What this covers

This lecture is a single-speaker address by Deborah Brautigam, director of the China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins, delivered as the Griffin Lecture at the University of Minnesota's China Center. She builds the case historically before turning to the present. The story begins with Paul Volcker's interest-rate hikes, which pushed debt service costs onto borrowers abroad. It then covers the 1982 Mexican default, the Baker and Brady Plans, and the slow, activist-driven path to relief for the poorest countries through Jubilee 2000. She also describes how the Paris Club moved from rescheduling payments to accepting that some countries were insolvent rather than merely short of cash.

The middle of the talk is about institutions: the formal rules of the IMF and World Bank, and the club governance of the Paris Club and the G20 (Group of Twenty)). She explains how the G20 grew out of the G7 and was widened after the Asian financial crisis. She also notes that it still lacks direct representation for private bondholders. Brautigam recalls Anne Krueger's proposal for a sovereign restructuring mechanism, which the US voted down in the IMF, and she frames the current moment with Gramsci's line about the old dying and the new not yet born. The Collective Action Problem of creditors fearing free riders runs through the argument.

The most contested section concerns China. Brautigam rejects the "debt trap" account of Sri Lanka's Hambantota port, saying there was no default and no seizure. She says the port's debt service was a small share of the country's total, and that she has found no case of Chinese lenders seizing assets. She describes Chinese tools such as debt-equity swaps and the 2000 cancellation program, and she discusses confidentiality clauses in Chinese loans. She also compares China's share of relief under the DSSI (Debt Service Suspension Initiative)) with the near-absence of contributions from commercial and multilateral creditors, drawing on Debt Justice analysis and a comment by Tim Jones that blaming China distracts from Western banks and asset managers.

Sharpest takeaway

Brautigam argues that solving the global debt crisis requires US-China cooperation through reformed multilateral institutions, but current geopolitical hostility and mischaracterization of Chinese lending as 'debt trap diplomacy' without evidence undermines necessary cooperation and threatens to destabilize the international financial system.

  • The Paris Club framework is outdated and unfit for a multipolar creditor landscape where China, bondholders, and commercial banks hold the majority of developing country debt
  • China has provided 55% of DSSI debt relief despite holding only 27% of eligible debt, contradicting claims of intransigence; the US is unfairly scapegoating China while failing to pressure bondholders and commercial creditors to participate
  • A new financial architecture through the G20 is the only mechanism capable of bringing all creditor groups (bilateral, multilateral, commercial) to the table with fair burden-sharing mechanisms

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0.84

International cooperation in debt governance can solve collective action problems such as the 'free rider problem,' where creditors fear that if they grant debt relief, borrowers will use it to repay other creditors, but this is overcome through mutual transparency, simultaneous coordination, and institution-building with rules and incentives.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Deborah Brautigam

“So all of these creditors are afraid that if they give debt relief then the borrowers Are just going to use that debt relief to repay the other creditors so they wanna make sure that they're not going to be, the other creditors are not going to be free riding on their debt relief. So you boost that cop cooperation by things like mutual transparency. Everybody is opened about how much money that countries owe them. That overcomes information asymmetries. You also need to all be in the same room and move at the same time, roughly, so that you can be sure that that free riding is not going to happen. This also takes trust and time and institution building and perhaps rules, even legislation and a judicious mixture of incentives and pressures, carrots and sticks.”

0.80

In the 1970s-1980s, the US Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker raised the federal funds interest rate to 22.36% from 1979-1981, which cured US inflation but exported high debt service costs to overseas countries whose debt obligations then ballooned.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Deborah Brautigam

“Because the US was experiencing high inflation During the 1970s. And to combat our inflation, the US Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volker raised the US federal funds interest rate to 22.36%, 1979-1981. So that's a huge increase. That's pretty expensive, a lot higher than what we have today. So this cured inflation in the United States. But these high interest rates were exported. Overseas countries debt service charges became much, much higher the cost of servicing that depth, as you can see in this slide, the blue band, the blue bands and the orange bands grew over the 1980s, mainly due to those interests rate increases.”

