
What this covers
This is a conversation in which CSIS analyst Daniel Byman, just back from meeting senior Israeli military officials, assesses how the war in Gaza is going. He looks at why the campaign has been so destructive and at what success would mean for Israel and for Hamas. Byman's account of the destruction rests on Hamas's years of preparation since 2007: strongpoints, sniper positions, fortified areas, and ammunition caches spread across the Gaza Strip. He pairs this with collocation of fighters and civilian sites, which he says terrorist groups exploit to claim victim status. He also names a harder-to-quantify factor: Israeli fury has raised the tolerance for civilian casualties.
The middle of the discussion works through what "destroying Hamas" could mean. Byman separates fighters, senior leaders like Yahya Sinwar, and governance. Israel claims to have killed about a quarter of an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 fighters, a figure he says needs careful reading. Progress against senior leadership has been much more limited. Replacing seventeen years of Hamas rule is hard because no obvious successor exists. He also notes that the Palestinian Authority was weakened by Israel's own past policies, and that support for resistance is especially strong in the West Bank.
The conversation then widens. Byman discusses the pressure from Hezbollah and the Houthis, and why deterrence matters to Israel's wider position. He covers the hundred-plus hostages and the cost of operating with uncertainty about where they are. He describes the poorly prepared reserves and the damage to Israel's international standing. On Israeli politics, he describes Netanyahu's collapsed approval and notes that his coalition is nonetheless stable. He also makes the contested forecast that figures like Ben Gvir may gain strength, so a successor government could be more conservative, not less.
The Israeli military campaign in Gaza is extremely destructive due to Hamas's deliberate use of civilian infrastructure, dense population, prepared defensive positions, and Israeli willingness to accept higher civilian casualty ratios, while facing the complex challenge of destroying Hamas across military, leadership, ideological, and governance dimensions without clear metrics of success.
- Hamas has spent years preparing fortified positions, tunnels, and ammunition caches throughout Gaza, requiring extensive Israeli destruction
- Hamas deliberately collocates military and civilian targets (schools, mosques, hospitals) to exploit international law and shift blame to Israel
- Israel is pursuing multiple conflicting definitions of 'destroying Hamas' (military power, leadership decapitation, ideology, governance replacement) without clear success metrics
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Senior Hamas leaders, like Yahya Sinwar, provide both military and symbolic value to the organization—they offer overall strategic direction like Bin Laden did for Al-Qaeda, and killing them carries both direct military benefit and symbolic/psychological benefit for Israel.
“these are not only important for Hamas as an organization they're important symbols so Americans may recall the kind of hunt for bin Laden and over the decade after 911 Bin Laden was not involved in many Al-Qaeda operations but he was nonetheless a symbol for the group he was providing overall strategic Direction and people like senoir are those symbols for Israel so there's benefit militarily from Israel from killing them but there's also benefit symbolically from doing so”
Hamas has served as the government of the Gaza Strip for the last 17 years, performing basic governmental functions like providing law and order and garbage collection; Israel wants to replace Hamas as the government, but this is a huge challenge because there is no logical new government to take over and any new government will have to deal with Hamas remnants trying to undermine it and eventually seize power again.
“the last way to think about destroying Hamas comes in terms of governance where Hamas for the last 17 years has been the government of the Gaza Strip and the world has not recognized as such but in terms of the most basic functions like providing Law and Order or picking up the trash it's been Hamas that's done this and Israel wants to replace M as the government and this again is a huge challenge without a good answer there isn't a logical new government to take over and any government that does is going to have to deal with the remnants of Hamas however strong they are trying to undermine the government and eventually seize power again”
Hamas punctured the Israeli sense that they did not need to deal with the Palestinians; before October 7th, Israelis believed Gaza was largely contained, that they were making progress on normalization with the Arab world, and that their economy was doing well with the Palestinians not particularly high on the list of concerns, but this is no longer the case.
“Hamas has done I'll say several accomplishments that are unfortunately quite impressive so one is it punctured the Israeli sense that they didn't need to deal with the Palestinians I think 3 months ago Israelis would have said yeah they the Palestinians but but Gaza itself is largely contained and we are making tremendous progress in terms of normalization with the Arab world and our econom is doing well and we have our own problems but the Palestinians are not particularly high in the list and no one is saying that now Israel has to deal with the Palestinians one way or another”
Hamas leaders are hiding in hospitals and underground locations, and there is no question that these tactics cause tremendous problems for the Israeli military and for Israel's international image, as the world looks at destruction of hospitals and finds it inexcusable regardless of what evidence Israel shows of Hamas weapons depots or fighters present.
“this causes tremendous problems for the Israeli military and for Israel's image around the world where Israelis feel that rather than Hamas being blamed for deliberately putting Military Assets in a civilian location that Israel is blamed when it tries to go after those military assets and the hospital or the school or whatever it is is damaged or destroyed and frankly this SAS tactic works there is no question that in the vast majority of the world people look at the destruction of a hospital and simply find it inexcusable no matter what photo Israel shows of a Hamas weapons Depot or fighter or tunnel there and so this is something that we see terrorist groups doing all the time which is they try to exploit the reaction of their enemy”
Terrorist groups, including Hamas, deliberately exploit enemy reactions and claim victim status even though they themselves are often primarily responsible for much of the damage caused by collocation of military and civilian targets.
