What this covers

This is a wide-ranging interview in which Aswath Damodaran talks with the Excess Returns hosts about his book on the Corporate Lifecycle. He is the only guest. The conversation starts with how companies age and why they struggle to act their age), then moves into Valuation as bounded storytelling that can be checked with the Three P Test: possible, plausible, probable. Intel and Starbucks serve as worked examples. He also argues that building a business model is an underrated skill distinct from having an idea, and that the skills a company needs change from one stage to the next. Walmart's $21 billion purchase of Flipkart appears as an expensive attempt at a corporate facelift.

The middle of the conversation covers investing practice. Damodaran criticizes factor investing, which he says began in academia but was taken up by active managers as a promise of alpha, and which he calls mechanical, backward-looking, and a product of data mining in the "factor zoo." He notes the small-cap premium has not appeared since the early 1980s, and he treats these claims as contested. He argues the real test of active investing is beating an index fund built on your own philosophy, a test that 85–90% of active investors fail, and he reads the rise of passive investing as a response to that record. On concentration among the biggest tech stocks, he sees a Winner-Take-All Economy driven by network effects, not a purely market-driven event. He also has pointed things to say about two-class share structures and the idea of the "great CEO."

The last stretch is personal and practical: managing confirmation bias by not doubling down and by keeping the feedback loop open, the cost of anger at markets, and why he has never attended the Berkshire Hathaway meeting. He says AI will outdo humans at rule-driven work, leaving humans the creative and judgment-based domains. His advice to ordinary investors is to preserve and grow wealth instead of chasing 100-baggers.

Sharpest takeaway

Damodaran argues that successful investing requires bounded storytelling grounded in reality, adaptability across market cycles rather than rigid dogma, and a focus on wealth preservation over speculation—a thesis directly opposed to both old-school value investing orthodoxy and modern narrative-driven venture capitalism.

  • Valuation is storytelling, not mechanical modeling; every valuation tells a story about a company that must be explicit and plausible
  • Companies and investors must adapt to their lifecycle stage; rigid rules and dogma prevent the flexibility required to succeed in changing markets
  • The core purpose of investing is preserving and growing wealth through income generation, not chasing outsized returns or getting rich

The claims · ranked102 claims · weighted by value

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0.80

Factor investing was born in academia (Banz's small-cap study, Fama-French 1990) and Fama and French explicitly did not describe factors as sources of excess returns, but rather as measures of unpriced risk; active investors subsequently misappropriated the framework to claim factor tilting would generate alpha.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Aswath Damodaran

“Factory investing at his birth place in Academia you can go back and write the history of factor investing as starting with Ral buns looking at small cap stocks in late &'70s but most critically to the farm of French paper in 1990 where they looked at dat over 60 years and concluded that two factors explain difference in returns one is market cap small market cap companies earned higher returns and large market cap companies and low priced book ratio companies earned higher returns those factors still are in their size and priced above now but in the 1990s you had an explosion of more and more data data on a second byc basis tra”

0.75

The real test of active investing is not whether you beat the S&P 500, but whether you can beat an index fund built entirely around what you claim your philosophy is (e.g., value index funds); SPIVA data shows that 85-90% of active investors underperform their respective indices, which is the true measure of market efficiency

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“the real test of active investing is not whether you can beat the index or beat the market but whether you can beat an index fund built entirely around what you claim your philosophy is and the spea statistics are just mindboggling 85 to 90% of active investors underperform their respective indices”

0.75

The market concentration we see today (FANG/MAG7 dominance) is not primarily a market phenomenon but a reflection of the underlying economy's shift to winner-take-all dynamics driven by network effects, scale advantages, and platform effects that create natural monopolies

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“it makes it much but there are two things that I that I see coming out of this one is it this is a reflection of an economic shift again people think of this as a market phenomenon markets reflect what's happening in the economy we're increasingly a winner take all economy”

0.75

The small-cap premium has not existed since 1981, despite historical data (1927-2023) showing small caps outperforming large caps by 3.5-5% on average, demonstrating that historical factors are not reliable predictors of future returns.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“the small cap premium do you know there hasn't been a small cap premium since 1981 I'm going to add that on as a data set Mi I'm going to let you pick the starting point and the ending point for the data and I'm going to put up the data from 1927 to 2023 over the entire period small cap stocks have earned about 3 and a half% more than the than large cap stocks maybe even more four 5% more than large cap stocks think there that's great I should buy small cap stocks but then I'll let you change the starting point from 1927 to 1950 to 1960 and you get to about 1977 starting in 1977 there's been no small cap reing doesn't mean that small cap stocks never do better it's that they win some years they lose other years”

0.74

Investing is fundamentally about preserving and growing wealth, not getting rich quickly; chasing 10-baggers or 100-baggers distorts this goal and leads to mistake-prone behavior; the priority should be steady wealth accumulation from earned income plus disciplined investment management.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Aswath Damodaran

“investing is about preserving and growing wealth it's not about getting rich and I think it's some of these days of YouTube celebrities telling you can get rich again I was just watching a PBS documentary on crypto and how people want to know hit the jackpot I think that going for 10 Baggers 100 Baggers again think of how much we go after those that's not the name of investing is about preserving and growing wealth would I like to grow wealth at 50% a year yes would I like to have a 100 bagger in my portfolio yes but I shouldn't be actively looking for those things because if I look for those things I'm going to miss the core tenants of investing”

0.74

Anger at markets is destructive and wastes mental energy; many active investors are angry at markets, other investors, and various market participants, and this anger does not improve their investing but instead impairs decision-making and well-being.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Aswath Damodaran

“when you get angry at markets nothing good comes out of it and if you think about it there are a lot of people out there very angry at markets they're very angry at other investors they're very angry at what other people do and my response is you're wasting your time and your energy and it's sucking up what you should be doing on your own Investments”

0.74

The core lesson for the average investor is that investing is about preserving and growing wealth, not getting rich or chasing 100-baggers; the obsession with outsized returns (influenced by YouTube celebrities and crypto narratives) causes investors to miss the fundamentals and take excessive risks

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Aswath Damodaran

“investing is about preserving and growing wealth it's not about getting rich and I think it's some of these days of YouTube celebrities telling you can get rich again I was just watching a PBS documentary on crypto and how people want to know hit the jackpot I think that going for 10 Baggers 100 Baggers again think of how much we go after those that's not the name of investing is about preserving and growing wealth”

0.69

Mechanical, rule-driven jobs (like factor investing or basic financial modeling) can be done better by AI/bots than humans because machines follow rules perfectly, are consistent, and don't have off days; therefore, humans can only compete in domains that require creativity, judgment, or non-mechanical reasoning.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“if what you do is mechanic mechical that's why Factor investing completely mechanical if what you do is mechanical rule driven bot can do it much better than you can because machines are better at mechanical stuff than you and I are and they follow the rules they will be absolutely Fidelity to those rules”

0.69

Factor investing was born in academia (Banz's 1981 small-cap discovery, Fama-French 1992) but Fama and French did not describe factors as sources of excess returns—they described them as missing risk variables; the explosion of factors since the 1990s is mechanical pattern-finding that does not account for whether those patterns can be exploited sustainably.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“Factory investing at his birth place in Academia you can go back and write the history of factor investing as starting with Ral buns looking at small cap stocks in late '70s but most critically to the farm of French paper in 1990 where they looked at dat over 60 years and concluded that two factors explain difference in returns one is market cap small market cap companies earned higher returns and large market cap companies and low priced book ratio companies earned higher returns those factors still are in their size and priced above now”

0.69

Walmart's 2014 acquisition of Flipkart for $21 billion was the most expensive facelift in history—an attempt by a middle-aged company to become young again through growth company acquisition that ultimately failed to rejuvenate the parent company

