social justice
The idea, which Hayek argued is meaningless, that the unintended aggregate outcomes of many individual actions can be evaluated as just or unjust as if they were the product of conscious design.
As defined in Don Boudreaux on Reading Hayek
Where it comes up · 2
- Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 1--An Overview 4/6/20092 claims
- Don Boudreaux on Reading Hayek1 claim
Most important claims · 3 of 3Search all claims for “social justice” →
- Smith's distributive justice—'proper beneficence in the becoming use of what is our own'—presupposes a classical-liberal configuration of ownership (this is my car, my house, my income), explicitly distinguished in his footnote from Aristotle's distributive justice (proper distribution of rewards from the public stock); modern social justice instead assumes resources are ultimately owned collectively by the polity, which then delegates sub-domains of use, so minimum-wage laws or similar are restrictions on what is mine, not mere definitions of a sub-domain granted to me.Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 1--An Overview 4/6/2009
- The concept of social justice is meaningless because justice applies only to conscious actions between individuals; the unintended, unplanned outcome of millions of separate actions cannot itself be just or unjust—it simply is—though the rules that gave rise to those outcomes can be evaluated as just or unjust.Don Boudreaux on Reading Hayek
- Left-leaning readings of Smith that emphasize passages like the higher tolls on luxury carriages overstate their significance: the carriage remark is a passing aside that may not even violate Smith's proportionality rule of taxation (the higher toll could still be roughly the same percentage of income), and on the whole Smith should not be read in a left or social-justice direction at all.Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 1--An Overview 4/6/2009