0.75

China is now the largest bilateral creditor to developing countries, while bondholders hold vastly more debt than Chinese banks in the developing world, and there is no global forum for debt restructuring or international bankruptcy court.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Deborah Brautigam

“China is the largest bilateral creditor. But bondholders, many of them US residents like you and me, hold vastly more debt in the developing world than do Chinese banks. And there's no global forum for debt restructuring. There's no international bankruptcy court.”

0.75

The G20 represents 80% of global income, 60% of global population, and three-quarters of global exports, giving it far more legitimacy than the Paris Club or OECD because it includes both China and the United States alongside emerging markets, though private sector bondholders (63% of global debt) are still not directly represented.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Deborah Brautigam

“They represent three-quarters of global exports, 60% of the global population, 80 per cent of global income. And importantly, it includes China and the United States, though they're in there together. That's not the case for the Paris Club...But one thing is still left out here, as we've seen now, 63% of global debt is held by the private sector, bondholders and commercial banks. And they really aren't represented in any of these institutions that we've been talking about here.”

0.74

The 1982 Mexican debt default marked the start of the developing country debt crisis; the US developed the Baker Plan and Brady Plan to address it, with the Brady Plan taking seven years (1982-1989) to implement and benefiting only 17 emerging market countries while poorer countries in Africa received no essential debt relief until 1988.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Deborah Brautigam

“The last debt crisis is generally said to have started when Mexico defaulted in August of 1982...So we tried the Baker plan and then finally we negotiated the Brady Plan. So the Brady Plan, but it took time, as you can see there, Mexico defaults in 1982, the Brady Plan happens in 1989, so that's seven years to get that going. And the Brady Plan dealt with emerging market countries, only 17 countries that benefited, but the poorer countries that were also having problems and that were in Africa, nothing was happening for them.”

0.69

Civil society activists in Europe, the United States, and borrower countries, particularly through the Jubilee 2000 campaign and massive protests at World Bank/IMF annual meetings (drawing up to 100,000 protestors), pushed wealthy governments to provide debt relief to the 38 poorest countries, but it took nearly 20 years from when the debt crisis began.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Deborah Brautigam

“It was actually civil society activists in Europe, the United States, and borrower countries who pushed hard for these policies and the 1990s do the Jubilee 2000 campaign. When I moved to Washington in 1994, I found that every October when the World Bank and the IMF are having their annual meetings, there are as many as 100,000 protestors in the streets...these activists campaigners succeeded in pushing our government and other wealthy governments to foot the bill for debt relief in these 38 of the poorest countries. But it took nearly 20 years from when the debt crisis began until that happened.”

0.69

Global debt crises create political instability and are dangerous situations that can lead to outcomes like the Great Depression and rising fascism, making cooperation between major powers not just economically necessary but existentially important.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Deborah Brautigam

“As the world was falling into the Great Depression and fascism was rising around 1930, and These are things that happen when global debt problems spread. It creates political instability, It's a dangerous situation.”

0.68

The IMF's Anne Krueger led a team that proposed a new mechanism for sovereign debt restructuring to replace the prolonged, unpredictable, and damaging existing process, but the US voted it down in the IMF, preventing its adoption and leaving the problem unresolved.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Deborah Brautigam

“And the IMF even concluded during a report that was done by Anne Krueger, who happens to be one of my colleagues at Johns Hopkins at SIAS. They said that the existing process of debt restructuring is prolonged, unpredictable, and ultimately damaging to creditors and borrowers and something new needs to happen. So Anne Krueger lead a team that proposed a new mechanism to do sovereign debt restructuring, where we've kinda bring everyone together to do this and have a new financial architecture for that. But the US voted it down in the IMF.”

0.68

Despite the widely reported case of China seizing the Sri Lankan Hambantota port as a debt trap, no evidence supports this narrative: there was no default, no seizure, and Brautigam found no cases where Chinese banks or government seized assets when countries failed to repay.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Deborah Brautigam

“Despite the much mythologized case of the Chinese finance ham and toda port in Sri Lanka, which is the foundation of the idea of debt trap diplomacy. Where the New York Times erroneously reported that China had seized this port, which was financed by Chinese bank when Sri Lanka defaulted on the loan. There was in fact no default and there was no seizure. We did not find any cases where Chinese banks or the government seized an asset in or outside the borrower country when a country failed to repay.”

