triple-A
The highest credit rating, which received regulatory advantages allowing larger leverage, incentivizing firms to create more of it.
As defined in Eugene Fama on Finance
Other definitions
The highest credit rating, indicating a security judged to have minimal default risk.
Greg Ip on Foolproof
Where it comes up · 4
- Greg Ip on Foolproof2 claims
- Jeffrey Gundlach on the market, millennials, cannabis, taxes, and the 2020 election2 claims
- Eugene Fama on Finance1 claim
- Paul Pfleiderer on the Misuse of Economic Models1 claim
Most important claims · 6 of 6Search all claims for “triple-A” →
- Unlike a corporation (e.g. Hewlett Packard) whose ability to adjust bond risk is third-order, issuers of securitized products in 2006-2007 had both the incentive and fine-grained control to engineer Triple-A ratings, so deals clustered right at the rating margin and carried more risk than equivalently rated corporate bonds.Paul Pfleiderer on the Misuse of Economic Models
- Regulators gave a leverage advantage to triple-A rated assets, allowing much larger leverage than on other assets, which incentivized firms to find or manufacture more triple-A paper—including securitized mortgages and European sovereign debt—because that was the most profitable thing to leverage with other people's money.Eugene Fama on Finance
- Gundlach made a public declaration at a prominent June 2007 conference that 'subprime is a total unmitigated disaster and it's going to get worse,' which was captured by media on five continents when triple-A and double-A subprime securities were still trading at par.Jeffrey Gundlach on the market, millennials, cannabis, taxes, and the 2020 election
- Distressed opportunities in fixed income come from securities that are mis-rated at issue (rated investment grade when they contain significant risk), leading to panic selling when market conditions reveal the hidden risk.Jeffrey Gundlach on the market, millennials, cannabis, taxes, and the 2020 election
- Because genuinely safe Triple-A assets are scarce, financial institutions seeking to satisfy safety requirements found creative ways to manufacture securities that looked Triple-A but turned out not to be, which was a central mechanism by which the financial system became fragile.Greg Ip on Foolproof
- Contrary to the narrative that Wall Street deliberately took big risks, many financiers honestly believed their AA- and AAA-rated securities had so much protection there was no way they could blow up, so the crisis stemmed substantially from fatal complacency rather than knowing recklessness.Greg Ip on Foolproof