
What this covers
This is a one-hour interview in which Shane Parish's host role (credited in the metadata as Shane Parikh) draws out Danny Kahneman on how organizations and individuals can decide better. The conversation moves from the limits of intuition to practical procedures. Kahneman says intuition can be trusted only where the environment is stable and feedback is fast, as in chess or firefighting. Most organizational decisions don't fit that description. His main fix is a method he designed as a young psychologist in the Israeli army: score separate dimensions independently, and form a global impression only afterward. He extends this to meetings, where staff briefing books end in a score on one dimension, and to groups that write down positions before discussing.
The range is wider than decision procedure. Kahneman explains why predictions should be less extreme than impressions, using the example of Linda, a graduating senior who read fluently at four. He describes insurance underwriters whose premiums for the same case varied far more than executives expected, which he treats as noise, and he covers shared-scale training for reducing it. He touches on devil's advocates and Red Team exercises, stressing that leaders must make dissent painless. He also explains why people resist keeping records of their decisions.
Other sections turn to psychology and policy. He separates happiness from life satisfaction, citing his work with Angus Deaton on income, which shows emotional wellbeing plateauing at a level while satisfaction keeps rising. He recalls Kurt Lewin's advice to remove restraining forces rather than add pressure. He explains how loss aversion produces the endowment effect, and why reforms stall when losers resist harder than winners cheer. The more contentious claims are that algorithms beat human judgment despite their social costs, that leaders who threaten no one are the ones whose organizations adopt better procedures, that people favor overconfident leaders, and that tribal belief in fake news has eroded public discourse. He is pessimistic about changing anyone's behavior, including one's own.
Kahneman argues that intuitive judgment is unreliable in most real-world contexts, and better decisions come from structured procedures that delay intuition, break problems into independent dimensions, and use algorithms when possible rather than trusting gut instinct.
- Intuition works well only in stable environments with repeated feedback and rapid learning; most organizational decisions lack these conditions
- Structured evaluation of separate dimensions before forming a global judgment produces better outcomes than rapid intuitive impression-formation
- Algorithms consistently outperform human judgment, and organizational procedures can reduce noise and bias better than individual awareness of biases
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The most effective way to influence someone's behavior is not to push them toward a desired state (B) by adding driving forces, but instead to ask 'Why aren't they already doing B?' and identify and remove the restraining forces that hold them in their current state, because pushing creates tension while removing restraints reduces overall system tension.
“when you want somebody to move from A to B in terms of their behavior you can think of it that there are two ways of doing it you can push them or you can ask the question why aren't they doing B already which is an unusual question but you know water so then when you ask why why not why aren't they doing be at they ought to as I think they ought to then you get a list of words go to Wayne that's psychologists my guru wonders hero and many people's here he spoke of restraining forces”
The best prediction is always less extreme than your intuitive impression because intuition does not account for regression to the mean—a statistical phenomenon where extreme cases tend to move back toward the average on re-measurement—and this is a subtle error that is very hard to correct even when recognized.
“there is a more subtle error and harder harder to fix but that the best prediction the best guess is always less extreme than your impression intuitive prediction is as we say not progressive it doesn't recognize regression to the mean but statistics is statistics of in statistics things are less extreme”
Happiness and life satisfaction are two distinct constructs: happiness is emotional tone—how pleasant it feels to live your life moment-to-moment and is primarily driven by social connection with people you love—while life satisfaction is how you evaluate your life when you reflect on it and is much more conventional, driven by success markers like money, education, and prestige.
“one sensible interpretation of it is that it's got to do with your emotions with how you feel with the emotional tone of your life whether it's a happy life that you know its pleasant to be you lots of this faction is a completely different thing I mean life satisfaction it is how do you feel about your life when you think about your life and most of the time you don't think about your life you just live but you know sometimes look I mean that that's when you determine how satisfied you are”
In research with economist Angus Deaton, Kahneman found that above approximately 70,000 dollars annual income in the US, additional money does not increase emotional happiness (the day-to-day positive and negative emotional tone of life), but it continues to increase life satisfaction without satiation because money serves as a proxy for subjective success.