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“Walmart by 2019 was a middle-age company nothing wrong with it they made it to Middle AG that's already an accomplishment we talk about the mortality rates but they didn't want to be middle-aged they wanted to be young they wanted to be a growth company and I called it the most expensive facelift in history because it paid $21 billion to buy an Indian online retailer”

0.69

Building a business model is a vastly underrated skill that is distinct from having a great idea; many companies with great ideas never make it to product, and many that reach product never scale to profitability because the skill sets required differ by lifecycle stage

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“building a business model is a vastly underrated skill I think for a for two decades now we've celebrated entrepreneurs because they have great ideas you know what happens to most great ideas they never make it to a product face and many companies that make it to a product to service don't make it as businesses because it's a different skill set”

0.69

The rise of passive investing is not a market phenomenon but a response to the reality that active investing has been bad; better information (real-time fund performance vs S&P 500) and lower switching costs (trading online vs physically visiting a broker) enabled investors to discover and act on the fact that they were paying for underperformance

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“active investing has always been crappy always through its entire lifetime but for much of its lifetime we know how crappy it was I I tell people to imagine being in the 1960s right there were only active mutual funds you put your money in an act actual active mutual fund you got one statement maybe for a year telling you what your investment was doing no comparisons no idea what the rest of the world is doing and you said these guys are professionals they know what they're doing I've trusted no trusted them this is the right thing to do two things happen one is we started to get information about how badly active investing was doing on a continuous basis on on your smartphone”

0.69

Confirmation bias cannot be eliminated, only managed; once you buy a stock, you are inherently biased toward finding it undervalued, so two mitigation strategies are: don't double down (buying more when it falls) and keep the feedback loop open by allowing others to challenge your thesis and borrowing insights from their pushback

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“you can't take bias go away we're human beings we're predisposed to be biased you buy something to put in your portfolio whether you like it or not from that day on you won't find that thing to be undervalued because you want confirmation that you did the right thing so I think then there are two things I would do though one is don't let confirmation bias make you double down that's one one one thing you should never do doubling down down is you buy something it Hales in price you're saying I am convinced I'm right I'm going to go buy more of it don't double down right”

0.68

Factor investing is backward-looking, mechanically implemented, and cannot deliver excess returns because it is now accessible to any investor with a computer; it is based on mean reversion in US equity markets during the 20th century, but that mean reversion may have been specific to the US and that era, not a replicable law of markets

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“it is backward looking it is mean reverting and I think that they have to factor in a reality that the tides may be shifting that the market may be changing now I'll give you an example the small cap premium do you know there hasn't been a small cap premium since 1981”

0.63

Market concentration in the top stocks is not a new phenomenon—missing the top 50 stocks historically resulted in returns below Treasury bonds—but what is new in the last 15 years is that the same stocks dominate year after year, whereas in the 20th century the top winners kept rotating.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Aswath Damodaran

“it's not that the biggest companies I mean it's always been true right I mean you might be familiar with the hendrik Besson binder study which went back and looked at what would have happened if you missed the five best stocks the 10 best stocks and it's horrifying if if you look at the number I think if you you miss the top 50 you eared less than than the treasury bond R stocks collectively actually under perform treasuries so it's always been true that the biggest winners carry the market markets are heavily skewed what's different about the last 15 years it's not just the biggest winners each year account for a big chunk of the market it's the same players every year whereas we go back to the 20th century the winners kept shifting”

0.62

Factor investing cannot sustainably deliver excess returns because it is purely mechanical screening that requires no skill; any machine or index fund can replicate the screening faster and cheaper than active investors, so active investors who bring nothing but factor exposure should expect no alpha.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I have a very simple saying I use in my investment philosophies class if you don't bring something to the table you should not expect to take something away I me what are you doing in Factor investing you're basically screening right you're screening for small cap stocks low price to book stocks whatever your factor is 50 years ago that took a lot of work you had to go collect the raw data you had to put in the screens often run them by hand today I can run the screens on Capital IQ across the global universes talks it takes me 3 minutes to do what makes you think that screening for fact is entitled you to special status to earn excess returns”

0.61

The small-cap premium—the claim that small-cap stocks outperform large-cap stocks—has not occurred since 1981; even though small caps earned 3–5% more than large caps from 1927–1977, starting in 1977 the premium has disappeared, suggesting the mean reversion has broken down and the world has changed.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“the small cap premium do you know there hasn't been a small cap premium since 1981 I'm going to add that on as a data set Mi I'm going to let you pick the starting point and the ending point for the data and I'm going to put up the data from 1927 to 2023 over the entire period small cap stocks have earned about 3 and a half% more than the than large cap stocks maybe even more four 5% more than large cap stocks think there that's great I should buy small cap stocks but then I'll let you change the starting point from 1927 to 1950 to 1960 and you get to about 1977 starting in 1977 there's been no small cap reing doesn't mean that small cap stocks never do better it's that they win some years they lose other years”

0.61

Shareholders have given up the power to remove management at the exact time they need it most by accepting two-class share structures where founder-CEOs hold voting shares; this is exemplified by Facebook, where complaining about Mark Zuckerberg's leadership while owning non-voting shares is like marrying a Kardashian and complaining about cameras

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“we've decided as shareholders we don't need the power to change management we've gone along with companies especially companies the 21st century companies with two classes of shares and guess who owns the voting shares the founder CEOs we've essentially created a Calamity for ourselves”

0.61

The 'Factor Zoo' emerged because more data and higher computational power led researchers to find more and more correlates with returns; this is a direct consequence of allowing researchers to search through multitudes of variables (data mining/multiple comparisons problem) without proper statistical controls.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“in the 1990s you had an explosion of more and more data data on a second byc basis tra and when you have more data and you look for things that explain returns guess what you're going to find them know I think it was Campbell Harvey who term the who created the term Factor Zoo which is you are going to find more and more things working”

0.61

The economy has shifted from local/regional business models to winner-take-all platforms; examples include hospitality (Airbnb), transportation (Uber/Didi), and other businesses that can now scale globally because of network effects, which means market concentration is a natural consequence of economic structure, not just a market phenomenon.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“this is a reflection of an economic shift again people think of this as a market phenomenon markets reflect what's happening in the economy we're increasingly a winner take all economy and I'll take two you know two businesses take the hospitality business 20 years ago Hospitality business 20 years ago had dozens of Hotel companies no single Hotel company even the largest one was more than 6 or 7% of the total Market why because you are restricted locationally re I mean you are constraints on how big you could get and then Airbnb came along how big can Airbnb get what's the upper limit car service 20 years ago the biggest car service company is probably a 2% market share largest taxi cap company maybe in New York and then Along Came Uber and DD and Liv in business after business we created business models that can scale up to effect L not just get bigger but have networking benefits as they get bigger which effectively means as they get bigger it actually gets easier for them to get bigger because everybody wants to be on those platforms”

0.59

85–90% of active investors underperform their respective index benchmarks, which is the real test of active investing—not whether active beats the market overall, but whether active beats a passively managed fund built around the same philosophy.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“the real test of active investing is not whether you can beat the index or beat the market but whether you can beat an index fund built entirely around what you claim your philosophy is and the spea statistics are just mindboggling 85 to 90% of active investors underperform their respective indices that's my efficient market the efficient market is one that it's not one where markets don't make mistakes that's the straw man that people like to use markets make of course they make mistake they make some doozies it's can you take advantage of those mistakes to earn more than you would have in an index fund and the answer is it's really really really difficult”

0.56

Bounded storytelling is the correct approach to valuation—telling stories about companies that reflect their actual position in the lifecycle rather than fairy tales, and the plausibility of a story can be tested with the three-P test: is it possible, plausible, and probable