0.68

Confidentiality clauses in Chinese loans prevent countries from publishing loan terms or contracts unless local law requires it; while some Chinese lending is conducted with confidentiality, borrower countries in debt distress do open their books to the IMF, meaning Chinese loans are not deliberately hidden.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Deborah Brautigam

“Confidentiality. Confidentiality clauses in Chinese loans DO keep countries from publishing the terms are contracts unless it's required by local laws and the borrower country. Chinese diplomats are applauded at home for undiplomatic behavior as wolf warriors. And this is not only unprofessional, it's counterproductive for China and for solving these problems which require diplomacy.”

0.68

Global economic conditions from 2000-2014 were buoyant with high growth rates in Africa and emerging markets, making both Chinese and commercial banks optimistic about loan repayment; they were not immune to 'irrational exuberance,' and only in 2014-2015 did problems become clear, with Chinese Eximbank peaks in Africa in 2013 and commercial banks peaking in 2016 as they responded to deteriorating conditions.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Deborah Brautigam

“If you look at the global economy during the last 20 years, and particularly in Africa and other places, it was booming. Growth rates are really high. We talked about Africa becoming these frontier markets. So countries were not just emerging markets and frontier markets and the bond holders, were all going in there and pumping money into these countries as well. And so there was this irrational exuberance going on and the Chinese were not immune to it. So they also thought that these countries would be repaying. It was only in 2015, 2014, 2015, when it started to become clear that there were problems happening.”

0.66

Global debt governance has historically occurred through a mix of formal rules (IMF, World Bank under Bretton Woods) and informal institutions or club governance (Paris Club, G20), with the Bretton Woods system of 1944 establishing the foundation for post-crisis financial architecture.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Deborah Brautigam

“So in global debt governance, this international cooperation has occurred through a mix of formal rules and informal institutions or club governance. And most of this has happened in the West. So the basis of this, the foundation of it is the Bretton Woods system. And this slide is from 1944 when the IMF and the World Bank were first set up.”

0.66

Antonio Gramsci's observation that 'in crisis, the old is dying and the new cannot be born' describes the current situation where old ways of dealing with debt are obsolete and new institutional mechanisms are struggling to emerge.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Deborah Brautigam

“The activist philosopher Antonio Gramsci famously said that in this crisis, the crisis the world was in, then it consists precisely in the fact that the old was dying and the new cannot be born. And so that's the situation that we're in now, the old ways of dealing with debt and dealing with a lot of things are dying and the new ones are struggling to be born.”

0.65

China launched its own debt cancellation program in 2000 for poor countries, which differed from the HIPC Initiative because it did not require structural adjustment reforms or economic liberalization that the World Bank and IMF demanded, but was limited to only interest-free loans and totaled about $3.4 billion over 20 years.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Deborah Brautigam

“They launched their own debt cancellation program in poor countries in the year 2000...The IMF and the World Bank and the Paris Club use a lot of conditionality to get debt relief. Countries had to jump through a lot of hoops. They had to implement structural adjustment reforms. They had to liberalize their economies. The Chinese didn't ask for anything like that...But it was only for one category of loans, these interest-free loans...it was about $3.4 billion over the last 20 years.”

0.64

US government messaging blames China for impeding global debt resolution, but Debt Justice analyst Tim Jones observed in July 2022 that this is a distraction; the truth is that Western banks, asset managers, and oil traders are far more responsible for the debt crisis, but the G7 lets them off the hook.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Deborah Brautigam

“And yet from our government, what we're mainly hearing is that China is the one that's impeding this, Or holding this all up. And I think Tim Jones said it well, it does justice in a paper that they published in July 2022, just a few months ago, he said Western leaders blame China for the debt crisis in Africa, but this is a distraction. The truth is, it's their own banks. Asset managers and oil traders are far more responsible, but the G7 are letting them off the hook.”