“in terms of happiness in terms of emotional tone positive and negative I think a lot of money doesn't make you happier but being poor makes you miserable so that's above a threshold that was like seventy thousand dollars approximately in the u.s. then extra money didn't make you emotionally happier but with life satisfaction was a different story he's less satisfaction that doesn't satiate so it's always good to have more”
Policymakers and governments, functioning as agents optimizing for society-wide outcomes, fail to account for the fact that potential losers from a reform fight much harder than potential winners would celebrate success, and this asymmetry means reforms frequently fail or become far more expensive than anticipated because compensation for losers must be negotiated but is often unanticipated in planning.
“where this goes into policy and governments and really important things that governments are like agents or people who who think about the good of society and agents they take the economic view they take the view of what things will be like in the end they don't figure out that there are some people are going to be losing because of the reform that they make and it turns out that you can really expect losers potential losers to fight a lot harder than potential winners and that's the reason that reforms so frequently fare and that when they succeed they're almost always way more expensive than anticipated they're more expensive because you have to compensate the losers and and that frequently is not anticipated”
When you want to improve decision-making, you should slow down, especially when you have an immediate strong conviction, and use procedures and algorithms; whenever you can replace judgment with rules and algorithms, algorithms will produce better decisions even though there are social costs to trusting algorithms.
“one basic rule is slow down especially if if you have the immediate conviction slow down there are procedures you know there are ways of reaching better better decisions but reaching better judgments and they can talk about them I would love to hear if you really want to improve the core decision-making use algorithms I mean whenever wherever you care if you can replace judgments by my rules and algorithms they'll do better now there's big social costs to trusting allowing algorithm to make decisions but but the decisions were likely to be better”
Organizations think more slowly and have procedures for thinking, so you can control the procedures and have more hope of improving organizational judgment than individual judgment; individual judgment is really hard to fix.
“I'm much more hopeful about organizations because organizations think more slowly and they have procedures for thinking and so you can control the procedures individual judgement is really hard to fix not impossible”
Intuitive judgment is trustworthy only in stable environments with repeated attempts, rapid feedback, and opportunity to learn patterns (like chess or firefighting), but most decisions made in organizations do not fit this environment, yet organizations make these decisions on judgment and experience anyway.
“I think one of the the things that strikes me the most about some of the work that you've done is the cases where we're likely to trust our intuition and when we're not and so if I'm correct me if I'm getting this wrong so it's sort of like a stable environment repeated attempts and rapid feedback it strikes me that most decisions made in organizations do not fit that environment and yet we're making a lot of these decisions on judgment or experience”
Noise is useless variability in judgment—when multiple underwriters at an insurance company assess the same case, they vary by about 50% in the premiums they assign, far more than expected by executives (who predict about 10%), and this variation produces no feedback or learning, just costly inconsistency.
“we tested that and they constructed some cases and then we have some like 50 underwriters assessor premium for the case with the same information mmm yeah with the really very realistic we didn't construct it they constructed the cases and they conducted the experiment but now the interesting question is how much variation do you expect there to be so we asked the executives the following question suppose you take two underwriters at random by what percentage they differ I mean you look at the difference between the premium divide that by the average premium what number do you and people expect 10% by the way it's not only the executives in that company for some reason people expect in person and it was roughly 50% 5-0”
We have intuitive ready-made answers to almost every problem presented to us, which arise automatically and gets in the way of clear thinking, because we cannot help but have them and we must consciously overcome them.
“you know what what gets in the way of clear thinking that we have we have intuitive use of almost everything so as soon as you present a problem to me uh you know I some ready-made answer and but Gibson will have clear thinking those ready-made answers and we can't help but help them”
Behavioral economists and social scientists want and choose leaders who are overconfident and intuitive rather than deliberative, which creates social and political pressure against the type of careful decision-making procedures that would improve outcomes
“I think it's pretty clear that people prefer leaders who are intuitive and were overconfidence leaders who deliberate too much of huge was suspicion you know so I think Obama was at a certain disadvantage relative to George Bush you know because you've seen is more deliberate”
Emotions get in the way of clear thinking, and independent clear thinking is, as a first approximation, impossible because we primarily form beliefs by trusting people we believe in and adopting their beliefs, not through reasoned analysis, even when we can articulate reasons after the fact.
