uniformity of nature
The assumption that nature behaves in a uniform, regular manner across times and places, which Hume identified as a necessary but unjustifiable background assumption for induction.
As defined in 76 | Ned Hall on Possible Worlds and the Laws of Nature
Where it comes up · 2
- 76 | Ned Hall on Possible Worlds and the Laws of Nature2 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 42 John Locke's Theory of Ideas1 claim
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- Hume's problem of induction holds that extrapolating from limited data requires a background assumption that nature is uniform, but that assumption is itself an empirical claim; if every empirical claim must be backed by empirical data while the very process of substantiation presupposes uniformity, the justification runs in a circle, so induction cannot be grounded as rational reasoning—though we must do it anyway.76 | Ned Hall on Possible Worlds and the Laws of Nature
- Historically the ultimate anti-Humean view was theistic—Newton took writing laws to be reading God's commandments—and a benevolent intelligible deity gives a positive reason to expect nature to be uniform enough to discover, whereas a deity with unknown intentions leaves Hume's problem of why we should expect simple laws to re-arise.76 | Ned Hall on Possible Worlds and the Laws of Nature
- The empiricist tradition asks: what logical basis justifies the assumption that nature is uniform—that the future will resemble the past and that unobserved causes will operate like observed causes—and this question of the uniformity of nature becomes central to epistemologyA History of Philosophy | 42 John Locke's Theory of Ideas