0.64

Global sovereign debt reached alarming levels by 2018, with government and private sector debt rising worldwide, and since COVID-19, Argentina, Belize, Ecuador, Lebanon, Suriname, Zambia, and Sri Lanka have all declared bankruptcy or defaulted on sovereign bonds.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Deborah Brautigam

“In 2018 when the UK advocacy group Debt Justice produced the graph up here, Government and private sector debt was already reaching alarming levels and this was happening all around the world. Since the COVID-19 pandemic began, Argentina, Belize, Ecuador, Lebanon, Suriname, Zambia, and Sri Lanka have all declared bankruptcy.”

0.63

During the DSSI period, an analysis by Debt Justice advocacy group showed inadequate burden sharing: private lenders and bondholders suspended zero payments, the World Bank suspended zero, China suspended 45% of expected participation, France 64%, but China held 27% of eligible debt service yet provided 55% of total DSSI debt relief, while commercial and multilateral creditors provided nothing.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Deborah Brautigam

“So as debt as Jubilee or Debt Justice advocacy group that's been working on debt relief now for 30 years or so, they did an analysis of what the different creditors had done during this G20 sponsored debt relief operation. And they showed that there was inadequate burden sharing. In their analysis here, the private lenders based in the UK, which was what they were focusing on since they are UK based, they had suspended zero payments, bond holders had suspended zero payments. The World Bank had suspended zero payments...What is striking is that even though the Chinese had the largest share, as you can see, as I mentioned earlier, they had 27% of the debt service that was due to them. They provided 55% of the total DSSI debt relief and they were responsible for 27% of the total debt service that was due.”

0.61

China used debt-equity swaps to manage debt distress, such as in Mali where a Chinese company paid off part of the debt and gained shares in a sugar factory that became a joint venture, and in Tanzania with a friendship textile factory that the Chinese still operate.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Deborah Brautigam

“The Chinese offered a debt-equity swap...In Mali, for example, the Chinese offered a debt-equity swap and so a Chinese company paid off part of the debt and gained some shares in a sugar factory that the Chinese had built and that became a joint venture. In Tanzania The same thing happened with a friendship textile factory...they are still running today.”

0.61

Between 2008-2012, after US subprime lenders and hedge funds sparked the world's worst financial crisis in almost 80 years, banks and governments in Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain defaulted on their debt, with Greece alone receiving a $330 billion bailout from the European Union and IMF.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Deborah Brautigam

“Between 2008-2012, after US subprime lenders and hedge funds sparked the world's worst financial crisis in almost 80 years, Banks and governments in Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain defaulted on their debt. And Greece alone received a bailout from the European Union and the IMF of about $330 billion.”

0.61

The G20 evolved from the G7/G8 informal meetings of finance ministers and central bankers of largest economies (starting in the 1970s during oil shocks and inflation), expanded to include emerging markets after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and now includes Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey alongside established economies.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Deborah Brautigam

“It started out as meetings, informal meetings of ministers of finance and central bankers of the six largest economies of the world in the 1970s when the oil price shocks happened and when the great inflation was happening...Then the Asian financial crisis hits in 1997 and the G7 realizes they're not gonna be able to cooperate to solve this crisis. They need to bring others in. And so we have the G20. The G20 brings in. As you can see, we've got Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey.”

0.61

From 1956 to 1988, the Paris Club provided only modest extensions of payment periods and no essential debt relief, but in 1988 accepted that some countries had insolvency problems (not just liquidity problems), and began implementing modest haircuts (debt value reductions), which were expanded to the World Bank and IMF in 1996.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Deborah Brautigam

“From 1956 to 1988 they gave no essential debt relief. They would just lengthen the payment period that countries had to repay. But in 1980, they started to accept that some of these countries had an insolvency problem...It wasn't just a liquidity problem...So they started doing these modest haircuts...And then in 1996, this was expanded to the World Bank and the IMF.”

0.61

Sri Lanka's Hambantota port debt service represented only 2.5% of Sri Lanka's total debt service in the year being negotiated; a new government not excited about the port privatized it to raise cash for large bond payments coming due, not because China engineered a seizure.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Deborah Brautigam

“When this Well, the debt for that port was 2.5%. The debt service for that port was 2.5% of what Sri Lanka owed in the year that that was being negotiated. So 2.5 per cent of the total debt service that they were supposed to make in that year is not very significant. What Sri Lanka faced in the year that was being negotiated was very large Bond payments that they needed to make...A new government came in that was not very excited about that port either. And so they decided to privatize the port Essentially.”