“emotions get in the way I would say that independent clear-thinking is the first approximation impossible I mean in the sense that you know we believe in things most of the time not because we have good reasons to believe them if you ask me for reasons I'll explain you I'll always find a reason but the reasons are not the causes of our beliefs we have beliefs because mostly we believe in some people and we trust them and we adopt their beliefs”
Using the example of Linda (graduating senior who read fluently at age 4), everyone forms an impression of her IQ in the 90th percentile, and then predicts her GPA will also be around the 90th percentile, which is statistically foolish because reading age is not diagnostic of GPA and the prediction should be less extreme (maybe 3.5 instead of 3.7), pulling back toward the population mean GPA of around 3.1-3.2.
“I'll tell you one fact about her that she read fluently when she was four what's a GPA and and the interesting thing here is that everybody has a number as soon as I told you that a number came to me now we know where that number came from we really that's one of the few things that I'm reasonably sure I understand perfectly and this is that when you hear she read fluently at age four you get an impression of how smart Ria's of how precocious she wants the date for and you could put that in percentiles you know whether that put her on a percentile for sort of aptitude ability and it's high it's not you know she read fluently at age two and a half could be more extreme but each four is pretty high so say at the 90th percentile and and then the GPA that comes to your mind is around the 90th percentile in the distribution of GPA so you pick something your prediction is as Extreme as your impression mm-hmm and it's idiotic statistically completely stupid because clearly the age at which try learn to read is not all that diagnostic with respect to GPA so it's better than nothing if you didn't know anything you would predict the mean GPA where they waited 3.1 3.2 now she's bright so probably a little higher but not 3.7”
Red Team / Blue Team exercises, devil's advocate procedures, and other formal processes for surfacing disagreement are all attempts to create disconfirming evidence and alternative perspectives, but protecting dissenters is the most important thing: leaders must make dissent painless because it is naturally costly and risky, and dissenters are valuable.
“the many you know them there are many procedures like Red Team Blue team devil's advocate in Boots I've been you know many attempts in in general you know if you are if you are the head of the group that makes the serums one of your missions would be to protect the dissenters because they are very valuable and you should make it painless to dissent or as painless as possible because it's out to be sick it's painful and costly so protecting the center's is important”
When a group is about to discuss a topic, people should write down their positions in advance before discussion begins; this creates broader diversity of thought, forces better preparation, and prevents rapid convergence that happens in group discussion, though people dislike this procedure because it requires more work than signaling support.
“when you're going to be discussing the topic and it's done in advance on people in sense of material to think about the topic that you may want them to write down their decision the decision they are in favor of before the discussions thoughts that has many advantages it's going to give you a broader diversity of points of view because people tend to converge very quickly in a in a group discussion and it forces people to be better prepared its accept people don't want this so I I don't know with it impossible to implement but clearly if you could would be a good idea”
For judgment problems where you're evaluating a situation or considering options and trying to score them, Kahneman's advice derives from a system he designed as a 22-year-old psychologist in the Israeli army for interviewing recruits: identify separate traits or dimensions, evaluate each independently, score each, and only after collecting all dimension scores should you form a global intuitive judgment.
“I'm interested specifically in another kind of problem judgment problems where basically you're considering options or you're evaluating a situation and you're trying to give it a score there there there is advice I think on how to do it for me it goes back to something I did and the Israeli army when I was like 22 years old so that's a long time ago like sixty-three years ago I was a psychologist in the Israeli on and I was sign the job of setting up an interviewing system for for the army that ridiculous look you know this was the beginning of the State of Israel so people were improvising low the place I had a BA and I was I think I were the best trained psychologist in the on my my boss was a chemist brilliant but anyway and the existing system was one where people would interview and try to form an intuitive global image how else that recruit would do as a combat soldier twist the objective of the object of the interview and because I have read a book at Paul mail at different talk and the different that was identified six traits that I sort of made up and I cut them ask questions and evaluate each of these traits independently and score it and write down the score then go onto the next string”
We are much more likely to believe fake news on our own side (politically/tribally aligned) than fake news on the other side, and this in-group bias in belief acceptance is a major factor in the degradation of public discourse in the US over the past 10-15 years.
