of a matter of fact statement is logically possible they are falsifiable”

0.68

Hume's main complaint is that the obscurity of ideas misleads philosophers like Descartes, Locke, Spinoza, and Berkeley, who mistakenly claim their ideas are clear and distinct when they are in fact obscure.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“his complaint is that um the obscurity of ideas the obscurity of ideas misleads people like dayart and Loch and Spinoza and even Berkeley now it sounds um sort of odd to say the obscurity of ideas when daycard and lock was stressing clear and distinct ideas uh his point is simply that ideas are not clear and distinct”

0.68

In a classroom discussion, a student argues that the empiricist criterion of meaning leads logically to nominalism, since without empirical impressions of abstract entities, general terms cannot refer to universals but only to custom-based groupings of particulars.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer (responding to student question)

“it seems to me that the empiricist Criterion of meaning leads naturally to um a nominalism for someone who's an empiricist because then you can't have the idea that words are actually did you get that hear that question John seems that the empiricist Criterion of meaning leads naturally I think you mean logically to uh nominalism yeah as long as you're maintaining an imp yeah yeah I think you're completely right”

0.66

Hume announces at the outset of his work his rejection of the Enlightenment conception of knowledge and the rule of reason, proposing instead that human nature rather than the artificial demands of reason should characterize philosophy.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“right at the outset then in that introductory section uh what he is doing is um um proclaiming announcing his rejection of the Enlightenment Spirit the enlightenment conception of knowledge the rule of reason and in talking about practical philosophy in contrast with this he's talking about what guides action why we believe what do we do and uh so he uh he says in talking of a mix for the two be a philosopher but be still a man well a woman too uh in other words um human nature rather than the artificial demands of Reason what should really characterize philosophy”

0.66

Wittgenstein's critique of the empiricist criterion argues that language plays multiple games beyond naming, denoting, and referring; language is a social function and cultural activity by which we accomplish many things.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“that in a way was viken Stein's Point um he he would say that um language CL language plays other games than simply the game of naming pointing denoting referring you see um and um what what's involved in that is the recognition that language doesn't just consist of isolated words nor of syntactical structures but language is a um um a social function a cultural activity a means by which in the culture we do all sorts of things in the language culture you see”

0.64

Hume identifies three principles of association by which simple ideas combine into complex ones: resemblance (ideas that are similar are combined), contiguity (ideas that are adjacent in space or time are associated), and cause and effect.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“the three principles of Association that uh that Hume comes up with three principles of Association are resemblance contiguity cause and effect so we seem to combine ideas to relate ideas into more complex ones when repeated Impressions and ideas are like one another we combine them”

0.60

The empiricist criterion of meaning was challenged starting in the 1940s and substantially by the 1950s-1960s, not from conceptualists defending abstract ideas, but from those who argued empiricists were not empirical enough about the diversity of language.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“it was challenged in the OR somewhat in the 40s but challenged in the 50s and by the 60s it was pretty well P 1960s um but its challenge was not So Much from the standpoint of conceptualists as rather from those who claimed that um the empiricist with the empiricist Criterion of meaning is not being empirical enough about the diversity of language you see”

0.60

In 20th century philosophy, the two crucial issues arising from the empiricist criterion of meaning were what it does to moral language and what it does to religious language.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“when this uh this business came up in the 20th century and we'll talk about that when we get to it one of the well two of The crucial issues involved were what does this do to moral language and what does it du to religious language you see and those were the two key issues in the 1950s”

0.55

Hume spends very little time on analytic propositions because their value is purely in mathematics and as mental exercise, and his real concern is with matter of fact statements where empirical evidence is relevant.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“Hume spends very very little time on relations of ideas um that is most evident in mathematics and um he wants to say nothing further about that then that's where abstruse philosophy abstruse reasoning has its value and it's good mental exercise and foot drill for the rest of us who are not in mathematics but his concern is with matter of fact statements”

0.52

Hume argues that moral action is driven not by the force of reasoning about ethical principles but by the psychology of human moral feelings, which lead us to act.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“similarly with regards to not just moral belief but moral action we're led to moral action again not by the force of reasoning about ethical principles but simply by the psychology of human feelings moral feelings which lead us to act”

0.52

Hume's view parallels Whitehead's concept of the primacy of causal efficacy in perception, except Hume emphasizes the primacy of the affective/emotive over the cognitive in human experience.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“his point is what um when we get to Whitehead later on he calls the Primacy of causal efficacy in perception except that Hume isn't prepared to call it causal efficacy but it's the pracy of the affective if you like of the emotive rather than the cognitive in Human Experience”

0.52

After understanding Hume's empiricist criterion of meaning, the rest of his philosophy appears to be a mopping-up operation: the basic question is not 'can you prove X' but 'what in experience are you talking about'—a question of empirical meaningfulness rather than truth.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“by the time you get through that orientation to hume's modified theory of ideas uh you can see pretty well where he's going and I think um it really begins to seem as if um the rest is simply a mopping up operation at least the rest of what he's doing about um knowledge and belief and metaphysical and Theological topics okay notice that his basic question is not can you prove such and such but what in experience are you talking about the basic question is one of meaningfulness empirical meaning rather than truth”

0.50

Locke's position on abstract ideas is defensible if we recognize that the carriers of abstract ideas are not mental images but words; when thinking abstractly, we think verbally, not by imaging particular qualities.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“I I think Lock's position is defensible uh if we recognize that um the carriers of abstract ideas are not mental images okay Lo seems to think with his notion of a clear and distinct idea that um What We Carry in Our Minds is mental images of something an image of the bless of your shirt or whatever you see no when it comes to thinking abstractly we're not um Imaging particular qualities we're thinking verbally you see and it's Words which are the vehicles of non-empirical thinking”

0.34

Hume's empiricist criterion of meaning was adopted and updated by 20th century logical empiricists, most notably A.J. Ayer in Language, Truth and Logic.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“it's this empiricist Criterion of meaning which was adopted and updated by 20th century logical empiricists and we'll be running into it again when we get to uh AJ a um and his book language truth and logic which we'll be reading on in the spring some time”

0.34

Hume wrote the Treatise on Human Nature as a long, fuller work that 'fell stillborn from the press,' so he then wrote the shorter Inquiry in a more popularly accessible style to achieve the literary fame he confesses he was anxious for.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“the earlier book The treaties is longer um Hume comments that it fell stillborn from the press and so apparently he wrote the inquiry in much shorter form jazzing it up a little bit in order to get the literary Fame uh where which he confesses he was so anxious for”

0.34

David Hume was born in 1711 and published his Treatise on Human Nature in 1739, completing it by 1736 when he was in his 20s, then republished a shorter, revised version as the Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding in 1748.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Philosophy Lecturer

“nine years earlier when he was only in his 20s as you see um 1711 born the treaties came out in 1739 it was actually finished I think in 1736”