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Aswath Damodaran

“when you tell a story about a business you're not a fiction writer you can't write fairy tales we might want Happy Endings hey you're writing a story about Bed Bath and Beyond it's going to be a Horror Story whether you like it or not because the reality is there is no light at the end of the tunnel I call this bounded storytelling which is you tell stories that reflect where your company is”

0.56

If someone has a consistent edge in investing, they must bring something to the table—unique insight, skill, or judgment that markets haven't already incorporated—otherwise they should not expect to earn excess returns.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I have a very simple saying I use in my investment philosophies class if you don't bring something to the table you should not expect to take something away I me what are you doing in Factor investing you're basically screening right”

0.55

20th-century companies like Ford and GM took 50–60 years to scale to dominance, lasted 100+ years, and had time for leadership transitions as founders aged out; 21st-century companies like Yahoo and Blackberry went from zero to $100 billion in 8 years, lasted at the top only 3–4 years, and will have lifespans of 20–25 years, making leadership continuity and age-matched management far more difficult.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“the companies of 20th century were long lived Enterprises but it took them a long time to get from zero to being big companies think of when Ford was founded when Ford became a large company 50 60 years CU scaling up was difficult Capital intensive businesses 130 years”

0.55

There is an argument that some companies have reached the end of their productive life and should be allowed to fail or be broken up, rather than artificially sustained; this applies to companies like Philip Morris where the fundamental reason for existence (selling cigarettes) is ethically questionable, and companies should be allowed to 'fold' when their time has passed.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I believe there's a time for companies to fold...there are some companies with the best record the the the the healthiest thing you can do is say look we had a great run and it's time for us to go away and I think that's something we have to accept in businesses”

0.53

Evolution works by use-it-or-lose-it: cognitive capabilities for connection-making that are not exercised will atrophy; losing capacity for reasoning and connection-making because it has become easy to look up answers is a genuine existential risk to human advantage.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Aswath Damodaran

“evolution is a magical Force powerful force we don't use stuff we lose right and I'm afraid we're going to lose that power to make connections to reason because it's become so easy to look up answ to things and to fill our minds up with other things”

0.53

An AI entity called 'the Damodaran bot' has been created by a machine-learning expert that has read all of Damodaran's blog posts, YouTube videos, and class materials and can value companies; the experiment will test whether all of Damodaran's public knowledge can be replicated by an AI, creating anxiety about redundancy.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Aswath Damodaran

“five weeks before the spring semester of 2024 classes ended I got a call from a friend of mine in fact I'm writing a blog post about this his name is vandar he teaches machine learning he knows more about artificial intelligence than I will ever learn in my lifetime he called me and he said I've created a deoderant bot that said a what he said a deoderant bot and I said what is a deoderant bot he said I've created this AI entity that has read every single blog post You've ever written watch every single YouTube video that you've ever put on which means it's watch every class it's looked at every evaluation that you've ever done and it remembers everything that it has and it's ready to go and I said ready to go where he said it's ready to value a company”

0.52

Valuation has become qualitatively worse despite more data and better tools because the field has forgotten that every valuation tells a story; financial modeling without storytelling produces meaningless numbers disconnected from reality.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“we had more data more powerful tools and evaluations were actually become qualitatively worse the question I start asking is what's going on why is the data and the more powerful dudes not translating to better valuations”

0.52

Building a business model is a vastly underrated skill; the kind of leader needed to manage an idea company differs fundamentally from one needed to build a business, which again differs from a growth-stage leader and a mature-stage leader managing market defense.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“building a business model is a vastly underrated skill I think for a for two decades now we've celebrated entrepreneurs because they have great ideas you know what happens to most great ideas they never make it to a product face”

0.52

The notion of a universally great CEO with a fixed set of characteristics is 'absolute nonsense' and is marketed by business schools and consultants as a package they can teach or consult on for profit, but CEO effectiveness must vary across the corporate lifecycle.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“it's very self-serving on the part of business school professors and Consultants to market the idea that there's a certain set of characteristics that make for a great CEO it's absolute nonsense because you look at the list of characteristics and then you look around you and say hey that guy is a great CEO is none of these characteristics but they want to Market this package because if they can convince you that there's a package then they can charge you $250,000 for getting an MBA”

0.52

Bounded storytelling in valuation means constraining narratives to plausibility tests: is the claim possible, plausible, and probable? Unbounded storytelling (as practiced in venture capital and by founders) creates fairy tales like Uber's claimed $5.2 trillion TAM, which counts all transportation spending regardless of whether Uber can capture it.

definitionhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“one of the things I have as a PR with storytelling and let's face it Venture capitals are all storytellers Founders are storytellers it's all stories but they're undisciplined storytelling where you don't kind of capture the bounds of that story based on reality in fact I have what I call the three p test is it possible is it plausible is it probable”

0.52

Starbucks' original story (Howard Schultz's vision of a meeting place where customers linger and consume multiple products) was destroyed by COVID-driven shift to online ordering, which transformed the business model into pure-delivery and created wait times that drive away in-store customers; there is no plausible growth story to restore Starbucks to high-growth status.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“the original story for Starbucks at least the Howard show story was that you'd wander into this nicely decorated Cafe you'd order a cappuccino you'd sit at that table you'd use the Wi-Fi and over the course of the next 3 hours consume half of the universe while you were sitting there you know a scone a sandwich have another coffee it was supposed to be a meeting place and then came Co and you know Starbucks of course switched to online ordering and with online ordering their story blew up”

0.52

There is no single pathway to successful investing; different philosophies (value investing, momentum, growth, etc.) can work, and investors should look inward to understand their own temperament, not adopt Warren Buffett's or anyone else's approach as universal doctrine.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I love Peter Lynch I love Warren Buffett I like what's some things that George Soros does I think there's something to be learned by looking at Great investors in every different in in every philosophy and if you ask me what's the best Philosophy for me my advice is look inward now figure out what makes you takech cuz that's going to tell you what the right Philosophy for you is it's not what work for Warren Buffett it's what's going to work for you”

0.52

Confirmation bias cannot be eliminated but can be managed through two practices: (1) never double down when a position declines in price, and (2) actively keep the feedback loop open by remaining receptive to pushback and asking whether others' critiques reveal gaps in your story rather than getting defensive.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“one is don't let confirmation bias make you double down that's one one one thing you should never do doubling down down is you buy something it Hales in price you're saying I am convinced I'm right I'm going to go buy more of it don't double down right second allow yourself doubt and that's why I use the word faith the essence of faith is your faith will be shaken accepted so you wake up and say I bought that stock you know I bought you know paler it's and you know I thought it would go up more it hasn't gone up did I make a mistake yes you could have made a mistake”

0.52

The most freeing words in investing are 'I was wrong' because once you admit a mistake, you can think about alternatives; refusing to admit error (as many active managers do) makes it nearly impossible to fix mistakes and move on to better ideas.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“the minute I put that down on paper it was a release because it basically meant that I was free to come up with a new story for Vol so for me and this is why I value Tesla every year and I've admitted when I've screwed up on Tesla and I missed that on Tesla and I'm going to go back and put it in is being wrong is part of this game and admitting you're wrong I three most freeing words in investing are I was wrong because the minute you say that you can think about what can I do instead if you refuse to say that and there are active portfolio managers who refuse to say the word I was wrong it's almost impossible to fix your mistakes”

0.52

We may reach a point where AI Mark, AI Jack, and AI Aswath interview each other; Damodaran hopes this never happens because genuine human conversation creates value that mechanical replication cannot, but hope is not a strategy—active effort to preserve human cognitive advantage is needed.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I'm H I'm hoping we never get to the point where AI Matt and AI Jack are interviewing AI aswath um because there there's so much value in this conversation I hope it never goes there but hope alone is not is not a strategy right we need to actively think about what do we do as human beings that's going to be that's not mechanical that's going to be difficult for a machine to replicate”