“you know I believe in the people tell me there is climate change and the people don't believe in climate change they believe in other people so but similarly there's like fake news and all this other stuff we you would have a same reaction too you know but but I'm much more likely to believe fake news on my side then the fake news on on the other side I mean it's true that there is a huge degradation in public discourse in and the recent 10-15 years of the United”
The endowment effect—where people demand more money to sell something they own than they would pay to acquire it—stems from the fact that loss aversion (the pain of giving something up) is stronger than the pleasure of gaining it, but when an agent makes decisions on behalf of others (without personal loss aversion), they apply the economically rational view where buying and selling prices should be equal.
“there is a phenomenon that we call the endowment effect which is that when I ask for more money to sell you my sandwich that I pay to get it I mean that's essentially the endowment effect and our explanation of it there are many explanations but a story I like to tell about it is that it's more painful to give something up than to get something but there is an interesting result that if you have an agent making decisions and somebody is behalf that agent doesn't have loss of us so that agent sells and buys are the same price which is the economically rational thing to do”
Ray Dalio and his firm Bridgewater represent the rare exception where decision journaling and evaluation procedures are actually adopted and implemented at scale in real organizations
“I mean there are exceptions Ray Dalio and his firm where everything is exploited yeah yeah Bridgewater but in general in Mike's having consulted with Bridgewater they don't need me but but in general when I suggested that never went anywhere”
Changing behavior—both in others and in oneself—is extremely difficult and rarely successful in significant ways; anyone who is very optimistic about changing behavior is simply unrealistic, as evidenced by the common failure of married couples trying to change each other.
“I'm not sure I buy the premise the changing behavior extremely difficult there are few tips you know a few guidelines about how to do that but anybody was very optimistic about changing behavior is just you it's it's not to change other people's behavior is very hard to change your own not simple this is what marriage is all about right longer the things you know people when when you know married people tried to change each other's behavior the lot of not satisfied”
Scale training and shared frame of reference training, where people learn how to use an evaluation scale consistently with others, is an important component of noise reduction and is used in human resources performance evaluation (frame of reference training) and super forecaster training (probability scale learning)
“and there is one very important aspect that I haven't mentioned but and this is training people in but the scale is so there is one piece of advice that you'd have for underwriters that they should always compare the case to other cases and if possible if you can have them share the same frame of reference with other underwriters we're going to cut down on the noise that's controlling the scale”
Keeping meetings short is important for improving their quality, but more important is structuring meetings to discuss one topic at a time, having staff prepare briefing books where each chapter ends with a score on one dimension, and then structuring board discussion around these dimensional scores rather than global impressions
“the question of structuring the meetings to be discussing topics one at a time that I think is is really useful I'll give you an example I mean it's something that I suggested when I was consulting but for some reason people didn't buy that suggestion so you when an investment is being discussed say by an investment firm some staff people if it's a big investment staff people will prepare a briefing book the chapters now our recommendation would be that the staff should end each chapter with a score how does that trap to taken on its own independently of anything else affect the likely decision”
People hate keeping track of their decisions and their outcomes for feedback and learning because reflecting on poor decisions is embarrassing, particularly for leaders, and this prevents organizational learning even though it is extremely valuable information.