0.61

The Sri Lankan port was originally designed by a Canadian company who said it was a good project in the late 1990s before it became a Chinese project; the idea that China plotted from the beginning to engineer a port takeover as part of the Belt and Road Initiative is untrue.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Deborah Brautigam

“And the Canadians really wanted to do that back in the late 1990s. So it wasn't even originally a Chinese project. So the idea in this country. Chinese plotted from the very beginning to engineer the takeover This port as part of the maritime arm of the Belt and Road Initiative is really something that is untrue.”

0.56

The World Bank warned that 58% of the world's poorest countries are already in debt distress or at high risk of it.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Deborah Brautigam

“The World Bank has been warning that 58% of the world's poorest countries are already in debt distress or at high risk of it.”

0.56

The US government has $30 trillion in debt, with China alone holding $1 trillion of this; China's external government debt is around $415 billion owed to foreign creditors.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Deborah Brautigam

“The US government, for example, has $30 trillion in debt that we owe to other foreigners, mainly treasury bonds. And China alone has $1 trillion of this. So they hold our debt, China's external government debt, ie, What the China, Chinese government owes to other foreign creditors, is around $415 billion.”

0.56

Chinese loan commitments to developing countries grew from barely visible in 2000 to almost $30 billion per year by 2016, with China distinguishing between official bilateral creditors (Eximbank) and commercial entities, while not all Chinese lending entities are centrally coordinated.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Deborah Brautigam

“So you can see in 2000 when the millennium started, it's hardly visible. There's Chinese loans going on, but there's very little happening. And then it gradually grows until we get to 2016 and that's almost $30 billion that year alone. And what I've done in this slide is break it down into a lot of different categories of creditors. So you've got the official, the blue, there is the Eximbank what China regards as its official bilateral creditors. So that's in the official government group. And then all the others there are regarded by China as in the commercial category.”

0.56

The Common Framework, formed by the G20 to restructure debt, is an experiment that includes only three countries (Chad, Zambia, and Ethiopia) and only the poorest 73 countries, but excludes middle-income countries that have also defaulted and owe significant debt to China and others.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Deborah Brautigam

“The common framework was an effort to bring the Paris Club and the G20 together to restructure debt. So the common framework is an experiment. So far only three countries have signed up, Chad, Zambia, and Ethiopia. It doesn't include the middle-income countries. It's only for the poor countries, the same group of 73 countries that the DSSI initiative applied to back in 2020.”

0.56

When the COVID-19 pandemic hit, the G20 moved with unprecedented speed to launch a Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) in April 2020 (only weeks after March 13 lockdown at Hopkins), covering 73 low-income countries, with all 20 G20 members including China on board, though it only covered official debt and intended private creditors and multilaterals to participate on comparable terms.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Deborah Brautigam

“And then the pandemic hit. So when the pandemic hit the G20 at the behest of the World Bank and the IMF, They moved quickly to address this. So this is really commendable. They pledged a debt service moratorium...All 20 members, including China, were on board with this multi-lateral initiative. And this happened so quickly. It was already launched - the pandemic, I know at Hopkins, it seemed to hit for us on March 13th, that was the evening that things just shut down. And this was launched in April, so it was negotiated at lightning speed compared to these other initiatives that have taken years to negotiate.”

0.56

The Common Framework lacks mechanisms to ensure fair burden-sharing among official, multilateral, and commercial creditors; as designed, even well-organized bondholder committees must wait for official creditors to move first before participating, and borrowers have little leverage to compel commercial creditors or other official creditors to participate.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Deborah Brautigam

“The common framework doesn't have mechanisms to ensure fair burden sharing among the official creditors and the bondholders and the commodity traders that in many cases hold the bulk of the debt in these distressed countries...And as presently designed, even well-organized creditor committees of bondholders still have to wait for the official creditors to make their move in the common framework before they can make their own move. And they're not actually part of it, they're just staying outside. So it's the borrowers have little leverage to compel the commercial creditors or other official creditors to come into these frameworks.”