0.52

Building modes against a bot requires thinking of yourself as if you have an AI competitor with access to all your public knowledge; the question 'what can I do that my bot cannot do?' forces active creation of unique value rather than passive reliance on existing capabilities.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“so act like I have a bot with my name on it and everything I've ever done is in the public domain so I'm probably unique experiment but I act like there's a bot coming for you which knows everything that you do and then say hey no can I can I out withit my bot can I do something that my bot cannot do and I think that's unless you actively go out there and create modes they're not going to magically appear right”

0.52

Companies go through life cycles similar to human aging, with distinct privileges and limits at each stage, and the healthiest companies recognize and accept their age rather than fight it through acquisitions and restructuring meant to appear young again.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I feel businesses go through this a similar process they age good stuff happens bad stuff happens and just like human beings companies and businesses fight aging nobody wants to get old”

0.52

Much active investing is like fighting the last war: practitioners use tools and strategies that worked in the 20th century while the rules of competition have changed; the French generals who built the Maginot Line to stop tanks learned the wrong lessons from WWI, just as backward-looking investors learn the wrong lessons from historical factors.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I you know I I still read the stories about the French generals who learned from the first world war and built the magal line because they thought they could stop the Germans from invading them by having this line which tanks could not cross because that's what they were used to and then the Germans just flew planes right over the wall and the whole whole thing crumbled in two weeks lot of active investing is your fighting battles from the last century when in fact we should be thinking about how do we fight the battles of the century we're in”

0.52

Success in the current market requires adaptability, openness to multiple pathways, and rejection of rigid dogmas; the old value-investing virtues (rigidity, ritual, righteousness) are precisely the opposite of what the 21st-century market rewards.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I'll tell you in general I don't know what the right way to play this game is but we need to be more adaptable less rigid more accepting that there are a dozen different Pathways to success not right it's in fact the exact opposite of all the things I said value investing became rigid ritualistic right is we need the exact opposit of those to succeed in the market we're in right now”

0.52

Being lucky in investing (e.g., buying Nvidia at $27/share and seeing it rise due to AI, without predicting AI) is not the same as skill; Damodaran bought Nvidia because it looked undervalued, not because he foresaw AI; attributing successful outcomes to skill when they were luck is a common investing mistake.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I've been incredibly lucky I've been lucky I've been on the right side of that divide but I'm also open to the POS possibility that nothing to do with my valuation skills and everything to do which is i b in in 2018 at $27 per share I would love to tell you it's because I saw AI coming I didn't even have the remotest clue about AI I just bought it because it looked undervalued to me I got incredibly lucky”

0.52

Modern life has eliminated empty moments: waiting in line, commuting, etc. are now filled with phones and distractions; this erosion of unstructured thinking time is dangerous because 'aha' moments and creative connections require mental space that we are systematically destroying.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I tell you what worries me is we have fewer and fewer empty moments in our mind right I mean imagine 20 years ago you were standing in line at the bank what did you do absolutely nothing you an empty mind because you had no choice now what do you do you got your phone you got checking your email you're checking the the news we are filling every moment with stuff because we think we're being busy and being busy is productive and being not busy is not but I think that unfortunately I think those are the times where you're going to make those connections that a bot cannot make”

0.52

Humans have a unique capacity to make novel connections across unrelated domains (like Newton seeing gravity from an apple falling, or Archimedes' bathtub insight); this creative synthesis is something AI bots cannot easily replicate because it requires unstructured 'empty mind' thinking.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I mean there are few things that human beings do that makes them difficult to replicate one is um we do make connections out of things that look unconnected and come up with insights right in galile there was sitting I mean what a Newton was sitting under an apple tree an apple Falls in his head instead of cursing the apple he thought of gravity take that Newton bot exactly aedus jumps out of a bathtub runs naked through the streets because again massive Insight right do that Nvidia but that's I think but that requires you know I know through time we've invade against you know an empty mind being a devil's world Workshop but let's face it an empty mind is where those connections happen”

0.52

In the future, only active investors who 'bring something to the table' (differentiated insight or process) will survive, because their edge will need to be genuine enough to overcome the fact that other investors can reverse-engineer their positions by observing their trades and create cheap ETFs replicating their strategies.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“the active investors are going to be left and people are going to be people who bring something to the table and it's not going to be permanent you got to be adaptable because you bring something to the table there's a need F already getting formed saying let's replicate what this guy is doing and they don't need to know what you're doing they just need to know what you're buying and selling they can look at your actions and reverse engineer what you do and the next thing you know there'll be an ETF doing exactly what you do charging 10 basis points and you can't survive with 10 basis points”

0.52

Better data and more powerful computational tools for valuation have paradoxically led to qualitatively worse valuations, because analysts have forgotten that valuation is storytelling—they have become Excel ninjas creating spreadsheet models rather than telling coherent stories about companies

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“our access to data became much better and we could know you couldn't go to S&P Capital iqx said download the last 25 years of data not just in your company but in every company in the sector in seconds you have more powerful tools I work with a calculator and a pencil you have Excel spreadsheet you can build macros if you're really sophisticated you can bring in Python and I noticed a contradiction we had more data more powerful tools and evaluations were actually become qu became qualitatively worse”

0.52

In the 21st century economy and markets, backward-looking investing and rigid strategies are fighting the last war (like the French generals building the Maginot Line to stop tanks on the ground, missing that planes could fly over it); adaptability, flexibility, and openness to multiple pathways are essential

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“lot of active investing is your fighting battles from the last century when in fact we should be thinking about how do we fight the battles of the century we're in and it's going to be it's going to I mean I'll tell you in general I don't know what the right way to play this game is but we need to be more adaptable less rigid more accepting that there are a dozen different Pathways to success not right it's in fact the exact opposite of all the things I said value investing became rigid ritualistic right is we need the exact opposit of those to succeed in the market we're in right now”

0.52

There is a time for companies to fold, and the healthiest thing a company can do is accept that and cease operations when its reason for existence is gone, rather than persist as a zombie entity; this challenges the packaged concept of corporate sustainability promoted by business schools

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I believe there's a time for companies to fold now the old Kenny Rogers songs time well you know you need to know when to hold them you need to know when to fold them and there are some companies with the best record the the the the healthiest thing you can do is say look we had a great run and it's time for us to go away and I think that's something we have to accept in businesses”

0.52

Passive investing will eventually hit a ceiling and active investing will return, but at much reduced scale; as passive grows and fewer investors look for bargains, the magnitude of mispricing may increase, creating opportunities for active investors; however, the business is structurally smaller and less profitable than it was

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I do think though that as as passive investing grows and it will continue to grow it's this is inexorable it it'll hit a cap the reason it hit a cap it's true that as as passive investing grows there are fewer and fewer people looking for bargains looking for mistakes but we talked about efficient the reason mistakes are so difficult to exploit in markets is because other people are also looking for that there's a dipping point where if too few people are looking for mistakes You could argue the magnitude of mistakes will get larger and that active investing is going to pay off again”

0.52

The challenge posed by AI is to identify what you do that a bot cannot do; mechanical, rule-driven work is vulnerable to automation because machines execute rules better than humans, so you should ask yourself: what is my moat against my bot

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“act as if there's a bot with your name looking over your shoulder watching what you're doing remember you I mean you don't have to be even the public domain like I am it it's watching what you're doing and ask yourself what can I do that a bot can't do B and that I think is going to be the challenge for those people who think AI is going to change the way we work and live is you like if your job is mechanic mechical that's why Factor investing completely mechanical if what you do is mechanical rule driven bot can do it much better than you can because machines are better at mechanical stuff than you and I are”

0.52

The essence of faith (as opposed to dogma) is accepting that your faith will be shaken and maintaining openness to feedback that might change your view, a practice Damodaran calls 'keeping the feedback loop open'.

definitionhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“the essence of faith is your faith will be shaken accepted so you wake up and say I bought that stock you know I bought you know paler it's and you know I thought it would go up more it hasn't gone up did I make a mistake yes you could have made a mistake the essence of faith is you accept the fact that you might have missed something that there could be now I call I call this keeping the feedback loop open it's a fifth step in my storytelling where after I've told a story and valued a company I try to be open to people pushing back and rather than get defensive I ask myself is there something I can borrow from what they're telling me to make my story better to make my story different”

0.52

Businesses go through lifecycle stages analogous to human aging—they have privileges and limits that change with age, and most companies refuse to accept aging and instead try to become young again through acquisitions or strategic pivots, often destructively

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“businesses go through this a similar process they age good stuff happens bad stuff happens and just like human beings companies and businesses fight aging nobody wants to get old”

0.52

Three structural shifts have undermined historical factor patterns: (1) the global economy is no longer US-centric, (2) disruption and globalization have replaced mean reversion with permanent competitive shifts, (3) technological change has made historical margin relationships unstable, meaning low P/E mean reversion no longer works.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“what's changed about the market first the global economy is not us Centric any 50 years ago the US economy was a center of the global economy now it is a big part of the global economy but it is not 50% of the global economy second you got disruption technology and globalization all playing Havoc with what used to be mean reversion mean reversion used to be that you got a steel company and your your margins drop they would revert back to what they used to be well that might or might not be the case when you have disruption and globalization”

0.52

Envy of others' windfalls (like early Bitcoin buyers) is a dangerous emotion that distorts investment judgment; comparing yourself to lucky speculators who got 50x returns while you earned 15% annually creates status anxiety that drives harmful decision-making.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I know it's tough to follow when people around you are getting rich effortlessly the guy who bought Bitcoin at 100 and sold it at 5,000 you say I'm working so hard to get a 15% return a year and there he made 50 times what he I think that's why looking at other people getting you know letting Envy Drive what you should be doing as an investor can be extremely dangerous”

0.49

Tesla is a 'corporate teenager'—a growth-stage company with great narrative and market-creating impact (electric vehicles) but lacking focus and constantly stepping on its own story through unrelated moves like Bitcoin purchases; teenage companies are a package deal where you accept both positive and negative traits.

definitionhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Aswath Damodaran

“Tesla in many ways is a fascinating company in terms of the of where you put in the lifecycle it's a company that I called my corporate teenager when I bought it for the first time in 2019 I know whether you have teenagers in your house or your familiar with teenagers but you know what teenagers do every day they wake up up they look in the mirror and they say I have lots of potential what can I do today to screw it all up the teenage tenants and Tesla in many ways has a great story line”

0.49

Passive investing will eventually reach a natural cap as too few active investors remain to identify pricing mistakes; when there are fewer bargain hunters, pricing errors will grow, creating opportunities for active managers to outperform again; there will be a cyclical flow back to active investing at some point.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Aswath Damodaran

“as passive investing grows and it will continue to grow it's this is inexorable it it'll hit a cap the reason it hit a cap it's true that as as passive investing grows there are fewer and fewer people looking for bargains looking for mistakes but we talked about efficient the reason mistakes are so difficult to exploit in markets is because other people are also looking for that there's a dipping point where if too few people are looking for mistakes You could argue the magnitude of mistakes will get larger and that active investing is going to pay off again so this is there's an e been a flow to this and I think there will be a point where passive investing overreaches and active investors will come back”

0.49

The iPhone and smartphone ecosystem is foundational to modern platform companies; most modern businesses (Uber, DoorDash, etc.) rely on the smartphone to function, suggesting that Uber, DoorDash, and other platforms should pay royalties to Apple/smartphone makers because without the device, these platforms cease to exist.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Aswath Damodaran

“let's face it without the smartphone in your hand think of how many businesses cease to exist right how are you going to call your Uber or door Dash in fact I would argue that may each of these companies should probably pay some kind of royalty to the smartphone business thing without us without you we're nothing”

0.49

Many old-time value investors claim to have read Ben Graham's Security Analysis, but Damodaran estimates only about 1 in 100 who claim this have actually read it, despite calling it mandatory reading.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I'll wager for every hundred people who claim to have read Ben Graham security analysis maybe one actually read the book”

0.49

Everything Damodaran has done (blog posts, YouTube videos, valuation models, teaching) is in the public domain; he was recently made aware that a machine learning researcher has created a 'Damodaran bot' trained on all his public output to value companies, which terrifies him because if the bot works well it signals his redundancy, and if it works poorly it suggests his method is flawed

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Aswath Damodaran

“five weeks before the spring semester of 2024 classes ended I got a call from a friend of mine in fact I'm writing a blog post about this his name is vandar he teaches machine learning he knows more about artificial intelligence than I will ever learn in my lifetime he called me and he said I've created a deoderant bot that said a what he said a deoderant bot and I said what is a deoderant bot he said I've created this AI entity that has read every single blog post You've ever written watch every single YouTube video that you've ever put on which means it's watch every class it's looked at every evaluation that you've ever done and it remembers everything that it has and it's ready to go”

0.48

Shareholders have surrendered the power to change management by accepting two-class share structures in which founder-CEOs control the voting shares; this is a calamity because we need change-management power most when 21st-century company lifecycles are compressed and founders cannot grow into new lifecycle stages.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“while this is going on we've decided as shareholders we don't need the power to change management we've gone along with companies especially companies the 21st century companies with two classes of shares and guess who owns the voting shares the founder CEOs we've essentially created a Calamity for ourselves”

0.48

Watching CNBC all day is 'a recipe for a terrible investing philosophy' because constant market information feeds into emotional decision-making and reactive trading rather than disciplined strategy.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“watching CNBC all day is a recipe for a terrible investing philosophy and um so spend less time kind of tracking markets on a minute by minute basis reading everything that's happening go back to living the rest of your lives and let investing do what it's supposed to do which is take the wealth you accumulate from the rest of your life and preserving and growing that wealth”

0.48

Active investors are analogous to a plumbing company that causes a flood when called to fix a leak and then bills you for it; you would never pay such a company, yet active investors charge fees for delivering returns below index benchmarks, which is exactly equivalent to paying for worse performance.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I describe active investing as the equivalent of floods or as a plumbing company that if you call into your house because there a leak leaves a flood and sends you a bill for it you'd never pay the guy right active investing bad performan is caught up with them”

0.48

Active investors who view value investing as requiring them to never buy MAG 7 or tech stocks are trapped by ideology; in reality, tech stocks can and have been undervalued at points (e.g., Facebook at 5x cash flows after the metaverse fiasco), so the rule 'never buy tech' is self-defeating.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“many oldtime value investing strategies would not have owned the M Fang am would not have owned the Mac 7 they're still waging their finger saying you you guys are going to pay the price every day I read about how terrible this is how the you know it's going the correction is coming any day now when do you stop doing that when do you accept the fact that you've missed out on the stocks that drove the market so I think that the advantage of index funds is you're never going to miss out the big Winners they're always going to be there in your portfolio”

0.48

Oldtime value investing has become rigid, ritualistic, and righteous: practitioners view adherence to Ben Graham principles and attendance at Berkshire's annual meeting as markers of the 'chosen ones' and look down on other investors as shallow and stupid, which is dangerous because it breeds contempt for alternative approaches and closes minds to new ideas.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“the three words that come to my mind when I think about oldtime value invest I'm not I'm not tarring Warren Buffett or Charlie manga with this is It's rigid it's it's ritualistic right there are certain things you're supposed to do as a value investor including going to Omaha reading Ben Graham security”