“I would advise people make a lot of decisions to keep track their decisions and of how they turned out so that later you can come and and evaluate your procedures and and see whether there is anything that is in common with those decision that turned out well and then not so well and so on people hate doing this well why do you think people hate doing it oh because because reach respectively they may look foolish some of them or all of them in particular the leader so they really don't like keeping track”
Slowing down evaluation is achieved by focusing systematically on separate dimensions or evidence points, delaying overall judgment until the full profile is reviewed, and where possible identifying deal-breakers early but otherwise resisting the urge to form a conclusion
“I'm curious how we delay intuition you delay intuition by focusing on the separate problems so our advice is that if you have you know the Board of Directors making decisions button investment we told them you do it that way take the separate dimensions and really think about each dimension separately and independently and don't allow me and I feel the chair don't allow people to give their final judgement say we wait until we cover the whole thing I mean if you find a deal-breaker then you stop but if you haven't found a deal-breaker wait to the end and look at the profile and then your decision is almost certainly going to be better”
Anything that threatens a leader is not going to be adopted in organizations, even if it would improve decision quality; leaders may also resist initiatives that threaten their subordinates for protective reasons
“but also very costly and you you will see that certainly anything that threatens the leader is not going to be adopted and leaders may not want something that threatened their subordinates either people are really very worried about embarrassment”
When you don't follow the structured discipline of independent dimension evaluation, people form impressions very quickly and then spend most of your time confirming that initial impression instead of collecting evidence; if the initial impression was wrong, you never correct it because you're only collecting confirming evidence.
“if you find a deal-breaker then you stop but if you haven't found a deal-breaker wait to the end and look at the profile and then your decision is almost certainly going to be better does that include waiting the different aspects of the problem differently or do you highlight that in advance or do you yeah I mean it it makes you see the trade-offs more clearly otherwise when we don't follow that discipline there is the way in which people form impressions very quickly to form an impression and then you spend most of your time confirming it instead of collecting evidence and so if accidentally your impression was in the wrong direction we are going to confirm it and you don't give yourself a chance to correct it”
Sometimes you can recognize a situation as one where you're likely to be wrong in a particular way (like visual illusions or anchoring in negotiations), and in those specific cases you can take action to protect yourself, but recognition of the pattern is necessary and this only works for identifiable recurring situations.
“sometimes you can recognize a situation as one in which you know you're likely to be wrong in a particular way so that's like illusions if you if you recognize a particular pattern as something that gives rise to visual illusion then you don't trust your eyes you know you do something else and the same thing happens when you recognize this is a situation where unlikely to make an error”
A famous priming study where exposure to wrinkle-related words caused people to walk more slowly has not held up in replication, and while directionally the hypothesis may be true (wrinkles might causally slow walking), the effect is so small relative to the huge noise in individual walking speed that it was never reliably detectable.
“there's a famous study that you mentioned wrinkles to people and then you measure the speed at which they walk and they walk more slowly turns out that hasn't held up in replication which is very painful it's one of the favorite studies but actually you know that if you mention wrinkle and it's been done any victims on the speed of walking it's not breaking to me it's not going to make people faster has any influence there to make them slower so directionally all these hypotheses are true but what there is is what people don't see is that then huge number of factors that determine the speed at which individuals walk and the differences in the speed of walking between individuals and that's noise and people neglect noise”
Keeping witnesses to a crime rigidly separate and collecting their testimony independently is more valuable for establishing truth than allowing witnesses to talk to each other, because if allowed to communicate they become less independent and their testimony becomes less informative about actual events.
“independence of the key because otherwise when you don't take those precautions it's like having a bunch of witnesses to some crimes and allowing those witnesses to talk to each other they're going to be less valuable if you're interested in the truth then keeping them rigidly separate and collecting what they have to say”
For forecasting problems, there are specific improvements possible: friend Phil Tetlock has identified super-forecasters and discovered what they do that makes them good at forecasting, and this can be taught to others to improve forecasting ability.
“there is you know one basic rule is slow down especially if if you have the immediate conviction slow down there are procedures you know there are ways of reaching better better decisions but reaching better judgments and they can talk about them I would love to hear if you really want to improve the core decision-making use algorithms I mean whenever wherever you care if you can replace judgments by my rules and algorithms they'll do better now there's big social costs to trusting allowing algorithm to make decisions but but the decisions were likely to be better so that's one thing if you can't use algorithms then you slow yourself down and then there are things that you can do for certain types of problems and there are different types of problems so one class of problems like forecasting problems a friend Phil tetlock in the house that Bokan super forecasters where he identifies what people who were good at forecasting the future what they do that makes them good and I tries to train people and we can improve B”
The first moving party in a negotiation has an advantage because their initial number sets what is considered plausible and anchors everyone's expectations in that direction; this is a recognizable pattern that people can learn to resist by explicitly rejecting absurd opening numbers rather than starting negotiations from them.