0.52

During the DSSI, there was confusion about definitions of 'official bilateral creditor' versus 'commercial creditor' because while Paris Club members and G20 governments had common understandings, the IMF did not use these definitions, leading Germany to classify its state-owned bank as commercial and China to do the same with China Development Bank.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Deborah Brautigam

“The Paris Club members in the G20, they all had these these common understandings of things like what was an official bilateral creditor and what was a commercial creditor. But these definitions were not something that's sort of held globally. For example the IMF didn't use these kinds of definitions. So Germany, for example has a state-owned bank, which you might think would be an official creditor, but they kept it out of this debt service suspension initiative on the grounds that it was a commercial bank. So China did the same thing with China Development Bank. They kept it out of this DSSI on the same grounds.”

0.52

Technology (internet, electronic forms) can help reduce information asymmetries in debt negotiations by enabling developing country debt management offices (which have low capacity) to report Chinese and other loans more efficiently, but negotiations work best face-to-face to build the personal relationships (guanxi) needed for sustained cooperation.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Deborah Brautigam

“One is that technology is helping in terms of transparency. So the problem in these poor countries is that if you, if you go to these ministries of finance and these debt management offices, you find that their levels of capacity and the staff, they have a very low...Having this all be electrify, be able to transmit it electronically, fill in these forms electronically, all that's going to help creating the information that's needed to reduce these information asymmetries...But where it doesn't help us that negotiations really happened best face-to-face. And so it's better to be in the room rather than doing it on Zoom or remotely...The Guangxi that Chinese talk about when you're doing it on Zoom and when you're doing that in different time zones as well.”

0.52

Chinese banks and construction companies work synergistically: Chinese banks provide loans that enable Chinese construction companies to gain business in Africa, generating $50 billion per year in revenues (a third of their global market), making it good business for China to expand these companies abroad through lending.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Deborah Brautigam

“Which is that these Chinese banks, or they're not going out, just out of altruism at all. They're going out to pave the way for Chinese companies to get business in the construction market, for example Chinese construction companies whose business is fostered by these loans from the bank, they make $50 billion a year in revenues in Africa, it's a third of their global market. So it's banks, it's a synergism there with the banks and the companies working together to get that business.”

0.51

China's first African loans were made in 1960 in Guinea; in 1964, Chinese leaders published Eight Principles governing foreign aid, with principle three stating they would extend repayment terms when necessary—establishing that China had mechanisms for debt relief long before modern belt and road lending.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Deborah Brautigam

“What we found is that China's first African loans were made in 1960. So, and that was in Guinea. And In 1964, Chinese lenders Or Chinese leaders published eight principles governing their foreign aid. And principle number three said that loans, they would extend the time period for repayment when necessary. So that was their way of dealing with debt distress.”

0.51

Chinese loan contracts have sovereign guarantees, not project collateral; the government guarantees the loan, and if the government goes bankrupt, creditors cannot seize the project because there is no contractual mechanism to do so.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Deborah Brautigam

“The Chinese contracts for loans don't have the project that's being funded is not collateral for the loan. So the loans have sovereign guarantees. So the government has guaranteed the loan. If the government goes bankrupt, they can't come and grab the project because there's no contractual mechanism to do that.”

0.51

Escrow accounts and take-or-pay agreements in Chinese project financing (e.g., Kenya Standard Gauge Railway with Kenya Ports Authority) are common project finance structures taught in business school, but are different from collateral that can be seized in default.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Deborah Brautigam

“Sometimes there is and This gets very technical, but sometimes there's an escrow account that payments for example in the standard gauge railway that we looked at in Kenya. The railway is partly being repaid through charges that are coming in from Kenya ports authority there they were, Do a take or pay agreement. It gets into very complicated legal structures. But if the Port Authority didn't ship cargo on the railway than they agreed to pay into an escrow account, the equivalent that would have that they would have shipped if they didn't ship a certain amount. And these are very common project finance structures in international commercial project finance. So you do find some structures like that. But that doesn't mean, for example in Kenya, the rumor arose that the Chinese could seize the Kenya port if they didn't repay the railway loan. And it's a misreading of these complex legal structures”

0.49

By early 2020, the Paris Club held only 8% of African debt while China held about 17%, and the Paris Club used a one-size-fits-all approach to debt restructuring whereas China used a project-by-project, loan-by-loan tailored approach.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Deborah Brautigam

“So therefore, in early 2020, we had a system where the 22 members of the Paris Club dealt with official bilateral debt restructuring, but they only made up a small fraction of the debt. By that time, the Paris Club in Africa, they held only 8% of all of the African debt. And China held about 17%. Of Sub-Saharan Africa That is. The Paris Club used a one size fits all approach. The Chinese used a tailored approach that was project by project. The Paris Club dealt with a whole portfolio of doubt. The Chinese just did it loan by loan as a project got into trouble.”