0.48

Market concentration in the last 15 years is different from historical patterns because the same companies (FANG/MAG 7) win year after year, whereas in the 20th century the biggest winners kept shifting; when the same companies dominate consecutively, they become $1–3 trillion entities, making the market dependent on their continued success.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“what's different about the last 15 years it's not just the biggest winners each year account for a big chunk of the market it's the same players every year whereas we go back to the 20th century the winners kept shifting so if you look at the last decade was the Fang gam stocks Facebook Amazon Netflix Google Apple and Microsoft now of course the mag 7 and that's a little scary because it's the same stocks year after year carrying the market and if they do it year after year they're going to become trillion dollar companies $2 trillion companies3 trillion companies and the pry of companies that big is if they stop delivering the upside it's very difficult for the rest of the market to make up for it”

0.48

Most of daily life in developed countries is spent within the ecosystems of FANG/MAG7 companies—using iPhones, asking Alexa, watching Netflix, searching Google—and should it be any surprise that the companies absorbing your time and data are the ones that dominate financial markets

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“think of how much of your day and I remember during the peak of covid when at that time the Fang am stocks were dominating the market data accounted for 20% increase in market cap over the previous decade that carry the market and people said this makes no sense I asked them to map out in a typical day how much time they spend on the platforms of different companies you wake up in the morning what's the first thing you do you check your Apple iPhone you're already in the Apple Eco system you ask Alexa what time it is as your so all through the day”

0.48

Apple's iPhone is the foundational platform that enables all downstream companies (Uber, DoorDash, Netflix); without the smartphone, these companies cease to exist, yet they don't compensate Apple for this dependency, suggesting an underpricing of Apple's platform value

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“Apple's iPhone appended the world in ways we still haven't figured out you know let's face it without the smartphone in your hand think of how many businesses cease to exist right how are you going to call your Uber or door Dash in fact I would argue that may each of these companies should probably pay some kind of royalty to the smartphone business thing without us without you we're nothing”

0.48

The notion of a 'great CEO' packaged by Harvard Business Review and McKinsey is nonsense; the characteristics required of a great CEO vary dramatically across the lifecycle stage of a company, and a CEO who is perfect for one stage may be destructive in another

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“this notion of a great CEO again marketed by the Harvard Business Review in McKenzie it's very self-serving on the part of business school professors and Consultants to market the idea that there's a certain set of characteristics iscs that make for a great CEO it's absolute nonsense because you look at the list of characteristics and then you look around you and say hey that guy is a great CEO is none of these characteristics”

0.48

Berkshire Hathaway's annual meeting and value investing community represent a rigid, ritualistic, righteous philosophy that views itself as the chosen ones and looks down on the rest of the investment world with contempt; Damodaran avoids the meeting because he rejects both the dogmatism and the righteous superiority

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“It's full of True Believers who think they've found the the I mean the three words that come to my mind when I think about oldtime value invest I'm not I'm not tarring Warren Buffett or Charlie manga with this is It's rigid it's it's ritualistic right there are certain things you're supposed to do as a value investor including going to Omaha reading Ben Graham security”

0.48

There is no one pathway to successful investing; investors should look inward to understand their own temperament, biases, and strengths, then choose an investment philosophy that aligns with them rather than blindly following the approach that worked for Warren Buffett or other celebrated investors

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“there is no one Pathway to success I love Peter Lynch I love Warren Buffett I like what's some things that George Soros does I think there's something to be learned by looking at Great investors in every different in in every philosophy and if you ask me what's the best Philosophy for me my advice is look inward now figure out what makes you takech cuz that's going to tell you what the right Philosophy for you is it's not what work for Warren Buffett it's what's going to work for you”

0.48

Damodaran publicly documents his investment mistakes (including Vale in 2012, which he sold at a loss after realizing he had missed country risk, commodity lag, and currency correlation) and writes about them; admitting 'I was wrong' is freeing because it allows you to develop new stories rather than defending the old one

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“no one of the things that's helped me is because I write a blog and I put down pretty much everything I do on the blog when I buy when I sell I Tred to tell people when I screwed up now I still remember one of my favorite posts was on Val the Brazilian iror mining company which I bought in 2012 when I bought it I called called it my 3C bet bet in a currency a commodity in a country I bought it at $8 or $7 or $10 per share and two years later it was trading at $4 per share”

0.48

Tilted index funds and factor-based index funds are inferior to pure index funds because they sacrifice the guarantee of 'match the market' (the index fund's key advantage) for a speculative bet that a particular factor will outperform

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“that's why I'm not a great fan of tilted index funds or you know index funds that try to tilt you to a small cap they they bring in Factor investing into index funds I don't want to beat the index by 30 basis points or 20 basis points I just want to match the index”

0.48

The ability to make novel connections between unconnected ideas (exemplified by Newton observing an apple fall and thinking about gravity, or Archimedes in the bathtub) is a uniquely human capacity that AI is unlikely to replicate; these 'aha moments' require an empty, undistracted mind that modern life is systematically destroying

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“there are few things that human beings do that makes them difficult to replicate one is um we do make connections out of things that look unconnected and come up with insights right in galile there was sitting I mean what a Newton was sitting under an apple tree an apple Falls in his head instead of cursing the apple he thought of gravity take that Newton bot exactly aedus jumps out of a bathtub runs naked through the streets because again massive Insight right do that Nvidia”

0.47

Three structural changes have undermined the viability of backward-looking factor investing: (1) globalization has shifted the economy away from being US-centric, (2) disruption and technology have broken the mean reversion that factoring strategies rely on, and (3) the world has shifted so fundamentally that many reasons factors worked in the past no longer apply.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“what's changed about the market first the global economy is not us Centric any 50 years ago the US economy was a center of the global economy now it is a big part of the global economy but it is not 50% of the global economy second you got disruption technology and globalization all playing Havoc with what used to be mean reversion mean reversion used to be that you got a steel company and your your margins drop they would revert back to what they used to be well that might or might not be the case when you have disruption and globalization so I think we have to factor in the very real possibility the world has shifted under us and if the world has shifted under us many of the reasons these factors worked in the past are no longer in place”

0.47

Modern advice to 'read more' is backwards; the better advice is 'read less, think more'; we live in a world where reading everything about everything is possible, but this fills the mind and prevents the reflective thinking that generates novel insights

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“my suggestion I keep getting asked by people what should I read next and my advice is always thr some office said read less think more we read too much we live in a world where we can read what everybody has ever written about everything we can watch what anybody no we don't even have give a our mind a chance to think through things now”

0.47

Henry Ford was the perfect CEO for Ford in 1902 because he was visionary and could break open the mass market automobile business, but as tenure progressed he became out of sync with the company's needs; in the 20th century, long-lived companies had time for natural transitions, but in the 21st century, companies scale from zero to $100 billion in 8 years and then decline, leaving the same founder/CEO running a company from startup to senescence without the adaptability required

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“Henry Ford was the perfect CEO for Ford in 1902 Visionary but remember Visionaries are kind of eccentric and that's the reason the model D came in one color black black or black it's just like you know Steve Jobs iteration one in apple saying I'm going to make a computer where you cannot expand no new memory because I don't like that but he was the perfect CEO for Ford to break the mass Market automobile comp business open towards the end of his tenure he was out living is welcome but time took care of the BR he died somebody else moved in time took care of transitions with the 20th century company”

0.45

He recommends 'read less, think more' as a response to information overload; reading excessive amounts does not improve reasoning, and instead crowds out the mental space needed for original thinking.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“my suggestion I keep getting asked by people what should I read next and my advice is always thr some office said read less think more we read too much we live in a world where we can read what everybody has ever written about everything we can watch what anybody no we don't even have give a our mind a chance to think through things now”