“the importance for example of what we've called an anchor so you're going to negotiate the price with somebody they start very high and that has an effect so you know or you should know that the person who moves in a negotiation has an advantage because it the first number changes everybody's view of what is considered plausible so it moves things in that direction that's that's a phenomenon people can learn that and they can learn to resist it so when I was teaching negotiations I would say somebody does that to you comes up with the number that's absurd I would say lose your temper make a scene say I will not start the conversation from that number it's an absurd number I don't want to that's he erased at them”
Kahneman was gullible in believing priming findings were well-established, trusting that published evidence must be true and not recognizing that you can publish things that aren't true, even though he should have known better as a scientist.
“I believed it and I wrote it as if it were true because you know the evidence suggested it and in fact I thought that you had to accept it because that was published evidence and and I should have blamed myself for having been a big gullible that as I should have known that you can publish things even if they're not true but I just didn't think that's me”
Intelligence makes cognitive bias worse in some ways because intelligent people are better at constructing post-hoc rationizations for their biased judgments, making the biases harder to detect and correct
“it also strikes me that the more intelligent you are the more stories you'd be able to conjure up about why why you're avoiding this I really think that's not very hopeful because there's so many biases and the biases work in different directions anyway”
The fundamental attribution error—a cognitive bias where people attribute others' behavior to personality rather than situation—is one of the most important psychological insights that should be widely known, and people would be less judgmental, more empathetic, and more patient if they understood that behavior is heavily determined by situational context rather than character.
“there is a bias that the social psychologist well-known social psychologist or the fundamental attribution error and that means that when you see people acting in some way you think that it's because of their personality that they do it may not be the case it's quite likely that the situation is making I'd like people to know that motivation is complex and that people do good things for a mixture of good and bad reasons and they do bad things for a mixture of good and bad reasons and I think that if the reasons of point to educating people in psychology is to make them less judgmental just as more empathy and more patience and being judgmental doesn't get you anywhere”
In the past ten years, Kahneman has had to change his mind about findings from his book Thinking Fast and Slow because of replication failures, notably on priming effects and unconscious priming, which have not held up under rigorous replication.
“there's been a replication crisis in psychology and some of the stuff that I really believed in when I wrote Thinking Fast and Slow some of the dividends has been discredited so I've had to change my mind what are they what's the big some of the sexiest of priming and unconscious priming and so this hasn't held up in replication”
Philosophers and psychologists are particularly prone to overconfidence because they reason primarily in within-subject contexts where intuitions are clear and strong, but then generalize to between-subject contexts where their intuitions have no calibration and are wildly overconfident.
“when you are philosopher and I should add one thing to see the clear intuitions you have to be in this kind of situation that psychologists call within subject that you have growths you have both yet with Wendy Astrid : without the ice cream cone so in a within subject situation that's an easy problem in a between subject situation it's an impossible problem but now if you're a philosopher you're always in a within subject situation and but people live in a between subject situation they live you know in once condition and the same thing is true for psychologists so psychologists live in a when they cook up their hypotheses they're in them within subject situation but then they make guesses about what will happen between subject and they're completely lost between clear intuitions and strong intuition we have no way of calibrating ourselves so that makes us wildly overconfident about what we know”
Amos Tversky was extraordinarily intelligent and universally recognized by peers as exceptionally smart; the experience of working with him was humorous and joyful, with most of Kahneman's lifetime laughter occurring during their ten-year collaboration
“you know he was a very unusual person most people who knew them thought that he was the smartest person that ever met and in fact famous psychologist Nick Nisbet said that it's sort of an intelligence test he says that when you are with Amos how long does it take you to figure out that he's smarter than you are and the faster you figure that out the smarter you are”
Judgment is informal measurement using your mind as the measuring instrument, and because it's informal, people are going to disagree on judgment outcomes, which introduces variability; judgment can be more or less slow and systematic, ranging from pure intuition (very fast) to delayed intuition (more deliberate), but all judgment ultimately involves intuition at some point.
