Steven Pinker
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Cognitive scientist and author
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Claims by Steven Pinker (20 of 159)
The use of subjective probabilities (credences) in single-case forecasting is justified when people have skin in the game via prediction markets, because this creates incentive alignment and forces calibration, but subjective probability assignments in the abstract are often meaningless and serve primarily as a way to rhetorically privilege one's own beliefs.
Children acquire language rapidly (by age 3) not merely through statistical pattern extraction like large language models, but through understanding that language is meaningful communication about intentional states, and they use this understanding as prior knowledge that constrains the learning problem.
Heritability as a statistical measure cannot tell us whether a trait is fixed by genes because it only measures the relative contribution of genetic variation within a particular population in a particular environment, and is silent about what would happen if the environment or selective pressures changed.
Physical constraints on exponential growth (e.g., the spherical expansion limit at light speed, the finite number of atoms) do not impose pessimistic bounds on civilization because growth is fundamentally about information and knowledge, not material consumption, and information can be rearranged without limit.
The question of whether substrate matters for consciousness (whether a silicon-based universal Turing machine could be conscious if it simulates a brain) is unanswerable and unresolved even in principle, so we should not base moral status decisions on confidence about consciousness.
Environmental variation that is not shared across siblings (unique or non-shared environment) explains as much or more variance in personality as genetic factors, but this residual variance is poorly understood and may include small random differences in development that compound into behavioral divergence.
The real practical concern with AI is not superintelligent alignment but malevolent actors using AI systems (like engineered superviruses), a race-to-the-bottom dynamic where cutting corners on safety to get to AGI first could occur, and that most AI harms will only become apparent as we develop particular systems and applications—standard for any new technology.
If you replace one neuron at a time with a functionally identical silicon chip, an external observer would not notice any change in behavior, but from the subjective point of view of the original organism, death might occur at each replacement—the subjective quality of experience cannot be preserved even if all external behavior is preserved.
Even if GPT models and other LLMs are creative in the sense of producing novel outputs, we should not grant them consciousness or moral status without deliberate engineering to target our emotions through humanoid design (voices, facial expressions, etc.); systems must be evaluated on substance rather than intuitive appeal.
Ideological factions committed to the idea that the world has never been worse resist data on human progress because it undermines their foundational beliefs, while social critics whose reputations depend on identifying what is wrong are insulated against the idea that things are improving.
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