0.45

Damodaran publicly admits his investment mistakes on his blog, including his purchase of Vale (a Brazilian iron ore company) in 2012 at $7-10 per share, which fell to $4 because he underestimated commodity lag effects, country risk, and the correlation between commodity prices and currency devaluation; he frames this not as permanent failure but as freedom to develop new stories for the company.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I bought it in 2012 when I bought it I called called it my 3C bet bet in a currency a commodity in a country I bought it at $8 or $7 or $10 per share and two years later it was trading at $4 per share why because there are things I missed about commodity businesses where there's a lag effect of commodity prices going down I miss the fact that country risk can be bad and can get worse before it gets better”

0.45

Envy-driven investing, where you compare your returns to others' lucky windfalls (Bitcoin bought at $100 sold at $5,000), is extremely dangerous and leads to abandoning your actual investing strategy for speculation; the solution is to maintain focus on your own portfolio rather than watching others' successes.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“would I like to grow wealth at 50% a year yes would I like to have a 100 bagger in my portfolio yes but I shouldn't be actively looking for those things because if I look for those things I'm going to miss the core tenants of investing so I know it's tough to follow when people around you are getting rich effortlessly the guy who bought Bitcoin at 100 and sold it at 5,000 you say I'm working so hard to get a 15% return a year and there he made 50 times what he...I think that's why looking at other people getting you know letting Envy Drive what you should be doing as an investor can be extremely dangerous”

0.45

Damodaran's personal investing approach accepts that he may underperform the market by 10–15 basis points but maintains diversification (40+ stocks) to avoid catastrophic losses; he views investing actively as a hobby he enjoys, not because he expects to beat the market but because the process itself is valuable.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I invest actively because I enjoy investing I invest actively not because I want to beat the market but because I enjoy investing which means that when I invest the one thing I have to do is remember the hypoc critical which is Do no harm don't do things in your portfolio that could cause you calamitous cost for instance I diversify I hold 40 plus stocks in my portfolio that would be a no no with oldtime value investing where you said concentrate now why not now people said don't you feel confident enough in your in your big Winners no I don't you might I don't because I know how many things I don't control”

0.45

Warren Buffett is actually much more flexible and adaptive than many of his orthodox followers; the value investing community has reified his approach into dogmatic rules that Buffett himself does not follow

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“know I think that you know Warren Buffett is actually a much more flexible investor than many of the people who claim to follow Warren Buffett but I think oldtime value investing has created these sets of rules that they believe everybody to should follow and to me there is no one Pathway to success”

0.45

The notion that 'never' is a valid investing maxim ('I will never buy tech stocks', 'I will never buy expensive stocks') is dangerous because it closes your mind to opportunities and causes you to miss major market moves; instead, use 'I will not buy these stocks at these prices' with an implicit understanding that circumstances change

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“when people say I could never buy a MAG 7 stock it's never undervalue that's not true I mean take of Facebook after that metaverse Fiasco you could have bought Facebook for five years of online advertising cash flows it was I mean it's a closest I've come to the Old Warren Buffett American Express investment in the 1960s after the salad oil Scandal the legend is he computed the cash flows he could have got from the card as a franchise and said five years of cash flows gets me to the price I'm buying MX meta was the American Express of this generation if you are willing to look there but people said tech companies they'll always be expensive I'll never buy them never is a dangerous word in invest I'll buy any company at the right price”

0.45

Narrative and reality must be bounded together in valuation; Intel's AI narrative is plausible because the AI market is genuinely large and Intel has relevant R&D capabilities, but the execution timeline risk is high and Nvidia's lead may be insurmountable.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“if I wanted to change their narrative I probably would want to do something around AI but the problem is they can't really deliver on AI”

0.45

The Fidelity offices in Boston show the scale of active investing's decline: two-thirds of the building is now empty because the firm no longer needs the floor space to house its shrinking active management workforce.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“it's you know it's the steady state is going to be about a lot fewer AC investors and we see today all those floors in Boston that Fidelity has 2third of them they don't need”

0.45

Damodaran invests actively not to beat the market but because he enjoys investing; he diversifies (40+ stocks) against his own uncertainty, accepts that he might underperform the market by 15 basis points, and would rather have the pleasure of picking stocks than the certainty of index returns

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“as a investor and I said look I invest actively because I enjoy investing I invest actively not because I want to beat the market but because I enjoy investing”

0.45

Tesla and Nvidia are partly manufacturing or design-heavy companies, but traditional manufacturing companies (like those dominating the 20th century) are unlikely to be at the top of 21st century markets; if autonomous driving succeeds, Tesla's role will fundamentally change, and the future looks more like software/design/platform companies at the top rather than manufacturers.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I don't see a Manufacturing Company being on top of this file anymore I mean you could get a Tesla and Nvidia which are partly manufacturing but let's face it Nvidia is a design company right it designs chips tsmc makes all the chips Tesla is still perhaps the only Manufacturing Company in the mix but if there's automated driving that's effectively in the card somewhere who knows what Tesla will look like”

0.45

Intel has a plausible comeback story because AI is a large, growing market and Intel has the R&D and chip design skills to compete; the question is whether the time lag has become too long and Nvidia has run too far ahead, but at minimum Intel could potentially return to middle-age viability as an AI participant.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I think there is a glimmer of a story you can tell for Intel because the Hope comes from the a I Market being a big one and Invidia dominating it and until maybe finding a way into that market maybe it's too late I don't know but the you know but they have the skill set they have the R&D but I think that whether the lead time is too long and ined has run away from them I don't know but I could tell a plausible story for Intel to make a comeback at least as a middle-aged company with AI providing”

0.45

Intel and Starbucks are both in decline, and while there is a plausible bounded story for Intel's comeback through AI (a large growing market where they have R&D capability), there is no plausible growth story for Starbucks because its market is saturated, it cannot compete in China due to cost structure, and it has destroyed its original retail/experience business model by shifting to online ordering

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I think there is a glimmer of a story you can tell for Intel because the Hope comes from the a I Market being a big one and Invidia dominating it and until maybe finding a way into that market maybe it's too late I don't know but the you know but they have the skill set they have the R&D but I think that whether the lead time is too long and ined has run away from them I don't know but I could tell a plausible story for Intel to make a comeback”

0.45

Silicon Valley founders and venture capitalists practice undisciplined storytelling by inflating total addressable markets (e.g., Uber claiming $5.2 trillion by including all spending on transportation, cars, and fuel) rather than bounded storytelling grounded in realistic market capture assumptions.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Aswath Damodaran

“in Silicon Valley they understood the importance of story but their storytelling was they taught Founders how to tell them big stories bigger stories I mean you see this play out when you look at um know to the total addressable markets has become a feature of almost every Silicon Valley company when Uber went public they claimed the total addressable Market was $5.2 trillion you know how they came up with the 5.2 trillion they spent every dollar people spent not just on car service but on buying cars on public they basically took everything anybody spent on transportation and say that's our total addressable Market you know why they like the 5.2 trillion you hold up 5.2 trillion in front of investor eyes they said this company could become huge but it's a fairy tale there is no way that car service is going to be a $5.2 trillion business so one of the things I have as a PR with storytelling and let's face it Venture capitals are all storytellers Founders are storytellers it's all stories but they're undisciplined storytelling”

0.45

Tesla is a corporate teenager—a company with great potential but prone to self-sabotage and narrative inconsistency; it created the electric car market, but constantly undermines its story by taking inexplicable actions like bringing Bitcoin into the picture, yet this is a package deal and Elon Musk's net effect on Tesla remains positive

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Aswath Damodaran

“Tesla in many ways is a fascinating company in terms of the of where you put in the lifecycle it's a company that I called my corporate teenager when I bought it for the first time in 2019”

0.45

Unlike 20th-century top 10 S&P 500 companies which showed significant turnover across decades, 21st-century dominance may be more durable because platform companies have higher barriers to entry and network effects that create natural moats; however, a platform technology disruption (not a manufacturing competitor) could eventually replace current leaders.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Aswath Damodaran