“judgment does is what you do when you integrate a lot of information informally into the score of some kind I we speak we being my co-authors and I in the book we're writing we speak of judgment as measurements but it's measurement with the measuring instrument is your mind but you do it informally and because you do it informally people are going necessarily going to agree so wherever we say it's a matter for judgment we're allowing for differences for variability now judgment can be more or less slow more or less systematic so at one end you have pure intuition where you allow the judgment to go very quickly and so on and at the other end you try to delay intuition but ultimately if you're making it by judgment you're good to have a judgment and it's going to be like an intuition and you're going to go with it so the more or less deliberate judgment intuition is always involved at one point or another”
Decision journals and pre-mortems are tools that can identify people whose judgment is better than their manager's, allowing for consistent calibration of judgment quality over time and potentially surfacing hidden talent or exposing managerial errors without social friction.
“it strikes me that decision journals and pre-mortem are a way to identify people that are sort of perhaps suppressed by their manager where you have somebody who's actually a better better at exercising judgment than the person that is you know that they're working for and this would be a pain-free sort of way to calibrate that score over time and identify the quality of judgment in a consistent way oh yeah I mean that strikes me as worth a lot of money to an organization”
The essence of negotiation is not trying to convince the other party through pressure, promises, and threats, but trying to understand them deeply and then finding ways to make it easy for them to move in your direction—a counter-intuitive insight that contradicts how we are taught to approach negotiation.
“the essence of teaching negotiations if that negotiations is not about trying to convince the other guy it's about trying to understand them so again it's slowing yourself down it's not doing what comes naturally because trying to convince them is prime pressure arguments promises and threats are always of crime pressure and what you really want is understand you know what you can do to make it easy for them to move your way very non-intuitive that's a surprising thing when you teach negotiation it's not obvious you know we are we are taught to apply pressure in social arms that way you'd mentioned”
One can evaluate the quality of someone's judgment by requiring them to explain their reasoning and then assessing whether the explanation is logical, uses the evidence, uses all the evidence, is strongly influenced by wishes (bias), and whether the conclusion appears to have been reached before the judgment was supposedly made (predetermined).
“you may require people to explain their judgments and evaluating the quality of the explanation is you know whether it's logical whether it uses the evidence whether it uses all the evidence whether it is strongly influenced by wishes whether the conclusion was reached before the judgments supposedly is made you know there are lots of there are lots of ways for judgment to fail that can be recognized”
Making a checklist of cognitive biases and trying to explain why each bias doesn't apply to your situation is not a helpful approach to reducing biases, partly because there are so many biases and they work in different directions, making systematic checking intractable.
“one of the things that I see people do in response to cognitive biases and trying to account for them is to sort of make a list of them almost like a checklist and then go through that checklist and explain or rationalize why those things don't apply in this situation it also strikes me that the more intelligent you are the more stories you'd be able to conjure up about why why you're avoiding this I really think that's not very hopeful because there's so many biases and the biases work in different directions anyway”
In academic job candidate evaluations at Berkeley, people would hear an excellent talk by a candidate and rate them highly on speaking ability, but then in discussion claim the candidate 'can't teach,' contradicting their own observation; when Kahneman pointed out this inconsistency, people would still not want to hire the candidate despite it, showing that people resist correcting biased impressions even when the contradiction is explicit.
“it's it's remarkable you know when you've been in academic life a long time so you've been at in many situations where people discuss the job candidate absurdities of that kind are very common so somebody a job candidate gives a talk and people evaluated and this is something happened you know a Berkeley when I was teaching there that somebody in the talk was a very good talk standard Abed now that person had teaching prizes and yet what was said about him in the discussion he can't teach you know we heard the talk so that's a mistake but the funny thing is you can point out to people that that's a mistake they still don't want to hire him because he gave a lovely talk”
A decision journal should record the main arguments pro and con, the alternative options considered, and the decision-maker's confidence level in the decision; this creates a record sufficient for later debriefing yourself and learning whether your judgment process is improving.