“this is something that we see terrorist groups doing all the time which is they try to exploit the reaction of their enemy and they try to claim victim status even though they themselves are often the first ones responsible for much of the damage”
Destroying Hamas fighting positions requires destruction in many areas because fighters are able to resist effectively, and military targets cannot be destroyed without affecting adjacent civilian targets due to Gaza's incredibly dense population.
“everywhere Israel is going it's encountering fighters who are able to resist very effectively and to destroy those fighting positions and that broader military capacity therefore requires destruction in lots of areas in addition the strip itself is incredibly densely populated and even though much of the population fled the fighting much of it did not and so it's hard to destroy destroy a military Target when right next to it is a civilian Target”
Hamas has spent years since taking power in 2007 preparing for conflict by creating huge numbers of Hamas strongpoints, ammunition caches, fortified areas, sniper positions, and massive tunnel systems throughout the Gaza Strip.
“Hamas has spent years since it took power in 2007 preparing for this attack so there are huge numbers of Hamas strong points ammunition caches fortified areas sniper positions and of course massive tunnels throughout the strip”
Israel needs to restore faith in its own institutions—the security services, the military, and the politicians—because strong public support for these institutions is necessary to fight the fear that terrorists try to promulgate, and Israel needs to be able to tell its own people they are safe.
“the last thing I would say is Israel needs to restore faith in its own institution that the failure of the security services the failure of the military the criticism of the politicians that's something that you need strong public support for these institutions in order to fight the fear that is part of what terrorists try to promulgate so it's very important for Israel to be able to tell its own people they are safe and that requires trusting their own institutions”
Even if Netanyahu loses power, more conservative voices in Israel are likely to become stronger in coming years; there are figures in government like Ben-Gvir and Smotrich who are radical extremists openly racist toward Palestinians, and the October 7th attacks' scale, ferocity, and brutality have strengthened these voices, so Americans who are critics of Netanyahu might not be pleased with a more conservative successor government.
“the caveat I would add is even if Netanyahu himself loses power more conservative voices in Israel are likely to become stronger in the coming years there are some figures in government some listeners may know names like Ben G and smotr who are in my view radical extremists who are openly racist and there's a lot more support for these positions for the idea that Palestinians cannot be trusted in terms of security at worst are subhuman and the October 7th attacks their scale the ferocity of them the brutality of them have strengthened these voices so for many Americans who are critics of Netanyahu and might be delighted to see him fall the result is not necessarily going to be a more liberal government it might be a more conservative one”
Many Israeli reserve fighters lack extensive preparation for the campaign, resulting in Israel making mistakes ranging from small to quite grievous.
“many of the Israelis fighting our reserves there wasn't tremendous preparation for this campaign and as a result Israel is making mistakes and sometimes these are small but sometimes they're quite Grievous”
Several hundred thousand people have left their homes in the South near Gaza and in the North due to fear of attacks from Hezbollah, which has been launching rockets and missiles at Israel.
“several hundred thousand people have left their homes in the South near Gaza but also the north because they're afraid of attacks from his Balo which has been launching rockets and missiles at Israel”
Senior Hamas figures who are harder to replace—very skilled operatives, leaders who can give orders, battalion commanders—have been targeted by Israel with some progress, but overall progress in eliminating senior leadership has been much more limited than progress against general fighters.
“another question is simply how many of these are senior figures in Hamas who are much harder to replace so whether that's very skilled operatives whether that's leaders who can give orders Israel has claimed it's killed several Battalion commanders of Hamas that it's otherwise made some progress but here it's been much more limited”
Support for continued fighting against Israel and the resistance ideology is especially strong among Palestinians in the West Bank, who are not bearing the brunt of the fighting and who have the advantage over Gaza nationals that they don't have to suffer the day-to-day destructiveness of the military campaign.
“there's tremendous support among many Palestinians for continued fighting against Israel and I think this is especially true among Palestinians in the West Bank who are not bearing the brunt of the fighting who have the advantage over their GS and conationals that they don't have to suffer the day-to-day destructiveness of a military campaign”
Whatever Hamas has gained, the people of Gaza have paid a staggering price for it; their suffering is extremely difficult to overstate, and Hamas was willing to make its own political gains knowing that the people of Gaza would suffer and pay the price for what Hamas was doing.
“I would close simply by saying that whatever Hamas has gained the people of Gaza have paid a staggering price for it and their suffering is something that it's really hard to overstate and Hamas was willing to make its own political gains knowing that the people of Gaza would suffer and pay the price for what Hamas was doing”
Israel's broader strategic success requires not only degrading Hamas but also maintaining deterrence against other regional actors like the Houthis (attacking from Yemen) and especially Hezbollah (launching rocket and missile attacks across the Israeli border).