0.48

The IMF has 184 country members represented through finance ministers and central bankers who hold shares, but the distribution of these shares is a contentious US-China geopolitical issue that complicates global debt management, though the specifics are not addressed in this talk.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Deborah Brautigam

“The IMF has 184 country members and governments are represented through their ministers of finance and their central bankers. They hold shares. Now, the distribution of these shares is a contentious US China geopolitical issue that some of you in the room might be familiar with. We don't have time to address it here though we could later.”

0.48

Chinese diplomats characterized as 'wolf warriors' are applauded at home for undiplomatic behavior, which is not only unprofessional but counterproductive for solving global debt problems that require diplomacy.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Deborah Brautigam

“Chinese diplomats are applauded at home for undiplomatic behavior as wolf warriors. And this is not only unprofessional, it's counterproductive for China and for solving these problems which require diplomacy.”

0.47

A new financial architecture is needed that brings all creditor entities together (bilateral, multilateral, commercial), and the G20 is the appropriate venue to craft this due to its diverse membership and legitimacy, though China's experimental approach ('crossing the river by feeling the stones') will be cautious but encouraging.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Deborah Brautigam

“What needs to be done is we need to craft a new financial architecture that brings all of these different entities together...realistically, the G20 is the place to do it. That's the room where it needs to happen. With this diversity of membership, It's an appropriate club to craft a new financial architecture for debt management...The Chinese, Chinese preference is for crossing the river by feeling the stones. As you know, they prefer an experimental approach, an evolutionary process. And that means that the Chinese are going to approach this cautiously. But I think it's very encouraging that they've joined in, they're part of the common framework.”

0.47

Chinese debt relief operations are conducted ad hoc without standardized processes or central coordination; different Chinese banks negotiate independently and achieve different outcomes, with the Chinese government 'muddling through' without much coordination.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Deborah Brautigam

“But what we found is that these were very ad hoc, a lot of different outcomes. So there wasn't anything standardized at all. And we concluded that basically they were muddling through Without much central coordination. We would see a Chinese bank doing its own debt restructuring and then a Chinese company would do its own negotiations and they would get a different kind of result there.”

0.46

In Zambia's Common Framework case, China holds 31% of debt, bondholders 24%, with 18 different Chinese commercial creditors involved, creating a very complicated situation that has taken a year-and-a-half to negotiate—illustrating the complexity of Chinese coordination rather than obstruction.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Deborah Brautigam

“The Chinese are 31%, the bond market is 24%. Uk banks, the World Bank, about the same, 10%, 11%. And so far the focus has pretty much been on the Chinese to come to the table to restructure their debt. We did research in Zambia this summer. We've published a paper on this. There are 18 different commercial creditors from China. It's a very complicated situation, and it's not surprising that it's taken now a year-and-a-half to try to work out what's going to happen in that situation.”

0.46

Unlike China (via Xi's public call), no top leaders in wealthy countries publicly pushed their commercial lenders to participate in the DSSI, and this did not occur under either Trump or Biden administrations.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Deborah Brautigam

“But none of the top leaders in the wealthier countries like ours, push publicly for their commercial lenders to take place in the DSSI. So we didn't see that happening from Trump and we didn't see that happening. We haven't seen that happening for him from President Biden either.”

0.45

Given current geopolitical hostility, it is unclear whether the US and China can summon the wise leadership required to cooperate on global debt, especially since they failed to cooperate effectively during the COVID-19 pandemic—a serious threat to all.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Deborah Brautigam

“Finally, it's not clear whether the US and China can summon the wise leadership given their politics, given our politics, that will be required to cooperate on global debt when they were unable to cooperate during the COVID-19 pandemic, which was a pretty serious threat. Again, to paraphrase Professor Freeman and Goldstein, each country wants the other one to cooperate with it. Rather than seeing the, what, what each country needs To do in order to get to yes.”