“if you look in the history of the S&P 500 and you look at the top 10 companies by decade there's usually significant turnover in that and I wonder are we going to still see that I mean are these companies so dominant now that that changes in the future you could see it but might be another platform that replaces this platform I think in a sense no I i think in many ways Apple's iPhone appended the world in ways we still haven't figured out you know let's face it without the smartphone in your hand think of how many businesses cease to exist right how are you going to call your Uber or door Dash in fact I would argue that may each of these companies should probably pay some kind of royalty to the smartphone business thing without us without you we're nothing”

0.43

Walmart's 2019 acquisition of Flipcart for $21 billion was an attempt by a middle-aged company to regain youth through a transaction, representing the 'most expensive facelift in history' because it failed to change Walmart's fundamental lifecycle stage or business model.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I remember about 5 years ago when Walmart bought flip cart the Indian online retailer and Walmart by 2019 was a middle-age company nothing wrong with it they made it to Middle AG that's already an accomplishment we talk about the mortality rates but they didn't want to be middle-aged they wanted to be young they wanted to be a growth company and I called it the most expensive facelift in history because it paid $21 billion to buy an Indian online retailer did it make them young again not at all”

0.43

With Facebook/Meta, portfolio managers and shareholders complained about Mark Zuckerberg not listening to them, but this is like getting married to a Kardashian and complaining that cameras follow you everywhere—you explicitly gave up your power to change management by buying stock in a two-class share structure, so the complaint is self-inflicted.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“a couple years ago you saw this play out at Facebook where portfolio manager said Hey how do we get Mark cleberg to listen to us and my response was now buying Facebook and complaining that Mark cleberg is not listening to you is like getting married to a Kardashian and complaining cameras follow away all over the place you gave up that power”

0.43

Index funds cannot be beaten by tilted or factor-tilted index funds because the advantage of indexing is capturing all the big winners; if you tilt toward small cap or factors, you risk missing the MAG 7 stocks that have driven the last decade's returns.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I'm not a great fan of tilted index funds or you know index funds that try to tilt you to a small cap they they bring in Factor investing into index funds I don't want to beat the index by 30 basis points or 20 basis points I just want to match the index the advantage of being an in of investing in an index fund is you're going to have the mag 7 in your portfolio always you're going to have the fan gam in your portfolio always because you're just investing in the index the problem with being an active investor is if your active investing philosophy drives you there you might not might not have owned any of the Fang gam stocks over the last decade in fact many oldtime value investing strategies would not have owned the M Fang am would not have owned the Mac 7”

0.43

Passive investing has grown because active investing has been terrible: empirically, information asymmetries collapsed (all data is public), transaction costs fell, and investors can now monitor fund performance continuously and switch easily; these factors naturally drove clients away from active management toward index funds.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“active investing has always been crappy always through its entire lifetime but for much of its lifetime we know how crappy it was I I tell people to imagine being in the 1960s right there were only active mutual funds you put your money in an act actual active mutual fund you got one statement maybe for a year telling you what your investment was doing no comparisons no idea what the rest of the world is doing and you said these guys are professionals they know what they're doing I've trusted no trusted them this is the right thing to do two things happen one is we started to get information about how badly active investing was doing on a continuous basis on on your smartphone you could say hey my fund is up 7% the S&P 500 is up 12% second we empowered investors to be able to move their money can you imagine moving your money in the late 60s from one brokerage house to another first you have to physically drive to that brokerage house you'd have to talk to the person at that desk who was going to convince you that this is the worst decision you could ever make”

0.43

The value of dogma is that it reduces decision-making work and eliminates debate (e.g., 'never buy a stock with P/E > 10'), but the cost is a portfolio that underperforms because the rules are outdated or context-insensitive

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“is there value in Dogma is there an upside to Dogma yeah you don't have to there's no debate right the upside to Dogma is you'll never buy a stock with the p ratio greater than 10 that makes it very very absolute they have less work to do but your pfolio is not going to thank you for your for your Dogma so the upside of Dogma is you you never have doubt”

0.43

One advantage of passive index investing is that you are guaranteed to own the big winners (the MAG7 in the current era); even if you miss every other prediction, you cannot avoid the stocks that drive the market, whereas active managers with specific philosophies (especially value) may systematically exclude them

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“the advantage of index funds is you're never going to miss out the big Winners they're always going to be there in your portfolio and that's a big plus because as you said if we're in a world where winner take all companies are going to dominate the market you can't afford not to have them in your portfolio at some point in time”

0.43

AQR's quality small-cap factor strategy might generate alpha because it adds a qualitative (non-mechanical) layer—evaluating management quality—beyond pure factor screening, thereby bringing something beyond mechanical rules to the table.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Aswath Damodaran

“if you bring nothing to the table and many Factor investors bring very to the table I don't expect you to take anything away that's why I'm not a great believer in pure Factor investing and you might add something to the mix That Makes You Different Makes You Makes You unique I know aqr had this quality small caps they said we want small cap companies with quality in addition to small capitalization maybe the qualitative maybe there's a qualitative component to that quality we look at management look at what they're do doing now I can see the reason why you might be able to earn excess returns”

0.42

Damodaran owns all seven MAG7 stocks not because he predicted AI dominance but because they looked undervalued at various points in time; he bought Meta after the metaverse fiasco at a price that reflected five years of cash flows, analogous to Buffett's American Express investment after the salad oil scandal

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I bought it like 171 every other one of the mag 7 stocks I bought at a different point in time and every one of them in my valuations has been undervalued at least two or three times in the last decade and these are the most successful companies in the market so when people say I could never buy a MAG 7 stock it's never undervalue that's not true”

0.39

Damodaran owns all seven of the MAG 7 stocks, bought them at different points in time, and has valued them as undervalued at least 2–3 times in the last decade; his ownership is not a fundamental prediction but a result of disciplined valuation finding those companies cheap at various points.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I own all my all of the seven Mac 7even stocks Tesla I re-bought this year because I bought and sold Tesla and it hit 180 and I value to 180 I bought it like 171 every other one of the mag 7 stocks I bought at a different point in time and every one of them in my valuations has been undervalued at least two or three times in the last decade and these are the most successful companies in the market so when people say I could never buy a MAG 7 stock it's never undervalue that's not true”

0.39

The active investing industry is structurally shrinking, as evidenced by Fidelity's Boston office towers, which formerly housed thousands of active managers, now occupying only one-third of their capacity, reflecting the irreversible decline of active asset management as a profession.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Aswath Damodaran

“we see today all those floors in Boston that Fidelity has 2third of them they don't need it's a it's a it's not great if you're in the active investing business because the business is going to get smaller”

0.39

Facebook/Meta's metaverse venture created a buying opportunity similar to Warren Buffett's American Express investment after the salad oil scandal; Damodaran bought Meta when it was valued at only 5 years of online advertising cash flows, making it a genuine value opportunity despite the broader tech stigma.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Aswath Damodaran

“take of Facebook after that metaverse Fiasco you could have bought Facebook for five years of online advertising cash flows it was I mean it's a closest I've come to the Old Warren Buffett American Express investment in the 1960s after the salad oil Scandal the legend is he computed the cash flows he could have got from the card as a franchise and said five years of cash flows gets me to the price I'm buying MX meta was the American Express of this generation if you are willing to look”

0.21

Damodaran has published 12 books by writing material and only calling it a book once it reaches critical mass; his writing practice is organic rather than commissioned.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Aswath Damodaran

“I got to start you with this thing I'm excited you've got a new book congratulations this is my 12th book and you know I've never ever sat down to write a book in my life I write stuff and if it accumulates and reaches a critical mass eventually I said look I've got a book here and does anybody want to publish it and somebody usually does”