“some are simply about hamas's military power hamas's leadership as we talked about but we also need to think about Israel's broader deterrence and that includes the houthis who have been trying to attack Israel from Yemen it includes especially the lebanes hisbah who have been doing rocket and missile and other attacks across the Israeli border”
Most of the world looks at what has happened and sees Israel as the aggressor in the conflict, despite the Israeli narrative about self-defense.
“for the most part the world has looked at what has happened and seen Israel as the aggressor here”
Israel's international reputation has suffered tremendously, with Europe and many circles in the United States criticizing Israel, though the Biden Administration has moved closer to Israel than it was before October 7th.
“it's also important to think about Israel's International reputation which has suffered tremendously in Europe also been criticism among many circles in the United States and I would say the Administration has moved closer to Israel than it was before October 7th”
There is a tremendous sense of Israeli fury at Hamas, and while this hopefully has not led to deliberate attacks on civilians except in isolated cases, it has certainly led to greater willingness to tolerate Palestinian civilian casualties in exchange for going after military targets, with casualty ratios varying historically but now much higher.
“there's a tremendous sense of Israeli Fury and while at least I hope this hasn't led to deliberate attacks on civilians except in what I hope our isolated cases it certainly has led to Greater willingness to power rate Palestinian civilian casualties in exchange for going after military targets so there was always a trade-off between should we target this individual who military commander if killing him leads to the risk of Civilian death and the question is how important is the commander and also how many civilians might be affected the ratios though have varied historically for Israel and now they're much higher”
The Palestinian Authority has numerous structural problems, but Israel's own past policies have also undermined it, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy where Israeli actions delegitimize the Palestinian organization most willing to negotiate, leaving only resistance-oriented groups like Hamas as appearing effective.
“and the Palestinian Authority has a 100 problems unrelated to Israel but Israel's own policies in the past also undermined the Palestinian Authority and made that problem worse”
Over a hundred Israelis remain in Hamas captivity, creating an overwhelming national concern visible in posters throughout Israel showing pictures of the captive individuals.
“the fate of the over a hundred Israelis who are still in Hamas captivity and the broader question of the security of the country”
Netanyahu's approval rating has cratered, he has refused to take responsibility for the October 7th attacks, he has been reluctant to meet with families of hostages, and he has generally treated this more as a politician than as a statesman.
“if you look at opinion polls Nat Yahoo's approval rating has cratered and he himself has refused to take responsibility for the October 7th attacks he's been reluctant to meet with families of hostages and in general has treated this more as a politician than as a Statesman”
Netanyahu's coalition appears fairly stable despite his political damage, so it is not a question of him being forced to resign due to coalition collapse, though his position could change quickly given the volatile nature of Israeli politics and widespread anger at Netanyahu that predated October 7th.
“his Coalition seems fairly stable so it's not a question of him having to resign because his Coalition is going to abandon support now that could change quickly politics in Israel are valal and there is widespread anger at Netanyahu that pre-existed October 7th so I could easily see him crashing down as a result”
Israel has killed some of its own soldiers and likely more hostages that it doesn't know about who died in bombing, illustrating the tragic dilemma of needing to conduct operations while uncertain about civilian and hostage locations.
“Israel has killed some of its own people accidentally of course and there probably more dead at dumb asn't know about who died in the bombing or something like that”
Israel has claimed to have killed around a quarter of Hamas's estimated 25,000 to 30,000 fighters, though casualty estimates require careful interpretation.
“Hamas there are different estimates but a common one is around 25,000 to 30,000 Fighters underarms and Israel has claimed when I was there that n killed around a quarter of these and there are a lot of different ways to do estimates and one should be very careful of these numbers but let's take these as roughly in the ballpark”
As of the time of the podcast recording, approximately 20,000 Palestinians in Gaza have died, with many of them being children and non-combatants, and huge percentages of the strip are in ruins with hunger and disease spreading.
“as we're recording this podcast the guess is about 20,000 Palestinians in Gaza have died many of them children and in any event many of them non-combatants of various sorts it's tremendously destructive you have huge percentages of the strip are in Ruins you have hunger you have disease starting to spread”
The mood in Israel is grim; the speaker has visited Israel many times over many decades but has never seen a country in such pain, marked by fury at Hamas, anger at intelligence and military performance, and anger at politicians.
“the mood in Israel is grim I've been to Israel many times over many decades now and I've never seen a country that is in such pain there's obviously Fury at Hamas but there's also a tremendous sense of anger at the poor performance of the intelligence service and Military and a lot of anger at politicians”
Israel feels it is at war; reserves have been called up with many people—sons and daughters—fighting, resulting in both a sense of pain and division but also a sense of unity.
“Israel at the same time is coming together the country feels it's at War the reserves have been called up with lots of people Sons and Daughters fighting and as a result you have both a sense of pain and division but also a sense of unity”
Talking to Israelis yields diverse opinions with little consensus; this contrasts with many other countries where official messaging is standardized, reflecting the fractious nature of Israeli political discourse.
“one of the characteristic things about talking to 10 Israelis is you'll get 100 different opinions so in contrast to many other countries where you get kind of a standard you know here's what's going on here we had opinions all over the map”