“you would want to say what were the main arguments pro and con what were the alternative that were considered you know it doesn't have to be very detailed but it should be enough so that you can come later and debrief yourself should you have a calibration like what degree of confidence you are that would be good then you know it would depend on something that you could evaluate late”
One should have low expectations about improving decisions; the impact of attempts to improve judgment is limited, and you should not expect dramatic improvements from general advice about cognitive biases.
“in the first place I think you know you you shouldn't expect too much impact to lower expectations inkyung should have low expectations about improving decisions I mean there is you know one basic rule is slow down especially if if you have the immediate conviction slow down”
The pre-mortem will not prevent major mistakes but will alert people to possible loopholes and encourage them to take safeguarding actions before committing to a decision.
“I don't you know I don't think that it's going to prevent people from making mistakes big mistakes but it could certainly it will alert people to possible loopholes to to things that they ought to do to make a safer this is so that's a that's a good procedure”
Some people work and concentrate better in cafes with ambient noise and activity around them, which shows that environmental effects on cognition are not simply negative (noise, distraction) but can be context-dependent, though the environment can certainly become oppressive enough to prevent proper thinking.
“many people think and work a lot better in cafes you know where there is actually ambient noise and activity around them and it helps them concentrate better so this is a very simple story the environment but certainly you can make the environment tough enough so that people wouldn't be able to think properly”
Kahneman's childhood was difficult as a Jewish child in France during WWII beginning when he was five years old, and he was physically inept as a child but improved after being held back a grade when moved to Israel at age 12
“so I was five when world war ii began so when i was a jew in france had a difficult childhood but from that point on but but i was like yeah i wasn't i was a nerdy child I was quite inept physically very fortunately for me when I'd finally moved to Israel at age 12 they held me up a grade and then and then it was alright”
People should avoid making decisions about policy or safety within a short interval after a terrible accident because emotional intensity distorts judgment; allowing time for emotions to settle and cool down is necessary before making major decisions, though this is widely recognized.
“I think people are aware of the fact that you shouldn't make the decision about road safety within short interval of the terrible accidents you know so you should allow things to settle down and cool down”
Color of a room has measurable but extremely minor effects on decision-making and cognitive performance, with some colors being more calming than others and thus preferable for decision contexts (e.g., red rooms are worse for decisions than calmer colors), but these effects are negligibly small.
“you know odd findings you know the color of the color of the room some colors are better than others and you would expect that some colors are more calming than others so you wouldn't want to be in a red room making decisions making decisions but you know those are extremely minor effects”
What distinguishes psychological thinking from philosophical thinking is the shift from asking 'Does God exist?' or 'What is good or bad?' to asking 'Why do people believe God exists?' and 'What makes people angry and indignant?' — psychological inquiry focuses on the mechanisms of human belief and emotion rather than abstract truth questions.
“you know it's always had that point of view that were later as a teenager it was you know interested in all the philosophical issues like you know this God exists and which good and bad and stuff like that and why shouldn't we must obey you know serious questions but but I discovered that actually I was less interested in the question of whether or not God exists then in why do people believe that he exists that I thought was interesting and I wasn't particularly interested in the question of it's good or bad but I was really interested in what makes people angry and indignant”
I was a psychologist very early on; before age 11 I wrote an essay about faith and religion where I argued that religious rituals like cathedrals and organ music function as a psychological substitute for direct faith experience, providing a similar emotional feeling oriented toward God.
“I was a psychologist very early on it was was very clear I I wrote an essay before I was 11 I remember where because it was it was a German counter-attack it was during that period we're in Paris and I wrote an essay about faith and religion and it was a very pompous assay... the essay started with another pompous thing that I supported Pascal my my sister had passed her exams and I had read not she studied some Pascal and I had read it and a skull had said that a faith is God made sensible to the heart... but then I said but faith is really hard to get you don't sense God all the time so that's what religious pump is for cathedrals organ music they give you and I call that booze odds face sort of a substitute faith because it's a it's a similar feeling it's got to do with God”