0.44

Chinese President Xi Jinping publicly called on Chinese financial institutions to hold friendly consultations with African countries and work out arrangements for commercial loans during the DSSI period, with Angola receiving $3.9 billion in suspended payments from both official (Eximbank) and commercial (ICBC, CDB) sources.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Deborah Brautigam

“On the other hand, if you note again, private creditors will be called upon publicly to participate. Well, the Chinese did that. So Chinese President Xi Jinping called on Chinese financial institutions to hold friendly consultations with African countries and workout arrangements for commercial loans. And so what happened was that it worked like that in Africa. So Angola, for example, which was one of the countries, received debt relief from China Eximbank on DSSI terms, which is the official creditor. And then with industrial and commercial bank in China Development Bank, they negotiated even better terms as they told us when we talked to the minister of finance in Angola. So they got $3.9 billion worth of suspended payments.”

0.44

In Chad's Common Framework case, a commodity trader (Glencore) holds 43% of debt ($1.3 billion, receiving repayment in oil), but Glencore held up debt restructuring and provided no relief, preventing the Common Framework from achieving debt sustainability because commercial creditors are not bound by the framework.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Deborah Brautigam

“In Chad, we've got UK. The largest chunk there is green. And what that green chunk is, is a commodity trader called Glencore. And they are, they owe, they have lent money to Chad and they're going to get repaid in oil and its $1.3 billion and 43% of their debt. So in this common framework, these country, although these official creditors got together, China agreed to suspend, to work out debt resolution for Chad. The World Bank was not part of it. Libya was also there As part of this. But Glencore held it up and they still haven't provided any debt relief.”

0.44

Ecuador restructured its debt quickly without using the Common Framework, restructuring bonds (46% of debt) and Chinese debt (14%), with multilateral debt taking a large enough share to allow Ecuador to move forward, showing a non-framework approach can work.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Deborah Brautigam

“If we look at Ecuador, Ecuador moved rather quickly. And they've had a restructuring of their debt. They're not in the common framework. And so their bonds, they restructured their bonds, which was 46%. And then the Chinese restructured their debt, which was about 14%. That all worked fairly efficiently. Although the multilateral debt and that took care of quite a large enough chunk for Ecuador to move forward.”

0.43

Periods of crisis tend to produce more rapid institutional change, and the current global debt crisis presents an opportunity for addressing bankruptcy in developing countries in a way that is fair to all parties, transparent, and protective of the vulnerable.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Deborah Brautigam

“Despite all that grim analysis, periods of crisis do tend to produce more rapid institutional change and we seem to be embarking on a global debt crisis Once again. Addressing the problem of bankruptcy in developing countries in a way that's fair to all parties, protects the vulnerable and is transparent, is long overdue.”

0.24

Brautigam became interested in China as a specialist after traveling around the world for about four years after college, deciding she needed an Asian language while in Thailand, randomly choosing to study Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan, then bringing her interests in China and development together in graduate school.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Deborah Brautigam

“As an undergraduate, what I wanted to do was see the world...I did that about seven or eight months after I graduated...took me about four years...I decided that I really needed an Asian language...I thought, should I study Japanese, Korean, or Chinese? And it was just kinda random. So I started studying Chinese in Hong Kong and then went to Taiwan and I fell in love with the language. And then in graduate school, I was really interested in development...I decided to study what the Chinese are doing on their foreign aid program.”

0.24

Brautigam began researching Chinese lending to developing countries by looking at a 1983 example in Liberia and was fortunate to follow what she loved, suggesting that passion-driven research rather than predetermined career paths can lead to important scholarly contributions.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Deborah Brautigam

“That picture there is of me doing research in Liberia and I was looking at Chinese lending there and that was in 1983...people say I was pressured to do my PhD dissertation on China and Africa. Like I knew back in 1983 that this was going to become a really big topic someday. I had no idea. I was lucky. I followed what I loved.”